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Abstract 
The 21st century has ushered in a new era of philanthropic globalisation marked 
by a dramatic rise in international charitable giving, delivering widespread benefits 
to those in need around the world. At the same time, increased cross-border 
philanthropy has raised legitimate fiscal and regulatory concerns for government. As 
a result, while most donor countries offer tax incentives as a policy tool to encourage 
philanthropy, many have placed geographic barriers around charitable tax relief for 
donors. With national boundaries around philanthropy starting to blur, the role of 
domestic tax policy in restricting the ability of donors to engage in tax-effective 
cross-border giving is called into question.  
Focusing on Australia, a country with one of the strictest legal regimes for the 
tax treatment of cross-border donations, this thesis examines whether the current tax 
incentives for Australian cross-border philanthropy and their oversight are 
appropriate to both regulate and facilitate international giving. To date, there has 
been little tax scholarship on Australia’s domestic tax policy affecting cross-border 
philanthropy, which has helped to shield this policy from principled scrutiny, leaving 
stakeholders with inadequate information and insufficient data from which to 
develop future policy direction. With recent judicial consideration of this policy 
resulting in extensive government review and a detailed legislative reform agenda, 
this thesis has captured a critical moment in history to redress the existing research 
chasm.  
This thesis offers the first comprehensive historical, theoretical, comparative 
and policy analysis of Australia’s tax treatment of cross-border donations. In doing 
so, it examines the development of Australia’s tax laws and policies affecting cross-
border philanthropy and employs comparative tax methodology to determine where 
Australia is located in, and how other donor countries are responding to, a changed 
global philanthropic landscape. The thesis concludes by offering Australian 
policymakers a principled basis for reform that seeks to maintain an appropriate 
balance between protecting the interests of the fiscal state and enabling its citizens to 
fully and effectively contribute to philanthropy’s globalisation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Almost every OECD country offers fiscal incentives to encourage 
philanthropy1 by lowering the price of giving, with the majority providing this 
incentive in the form of a tax deduction for charitable gifts.2 The accepted wisdom is 
that these donor countries provide charitable tax incentives because nonprofit 
organisations3 supply public goods and services that may not be provided in 
sufficient quantity by the private marketplace, which must then be provided by the 
state. Nonprofit organisations arise to satisfy a demand for public goods that is not 
fulfilled by government.4 By attracting philanthropic funding, nonprofits are able to 
produce more of these public goods and services, generating external benefits to the 
wider society in which they operate. Given philanthropy’s role as ‘the lifeblood of 
civil society, the question of tax treatment goes to the heart of the sector’s 
sustainability’.5  
The extent to which the gift deduction6 succeeds in encouraging philanthropy 
depends on how responsive donors are to price incentives, measured by economists 
                                                             
 
1 Defined as the voluntarily use of private funds for public purposes. See Helmut Anheier and 
Siobhan Daly, ‘Philanthropic Foundations: A New Global Force?’ (2004) 5 Global Civil Society 
158, 159. 
2 David Roodman and Scott Standley, Tax Policies to Promote Private Charitable Giving in DAC 
Countries (Working Paper No 82, Center for Global Development, 2006) 14–15, who undertook a 
cross-country survey of national tax policies in all 22 DAC countries except Luxembourg. Of 
these countries, 18 employed some type of income tax incentive, with 12 providing a tax 
deduction on charitable gifts, while the other six offered tax credits.  
3 The term ‘nonprofit organisation’ (NPO) will be used throughout this thesis interchangeably 
with ‘not-for-profit organisation’ (NFP) and ‘non-governmental organisation’ (NGO). 
4 Burton Weisbrod, ‘Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a Three-Sector 
Economy’, in Edmund Phelps (ed), Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory (Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1975) 171, 171–195.  
5 Penina Kessler Lieber, ‘1601–2001: An Anniversary of Note’ (2000–2001) 62 University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review 731, 741.  
6 ‘Gift deduction’ and ‘charitable deduction’ will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis 
as shorthand for the tax deduction for charitable gifts. 
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as the price elasticity of giving. Many studies have attempted to determine the 
relationship between charitable donations and the price elasticity of giving. The 
findings from the majority of these studies indicate that the price elasticity of giving 
has an absolute value greater than one,7 particularly for high-income individuals,8 
suggesting that lowering the price of giving through tax incentives can potentially 
increase both the amount donated and the number of individuals donating.9 As a 
result, there appears to be general agreement among economists that charitable 
giving is responsive to tax incentives such as the gift deduction,10 and is therefore an 
efficient way of funding nonprofit organisations.11 
                                                             
 
7 See Mark Gergen, ‘The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction’ (1988) 74(8) Virginia 
Law Review 1393, 1404; Charles Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving (University 
of Chicago Press, 1985) 49–63; Jon Bakija and Bradley Heim, ‘How Does Charitable Giving 
Respond to Incentives and Income? New Estimates from Panel Data’ (2011) 64(2) National Tax 
Journal 615, 617 estimate ‘a large persistent price elasticity of charitable giving’ in range of -1.1 
to -1.5. But see David Duff, ‘Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions in Canada: Theory, 
Practice, and Reform’ (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 47, 60 citing a number of studies 
using different methodologies that have reported much lower estimates of price elasticities; 
Joseph Cordes, ‘Re-Thinking the Deduction for Charitable Contributions: Evaluating the Effects 
of Deficit-Reduction Proposals’ (2011) 64(4) National Tax Journal 1001, 1003 noting results 
‘more on the order of 0.50 (in absolute value)’; Productivity Commission, ‘Contribution of the 
Not-for-Profit Sector’ (Research Report, Australian Government, January 2010) 174 with 
estimates from research studies of donor tax-price elasticities between 0.51 and -1.26. 
8 Jon Bakija, ‘Tax Policy and Philanthropy: A Primer on the Empirical Evidence for the United 
States and its Implications’ (2013) 80(2) Social Research 557, 558; Evelyn Brody, ‘Charities in 
Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert’ (1999) 66 Tennessee Law Review 687, 716; 
Duff, ‘Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions in Canada’, above n 7, 86; Productivity 
Commission, above n 7, 174. 
9 See John Simon, Harvey Dale and Laura Chisolm, ‘The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable 
Organizations’ in Walter Powell and Richard Steinberg (eds), The Non Profit Sector: A Research 
Handbook (Yale University Press, 2nd ed, 2006) 267, 272; Cordes, above n 7, 1003; Clotfelter, 
above n 7, 281; Roger Colinvaux, Brian Galle and Eugene Steuerle, Evaluating the Charitable 
Deduction and Proposed Reforms (Urban Institute Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, 2012) 
9. 
10 See Cordes, above n 7, 1012 noting that there is less agreement about the degree of the 
response. 
11 David Duff, ‘The Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions in a Personal Income Tax: Lessons 
from Theory and the Canadian Experience’ in Matthew Harding, Ann O’Connell and Miranda 
Stewart (eds) Not-for-Profit Law: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) 199, 211. 
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There have been no studies estimating the price elasticity of cross-border 
philanthropy,12 a charitable gift from a donor in one jurisdiction to a recipient in 
another.13 However, the Center for Global Development conducted a comparative 
study of private charitable giving to developing countries and concluded that 
‘citizens in countries with stronger targeted income tax incentives appear to give 
more private charity to poor countries’.14 This finding indicates a high price elasticity 
for taxpayers who give overseas, highlighting the importance of domestic tax 
incentives for encouraging individuals to engage in cross-border philanthropy. At the 
same time, it sheds light on the role of domestic tax policy as an instrument of 
foreign aid policy, with tax incentives facilitating the delivery of ‘private’ aid to 
developing countries.15 In this sense, tax policies that promote cross-border 
philanthropy can be considered ‘de facto aid policy’, with private international 
giving serving as a complement to (rather than a substitute for) official foreign aid.16 
With a country’s tax treatment of cross-border donations potentially affecting 
both the number of its citizens giving overseas and the amount that they give, which 
in turn impacts the provision of foreign aid, it is important to understand the current 
global environment in which cross-border philanthropy operates and how it has 
affected the domestic tax policies of donor countries around the world. This chapter 
begins with a description of the global philanthropic landscape and how it has been 
transformed in the 21st century through a dramatic rise in both the amount of 
                                                             
 
12 This term will be used throughout this thesis interchangeably with ‘international 
philanthropy’, ‘international giving’ and ‘cross-border giving’. 
13 See also David Moore and Douglas Rutzen, ‘Legal Framework for Global Philanthropy: 
Barriers and Opportunities’ (2011) 13 (1–2) International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 5, 6 
defining international philanthropy as ‘the making of grant, donation or voluntary contribution 
from a private donor in one country to a recipient in another, in order to pursue a public 
objective’.  
14 The study found that tax incentives from DAC donor countries increased cross-border 
charitable giving to developing countries by approximately USD7.5 billion in 2003. See 
Roodman and Standley, above n 2, 35. 
15 Center for Global Prosperity, The Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2013 (Hudson 
Institute, 2013) 7; Roodman and Standley, above n 2, 7, 35. 
16 Roodman and Standley, above n 2, 34–5, finding that private giving and public aid have ‘a 
strong positive relationship’. See also David Pozen, ‘Tax Expenditures as Foreign Aid’ (2007) 
116 Yale Law Journal 869. 
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international giving and the form that giving takes. This is followed by an 
examination of government responses to an altered global philanthropic 
environment, focusing in particular on divergent donor country approaches utilising 
domestic tax policy. The latter part of the chapter provides an overview of the thesis 
by introducing the research problem and questions, describing the methodology 
employed and presenting the thesis structure. 
1.2 THE GLOBAL PHILANTHROPIC LANDSCAPE 
The late 20th century witnessed the transformation of the global economy 
beyond the fixed geographic boundaries of the nation-state system to one ‘dominated 
by financial centers, global markets, and transnational firms’.17 This economic 
globalisation18 was followed closely by a ‘global “associational revolution”’19 which 
saw a rise in nonprofit organisations engaging in private, voluntary activities around 
the world, resulting in the creation of a global civil society20 ‘pursuing public 
purposes outside the formal apparatus of the state’.21 More recently, this 
globalisation of charity has extended to philanthropy, with charitable donations 
increasingly crossing national borders.22 This era of ‘philanthropic globalisation’23 
                                                             
 
17 Saskia Sassen, Globalization and its Discontents (New Press, 1998) xxvii–xxx. See also Martin 
Shaw, Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) 5–6. 
18 In the social science literature ‘globalisation’ has a broader meaning referring to the growing 
‘global interconnectedness’ within all the social domains. See David Held et al, Global 
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford University Press, 1999) 15, 27. 
19 This term first appeared in Lester Salamon, ‘The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector’ (1994) 73(4) 
Foreign Affairs 109, 109, 122 and is adapted from Alexis de Tocqueville’s praise of associations 
in American civil life. 
20 ‘Civil society’ is also known as the ‘third’, ‘charitable’, ‘nonprofit’ or ‘not-for-profit’ sector. See 
Lester Salamon, S Wojciech Sokolowski and Regina List, ‘Global Civil Society: An Overview’ in 
Lester Salamon and S Wojciech Sokolowski (eds), Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the 
Nonprofit Sector (Kumarian Press, 2004) vol 2, 3. The concept of a ‘global’ civil society evolved in 
the late 20th century – prior to that ‘civil society was primarily thought of as a national concept’. 
See Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor, ‘Introducing Global Civil Society’ in 
Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (eds), Global Civil Society (Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 3, 16. 
21 Salamon, ‘The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector’, above n 19, 109.  
22 See Salamon, ‘The Revolution of the Frontiers of Philanthropy: An Introduction’, above n 22, 5 
who argues that the 21st century has witnessed ‘the emergence of a “new frontier” in 
philanthropy and social investing that differs from twentieth century philanthropy’. One of the 
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has brought widespread benefits to global society. Because it is not encumbered by 
the political relationships, policy directives and bureaucratic structures associated 
with government aid, private philanthropy is often seen as being more cost-effective, 
having greater flexibility and being more adaptable to local environments.24 
The United States (US) has been at the forefront of the globalisation of 
philanthropy, with US private giving to developing countries in 2013 just over 
USD22 billion, a significant increase from approximately USD2.5 billion in 1990.25 
From the architects of modern philanthropy, Andrew Carnegie and John D 
Rockefeller, who demonstrated a strong commitment to international causes,26 to 
later American philanthropists such as Chuck Feeney and George Soros, who 
established multi-billion-dollar philanthropic foundations serving as vehicles for 
large-scale cross-border philanthropy,27 the US has been an ‘engine of international 
philanthropy’ powered by its wealthiest citizens.28 Nowhere is this more evident than 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.29 According to the OECD’s official aid data 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
ways in which it differs is that philanthropy has become ‘more global’ by ‘engaging problems on 
an international scale and applying models developed in cross-national settings’. 
23 I use this term and the related term ‘globalisation of philanthropy’ in the same sense that the 
‘globalisation of charity’ or ‘global civil society’ can be posed as a ‘counterweight’ to the process 
of economic globalisation and ‘as an aspiration to reach and include citizens everywhere and to 
enable them to think and act as global citizens’. See Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor, above n 20, 16–
17. 
24 See Raj Desai and Homi Kharas, ‘The California Consensus: Can Private Aid End Global 
Poverty?’ (2008) 50(4) Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 155, 161. See also Garry Jenkins, 
‘Soft Power, Strategic Security, and International Philanthropy’, (2007) 85 North Carolina Law 
Review 773, 788. 
25 See OECD, OECD.Stat <http://stats.oecd.org/>. 
26 See Joan Spero, The Global Role of US Foundations (Foundation Center, 2010) 1. 
27 In 1984 Chuck Feeney set up the Atlantic Philanthropies, which has spent almost USD7 billion 
over the past 30 years. See The Atlantic Philanthropies, About Atlantic 
<http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/about-atlantic>; George Soros’s Open Society 
Foundations, also created more than 30 years ago, have spent USD11 billion. See Open Society 
Foundations, About Us – Mission & Values 
<http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/mission-values>. 
28 Anheier and Daly, ‘Philanthropic Foundations: A New Global Force?’, above n 1, 158. See also 
Luc Tayart de Borms, Foundations: Creating Impact in a Globalised World (John Wiley & Sons, 
2005), 160.  
29 With an endowment of more than USD40 billion, the international reach of the Gates 
Foundation is vast, funding work in over 100 countries through its global health and 
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(that has included the Gates Foundation’s global health grants as a category in its 
own right alongside countries since 2011), the Gates Foundation is now the largest 
funder in the global health arena outside the US and United Kingdom (UK) 
Governments,30 spending more annually on global health than the World Health 
Organisation.31  
In an era of philanthropic globalisation, the expansion of cross-border 
philanthropy beyond the US throughout Europe and the Asia-Pacific in the 21st 
century has cemented its institutionalisation.32 With Singapore becoming a hub for 
philanthropy in Asia,33 and the emerging economies of China, Brazil and India 
evidencing nascent development of their philanthropic sectors, early stages of private 
philanthropy and the provision of government aid,34 the global philanthropic 
landscape continues to evolve with respect to both the scope and the nature of cross-
border giving. This evolution is examined in the following two sections. 
1.2.1 The Amount of International Giving in a Changed Philanthropic 
Landscape 
In the two decades from 1991 to 2011, cross-border philanthropy from OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor countries to the developing world 
grew from approximately USD5 billion to USD32 billion,35 with some estimates for 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
development programs. See Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Foundation Fact Sheet 
<http://www.gatesfoundation.org/who-we-are/general-information/foundation-factsheet>.  
30 Kimberly Smith, Statistical Reporting by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to the OECD 
DAC (OECD, 2011) 1.  
31 Linsey McGoey, ‘The Philanthropic State: Market–State Hybrids in the Philanthrocapitalist 
Turn’ (2014) 35(1) Third World Quarterly 109, 109–10. 
32 Anheier and Daly, ‘Philanthropic Foundations: A New Global Force?’, above n 1, 158. 
33 Prapti Upadhyay Anand and Crystal Hayling, ‘Levers for Change – Philanthropy in Select South 
East Asian Countries’ (Social Insight Research Series, Lien Centre for Social Innovation, 2014) 
14, 53–55, 62 <http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lien_reports/6>. 
34 Joan Spero, Charity and Philanthropy in Russia, China, India and Brazil (Foundation Center, 
2014) 5, 15; Center for Global Prosperity, The Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 
2013, above n 15, 5. 
35 See OECD, Development Co-operation Report 2015: Making Partnerships Effective Coalitions for 
Action (2015) 311, annex A, table A.2. DAC member governments provide the OECD with annual 
estimates of private giving to developing countries along with official aid data. These estimates 
measure expenditure by national NGOs working in development assistance and relief together 
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2011 as high as USD59 billion.36 While there are considerable difficulties measuring 
the amount of cross-border giving, including the lack of a standardised collection 
process across countries and the under-reporting of private giving within countries,37 
the ‘sheer amount of money being given across borders and in aid of global issues’38 
has commanded both government and scholarly attention.39 If private philanthropic 
contributions combined were a country, they would constitute the world’s largest 
donor.40 In the same way that economic globalisation transformed the global 
economy in the late 20th century creating a ‘new international economic order’,41 so 
too the dramatic rise in international philanthropy in the early 21st century has 
significantly altered the global philanthropic landscape.42  
Together with this upsurge in cross-border philanthropy around the world, 
there has also been an increase in overseas development assistance (ODA) from 
DAC donor countries, suggesting a positive relationship between private and public 
international giving.43 Figures from the OECD show that since 1997, government aid 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
with any additional contributions in kind made to developing countries, multilateral 
organisations, or international NGOs. Donor government grants and subsidies to national NGOs 
are subtracted from these estimates in order to avoid double counting. This figure is from the 
line item ‘net grants by NGOs’ from OECD DAC countries to developing countries based on gross 
national income (GNI) per capita. See OECD, The DAC List of ODA Recipients – Factsheet January 
2012 <www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist>. See also Roodman and Standley, above n 2, 5–6, 10.  
36 Center for Global Prosperity, The Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2013, above n 
15, 11–12. 
37 See ibid; Roodman and Standley, above n 2, 4, 10. 
38 Christopher Groves and Alana Lowe-Petraske, ‘The Practice of International Philanthropy’ in 
Clive Cutbill, Alison Paines and Murray Hallam (eds) International Charitable Giving (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 3, 4.  
39 Ibid. See also Center for Global Prosperity, Philanthropic Freedom: A Pilot Study (Hudson 
Institute, 2013) 4–5; Moore and Rutzen, above n 13, 6. 
40 Based on 2011 OECD data, showing that the largest donor country in terms of net overseas 
development assistance (ODA) was the US with USD30.92. Roodman and Standley, above n 2, 7–
8 made this comparison based on 2003 OECD data. 
41 Saskia Sassen, above n 17, xxix. 
42 Indeed, some argue that philanthropy plays a vital role in the process of globalisation itself. 
See Soma Hewa and Darwin Stapleton, ‘Structure and Process of Global Integration,’ in Soma 
Hewa and Darwin Stapleton (eds) Globalization, Philanthropy, and Civil Society: Toward a New 
Political Culture in the Twenty-First Century (Springer, 2005) 3, 9. 
43 Roodman and Standley, above n 2, 34–5. 
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to developing countries grew steadily, with the exception of 2011 and 2012 when 
many governments took austerity measures.44 In 2013, foreign aid rose more than six 
per cent in real terms to reach a total of approximately USD135 billion in net ODA, 
the highest level ever recorded despite continued pressure on budgets.45 Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden continue to exceed the UN target for ODA as a 
percentage of gross national income (GNI) of 0.7 per cent, while the UK increased 
its ODA in 2013 by almost 30 per cent to reach the UN target of 0.7 per cent for the 
first time.46 Australia has resisted this international trend owing to a bipartisan 
political commitment to reduce government aid,47 with ODA decreasing by 4.5 per 
cent in 2013 to USD4.85 billion, representing just 0.34 per cent of GNI.48 
There is also evidence the significant increase in cross-border philanthropy has 
altered the relationship between private and public aid compared to 40 years ago.49 
Of the total financial flows from developed to developing countries, government aid 
at less than 20 per cent is dwarfed by private aid at more than 80 per cent, consisting 
of private philanthropy, remittances and private capital flows.50 With cross-border 
philanthropy alone representing almost a quarter of the amount DAC donor countries 
                                                             
 
44 OECD, Aid to Developing Countries Rebounds in 2013 to Reach an All-Time High (Media Release, 
8 April 2014) <http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aid-to-developing-countries-rebounds-in-
2013-to-reach-an-all-time-high.htm>. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 See Matt Grudnoff and Dan Gilchrist, Charity Ends at Home: The Decline of Foreign Aid in 
Australia (The Australia Institute, 2015) 4; Sandy Hollway et al, Independent Review of Aid 
Effectiveness (2011) 57; OECD Development Assistance Committee, OECD Development Co-
operation Peer Review: Australia 2013 (2013) 18. 
48 OECD, Aid to Developing Countries Rebounds in 2013 to Reach an All-Time High, above n 44. See 
also ACFID Federal Budget Analysis 2014–2015 (15 May 2014). 
49 Center for Global Prosperity, The Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2013, above n 
15, 5. 
50 Ibid 4–5, 26. 
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provide in ODA,51 in an era of philanthropic globalisation private international 
giving is playing an increasingly larger role in the delivery of foreign aid.52  
The global philanthropic landscape has been altered, not only regarding the 
amount of charitable giving crossing borders, but also in the form that giving takes, 
as discussed in the following section. 
1.2.2 The Nature of International Giving in a Changed Philanthropic 
Landscape 
The nature of international giving has changed in the 21st century as a result of 
the convergence of a number of factors. These include: deeply integrated global 
markets53 and free trade zones; significant advances in communications 
technology;54 increased migration and international workforce mobility; the advent 
of contemporary global challenges requiring new solutions;55 and the enormous 
growth of private wealth.56  
The introduction of new web-based communication technologies, such as e-
philanthropy and online giving, as well as an assortment of social media, has resulted 
in an emerging infrastructure for a global philanthropic marketplace transcending the 
                                                             
 
51 Based on conservative estimates of USD32 billion annually in philanthropic funding to 
developing countries and USD135 billion in official government aid. See ibid 6. 
52 Ibid 7; Roodman and Standley, above n 2, 35. 
53 Groves and Lowe-Petraske, above n 38, 6. 
54 Spero, The Global Role of US Foundations, above n 26, 8; Groves and Lowe-Petraske, above n 
38, 6; Peter Frumkin, ‘American Foundations and Overseas Funding: New Challenges in the Era 
of Globalization,’ in Soma Hewa and Darwin Stapleton (eds) Globalization, Philanthropy, and Civil 
Society: Toward a New Political Culture in the Twenty-First Century (Springer, 2005) 99, 111; 
Helmut Anheier and Siobhan Daly, ‘Foundations in Europe: Roles and Policy Scenarios in an Age 
of Globalization,’ in Soma Hewa and Darwin Stapleton (eds) Globalization, Philanthropy, and Civil 
Society: Toward a New Political Culture in the Twenty-First Century (Springer, 2005) 117, 119. 
55 See Salamon, ‘The Revolution of the Frontiers of Philanthropy: An Introduction’, above n 22; 
Norine MacDonald, ‘The Evolving Mosaic of Global Philanthropy: “A Philanthropic Thriller”’ in 
Norine MacDonald and Luc Tayart de Borms (eds) Global Philanthropy (MF Publishing, 2010) 1, 
6 (‘Conflicts, poverty and migration remain issues of concern, but sit alongside newer issues 
such as the environment, climate change, mega-cities and social and economic crises’.); Spero, 
The Global Role of US Foundations, above n 26, 8; Frumkin, above n 54, 111. 
56 See Groves and Lowe-Petraske, above n 38, 7; Anheier and Daly, ‘Foundations in Europe’, 
above n 54, 119. 
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boundaries of the fiscal state.57 This global marketplace is served by numerous 
organisations and individuals, providing advice and analysis to potential donors 
about where and how to give across borders.58 
A rise in international migration and an increasingly mobile international 
workforce have generated significant diaspora giving, as well as remittances from 
migrant communities back to family in their home countries.59 While remittances as 
compared to diaspora giving are distinct from philanthropic giving, they represent an 
important measure of donor engagement with, and financial flows to, the developing 
world.60 The World Bank estimated that official remittance flows to developing 
countries reached a remarkable USD401 billion in 2012, and are expected to 
continue growing at 8.8 per cent annually.61  
New financing mechanisms have also emerged through 
‘philanthrocapitalism’62 — the application of business tools and techniques to 
philanthropy — driven by a new generation of entrepreneurial, highly engaged 
                                                             
 
57 Groves and Lowe-Petraske, above n 38, 3–4, 21–22; Frumkin, above n 54, 111; Anheier and 
Daly, ‘Foundations in Europe’, above n 54, 119. 
58 Groves and Lowe-Petraske, above n 38, 21–22. 
59 See Gemechu Ayana Aga et al, Migration and Development Brief 20 (World Bank, Migration and 
Remittances Unit, 2013); Groves and Lowe-Petraske, above n 38, 7; Charities Aid Foundation, 
International Comparisons of Charitable Giving (2006) 3, 7; Carol Adelman, ‘Global Philanthropy 
and Remittances: Reinventing Foreign Aid’ (2009) 15(2) The Brown Journal of World Affairs 23, 
25–6. 
60 See Aga et al, above n 59, 1. See also Groves and Lowe-Petraske, above n 38, 7; Charities Aid 
Foundation, International Comparisons of Charitable Giving, above n 59, 3, 7; Adelman, ‘Global 
Philanthropy and Remittances’, above n 59, 25–6; Hannah Cross, ‘Finance, Development, and 
Remittances: Extending the Scale of Accumulation in Migrant Labour Regimes’ (2015) 21(3) 
Globalizations 305. 
61 See Aga et al, above n 59, 1. 
62 This term was first used in 2006 by Matthew Bishop, a journalist at The Economist who later 
authored with Michael Green, an economist, Philanthrocapitalism: How the Rich Can Save the 
World (Bloomsbury Press, 2008). Since then, philanthrocapitalism has received extensive 
scholarly attention. See Michael Edwards, ‘Gates, Google, and the Ending of Global Poverty: 
Philanthrocapitalism and International Development’ (2009) 15(2) The Brown Journal of World 
Affairs 35; Garry Jenkins, ‘Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?’ (2011) 61(3) Case Western 
Reserve Law Review 753; Robin Rogers, ‘Why Philanthro-Policymaking Matters’ (2011) 48(5) 
Society 376; McGoey, above n 31. 
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donors.63 Philanthrocapitalists have introduced new forms of social investment, 
employing nonprofit, for-profit and hybrid structures, which are changing the face of 
international philanthropy.64 Comprising a trans-global economic elite, these new 
philanthropists have ‘the money, power, and will to transform societies’.65 On the 
one hand, these philanthrocapitalists and their philanthropic foundations have been 
subject to criticism in exercising excessive ‘influence over social policy’ while 
remaining ‘independent of democratic control’.66 On the other, not being accountable 
to voters has enabled them to have ‘far-reaching time horizons’67 and to play a vital 
role in tackling contemporary social problems and long-term global challenges that 
governments have been unable (or unwilling) to solve, such as the rapid spread of 
infectious diseases, economic degradation caused by climate change, and an upsurge 
of refugee crises.68  
The dramatic rise in both the amount and nature of international giving in the 
early 21st century has significantly disrupted the global philanthropic landscape. The 
next section examines how governments in both donor and recipient countries have 
responded to this disruption through changes in their domestic policies affecting 
cross-border philanthropy. 
                                                             
 
63 Matthew Bishop and Michael Green, ‘Who Gains?’ in Lester Salamon (ed), New Frontiers of 
Philanthropy: A Guide to the New Tools and New Actors That Are Reshaping Global Philanthropy 
and Social Investing (Oxford University Press, 2014) 549, 550. 
64 Carol Adelman, ‘Global Philanthropy and Beyond: Reinventing Foreign Assistance’ (2012) 13 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 15, 20; Salamon, ‘The Revolution of the Frontiers of 
Philanthropy: An Introduction’, above n 22, 4. 
65 See Rogers, above n 62, 377–8. 
66 James Surowiecki, ‘In Defense of Philanthrocapitalism’, The New Yorker (online), 21 & 28 
December 2015, 40 <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/12/21/in-defense-of-
philanthrocapitalism>. 
67 Ibid. 
68 See Salamon, ‘The Revolution of the Frontiers of Philanthropy: An Introduction’, above n 22; 
MacDonald, above n 55, 6; Spero, The Global Role of US Foundations, above n 26, 8; Frumkin, 
above n 54, 111. 
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1.3 DOMESTIC POLICY RESPONSES TO A CHANGED GLOBAL PHILANTHROPIC 
LANDSCAPE 
The transformation of the philanthropic landscape has brought widespread 
benefits to global society, yet at the same time it has invoked fiscal and regulatory 
concerns for national governments.69 Particularly since the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, governments in both donor and recipient countries have been concerned with 
the potential for international philanthropy — like other cross-border transactions — 
to be diverted for the purposes of terrorism and money laundering.70 Cross-border 
philanthropy is ‘recognised as particularly vulnerable because [it] can be seen to 
provide a ready-made global framework for operations and financial transactions’.71 
Donor country governments are also concerned with limiting the consequences for 
the fisc (or public purse), and ensuring that taxpayer-funded concessions are being 
applied for the ‘public benefit’.72 In recipient countries, governments can view 
foreign funding as a threat to government power and national sovereignty.73 As a 
result of these concerns, many countries have put in place legal and regulatory 
barriers to restrict cross-border philanthropy.74  
                                                             
 
69 See Jenkins, ‘Soft Power, Strategic Security, and International Philanthropy’, above n 24, 807–
820; Nina Crimm, ‘Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Role of Federal 
Tax Laws and Tax Policies Applicable to Global Philanthropy by Private Foundations and Their 
Donors’ (2003–04) 23(1) Virginia Tax Review 1, 113–121. 
70 See Victoria Bjorkland, Jenni Reynoso and Abbey Hazlett, ‘Terrorism and Money Laundering: 
Illegal Purposes and Activities’ (2004–5) 25 Pace Law Review 233, 233; Groves and Lowe-
Petraske, above n 38, 13–14; Douglas Rutzen, ‘Aid Barriers and the Rise of Philanthropic 
Protectionism’ (2015) 17(1) International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 5, 18–19; Rebecca 
Vernon, ‘Closing the Door on Aid’ (2009) 11(4) International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 5, 17–
19. 
71 Groves and Lowe-Petraske, above n 38, 13. 
72 See Miranda Stewart, ‘The Boundaries of Charities and Tax,’ in Matthew Harding, Ann 
O’Connell and Miranda Stewart (eds) Not-for-Profit Law: Theoretical and Comparative 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 232; Paul Bater, ‘Introduction: International 
Tax Issues Relating to Non-Profit Organisations and Their Supporters’ in Paul Bater, Frits 
Hondius, and Penina Kessler Lieber (eds), The Tax Treatment of NGOs: Legal, Fiscal, and Ethical 
Standards for Promoting NGOs and Their Activities (Kluwer Law International, 2004) 1, 3.  
73 See Rutzen, above n 70, 24–32; Vernon, above n 70, 19–20; Charities Aid Foundation, Future 
World Giving: Building Trust in Charitable Giving (2014) 30. 
74 See Moore and Rutzen, above n 13, 9–31 for a discussion of these legal barriers. See also 
Bater, ‘Introduction: International Tax Issues Relating to Non-Profit Organisations and Their 
Supporters’, above n 72, 2–3. 
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Recipient countries have introduced legal measures ‘limiting what, when, and 
how foreign donors may give to civil society groups’ in the form of an outright 
prohibition on foreign funding, a requirement that such funding is directed through 
government channels or receive advance government approval, or by limiting foreign 
funding to selected organisations.75 India provides a striking example. In June 2014, 
the Indian Government ordered the Reserve Bank of India to hold all foreign 
contributions to Indian charities until they received approval from the Home 
Ministry, in an effort to control the amount and use of foreign funding flowing to 
India.76 By April 2015, approximately 9000 nonprofits in India that received foreign 
funding had their registrations terminated.77 In some recipient countries, 
governments have also employed national tax laws to make foreign funding 
financially unviable by imposing prohibitively high tax rates on grants from foreign 
sources.78 
While almost every donor country has tax incentives to encourage domestic 
philanthropy, until recently most had not considered tax incentives for cross-border 
philanthropy to the same extent as domestic giving. Philanthropic globalisation has 
disrupted the traditional framework for the provision of these tax incentives. With 
national boundaries around philanthropy starting to blur, donor countries have been 
forced to consider — or reconsider — their tax treatment of cross-border donations.79 
Some donor countries, including Australia, have responded by employing domestic 
                                                             
 
75 See Vernon, above n 70, 9–16. See also Rutzen, above n 70; Moore and Rutzen, above n 13, 17–
25. 
76 Katy Daigle, 'India Sees Threat in Some Charities', The Boston Globe (online), 20 June 2014 
<www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2014/06/19/india-cracking-down-foreign-funded-
charities/K751UnyGf2OoF4tTWdvAPL/story.html>; Center for Global Prosperity, Philanthropic 
Freedom: A Pilot Study, above n 39, 18. 
77 John Godfrey, ‘Why have 9,000 Indian NGOs Been Deregistered?’, Nonprofit Quarterly (online), 
28 April 2015 <http://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/05/04/why-have-9-000-indian-ngos-been-
deregistered/>. 
78 Vernon, above n 70, 16–17. 
79 See Miranda Stewart, ‘The Boundaries of Charities and Tax,’ in Matthew Harding, Ann 
O’Connell and Miranda Stewart (eds), Not-for-Profit Law: Theoretical and Comparative 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 32, 232, arguing that ‘we need to reframe the 
traditional debate about the boundaries of the fiscal state, the market and charity [which] must 
take account of the particular challenges faced by the fiscal state in the global era’. 
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tax policy to put in place ‘territorial fiscal restrictions’ on charitable tax relief for 
donors.80 For countries that adopt this protectionist approach, tax incentives for 
charitable giving generally stop at the country’s borders. In contrast to these ‘water’s 
edge policies’,81 some countries in Europe have liberalised the tax incentives for 
cross-border donations, adopting a free trade approach of allowing tax deductible 
donations to cross borders, blurring national boundaries around charitable giving. 
The next section describes this significant European development. 
1.3.1 Europe: Liberalisation of Tax Treatment for Cross-Border Donations 
Just a decade ago in the European Union (EU), tax incentives were limited to 
donations for domestic charitable activities in the majority of Member States.82 
However, with the development of the case law of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ),83 national boundaries for charitable gifts in the EU have started to diminish. 
The ECJ has issued judgments affecting a Member State’s ability to impose 
territorial fiscal restrictions on charitable tax relief. The landmark case for the tax 
treatment of charitable donations in the EU is Hein Persche v Finanzamt 
Lüdenscheid (‘Hein Persche’),84 brought by Mr Persche, a German citizen, who 
made an in-kind gift to a retirement home with a children’s home attached in 
Portugal, which was a registered charity under Portuguese law. Mr Persche claimed a 
tax deduction for the gift in his German income tax return, which was refused by the 
                                                             
 
80 Groves and Lowe-Petraske, above n 38, 11. Donor country tax regimes may also limit the 
ability of tax exempt organisations to engage in cross-border philanthropy. See Moore and 
Rutzen, above n 13, 10. See also Ineke Koele, International Taxation of Philanthropy: Removing 
Tax Obstacles for International Charities (IBFD, 2007) 4, who describes the ‘direct or indirect 
geographical limitation imposed as a condition for privileged tax treatment of philanthropic 
activities’ as a ‘landlock’. 
81 This term was first used by American tax scholars John Simon, Harvey Dale and Laura Chisolm 
to describe the US rules on tax deductibility. See Simon, Dale and Chisolm, above n 9, 272. 
82 Thomas von Hippel, ‘Taxation of Cross-Border Philanthropy in Europe After Persche and 
Stauffer: From Landlock to Free Movement?’ (European Foundation Center, 2014) 12. 
83 In particular the cases of Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v Finanzamt München für 
Körperschaften (C-386/04) [2006] ECR I-8234 and Hein Persche v Finanzamt Lüdenscheid (C-
318/07) [2009] I-359 (‘Hein Persche’). 
84 Hein Persche (C-318/07) [2009] I-359. This built upon the decision in an earlier case Centro di 
Musicologia Walter Stauffer v Finanzamt München für Körperschaften (C-386/04) [2006] ECR I-
8234.  
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German tax office on the basis that the recipient charity was not established in 
Germany, a requirement under German law. The ECJ ruled in favour of Mr Persche, 
determining that Germany's water's edge policy of allowing a tax concession for 
donations to a charitable entity only if the charity is resident in Germany was 
incompatible with the principle of the free movement of capital.  
Following this ruling, the majority of Member States now grant the same type 
of tax relief available for domestic donations to ‘European’ cross-border donations.85 
The removal of these fiscal barriers to cross-border philanthropy has effectively 
created a European philanthropic marketplace involving the cross-subsidisation of 
Member States’ charitable sectors.86 This remarkable development sheds light on the 
potential implications of philanthropic globalisation for the fiscal state, including the 
equitable tax treatment of cross-border giving resulting from the liberalisation of tax 
incentives.87  
The practical effect of the removal of national boundaries around philanthropy 
for many EU Member States has been demonstrated in a 64-country comparative 
study measuring the state of philanthropic freedom around the world, including the 
ease of sending and receiving cross-border donations.88 The study found that as a 
result of the Hein Persche case, ‘barriers to international giving are gradually easing 
in most Western European states’.89 The two countries found to have the lowest 
                                                             
 
85 See von Hippel, above n 82, 21, 28–9, 33 (‘[M]ost, but not all, Member States have 
implemented the non-discrimination rule of the ECJ in case of tax benefits for foreign EU-based 
PBOs and their donors. However, there are still 22 out of a possible 84 cases where the wording 
of the law appears to discriminate against foreign EU-based PBOs’.); Sabine Heidenbauer, 
Charity Crossing Borders: The Fundamental Freedoms' Impact on Charity and Donor Taxation in 
Europe (Kluwer Law International, 2011), 90. 
86 See Sabine Heidenbauer et al, ‘Cross-Border Charitable Giving and its Tax Limitations’ (2013) 
67(11) Bulletin of International Taxation 1, 11; Lilian Faulhaber, ‘Charitable Giving, Tax 
Expenditures, and the Fiscal Future of the European Union’ (Working Paper No 13–17, Boston 
University School of Law, 20 May 2013) 3; Stewart, ‘The Boundaries of Charities and Tax’, above 
n 79, 232. 
87 See Stewart, ‘The Boundaries of Charities and Tax’, above n 79, 232; Charities Aid Foundation, 
International Comparisons of Charitable Giving, above n 59, 4. 
88 Center for Global Prosperity, The Index of Philanthropic Freedom 2015 (Hudson Institute, 
2015). 
89 Ibid 19. 
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barriers to cross-border philanthropy were Sweden and the Netherlands.90 Both of 
these countries have extended the principles enunciated in Heine Persche beyond the 
EU, applying the same tax treatment to domestic and cross-border donations.91 In 
contrast to the response of these European donor countries, the Australian 
Government has responded to philanthropic globalisation and domestic fiscal 
pressures by restricting the tax treatment of cross-border donations, as discussed in 
the following section. 
1.3.2 Australia: Restrictive Tax Treatment for Cross-Border Donations 
Of the sixteen OECD DAC countries included in the comparative study 
measuring the state of philanthropic freedom around the world, Australia was found 
to have the highest barriers to cross-border philanthropy.92 While Australia has a tax 
deduction for charitable gifts targeting domestic organisations and activities, there is 
no specific provision for gift deductions to organisations located and operating 
outside Australia. Such organisations could register with the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) for tax deductible status as a Deductible Gift Recipient (DGR), but 
unless they fall within one of the limited classes of exceptions for organisations 
engaged in charitable activities overseas, their donors would not be entitled to claim 
a tax deduction for gifts to the organisation.93 
In making the distinction between domestic and international philanthropy, the 
Australian Government is seeking to maintain a delicate policy balance between 
promoting philanthropy on the one hand, while ensuring that these taxpayer-funded 
concessions primarily benefit the Australian public on the other. In doing so, the 
Government has invoked donor-country concerns relating to the fiscal consequences 
of extending tax concessions to cross-border donations, as well as broader concerns 
                                                             
 
90 Ibid 40. The Netherlands and Sweden received the highest cross-border scores (5.0) of all the 
countries examined. 
91 See Sabine Heidenbauer, Charity Crossing Borders: The Fundamental Freedoms' Impact on 
Charity and Donor Taxation in Europe (Kluwer Law International, 2011) 90. 
92 Center for Global Prosperity, The Index of Philanthropic Freedom 2015, above n 88, 40. 
Australia received a cross-border score of 3.8, lower than Austria, (4.0), Canada (4.0), Finland 
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93 For a detailed discussion of DGR eligibility requirements, see below section 3.2.3. 
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of supervising philanthropy outside the jurisdiction, where funds may be channelled 
into financing terrorism or money laundering. 
While it may be possible for an Australian donor to effect a tax deductible 
cross-border gift using an Australian resident organisation as a giving intermediary (a 
common workaround in some other jurisdictions),94 this avenue is limited since the 
organisation has to qualify for and maintain both income tax exemption and DGR 
status. Recent judicial decisions have addressed the use of such workarounds and in 
doing so have challenged the geographic restrictions on the gift deduction,95 but their 
implications have not yet been formally acknowledged by the ATO. The 
Government’s response, at a time of budgetary constraint, has been to propose a 
reform agenda through a detailed Bill that places further limitations on the ability of 
Australian donors to obtain a tax deduction for cross-border donations and for 
Australian organisations to engage in international charitable activities.96  
Despite Australia’s tax laws affecting cross-border philanthropy having 
reached this crossroads, there has been little academic literature examining the 
development of, and the rationale behind, the water’s edge policy underlying 
Australia’s tax treatment of cross-border donations and whether it should continue. 
Most of the legal scholarship in Australia has focused on tax concessions for 
domestic charitable activities.97 This thesis will offer the first comprehensive analysis 
of the role of domestic tax policy in Australia as it affects donations targeting cross-
border charitable activities. At a time when the Government is examining specific 
legislative reforms in this area, it is crucial that policymakers and other stakeholders 
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have carefully considered and documented material that provides a solid evidence 
base from which to determine future policy direction.  
1.4 EXAMINING DOMESTIC TAX POLICY IN AN ERA OF PHILANTHROPIC 
GLOBALISATION AND DOMESTIC FISCAL RESTRAINT: INTRODUCING THE 
RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The remarkable rise in international philanthropy has brought widespread 
benefits to the global community, delivering an innovative and cost-effective means 
of addressing contemporary global challenges and providing support to those in need 
around the world. Almost every OECD donor country offers tax incentives to 
encourage the production and delivery of public goods through philanthropy, making 
charitable gifts less expensive for donors than they would be otherwise. However, as 
a result of the fiscal and regulatory concerns, many governments have placed 
territorial barriers around charitable tax relief for donors. With national boundaries 
around philanthropy starting to blur, the role of domestic tax policy in restricting the 
ability of donors to engage in tax-effective cross-border philanthropy is called into 
question. 
In comparison to other DAC donor countries, Australia is considered to have 
one of the strictest legal regimes for the tax treatment of cross-border philanthropy. 
While Australia provides a tax deduction for donations targeting domestic charitable 
activities and organisations, the deduction generally does not extend to cross-border 
donations. Through a proposed reform agenda to further tighten Australia’s tax laws 
surrounding cross-border philanthropy, the Government is signalling its commitment 
to a water’s edge policy of tightly controlled geographic boundaries around 
charitable giving. When combined with a reduced foreign aid budget, Australia’s 
delivery of both private and public aid may be compromised. 
The research problem addressed in this thesis is whether the current tax 
incentives for Australian cross-border philanthropy and their oversight are 
appropriate to both regulate and facilitate international giving. To date, there has 
been little tax scholarship on Australia’s domestic tax policy affecting cross-border 
philanthropy, which has helped to shield this policy from principled scrutiny, leaving 
all stakeholders with inadequate information and insufficient data from which to 
develop future policy direction. With recent judicial consideration of this policy 
resulting in extensive government review and a detailed legislative reform agenda, 
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this thesis has captured a critical moment in the history of Australia’s tax treatment 
of cross-border donations in which to redress the existing research chasm. 
This thesis will undertake the first comprehensive historical, theoretical and 
comparative analysis of this issue. In doing so, it will inform probable future 
legislation, tax rulings and judicial decisions. More broadly, this thesis can also 
inform and, ideally, generate public debate on the Government’s water’s edge policy 
and whether it should continue. The implications of this research are significant. To 
ensure that Australian nonprofit organisations and their donors are able to effectively 
contribute to the globalisation of charity and philanthropy, it is critical that Australia 
does not fall behind other OECD nations in either the regulation or facilitation of 
cross-border philanthropy. Adopting a free trade approach of allowing tax deductible 
donations to cross borders provides Australia with an opportunity to embrace the 
changes brought about by globalisation.  
The research undertaken in this thesis will provide policymakers with 
appropriate historical information and data, a solid evidence base grounded in tax 
theory and tax policy, and an understanding of the tax laws in other DAC donor 
countries. Together, this research offers a principled basis for reforming domestic tax 
policy in Australia as it affects cross-border donations. 
1.5 ANALYSING THE AUSTRALIAN TAX TREATMENT OF CROSS-BORDER 
DONATIONS: INTRODUCING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS            
This thesis will undertake a comprehensive analysis of the Australian tax 
treatment of cross-border donations building inductively over five distinct stages. 
Each stage corresponds to the five research questions the thesis seeks to address.  
The analysis begins with a descriptive examination of Australia’s income tax 
laws that affect cross-border giving and the policies that have shaped these laws, 
taking into consideration the wider historical and cultural context in which the 
Australian charitable tax regime operates. RQ1. Considered in its wider historical 
and cultural context, what is the Australian legal and policy framework for cross-
border philanthropy? An analysis of the unique historical context and legislative 
architecture of the gift deduction in Australia and its geographic restrictions provides 
the basis for understanding the current legal regime and how it impacts the options 
available for Australian donors seeking to engage in tax-effective cross-border 
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philanthropy. An examination of Australia’s policies affecting the tax treatment of 
cross-border donations provides insights into why successive Australian 
governments have maintained tightly controlled geographic boundaries around 
charitable giving.  
The second stage of the analysis is to consider the normative concerns that 
ordinarily inform domestic tax policymaking in order to evaluate the gift deduction 
in Australia as it applies to domestic and cross-border giving. RQ2. What are the 
relevant considerations that normally inform Australian tax policymaking and what 
does their application reveal about the deduction for cross-border donations? A tax 
policy analysis is undertaken to evaluate the gift deduction against traditional tax 
policy considerations to understand the implications of extending gift deductibility to 
cross-border giving. 
The third stage is to undertake a normative analysis of the principal theories 
that provide insights into the boundaries of public benefit for the purposes of cross-
border giving, and to apply those insights to the tax treatment of cross-border 
donations. This will assist in determining whether donations targeting international 
charitable activities should be treated similar to, or different from, domestically 
targeted donations. RQ3. What are the principal theories providing insights into the 
boundaries of public benefit for the purposes of international philanthropy, and how 
do these insights inform the tax treatment of cross-border donations? Establishing a 
theoretical framework provides greater insights into the policies underlying the 
Australian Government’s approach to the tax treatment of cross-border donations and 
provides a principled basis for formulating any proposed reforms. 
The fourth stage introduces a global perspective by undertaking a comparative 
analysis of the tax laws and policies in four ‘comparable’ jurisdictions to examine 
how other donor countries treat cross-border donations in an era of philanthropic 
globalisation. RQ4. What other legal and policy frameworks for cross-border 
philanthropy exist in comparable jurisdictions and how have they responded to the 
globalisation of philanthropy? This analysis examines how different donor countries 
have adapted to the challenges and opportunities presented by a changed global 
charitable and philanthropic landscape, as well as determining where Australia is 
located globally on this issue.  
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With the rising tide of international giving, the Australian Government may 
decide to re-think its domestic tax policy affecting cross-border giving. If this ensues, 
the final stage of the analysis is to determine the most appropriate policy framework 
for Australian cross-border philanthropy. RQ5. If the Government ultimately decides 
to implement a tax policy facilitating the production and delivery of public goods 
throughout the world, what would be the most appropriate policy framework for 
Australian cross-border philanthropy? A policy framework is proposed for 
reforming the Australian tax regime governing cross-border philanthropy that 
addresses the Government’s fiscal and oversight concerns, while providing 
Australian taxpayers with the means to engage in tax-effective cross-border giving to 
enable them to directly support the production and delivery of public goods 
throughout the world. 
While these research questions include an analysis based on tax theory (an 
investigation of the nature of tax law)98 and tax policy (finding solutions to a tax 
problem that a legal system needs to address),99 the primary method that will be used 
in this thesis is comparative legal methodology with a focus on comparative tax law. 
This methodology is described in the following section. 
1.6 METHODOLOGY: EMPLOYING A COMPARATIVE LAW LENS 
The tax treatment of cross-border donations is particularly suited to 
comparative legal methodology because it is a narrow topic with distinct legal rules 
that cross borders, implicating other countries and their international tax regimes.100 
As a tool for tax reform, a comparative analysis enables a country’s tax laws and 
policies affecting cross-border philanthropy to be considered beyond the domestic 
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Research and Writing in Law (Lawbook Co, 3rd ed, 2010) 23. 
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sphere and its traditional tax policymaking concerns,101 to take into account the 
reality of ‘cross-border movements’ in an increasingly globalised world.102  
Comparative tax methodology is the ‘application of “comparative law” 
methodologies to the study of tax laws’.103 The essence of the comparative method is 
that the ‘comparative knowledge’ resulting from such a comparison ‘could not have 
been produced in a non-comparative fashion’.104 As Victor Thuryoni remarked in his 
seminal work on comparative tax law: ‘[S]tudy of other systems paradoxically helps 
you better think about your own and can provoke insights that lead to breakthroughs 
in understanding’.105 There are other methodologies that employ a comparative 
perspective such as country surveys106 and case studies.107 However, comparative tax 
methodology takes a country comparison beyond parallel descriptions of domestic 
tax rules in multiple jurisdictions, to provide a critical evaluation of those rules 
within the legal systems in which they operate in order to develop an appropriate 
policy framework for reform.108 
While there are a number of schools of thought in comparative legal studies,109 
this thesis is based on a modified version of the functionalist (or functional) 
                                                             
 
101 These are efficiency, equity and simplicity. See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion.  
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approach, the ‘existing methodological modus operandi of comparative legal 
studies’.110 This approach rests on the assumption that ‘the legal system of every 
society faces essentially the same problems, and solves these problems by quite 
different means though very often with similar results.’111 The functional approach 
seeks to identify ‘a common legal solution to a common social problem’ by 
examining ‘comparable’ jurisdictions.112 Carlo Garbarino argues that the functional 
approach is particularly suited to comparative tax law113 because it is able to 
overcome the obstacles to comparing tax rules ‘posed by rapid legislative change, 
complexity of tax systems and the heterogeneity of local tax concepts [by looking] at 
the functions of tax rules in different domestic systems as they evolve over time’.114 
In doing so, the comparative analysis goes ‘beyond formal legal rules and looks at 
the solutions adopted in different countries’.115  
For a practical application of this comparative approach, Konrad Zweigert and 
Hein Kotz broke down the functional method of comparative analysis into a series of 
five steps.116 The first step is to identify the problem to be studied in ‘purely 
functional terms … without reference to the concepts of one’s own legal system’.117 
The second step is to choose the legal systems to be compared, which typically 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
examines the deviations of different jurisdictions from an economically efficient benchmark: a 
‘model’ legal institution; the Cultural Approach assumes that law is part of a broader cultural 
phenomenon whereby each culture contains unique values, traditions, and beliefs; and the 
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110 Ibid, 420. See also Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford 
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111 Zweigert and Kötz, above n 110, 34. 
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114 Garbarino, above n 99, 689. 
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involves selecting ‘“comparable jurisdictions” … at a similar level of evolutionary 
legal development’.118 The third step is to prepare reports objectively describing the 
relevant laws of each of the legal systems. The fourth step is to compare and contrast 
the legal systems chosen in an effort to identify similarities among and differences 
between them.119 The fifth and final step involves critically evaluating the different 
solutions adopted to determine which are ‘better’ or whether there is a ‘new solution, 
superior to all others, out of parts of the different national solutions’.120  
The strict functionalist approach of Zweigert and Kotz has been criticised ‘on 
the ground that it focuses on the law as a set of rules and fails initially to place the 
law in its wider cultural context’.121 In response to this criticism, other comparative 
legal scholars modified this approach to reflect different countries’ ‘unique political, 
social, and economic structures’.122 Walter Kamba developed a comparative 
technique based on the functional approach, which also takes into account local 
differences. Kamba’s approach reduced the steps involved in the comparative 
analysis from five phases to three, as shown in Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1. Three phases of comparative analysis  
In the first ‘descriptive phase’, the ‘norms, concepts and institutions of the systems 
concerned’123 are described in their local context. In the second ‘identification’ 
phase, the systems are compared in an effort to identify ‘divergences and 
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resemblances between the legal systems or parts of the legal systems compared’.124 
In the third ‘explanatory’ phase, the results of the analysis are critically evaluated 
and the divergences and resemblances explained.125  
Anthony Infanti, a tax and comparative law scholar, adopted Kamba’s general 
comparative legal technique to develop a comparative tax framework. Infanti’s 
framework of ‘spontaneous tax coordination’ involves ‘unilateral action on the part 
of [a country seeking to reform its tax system by] reviewing and evaluating the 
international tax rules adopted by other countries’ in order to understand and 
accommodate legislative solutions and trends overseas.126 He defined ‘tax 
coordination’ broadly as ‘the adaptation of one country’s tax system to that of 
another’,127 in order to ‘imbue the framework with a great deal of flexibility and 
allow policymakers to vary the desired level of coordination as necessary to 
accommodate domestic political, economic, and social norms.’128  
For the practical application of his framework, Infanti followed Kamba’s three 
phases of comparative legal analysis and tailored them to comparative tax law, which 
involved  
identifying the rules currently in place in other countries — along with any 
trends in the rules being adopted or abandoned by them … compar[ing] and 
contrast[ing] these rules to determine which, if any, is superior to the others 
… [and determining] whether … the superior rule, an amalgamation of 
existing rules, or a different rule is the most ‘appropriate’ rule for 
enactment.129 
While Infanti did not provide specific guidance on the standards to apply for this 
evaluation, he proposed ‘balancing the benefits of the superior rule against all of the 
relevant theoretical and practical considerations that normally inform US 
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international tax policymaking’.130 These international tax policy concerns included 
the expected impact of tax provisions on: political relations with foreign countries; 
the need to raise revenue; the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion; and the 
mitigation of external complexity.131 To test his theoretical framework, Infanti 
applied it to a ‘discrete issue of international tax law’, reforming the rules governing 
the US tax treatment of cross-border charitable contributions.132 He argued that these 
rules suffer ‘from both the excessive complexity and the failure to keep pace with a 
changing economy that generally plague the US international tax regime’.133  
This thesis adopts Infanti’s comparative tax methodology to similarly develop 
a proposal for reforming the Australian tax treatment of cross-border donations. It 
deviates from Infanti’s framework in one important respect: approach to 
jurisdictional selection. While Infanti compared a broad cross-section of countries 
representing ‘each of the eight families of income tax laws’,134 this thesis takes a 
functionalist approach to jurisdictional selection. In doing so, it will examine the 
‘comparable’ jurisdictions of the US, UK, the Netherlands and Canada. These 
countries are all present members of the OECD group of DAC donor countries along 
with Australia and as such are all considered developed nations with high income 
and the most significant providers of overseas development aid.135 They also share 
similarities in their approach to civil society regulation136 and are at a similar level of 
evolutionary legal development, providing a functional equivalence that facilitates 
the comparative analysis.  
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Following Infanti’s framework, this thesis will undertake a comparative 
analysis in three phases. In the descriptive phase (undertaken in chapter 6), each 
jurisdiction's laws and policies governing the tax treatment of cross-border donations 
are described, taking into consideration their historical and cultural context. In the 
identification phase (undertaken in the first part of chapter 7), these laws and policies 
are compared thematically to identify any similarities among and differences 
between them, as well as any trends that emerge. In the explanatory phase 
(undertaken in the second part of chapter 7), the results of the comparative analysis 
are critically evaluated and the similarities and differences explained. The key 
findings from the comparative analysis will then inform the most appropriate path for 
reforming the Australian tax regime governing cross-border philanthropy 
(undertaken in chapter 8). 
1.7 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis will undertake a comprehensive analysis of the Australian tax 
treatment of cross-border donations, building inductively over five distinct stages 
that correspond to the research questions outlined above.  
Chapters 2 and 3 provide a descriptive examination of the Australian tax laws 
and policies underlying the gift deduction and its geographic restrictions, taking into 
consideration the broader historical and cultural context in which the Australian 
charitable tax regime operates. This examination highlights the concept of public 
benefit, which is foundational to understanding the origins of the gift deduction and 
its geographic boundaries. Chapter 4 examines the considerations that ordinarily 
inform Australian tax policymaking to evaluate the gift deduction as it applies to 
domestic and cross-border giving. This domestic policy analysis will determine 
whether there is a principled basis in tax policy for extending the deduction to cross-
border donations. Chapter 5 establishes a theoretical framework based on the 
principal theories providing insights into the geographic boundaries of public benefit, 
and applies these insights to the tax treatment of cross-border donations. This 
theoretical framework, centred around the concept of public benefit, will determine 
whether there is a principled basis in tax (and other) theory for providing similar tax 
treatment to domestic and cross-border donations. Chapters 6 and 7 utilise 
comparative tax methodology to examine the approaches of other donor countries to 
the tax treatment of cross-border donations. This comparative analysis will determine 
 28 Chapter 1: Introduction 
where Australia is located on the spectrum of approaches and will provide insights 
into any proposed reforms. Informed by the comparative analysis, chapter 8 presents 
the research findings and offers a policy framework for reforming the Australian tax 
regime governing cross-border philanthropy in a changed global philanthropic 
landscape. 
1.8 CONCLUSION 
The 21st century has ushered in an era of philanthropic globalisation, altering 
the global philanthropic landscape in terms of both the amount of private 
philanthropy and the form that giving takes, accompanied by a new breed of global 
philanthropists giving large amounts of their wealth to tackle social problems around 
the world. The dramatic increase in international giving has brought widespread 
benefits to global society, while raising legitimate fiscal and regulatory concerns for 
government. As a result of these concerns, while almost every OECD country 
provides tax incentives to encourage philanthropy, many have established geographic 
barriers around charitable tax relief for donors.  
Tax incentives are an important policy tool to encourage philanthropy, having 
the potential to lower the price of donations and increase the amount donated, 
particularly for wealthy taxpayers. Until recently, however, these tax incentives did 
not extend to cross-border philanthropy, notwithstanding their significance for 
organisations engaged in international charitable activities that rely on philanthropic 
funding. With national boundaries around philanthropy becoming more porous, and 
some European countries now liberalising the tax relief available to cross-border 
donations, it is timely to consider the tax treatment of international giving.  
Australia is a high-income DAC donor country that employs domestic tax 
policy to restrict the ability of donors to engage in tax-effective cross-border 
philanthropy based on revenue and oversight concerns. At the same time, domestic 
fiscal restraint has created a significant funding gap in the amount of Australia’s 
official government aid. The intersection of tax policy and foreign aid policy raises 
the question of whether appropriate tax incentives for cross-border philanthropy 
could assist in closing the gap in the delivery of Australia's foreign aid to the 
developing world. This question also relates to the broader research problem this 
thesis seeks to address of whether the current tax incentives for Australian cross-
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border philanthropy and their oversight are appropriate to both facilitate and regulate 
international giving. 
Providing all stakeholders with adequate information and data from which to 
determine future policy course can only lead to better policy outcomes. With this in 
mind, the thesis will undertake a comparative tax analysis of other DAC donor 
countries to determine where Australia is situated in, and how other countries are 
responding to, a changed global philanthropic landscape. An exploration of the main 
theories providing insights into the geographic boundaries of public benefit and a 
domestic tax policy analysis will provide a principled basis for identifying potential 
solutions to the quandary facing Australia — and other donor countries — of finding 
the appropriate balance between protecting national interests and enabling its citizens 
to fully and effectively participate in philanthropy’s globalisation.  
The following two chapters mark the beginning of this journey by examining 
Australia’s tax laws and policies underlying the gift deduction and its geographic 
restrictions, taking into consideration the unique historical and cultural context in 
which the Australian charitable tax regime operates. 
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Chapter 2: The Australian Philanthropic 
Landscape 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses RQ1. Considered in its wider historical and cultural 
context, what is the Australian legal and policy framework for cross-border 
philanthropy? In doing so, it provides a complete picture of the Australian 
philanthropic landscape surrounding international giving by examining the broader 
context in which the Australian charitable tax regime functions, in order to 
understand why successive Australian governments have preserved gift deductibility 
for domestically-targeted donations and contained it for donations directed overseas.  
A recent comparative study measuring the state of philanthropic freedom 
around the world described Australia’s philanthropic environment as ‘decidedly 
disjointed’.137 This state of affairs is largely a result of the highly complex tax regime 
that applies to Australia’s nonprofit sector based on the ‘piece-meal approach’ in the 
development of the charitable tax concessions.138 The gift deduction in particular 
suffers from the ‘accidental nature’ of the tax concessions and ‘their obscure 
origins’.139 Understanding how this legal complexity came to be is foundational to 
any analysis of the gift deduction as it impacts cross-border philanthropy. Exploring 
the deduction’s chequered history can also uncover potential issues contained in the 
tax laws and their interpretation, informing future policymaking.  
The chapter begins with an examination of the cultural context for Australian 
international giving by examining the available data on charitable giving, and the 
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scant evidence on the amount and nature of Australian cross-border giving and its 
interaction with the Government’s provision of foreign aid. This is followed by an 
examination of the historical context in which the Australian charitable tax regime 
operates, including: an overview of the foundations of Australian charity law, 
focusing on the development of the judicial conception of public benefit for the 
purposes of cross-border giving; and a detailed analysis of the legislative history and 
the policy rationale for the gift deduction and its provisions affecting cross-border 
giving.  
2.2 NATURE AND SCOPE OF AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL GIVING 
Understanding the wider cultural context for Australian international giving 
provides the basis for undertaking a policy analysis of the tax deduction for cross-
border donations, including its potential cost to the fisc. This section explores the 
nature and scope of Australian international giving by examining the extent of the 
culture of charitable giving and cross-border giving in Australia, as well as the 
intersection between Australian private international giving and the Government’s 
provision of foreign aid.  
2.2.1 How Extensive is the Culture of Charitable Giving in Australia? 
Because Australian nonprofit organisations do not generally file tax returns,140 
there is no convenient and reliable data source for measuring the amount of the 
charitable tax concessions (and even less on cross-border philanthropic tax 
concessions), placing Australia at a ‘comparative disadvantage’ when it comes to 
data collection on charitable giving.141 The total measured nonprofit tax concessions 
at all levels of government are estimated to be AUD4 billion, with unmeasured fiscal 
concessions double this amount.142 
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The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Non-Profit Institutions Satellite 
Account 2012–13,143 based on nearly 57 000 ‘economically significant’ not-for-profit 
(NFP) organisations (of the ABS’s estimated 177 000 having an active tax role),144 
estimates that in 2012–13 total charitable giving in Australia was AUD8.6 billion, 
comprising donations by individuals including bequests and legacies (46.4 per cent), 
businesses including sponsorships (26.0 per cent), foundations (5.5 per cent), and 
other fundraising (22.1 per cent).145 Total charitable giving represented eight per cent 
of total sector income and 0.57 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP).146 
Of this AUD8.6 billion in total giving, just AUD2.24 billion (26 per cent) was 
claimed as tax deductible donations.147 Despite the relatively small amount of 
charitable gifts claimed, a trend analysis conducted by the Australian Centre for 
Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies shows that tax deductible giving has generally 
increased since 1978–79 (the first year for which data is available), when the total 
amount of tax deductible gifts claimed was AUD58.69 million.148 Total tax 
deductible donations reached AUD250 million in 1986–87, AUD500 million in 
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2012–13 Income Year and Other Reported Tax Information for the 2013–14 Financial Year (2015) 
<https://data.gov.au/dataset/taxation-statistics-2012-13>; McGregor-Lowndes, ‘The Not-for-
Profit Sector in Australia’, above n 141, 4. 
148 See Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, Trend Analysis Since 1979 
(Queensland University of Technology, 2013). Prior to 1978–79, gifts were included under the 
general heading ‘other deductions’.  
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1995–96 and AUD1 billion in 2002–03.149 By 2011–12, the AUD2.29 billion in tax 
deductible gifts claimed amounted to just over AUD250 million in real 1978–79 
dollars,150 although in real terms it is AUD385 million less than the level of tax 
deductible giving in 2007–08,151 evidencing a slight decline in charitable giving in 
the years following the global financial crisis. 
Wealthy donors represent a large proportion of total charitable giving in 
Australia. For taxpayers with an annual taxable income over AUD1 million, the 
average tax deductible donation in 2012–13 was AUD41 245, representing 1.14 per 
cent of their taxable income: almost four times the national average.152  As part of a 
package of taxation reforms announced in 1999 to encourage philanthropy, targeting 
high-net-worth individuals in particular,153 the Government introduced Private 
Ancillary Funds (PAFs).154 Similar to private foundations in the United States (US), 
PAFs are required to distribute at least five per cent of the market value of net assets 
each year, with a minimum annual distribution requirement of AUD11 000, but they 
can only distribute funds to Deductible Gift Recipients (DGRs).155  
PAFs have proven to be a popular giving vehicle for wealthy Australians. Since 
being introduced in 2001, they have grown significantly. There were 1069 PAFs by 
the end of the 2012–13 financial year, with 84 new funds registering for DGR status 
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in that year.156 In 2000–01, the first year that distributions from PAFs were made, 
annual distributions totalled AUD6.7 million. By 2012–13, they had increased by a 
multiple of 36 to AUD244.5 million.157 The closing value of PAFs in their first year 
was AUD78.6 million; by 2012–13, this had increased by a multiple of 36 to 
AUD2.8 billion.158 This data indicates that the introduction of PAFs and other 
incentives to encourage philanthropy among high-net-worth individuals have 
succeeded.159 The next section examines whether the tax incentives to promote 
charitable giving have also increased the level of Australian cross-border 
philanthropy.  
2.2.2 How Extensive is the Culture of Cross-Border Charitable Giving in 
Australia? 
The Australian Tax Expenditures Statement does not provide estimates for tax 
expenditures of many mainstream nonprofit concessions, let alone those for cross-
border philanthropy.160 In 1991, a Senate Committee report noted the lack of data on 
cross-border philanthropic tax concessions and specifically recommended that 
statistics should be kept in order to inform policy development and provide a basis 
for audit activity.161 This recommendation has not been implemented. As a result, the 
amount of charitable giving flowing out of Australia has remained a mystery, as well 
as how much of this outflow is classified as tax deductible gifts.  
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There are sources that provide indications as to the size of Australian cross-
border charitable flows and activities. The ABS Non-Profit Institutions Satellite 
Account 2012–13 sheds light on the amount of outgoing charitable funds. The ABS 
estimated that of AUD5.7 billion in ‘grants and other payments’ made by NFPs, 
slightly more than AUD1 billion (18 per cent) went to ‘non-resident organisations’ 
defined as any organisation domiciled overseas.162 While this figure includes DGRs 
that have been sanctioned to provide support for international charitable activities, a 
significant component also includes intermediary giving, where qualified Australian 
DGRs channel tax deductible funds overseas for other charitable entities. 
The recently established Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission 
(ACNC),163 Australia’s national charity regulator, has also begun collecting 
information on cross-border charitable activities as part of its remit to collect and 
publish annual returns from charities. The first analysis of the 2013 Annual 
Information Statements (AIS) noted that: 
Charities could indicate that they were involved with countries outside of 
Australia in three ways: by nominating ‘international activities’ as one of 
their activities, by nominating ‘communities overseas’ as one of their 
beneficiaries, or by advising that they operate outside of Australia. In total, 
6,476 charities or 17% of all reporting charities indicated they were involved 
in someway internationally. This could include sending donations or other 
aid or more active involvement.164 
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A total of 218 charities (0.6 per cent) reported that their main activity was 
‘international activities’.165 In the most recent 2014 AIS submitted by 37 798 
charities, almost 17 per cent reported having an ‘international element’ to their work 
(ie international activities, overseas operations, or having beneficiaries overseas),166 
while approximately 7.7 per cent have ‘some overseas operations’ (the majority 
being small charities).167 A total of 298 charities (0.8 per cent) reported that their 
main activity was ‘international activities’.168 
Private and public ancillary funds, which enable Australian taxpayers to make 
tax deductible gifts to private and community foundations respectively, do file 
annual audited financial statements with their distributions by area of allocation, 
including those made to ‘international affairs’. In the 2012–13 tax year, PAFs 
distributed approximately AUD19.6 million and public ancillary funds distributed 
approximately AUD8.0 million to Australian organisations operating overseas, 
representing eight per cent and almost three per cent respectively of total 
distributions for each of these philanthropic vehicles.169 While this data provides 
some indication of cross-border philanthropic flows, it represents 25 per cent of all 
tax deductible giving and just seven per cent of total giving.170 
Finally, Australia’s membership of the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC)171 requires Australia to provide annual estimates of private 
philanthropic flows to developing countries, along with official aid data. OECD 
figures show that in 2012, the Australian Government reported just over 
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USD1.4 billion in private giving to developing countries.172 However, it appears that 
a more accurate figure is USD897 million because of data calculation errors.173 This 
is consistent with a recent analysis of financial data from the Australian Council for 
International Development (ACFID), the peak council for Australian aid and 
development organisations,174 showing total private support to ACFID members was 
AUD832 million175 (or USD862 million) in 2012.176 The revised amount of private 
giving to developing countries represents approximately 10 per cent of total 
charitable giving (of AUD8.6 billion), a significant increase from USD55 million in 
1990.177 Because most private international giving is channelled to developing 
countries through relief and development NGOs,178 ACFID’s data represents a 
significant component of Australian cross-border giving. Australians also support 
overseas activities and beneficiaries for purposes other than relief or development, so 
the total cross-border philanthropy numbers would have to be added to the revised 
DAC calculations. 
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It is also possible to use ACFID’s private giving data to make a crude estimate 
of the cost to the fisc of the tax deduction for cross-border donations, because this 
data is derived from donations to international relief and development organisations, 
the majority of which are tax deductible and would therefore be included in 
Treasury’s annual tax expenditures statement under ‘deduction for gifts to DGRs’.179 
The Tax Expenditures Statement 2014 shows that in 2012–13, the deduction for gifts 
to DGRs cost AUD1.01 billion.180 Based on the ACFID data, approximately 10 per 
cent of these gifts are directed to DGRs operating overseas, resulting in a relatively 
minor cost to Treasury of approximately AUD101 million for cross-border 
donations. Any calculation of the cost to the fisc also needs to consider the return in 
the form of benefits that the Government receives for the public funds expended.181  
International philanthropy does not exist in isolation from the broader context 
of the provision of foreign aid by government. The next section examines the 
connection between Australian cross-border giving and the delivery of official 
government aid to developing countries, in order to better understand the relationship 
between these two forms of international giving. 
2.2.3 What is the Intersection between Australian Cross-Border Philanthropy 
and Government-Funded Foreign Aid? 
Studies have shown that private giving and public aid have a ‘strong positive 
relationship’, indicating that private international giving is a complement to — rather 
than a substitute for — official foreign aid.182 With the appropriate tax incentives, 
there is a potential role for private philanthropy to assist in the provision of overseas 
aid and the generation of ‘soft power’ for government that can be used to improve a 
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country’s global standing and influence on the world stage.183 In determining 
whether there is a role for Australian cross-border philanthropy in the delivery of 
Australian aid overseas, Australia’s foreign aid policy and spending requires 
examination. 
Over the past decade, the Australian Government’s spending on international 
aid has generally grown in absolute dollars and as a percentage of gross national 
income (GNI), the result of a bipartisan political commitment to increase Australia’s 
overseas development assistance (ODA) in line with the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals.184 However, 2012 marked the end of this commitment, with the 
then Labor Government announcing that domestic fiscal restraint would require 
significant funding cuts from Australia’s aid program.185 As a result, ODA decreased 
by 4.5 per cent in 2013 to USD4.85 billion, representing 0.34 per cent of GNI and 
approximately 1.3 per cent of government spending.186 This placed Australia as the 
10th largest donor in the OECD group of 28 DAC donor countries, and, as a 
proportion of GNI, Australia ranked 13th.187   
In 2014, the new Coalition Government went further, announcing in its first 
budget that foreign aid would be capped to realise an estimated budget saving of 
AUD7.6 billion over five years, as part of a policy of domestic fiscal restraint 
triggered by the end of Australia’s mining boom.188 In the 2015 Budget, foreign aid 
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was cut by a further AUD1 billion (20 per cent), representing the largest cuts in aid 
over a single year.189 The Government also integrated Australia’s standalone aid 
agency, Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), into the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) ‘enabling the aid and diplomatic 
arms of Australia’s international policy agenda to be more closely aligned’.190 This 
reflects Australia’s stated foreign aid policy goals of overcoming poverty and 
promoting economic growth in line with Australia’s broader foreign policy priorities 
and national interests:191 
Through Australia’s aid program, DFAT will contribute to sustainable 
economic growth to reduce poverty and lift living standards, with a 
particular focus on the Indian Ocean Asia-Pacific region. Australia’s 
overseas development budget will be driven by a new paradigm which 
promotes a prosperous, growing region that is more stable and secure, and 
reduces poverty.192  
Consistent with a geographic focus that advances Australia’s national interests, 
the Indian Ocean Asia-Pacific (Indo-Pacific) region is receiving approximately 92 
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per cent of country and regional program funding in 2014–15,193 up from 86 per cent 
in previous years.194 Indonesia and Papua New Guinea are Australia’s two largest aid 
recipients, receiving AUD647 million and AUD507 million respectively in 2013–
14.195 The focus on the Indo-Pacific region corresponds with a significant decrease in 
funding for programs in other areas of the world, with aid to Africa discontinued 
completely.196 This has provoked criticism from Australia’s international 
development sector that Australia’s poverty alleviation goals may not be met and that 
Australia may be undermining its standing as a ‘good global citizen’, potentially 
harming its standing in the international community.197  
The contraction of Australia’s stated foreign aid policy goals to focus on the 
Indo-Pacific region in the provision of official aid suggests a role for private 
philanthropy in other regions to complement the Government’s aid program. Data 
collected by ACFID shows there is widespread support in the Australian community 
for aid to Africa, with 41 per cent of Australian public contributions to ACFID 
members being allocated to the African region, higher than any other region in the 
world.198 Bipartisan political support for a significant reduction in the amount and 
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scope of foreign aid may provide an opportunity for Australian philanthropists to 
assist in closing this gap through appropriate tax incentives, and at the same time 
enhance Australia’s international presence through the ‘soft power’ of aid.  
The next section provides an historical examination of gift deductibility in 
Australia in order to understand the considerations that have shaped the current legal 
architecture for the gift deduction and its potential to serve as an appropriate tax 
incentive for international giving. 
2.3 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS AND POLICIES AFFECTING 
AUSTRALIAN CROSS-BORDER PHILANTHROPY 
Understanding the wider historical context for gift deductibility as it affects 
Australian international giving is foundational to understanding the current legal 
regime and how it impacts the options available for Australian donors who seek to 
engage in tax-effective cross-border philanthropy. This section examines the 
historical development of the laws and policies impacting Australian cross-border 
philanthropy: from the foundations of Australian charity law focusing on the 
development of the judicial conception of public benefit for the purposes of cross-
border giving, through to the legislative history of, and the policy rationale for, the 
gift deduction and its geographic restrictions. 
2.3.1 Foundations of Australian Charity Law and the Geographic Boundaries of 
Public Benefit 
Since colonial times, the Australian legislature and judiciary have relied on the 
English common law model of charity,199 with the common law definition of charity 
enunciated in the seminal 1891 case Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income 
Tax v Pemsel (‘Pemsel’),200 comprising both charitable purpose and public benefit, 
providing the foundation for the modern legal definition of charity.201 The preamble 
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to the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601202 set forth the typical charitable purposes of 
the time and formed the basis for Lord Macnaghten’s articulation of a legal definition 
of charity in Pemsel by classifying charitable purposes under ‘four heads of 
charity’:203  
Charity in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the 
relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the 
advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the 
community, not falling under any of the preceding heads.204 
With this classification describing the four heads of charity as purposes ‘beneficial to 
the community’, the concept of public benefit became central to the legal definition 
of charity.205 The majority of common law jurisdictions have now codified the 
meaning of charity,206 with Australia recently codifying this definition in the 
Charities Act 2013 (Cth).207 In doing so, these jurisdictions have affirmed the 
common law position that a charitable purpose must be for the public benefit.208  
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The concept of public benefit provides a means by which the law can exclude 
benefits that do not warrant public recognition.209 The boundary of public benefit has 
largely drawn the line between that which is private or benefits the individual, and 
that which is public or benefits the community.210 The tax treatment of cross-border 
philanthropy raises two other important questions concerning the boundaries of 
public benefit, which will be developed further in chapter 5:  
 Who is the ‘public’ that the test for charitable status refers to: is it confined 
to those in the home jurisdiction or does it extend beyond national 
borders?211 
 Can charitable objects performed overseas or charitable gifts directed 
overseas provide a direct or indirect ‘benefit’ to the public in the home 
jurisdiction? 
While a ‘compendious expression’, public benefit is generally understood by 
giving meaning to its ‘constituent elements’.212 The ‘public’ element refers to ‘the 
general community or a sufficient section of the community’ and distinguishes a 
public benefit from a private benefit.213 The ‘benefit’ element is interpreted broadly 
and ‘is not confined to material benefit but includes other forms of benefit such as 
social, mental and spiritual benefit’,214 but there are limits.215 Recent English cases 
have sought to classify benefits into three types of benefit: direct, indirect and wider 
benefits.  
Direct benefits [are] benefits to persons whose needs it is a purpose of the 
charity to relieve which are received by such persons as recipients of the 
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main services which the charity provides … Indirect benefits [are] benefits 
to persons whose needs it is a purpose of the charity to relieve which are 
received by such persons otherwise than as recipients of the main service 
which the charity provides … Wider benefits [are] benefits other than direct 
and indirect benefits which are received by the community at large from the 
activities of the charity.216 
Jonathan Garton observes that the distinction between an indirect benefit and a wider 
benefit is unclear with ‘both being benefit that accrues to people other than the 
recipients of the main service which the charity provides’.217 He notes that this lack 
of clarity is evidenced within the judgment R (Independent Schools Council) v 
Charity Commission for England and Wales, where some sections treat ‘indirect 
benefit and wider benefit as two distinct concepts, but in others [consider] the former 
to include the latter’.218 Garton also finds that it has also been interpreted differently 
by judges where, for example, one ‘described the advancement of animal welfare as 
an illustration of indirect benefit [while another described it] as an example of wider 
benefit’.  
It is the concept of public benefit embodied in the definition of charity that 
justifies the preferential tax treatment afforded to charities.219 As stated by Lord 
Cross in Dingle v Turner, a case involving whether fiscal privileges should be 
considered in deciding whether a particular trust or gift was charitable:  
[T]here would be no reason for the courts not to look favourably on the 
claim of any ‘purpose’ trust to be considered as a charity if it seemed 
calculated to confer some real benefit on those intended to benefit by it 
whoever they might be … Charities automatically enjoy fiscal privileges 
which with the increased burden of taxation have become more and more 
important and in deciding that such and such a trust is a charitable trust the 
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court is endowing it with a substantial annual subsidy at the expense of the 
taxpayer.220 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the charitable tax 
concessions are justified because charities confer a public benefit.221 The charitable 
tax concessions have in turn provided ‘the lifeblood for much of modern charity law’ 
in common law jurisdictions.222 The growth in the amount and types of taxes in the 
20th century ‘explains why most of the “modern” case law on charities stems from 
disputes relating to fiscal exemptions or concessions’.223  
Who is the ‘Public’ that should Benefit from Charity?  
With public benefit justifying charities’ preferential tax treatment, what was 
the judicial conception of the ‘public’ who should ‘benefit’ from charity? A number 
of cases spanning more than a century suggest that the public is not confined to those 
in the jurisdiction in which the charity is based.224 In 1858, the House of Lords found 
that a trust for the advancement of education ‘in every part of the world so as 
circumstances will permit’ was held to be charitable.225 Similarly in Pemsel, a 
charitable trust established in the UK pursuant to which some funds were directed to 
support and advance ‘the missionary establishments among heathen nations of the 
Protestant Episcopal Church’ was held to be valid.226 In Camille and Henry Dreyfus 
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Foundation Inc v Inland Revenue Commissioners (‘Dreyfus Foundation’)227 Jenkins 
LJ observed: 
One might expect that the community or public or section thereof, some 
benefit to whom is held to be an essential ingredient in all charity should be 
the community, or public or section thereof, existing in our own country and 
not a foreign community or foreign public. But the authorities do not bear 
this out.228 
Indeed, in both the UK229 and Australia,230 the courts have heat upheld trusts 
covering a wide range of charitable purposes to be carried out overseas, provided that 
they do not contravene policy in the home jurisdiction.231 
Beyond case law, this broader view of public benefit also finds support in the 
UK and Australia in administrative guidance. The position of the Charity 
Commission of England and Wales is as follows:  
A purpose may be charitable even if all its potential beneficiaries are outside 
England and Wales … The Commission’s approach is to consider whether 
the purpose would be charitable if it were confined to England and Wales. If 
                                                             
 
227 [1954] Ch 672. 
228 [1954] Ch 672, 704. 
229 Ironmongers’ Co v A-G (1844) 10 Cl & Fin 908 (relief of poverty); Armstrong v Reeves (1890) 
25 LR Ir 325 (Ch) (animal welfare); Re Geck (1893) 69 LT 819 (relief of poverty in Germany); Re 
Vagliano (1905) 75 LJ Ch 119 (charitable objects generally); Re Redish (1909) 26 TLR 42 
(advancement of religion); Re Robinson [1931] 2 Ch 122 (relief of those in needs due to ill-
health); Re Jacobs (1970) 114 SJ 515 (planting of trees); Re Niyazi’s Will Trusts [1978] 1WLR 910 
(relief of poverty); Human Dignity Trust v The Charity Commission for England and Wales [2014] 
UKFTT (First Tier Tribunal (Charity)) (promotion of human rights). 
230 Re Pieper [1951] VLR 42 (relief of distress in Europe); Kytherian Association of Queensland v 
Sklavos (1958) 101 CLR 56 (advancement of healthcare in Greece); Estate of Schultz [1961] 
SASR 377 (advancement of education in Germany); Re Lowin [1967] 2 NSWR 140 (advancement 
of music in Austria); Re Stone (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 704 (promoting the settlement of Jews in 
Israel); McGrath v Cohen [1978] 1 NSWLR 621 (gift to Hebrew University in Israel); Lander v 
Whitbread [1982] 2 NSWLR 530 (advancement of education in Israel); Goldwyn v Mazal [2003] 
NSWSC 427 (assisting the neurologically impaired and communicatively handicapped in Israel). 
231 For example, supporting the armed forces of a foreign state, results in a detriment to the 
home jurisdiction outweighs the public benefit. See Dreyfus Foundation [1954] Ch 672, 684 per 
Evershed MR, 704–5 per Jenkins LJ; Re Lowin [1967] 2 NSWLR 140, 146 (Wallace P and Holmes 
JA).  
 48 Chapter 2: The Australian Philanthropic Landscape 
it is, the Commission will recognise it as charitable unless it would be 
contrary to United Kingdom public policy to do so.232 
In the Australian Report of the Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related 
Organisations, Ian Sheppard, Robert Fitzgerald and David Gonski noted that:  
The definitional principles we are recommending are not intended to 
differentiate on the basis of the location of the beneficiary. In our view, 
public benefit is a universal concept and cannot be contained within the 
boundaries of any country.233  
Can Charitable Objects Performed Overseas ‘Benefit’ the Public in the 
Home Jurisdiction? 
While it is well established that charitable objects may be performed overseas, 
the authorities are not settled as to whether a purpose carried out in another country 
is charitable because it is for the benefit of the public in the home jurisdiction or 
because the potential foreign beneficiaries constitute the public or a sufficient section 
of the public.234 One line of precedent has required no link to a benefit in the home 
jurisdiction. Evershed MR in Dreyfus Foundation235 observed ‘there are undoubtedly 
instances of trusts being held or regarded as charitable which were exclusively for 
the benefit of objects outside the United Kingdom’.236 In Armenian Patriarch of 
Jerusalem v Sonsino,237 Jacob J, in determining that a trust for the advancement in 
life of Armenian children was a charitable purpose in England, rejected the ‘general 
idea … that benefiting a foreign public will only suffice if there is a knock-on effect’ 
in the home jurisdiction.238 In the recent case of Human Dignity Trust v The Charity 
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Commission for England and Wales (‘Human Dignity Trust’),239 where the 
appellant’s purposes were to promote and protect the human rights of those 
throughout the world affected by the criminalisation of private consensual 
homosexual conduct, the charity tribunal stated: ‘we are not satisfied that it is 
necessary for [the appellant] to demonstrate that there will be a benefit to the public 
in England and Wales arising from its activities abroad’.240 
Another line of precedent has sought to establish a benefit to the public in the 
home jurisdiction. In Dreyfus Foundation, Evershed MR noted: 
It may be that on very broad and general grounds, relief of poverty or 
distress in any part of the world, or the advancement of the Christian religion 
in any part of the world, would be regarded as being for the benefit of the 
community in the United Kingdom.241   
Similarly, in Re Lowin242 the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that a 
charitable trust providing for a musical competition in Vienna was valid because 
music is of ‘universal interest’ and advancing music in Austria had a ‘sufficient 
nexus’ with the benefit of a substantial section of the Australian public.243 
The trust in the present case is a trust for the advancement of education 
through music which speaks a universal language and knows no territorial 
boundaries. The adjective ‘national’ can be applied to music only in a 
restricted sense and the music of each nation educates the musical 
development and sense of the people of other nations.244  
This decision suggests that the ‘universal’ nature of many charitable purposes may 
still provide a direct benefit to the home jurisdiction even when conducted overseas. 
In Human Dignity Trust, the UK Charity Tribunal determined that: 
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 [I]t is for the public benefit of the community in England and Wales (and, 
indeed, the UK), as well as in the country where such a contravention [of 
international human rights law] occurs, for this situation to be addressed and 
for the human rights standards recognised by the international community to 
be promoted and protected … There may [also] be an identifiable public 
benefit to the community in the UK if [the appellant’s] activities may be 
seen to contribute to the development of effective measures to tackle the 
spread of HIV infection worldwide.245 
In addition to the arts, human rights and medical research illustrated in these cases, 
there are many other charitable purposes that are not confined by territorial 
boundaries.246 
In Dreyfus Foundation, Jenkins LJ questioned whether the public benefit in the 
case of charitable purposes carried out overseas should be viewed as consisting of a 
‘direct benefit provided for the foreign public concerned, or in some secondary and 
indirect benefit in the shape (for instance) of moral improvement, assumed to be 
conferred on the public at home’.247 The English scholar Harvey Cohen advocated 
the latter, stating: 
An argument can be advanced in the case of all charitable trusts which 
operate outside the United Kingdom that they will, of necessity, only 
indirectly benefit the inhabitants of the United Kingdom and that benefit in 
all cases must be moral. 248  
Cohen cited cases involving animal welfare trusts, trusts for procuring the abolition 
of torture, and trusts to develop the arts in any part of the world as charitable 
purposes that ‘know no narrow national boundaries’ and are ‘of moral benefit to the 
                                                             
 
245 [2014] UKFTT (First Tier Tribunal (Charity)), 20[78]. 
246 For eg relief of poverty (see Ironmongers’ Co v A-G (1844) 10 Cl & Fin 908; Re Geck (1893) 69 
LT 819 and Re Niyazi’s Will Trusts [1978] 1WLR 910); promoting animal welfare (see Armstrong 
v Reeves (1890) 25 LR Ir 325; advancement of health (see Re Robinson [1931] 2 Ch 122; 
Kytherian Association of Queensland v Sklavos (1958) 101 CLR 56); environmental preservation 
(see Re Jacobs (1970) 114 SJ 515; advancement of education (McGrath v Cohen [1978] 1 NSWLR 
621); Lander v Whitbread [1982] 2 NSWLR 530). 
247 [1954] Ch 672, 704–5.  
248 Harvey Cohen, ‘Charities – A Utilitarian Perspective’ (1983) 36(1) Current Legal Problems 
241, 254.  
 Chapter 2: The Australian Philanthropic Landscape 51 
community in the [home jurisdiction]’.249 There are many charitable purposes, such 
as disaster relief and eradicating global health epidemics, that by relieving a need 
overseas ‘discharge a moral obligation on the populace at home to respond to that 
need, and thus their pursuit results in a public benefit at home’.250 
The universal concept of public benefit developed in charity law suggests that 
the ‘public’ who should ‘benefit’ from charity extends beyond national borders. With 
a broad concept of public benefit justifying the preferential tax treatment for 
charities, this supports the idea that charitable objects performed overseas provide 
benefits to the home jurisdiction in the form of either a direct benefit or an indirect 
(moral) benefit. This broader idea of public benefit found in charity law has 
important implications for tax law. The following section examines the origins and 
development of the Australian provisions allowing a tax deduction for charitable 
gifts and their impact on cross-border donations. 
2.3.2 Legislative History of the Gift Deduction and its Geographic Restrictions 
Early History of Australian Nonprofit Tax Law 
Together with the adoption of the English common law model of charity, the 
Australian colonies also embraced a ‘British style of charity’,251 with churches and 
citizens being the primary drivers of voluntary sector activities and organisations 
from the early 1800s.252 The colonial governments ‘encouraged leading colonists and 
their wives to form and support nonprofit organisations and to provide services’.253 
These early colonists responded by forming citizen committees to run voluntary 
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public societies based on member subscriptions, delivering a wide range of social 
services that were subsidised by government for their running and capital costs.254  
Australia’s involvement in the First World War had many implications for the 
country,255 one of which was a need to raise revenue to maintain the war effort.256 
The Commonwealth Government introduced three new taxes in three years, 
including the first federal income tax in 1915.257 Until that time, only state 
governments imposed income tax, with the Commonwealth relying on customs and 
excise duties for most of its revenue.258 During the Second World War, the 
Commonwealth assumed exclusive control over the income tax in 1942.259 In doing 
so, the Commonwealth extended the reach of the tax, enabling the Government to 
dramatically increase the provision of social services.260  
The uniqueness of colonial systems of poor relief continued into the 20th 
century with the emergence of the welfare state. At the turn of the century 
Australians were not afraid to forge new social policies for the fledgling 
nation and many believed that Australia had become the ‘social laboratory of 
the world’. The consequence was a system of social benefits financed from 
general revenue.261 
This colonial model of welfare provision combining private charity through the 
delivery of public services with significant government subsidies continued to 
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provide the basis for the new welfare state.262 Under this model, ‘state responsibility 
was held at arms length by working through largely autonomous and informal 
charities’.263  
In the latter half of the 20th century, the growth of Australia’s nonprofit sector 
and the degree of government support resulted in increased government regulation, 
although concern about the sector did not extend to establishing an independent 
charity regulator. As a result, much of this regulation has been conducted via the 
federal income tax system through the tax law, with the Australian Taxation Office 
(ATO) responsible for administering and enforcing tax law for nonprofit 
organisations. With the recent establishment of the ACNC as Australia’s national 
charity regulator, nonprofit regulation has increased, as registered charities now have 
reporting obligations and governance standards enforced by the ACNC.264  
A number of federal tax concessions are available to nonprofit organisations, 
with the principal concessions being exemption from income tax, goods and services 
tax concessions, fringe benefits tax concessions and gift deductibility.265 Enacted 
with the first Commonwealth legislation introducing personal income tax in 1915, 
the gift deduction has been an enduring feature of Australia’s federal income tax 
system. The next section examines the origins of gift deductibility in Australia. 
State Legislation: Early Victorian Statutes 
The Australian tradition of providing favourable tax treatment for nonprofit 
organisations has it origins in British law,266 with tax exemptions appearing in the 
Australian colonial statutes well before federation in 1901.267 The gift deduction first 
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appeared in Australian legislation after federation in two Victorian statutes, which 
provided for deductions for gifts to certain institutions ‘situate within Victoria.’268 
The Income Tax Act 1907 (Vic) stated:  
In estimating the income for any year of any taxpayer liable to tax there shall 
be deducted from the gross amount of such taxpayer's income any gift of any 
sum over Twenty pounds paid by him during such year to or for any free 
public library or any free public museum or any public institution for the 
promotion of science and art … Provided that such public library or museum 
or other public institution is situate within Victoria.269 
The Administration and Probate Duties Act 1907 (Vic) exempted ‘public charitable 
bequests’ and ‘public charitable settlements’ to certain public institutions from 
administration and probate duties with the proviso that ‘such public library or 
museum or other public institution is situate within Victoria’.270 The wording in these 
two statutes indicates that the geographic restriction was based on the physical 
location of the institution. 
An Industry Commission report on Charitable Organisations in Australia 
found that the language in these Victorian provisions, which continues to apply to 
some trusts today as they were created by wills when this language was in force, has 
caused problems for trustees in restricting trust distributions to Victorian-based 
organisations.271 As a result, the Commission recommended amending the legislation 
to waive the geographic restrictions.272 These findings serve as a cautionary tale for 
enacting geographic restrictions that impact charitable distributions well into the 
future. 
                                                             
 
268 For an interesting discussion of the parliamentary debates that led to this legislation, see 
ibid, 101–4. 
269 Income Tax Act 1907 (Vic) s 3. Emphasis added. 
270 Administration and Probate Duties Act 1907 (Vic) s 3(2). Emphasis added. 
271 For example, Administration and Probate Act 1928 (Vic) s 160; Administration and Probate 
Act 1953 (Vic) s 117; and Probate Duties Act 1962 (Vic) s 21. See Industry Commission, 
‘Charitable Organisations in Australia’ (Report No 45, AGPS, 1995) 253.  
272 See Industry Commission, above n 271, 254. 
 Chapter 2: The Australian Philanthropic Landscape 55 
ITAA 1915: Section 18(h) 
The Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 (Cth) (‘ITAA 1915’) contained the first 
federal gift deductibility provision:273 
18. In calculating the taxable income of a taxpayer the total income derived 
by the taxpayer from all sources in Australia shall be taken as a basis, and 
from it there shall be deducted — (h) gifts exceeding Twenty pounds each to 
public charitable institutions in Australia and contributions exceeding Five 
pounds in the aggregate in respect of each object of contribution made 
during the continuance of the present war to any public fund established in 
any part of the King's Dominions or in any country in alliance with Great 
Britain for any purpose connected with the present war: Provided that 
payments shall not be allowable as deductions under this paragraph unless 
verified to the satisfaction of the Commissioner.274 
The provision of gifts over twenty pounds ‘to public charitable institutions in 
Australia’ in s 18(h) of the ITAA 1915 represents the origins of the gift deduction’s 
‘in Australia’ requirement. The wording was likely based on the gift deductibility 
provisions in the two earlier Victorian statutes requiring that gifts be made to 
charitable institutions ‘situate within Victoria’,275 which indicates that the ‘in 
Australia’ restriction was based on the physical location of the institution. 
 Section 18(h) also provided for a deduction for contributions over five pounds 
to public funds overseas, specifically to countries in the King’s Dominions and Great 
Britain’s allies in World War I. While the Bill as originally conceived had provided 
for ‘contributions … made during the continuance of the present war to any public 
fund established in Australia for any purpose connected with the present war,’276 the 
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Attorney-General amended this provision to remove ‘Australia’ and replace it with 
‘any part of the King's Dominions, or in any country in alliance with Great 
Britain’.277 In doing so, the Attorney-General clearly viewed this provision as 
allowing a deduction for overseas donations only. The Bill returned from the Senate 
with language containing a deduction for both domestic and international donations, 
at it appeared in the final legislation.278 Even with these early differences of opinion 
regarding the geographic parameters of gift deduction, it is clear that the ability to 
obtain a gift deduction pursuant to s 18(h) was based on the physical location of the 
recipient organisation. 
ITAA 1922: Section 23(h) 
The early differences of opinion extended to questioning the very existence of 
gift deductibility in the Australian legislation. A Royal Commission on Taxation was 
appointed in September 1920 to provide recommendations for a revised income tax 
assessment act.279 In its 1922 report, the Commission strongly recommended that the 
gift deductibility provision be omitted from the revised act,280 on the basis that it was 
not in the public interest for the provision to be retained. The Commission gave two 
reasons for this conclusion. First, the inequities produced between taxpayers on 
different income tax rates, with a gift by a taxpayer on a higher tax rate making a 
greater revenue contribution than the same gift by a taxpayer on a lower rate. 
Second, the Commission questioned the gift deduction’s ability to stimulate 
charitable giving.281   
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The Income Tax Assessment Act 1922 (Cth) (‘ITAA 1922’), which incorporated 
many of the Commission’s recommendations, did not adopt the recommendation to 
repeal the gift deduction. Instead, it contained a slightly altered gift deduction 
provision:  
23. (1) In calculating the taxable income of a taxpayer the total assessable 
income derived by the taxpayer from all sources in Australia shall be taken 
as a basis, and from it there shall be deducted — (h) (i) contributions made 
to the Department of Repatriation or to any public authority for the purpose 
of being handed over to the Department of Repatriation … and (ii) gifts 
exceeding Five pounds each made, during the year in which the income was 
derived, to public charitable institutions in Australia, if the gifts are 
verified to the satisfaction of the Commissioner.282 
 The Explanatory Memorandum noted that ‘owing to the termination of the 
war’, there was no longer a need to reference donations to public funds overseas for 
purposes connected with World War I.283 It replaced this provision with deductions 
for contributions to the Department of Repatriation.284 The Explanatory 
Memorandum also gave some indication of the meaning ‘in Australia’ in relation to 
another subsection dealing with the deductibility of ‘losses and outgoings’. In that 
subsection, the wording ‘incurred in Australia’ was to be interpreted as meaning 
‘decided upon in Australia by the controlling authority, although the actual 
expenditure might be made outside Australia’.285 Again, this language points to the 
physical location being the primary determinant for accessing the tax concession. 
ITAA 1936: Section 78 
A second Royal Commission on Taxation was established in 1932 in an effort 
to simplify and standardise the taxation laws of the Commonwealth and states and 
make recommendations on achieving uniform legislation.286 As part of its inquiries, 
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the Commission considered deductibility of gifts and donations to charitable 
institutions, but in contrast to the first Royal Commission on Taxation, the focus was 
no longer on the merits of the gift deduction, reflecting its entrenchment in 
Australian income tax law.287 Instead, the Commission was primarily concerned with 
the parameters of the gift deduction. In its final report, the Commission 
recommended ‘that a deduction be allowed for gifts of one pound and upwards made 
during the year of income to charitable institutions which carry on their functions 
within the jurisdiction of the taxing authority’.288  In this event, ‘the Commonwealth 
would allow deductions to a charitable institution in Australia, and each State would 
allow donations to similar institutions within the State’.289 This language evidences 
that the policy intent of the ‘in Australia’ requirement is that an organisation’s 
‘functions’ are carried out in Australia, which suggests that in addition to being 
physically located in Australia, the organisation has its operations in Australia.  
The ‘in Australia’ wording was raised at the Conference of Commonwealth 
and State Commissioners of Taxation to discuss recommendations of the Royal 
Commission in 1935.290 At the conference, the Commonwealth Commissioner for 
Taxation maintained that the federal law covered only charitable institutions in 
Australia, and indicated that donations made directly to a fund located overseas 
would not be covered by the deduction provisions.291 The second Commission’s 
work resulted in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (‘ITAA 1936’). Under the 
ITAA 1936, the gift deductibility provisions grew considerably from the previous 
Acts and were designated their own section, which provided: 
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78. (1) The following shall … be allowable deductions: (a) Gifts of the value 
of one pound and upwards made by the taxpayer in the year of income to any 
of the following funds, authorities or institutions in Australia: (i) a public 
hospital; (ii) a public benevolent institution; (iii) a public fund established 
and maintained for the purpose of providing money for public hospitals or 
public benevolent institutions in Australia, or for the establishment of such 
hospitals or institutions, or for the relief of persons in Australia who are in 
necessitous circumstances; (iv) a public authority engaged in research into 
the causes, prevention or cure of disease in human beings, animals or plants, 
where the gift is for such research, or a public institution engaged solely in 
such research; (v) a public university or a public fund for the establishment 
of a public university; (vi) a residential educational institution affiliated 
under statutory provisions with a public university, or established by the 
Commonwealth; and (vii) a public fund established and maintained for 
providing money for the construction or maintenance of a public memorial 
relating to the war which commenced on the fourth day of August, One 
thousand nine hundred and fourteen.292 
This extended provision included the ‘in Australia’ requirement as both a general 
condition for gift deductibility, as well as an express limitation for certain types of 
funds and institutions. The Explanatory Memorandum said little on the meaning of 
‘in Australia’ in its use as a general overarching rule and as a limitation in the 
subsections, noting only that the phrase ‘in Australia’ was included in sub-s 78(1)(iii) 
‘to make the intention of the law clear’.293 Unfortunately, its inclusion had the 
opposite effect, creating uncertainty over the meaning in both instances.  
This uncertainty was reflected in two conflicting internal memoranda 
distributed by the ATO. The first memorandum, the Canberra Income Tax Circular 
Memorandum 806 (‘CM 806’), was circulated following the 1961 Conference of 
Deputy Commissioners, where it was determined that senior officers delegated by 
Deputy Commissioners could make decisions of whether gifts should be allowable 
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deductions under s 78.294 The objective of the memorandum was to provide guidance 
for approving officers on questions arising as to the meaning of ‘gift’ under s 78 and 
the approval of institutions and funds pursuant to s 78.295 With respect to the 
approval of public benevolent institutions (PBIs), paragraph 26 of CM 806 addressed 
the meaning of ‘in Australia’ in s 78, advising that 
the words ‘in Australia’ refer to the location of the institution and not to the 
persons who are to benefit from the institution’s activities. If the public 
benevolent institution is in Australia, it is not essential that the granting of 
assistance be limited to persons in Australia.296 
With respect to the approval of certain public funds, paragraph 36 stated: 
Public funds providing relief for persons in necessitous circumstances will 
qualify for approval only if those persons are in Australia. Similarly, public 
hospitals, non-profit hospitals or public benevolent institutions which are to 
benefit from a public fund must be in Australia.297   
CM 806 makes it clear that pursuant to s 78, the ‘in Australia’ condition for PBIs 
refers to their physical location only, and does not require that their purposes or 
beneficiaries be in Australia.  
Six years later, an internal memorandum was circulated to all Deputy 
Commissioners in response to decisions that had been made pursuant to paragraph 26 
of CM 806. The purpose of the 1967 memorandum was to provide guidance in 
deciding claims under s 78 in relation to institutions and funds ‘which have as their 
principal object the provision of relief for persons who are not resident in 
Australia’.298 The memorandum explained that the comments in paragraph 26 of CM 
806:  
                                                             
 
294 Commissioner of Taxation, Gifts to Public Hospitals, Public Benevolent Institutions, Etc 
(Canberra Income Tax Circular Memorandum No 806, 10 November 1961) [1], 1. 
295 Ibid [3], 1. 
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298 First Assistant Commissioner of Taxation, Organisations Concerned with Overseas Relief, 
J106/82/2 Pt. 26, 13 January 1967, para 1, 1. 
 Chapter 2: The Australian Philanthropic Landscape 61 
were based primarily on the particular case of the Australian Red Cross 
Society which, some years previously, had been approved as a public 
benevolent institution in Australia although its charter authorised the use of 
the Society’s funds outside Australia. The approval, however, was based on 
an understanding that the main function of the society is to carry out 
benevolent work in Australia, that it can sponsor appeals for funds overseas 
only where these funds are distributed by a Red Cross organisation in the 
relevant area and that, in practice, the proportion of Australian Red Cross 
moneys applied to overseas projects is insignificant.299 
The memorandum further explained: ‘It is the clear intention of the income tax 
legislation that deductions should be limited in general to gifts made to organisations 
which render aid to needy residents of Australia’.300 As a result, an organisation 
concerned with the provision of relief overseas ‘should not be treated as a PBI in 
Australia if its benevolent work is carried out mainly overseas’.301 The ATO’s 
interpretation of ‘in Australia’ in this memorandum represented a significant revision 
of its interpretation in CM 806, which had reflected the statutory origins of ‘in 
Australia’ referring simply to the physical location of an organisation. In its place, 
the 1967 memorandum adopted a far broader meaning of ‘in Australia’, requiring 
that not only must the organisation be located in Australia, but its activities and 
beneficiaries must also be in Australia.  
Until very recently, this has been the ATO’s position. In a 1987 taxation ruling, 
the Commissioner, noting the precedential value of the 1967 memorandum, 
determined that a PBI whose purpose was to provide financial assistance to people in 
necessitous circumstances in a country overseas should be denied the ability to 
receive tax deductible gifts pursuant to s 78 because its purposes and beneficiaries 
                                                             
 
299 First Assistant Commissioner of Taxation, Organisations Concerned with Overseas Relief, 
J106/82/2 Pt. 26, 13 January 1967, para 4, 1. 
300 First Assistant Commissioner of Taxation, Organisations Concerned with Overseas Relief, 
J106/82/2 Pt. 26, 13 January 1967, para 2, 1. 
301 First Assistant Commissioner of Taxation, Organisations Concerned with Overseas Relief, 
J106/82/2 Pt. 26, 13 January 1967, para 7, 2. 
 62 Chapter 2: The Australian Philanthropic Landscape 
were located overseas.302 This position culminated in 2003 with the most recent 
public ruling on PBIs, where the Commissioner determined that a PBI must be 
‘established, controlled, maintained and operated in Australia and its benevolent 
purposes must be in Australia’.303 More recently, the ATO’s position appears to be 
shifting, with modifications being made to its taxation guide and website, and the 
issuing of a detailed ‘in Australia’ discussion paper. These are discussed in detail in s 
3.3 below. 
In the intervening years, s 78 grew considerably, reflecting both the growth of 
Australia’s nonprofit sector and the perception of its importance.304 As a result of the 
ATO’s strict interpretation of the ‘in Australia’ requirement since 1967, gifts to 
organisations with overseas beneficiaries were not deductible for income tax 
purposes.305 In 1980, a call for an amendment to s 78 to provide tax deductibility for 
gifts to international aid organisations was made through parliamentary petitions306 
and members of Parliament. Senator Missen, one of the most vocal proponents, 
questioned the ‘apparent discrimination that at present exists against overseas aid 
agencies’:307  
Will the Minister inform the Senate why tax deductibility is granted for gifts 
to local charities but not to donations made through agencies such as 
Community Aid Abroad and World Vision? Does the Minister agree that 
Australia's economic difficulties are small compared with the dehumanizing 
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daily struggle faced by hundreds of millions of people in other countries to 
secure decent food, housing, health and work? Does he also agree that the 
Australian Government has both a moral and an intellectual responsibility to 
stand with those Australians who choose to give to overseas aid? If so, will 
he assure the Senate that consideration will be given by the Government to 
allowing tax deductibility to those overseas aid agencies which have 
demonstrated the ability to deliver overseas aid effectively at a grassroots 
level?308 
The Government responded to these repeated calls for changes to the gift 
deductibility provisions in the 1980–81 Budget, with the Treasurer announcing in his 
Budget Speech that the Government had decided to allow taxation deductions for 
gifts to eligible organisations providing assistance to developing countries.309 This 
was followed by an amendment to s 78 of the ITAA 1936 in 1981,310 ‘introduc[ing] a 
scheme to authorise deductions for gifts to certain public funds maintained for the 
relief of persons in developing countries’,311 which became the Overseas Aid Gift 
Deduction Scheme (OAGDS).312 
The introduction of the international aid exception to the ‘in Australia’ 
requirement created greater uncertainty around the meaning of ‘in Australia’ in s 78. 
Specifically, it raised the question of how allowing gift deductibility for donations to 
organisations with overseas purposes and beneficiaries could be consistent with the 
‘in Australia’ requirement, mandating (as enunciated by the ATO) that an 
organisation’s purposes and beneficiaries be in Australia. It was simply not possible 
for an overseas aid fund maintained for the relief of people in developing countries to 
be ‘in Australia’. The only way to reconcile these conflicting provisions is if the ‘in 
Australia’ requirement referred to physical location only, which would enable the 
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overseas aid provision to allow a deduction for gifts to funds established in Australia 
for the purpose of providing relief to people outside Australia.  
The international aid exception was not the only inconsistency in s 78 arising 
from the ATO’s strict interpretation of ‘in Australia’. With the expansion of s 78 
over the years, the number of sub-paragraphs containing express ‘in Australia’ 
limitations grew to encompass not only necessitous circumstances funds and public 
hospital funds, but also public funds providing religious instruction in government 
schools, Australian disaster relief funds, Australian war memorial funds, public funds 
for family counselling or family dispute resolution, and marriage guidance funds. 
The express inclusion of a geographic limitation in these sub-paragraphs appears to 
make the overarching ‘in Australia’ general condition at the beginning of s 78 
redundant. Like the overseas aid exception, the only way these conflicting ‘in 
Australia’ provisions could be reconciled is if the meaning of ‘in Australia’ in the 
overarching general condition referred to an organisation’s physical location only 
and the specific limitations in the sub-paragraphs extended to an organisation’s 
purposes and beneficiaries.  
ITAA 1997: Division 30 
In 1993, the Joint Committee of Public Accounts recommended that 
Australia’s income tax law be rewritten, which led to the Tax Law Improvement 
Project, resulting in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (‘ITAA 1997’).313 As part 
of this project, the long list of DGRs that had been progressively introduced into the 
legislation since the mid‐1930s were divided into categories to remove the clutter 
and make the provision easier to understand.314 These provisions were later 
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rewritten315 and, as a reflection of their entrenched position in Australian income tax 
law, were designated their own division in the ITAA 1997: div 30. Under div 30, the 
gift deductibility provisions are extensive and detailed.316 Australian residents can 
deduct from their taxable income the value of donations of $2 or more made to a 
DGR. Eligible donations include gifts of cash as well as certain non-cash items, such 
as property, trading stock and shares.317 
 The ‘in Australia’ general condition for gift deductibility is set out in the table 
in s 30-15 under ‘Special Conditions’, which states that ‘the fund, authority or 
institution must be in Australia’.318 Following its predecessor, Div 30 also contains 
express ‘in Australia’ limitations for certain categories of funds, including public 
funds providing religious instruction or ethics in government schools,319 Australian 
disaster relief funds,320 necessitous circumstances funds,321 Australian war memorial 
funds,322 public funds for family counselling or family dispute resolution,323 and 
marriage guidance funds.324 The result is that the inconsistencies contained in s 78 
arising from the ATO’s strict interpretation of the phrase ‘in Australia’ remain today, 
creating uncertainty for both organisations and their donors seeking to engage in 
cross-border charitable activities. 
In an attempt to provide greater clarity to the ‘in Australia’ provisions, the 
Government has proposed a reform agenda with specific policy imperatives that 
seeks to further limit the ability of Australian organisations and their donors to 
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engage in tax deductible cross-border charitable activities.325 Through these proposed 
reforms to tighten Australia’s tax laws surrounding cross-border philanthropy, the 
Government is signalling its commitment to a water’s edge policy of tightly 
controlled geographic boundaries around charitable giving. With national boundaries 
around philanthropy starting to blur, the policy rationale for restricting the ability of 
donors to engage in tax-effective cross-border philanthropy requires further scrutiny. 
The next section examines this policy rationale in detail, with chapter 3 providing a 
comprehensive analysis of the current tax laws surrounding cross-border 
philanthropy and the Government’s proposed reform agenda. 
2.3.3 Policy Rationale for the Gift Deduction’s Geographic Restrictions 
The policy rationale for the gift deduction is not set out in the legislation; 
however, successive Australian governments have made it clear that the purpose of 
the deduction is to assist nonprofit organisations in attracting public support for their 
activities and to promote philanthropic giving.326 The rationale is that by increasing 
giving to these organisations, more goods and services will be produced with public 
benefits.327 The gift deduction is therefore the primary tax incentive used by the 
Australian Government to encourage philanthropy, making charitable gifts less 
expensive for donors than they would be otherwise.328  
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The policy rationale for the geographic restrictions contained in the gift 
deductibility provisions has been less clearly articulated. While the ‘in Australia’ 
requirement for gift deductibility has existed since the gift deduction first appeared in 
the federal income tax legislation in 1915, the meaning of the phrase ‘in Australia’ 
has changed over time. From its inception until 1967, ‘in Australia’ generally 
referred to an organisation’s physical location.329 Following the ATO’s 1967 
memorandum, the meaning of ‘in Australia’ shifted to defining and limiting the 
geographic scope of an organisation’s purposes, activities and beneficiaries, 
culminating in the proposed ‘in Australia’ reforms seeking to further tighten the 
Australian tax laws around cross-border giving. 
It was not until the Bill introducing these proposed reforms, the Tax Laws 
Amendment (Special Conditions for Not-for-profit Concessions) Bill 2012 (‘In 
Australia Bill’), that the Government clearly articulated the policy rationale 
underlying the ‘in Australia’ requirements for both gift deductibility and income tax 
exemption. In the Bill’s second reading speech, the Assistant Treasurer stated that  
publicly funded tax concessions are intended to be used for the broad benefit 
of the Australian community, with some exceptions. In addition, without 
appropriate oversight, there is a risk of funds being misdirected to 
inappropriate and unauthorised activities outside Australia, such as money 
laundering and terrorist financing.330  
From this speech and as further elaborated in the Explanatory Materials to the Bill’s 
exposure drafts, there are two policy imperatives underlying the ‘in Australia’ 
requirements and their proposed reforms.331 These are: 
 to protect the national tax base by ensuring that publicly-funded tax 
concessions are used for the broad benefit of the Australian community; 
and332 
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 to prevent nonprofit organisations being used for tax abuse purposes of 
money laundering, offshore avoidance arrangements and terrorist 
financing.333 
These two imperatives to restrict cross-border tax concessions come up against the 
underlying policy rationale for the gift deduction generally, to serve as a tax 
incentive to facilitate philanthropic giving. The Government appears to have 
reconciled these conflicting policies by limiting the reach of the gift deduction to 
encouraging philanthropy in Australia. The following sections examine each of these 
policy imperatives to understand both the level of call upon the fisc for subsidy, as 
well as the potential tax abuse risk profile.  
Revenue Concerns: Cost to the Fisc 
The Government has made it clear that publicly funded taxpayer concessions 
should be used for the broad benefit of Australians.334 During the second reading of 
the In Australia Bill, the Assistant Treasurer noted the ‘longstanding policy of 
successive governments that DGRs should operate only in Australia, for the benefit 
of the Australian public’.335 The Explanatory Materials to the most recent exposure 
draft of the In Australia Bill added the broader justification of protecting the 
‘material amounts of revenue that would otherwise be forgone’.336 However, none of 
the Explanatory Memoranda provide an estimate of the revenue costs associated with 
cross-border giving.337  
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The gift deduction can impact the fisc through both administrative costs and 
the cost of the subsidy for donations that are claimed as a tax deduction. Because 
Australia generally does not require nonprofit organisations to file tax returns, the 
costs of the subsidy are difficult to measure. As a result, the data needed to make a 
reliable estimate of the revenue impact of deductions to DGRs engaged overseas 
does not exist.338  
To date, the Government does not appear to have been challenged on its policy 
position that strict geographic limits on the deductibility provisions are necessary due 
to the significant drain on the fisc.339 While a lack of reliable data from deductions to 
DGRs engaged overseas makes it difficult to challenge the Government’s policy 
focusing on the fiscal impact, it is possible nonetheless to make a rough estimate. 
Treasury’s Tax Expenditures Statement 2014 shows that in 2012–13, the deduction 
for gifts to DGRs cost AUD1.01 billion.340 Based on ACFID’s data, 10 per cent of 
these gifts are directed to DGRs operating overseas,341 with a resulting cost to the 
fisc for the deduction for cross-border gifts of approximately AUD101 million, 
representing a relatively minor cost to Treasury when compared to the total cost of 
the subsidy for gifts to DGRs of AUD1.1 billion.  
Whether the floodgates would be opened by liberalising gift deductibility for 
cross-border philanthropy is also difficult to verify. If cross-border giving statistics 
had been retained, they might show that channelling is accounting for a significant 
proportion of cross-border charitable activity. Evidence from the liberalisation of the 
tax treatment for cross-border donations in Europe indicates that it has had a minimal 
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revenue impact, supported by tax expenditure data from the Netherlands, where there 
is equal tax treatment for domestic and cross-border donations.342 
Focusing solely on the deduction’s costs distracts from the need to undertake a 
cost-benefit analysis of the deduction’s actual impact. Any calculation of the 
potential cost to the fisc of the deduction for cross-border gifts also needs to calculate 
the potential benefits that flow from this tax expenditure.343 That is, the larger social 
aims of the deduction and the reach of the social benefits it delivers become 
important. These benefits, which include the generation of ‘soft power’ for the 
Australian Government and the production of global public goods for the benefit of 
Australians as well as the wider international community, are often difficult to 
measure due to their intangible and long-term nature.344 If quantified, however, they 
could reveal a significant return for the amount of public funds expended on the 
subsidy. The next section examines the second policy imperative of countering tax 
abuse and terrorist financing in order to determine the potential tax abuse risk profile. 
Policing Concerns: Tax Avoidance, Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing 
The Australian Government has been very clear that the policing concerns of 
tax avoidance, money laundering and terrorist financing have been a primary driver 
behind the ‘in Australia’ requirement for DGRs. In its announcement in the 2009–10 
Budget that it would amend the ‘in Australia’ requirements in the ITAA 1997 for both 
gift deductibility and income tax exemption, the Government stated that the rationale 
was ‘to ensure that Parliament retains the ability to fully scrutinise those 
organisations seeking to pass money to overseas charities and other entities’.345 The 
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Explanatory Memorandum to the In Australia Bill further explained that the ‘in 
Australia’ requirement for DGRs provides 
 additional measures to address possible abuse of not-for-profit entities for 
the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing, and ensure the 
proper operation of not-for-profit entities, their use of public donations and 
funds, and the protection of their assets. By limiting the use of monies to 
specified areas, in conjunction with greater regulatory requirements, this 
ensures those monies are expended appropriately and in a manner consistent 
with the eligibility for tax concession status.346 
The Government’s concern with nonprofit entities being used for tax abuse 
purposes harks back to the widespread tax avoidance and tax evasion schemes in the 
1970s, which ‘undermined the viability of the income tax system [as] public 
confidence in the tax system eroded’.347 The ATO was ‘the agency initially in the 
front line of the fiscal assault of the avoidance industry’, coming under attack for its 
failure to act.348 While the role of the High Court in endorsing avoidance schemes 
affected the ability of the Commissioner to combat them,349 once the extent of these 
schemes were exposed the ATO was subject to years of criticism and examination.350 
This bleak period in Australian taxation history became a catalyst for major reforms 
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Some Social Ramifications of Taxation Fraud’ (1988) 12 Criminal Law Journal 136, 137. 
348 Arie Freiberg, ‘Ripples from the Bottom of the Harbour: Some Social Ramifications of 
Taxation Fraud’ (1988) 12 Criminal Law Journal 136, 155. 
349 See Krever, ‘Tax Reform in Australia: Base-Broadening Down Under’, above n 347, 351–2. 
350 Freiberg, above n 348, 157. 
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of the income taxation system,351 and had a profound impact on the workings of the 
ATO352 and on the taxation policy of successive Australian governments.353  
The Government’s response to the potential use of domestic charities in tax 
avoidance schemes is illustrative. The Government introduced s 78A of the ITAA 
1936 as a specific anti-avoidance provision for schemes involving domestic 
charities,354 which proved effective in curtailing avoidance activities in conjunction 
with other measures.355 However, the issue of charities being used for tax avoidance 
did not completely disappear. In 1987, the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Finance and Public Administration investigated international tax 
avoidance arrangements involving tax exempt charities using charitable trusts to shift 
funds overseas.356 In its final report, the Committee found that while schemes 
involving domestic charities were used as a tax avoidance mechanism in the late 
1970s, by the 1990s there was no evidence that such schemes were being perpetrated 
in Australia on a significant scale.357 Despite this finding, the Committee determined 
that ‘there is a perception within the ATO that distributions to overseas charities have 
become increasingly popular’358 and concern remained over ‘the potential for tax 
avoidance hidden within the guise of donations to overseas charities’.359 As a result, 
the Committee recommended that specific anti-avoidance measures similar to s 78A 
be introduced for tax exempt entities ‘to counter any potential for tax avoidance’.360 
                                                             
 
351 Ibid, 136, 158; Richard Krever, ‘Avoidance, Evasion and Reform: Who Dismantled and Who’s 
Rebuilding the Australian Income Tax System?’ (1988) 10(2) University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 215, 215. 
352 See Freiberg, above n 348, 157.  
353 See Margaret McKercha and Cynthia Coleman, ‘Avoiding Evasion: An Australian Historical 
Perspective,’ (Paper presented at the Tax Law History Conference, Centre for Tax Law, 
University of Cambridge, 5–6 July 2010). 
354 Follow the Yellow Brick Road Report, above n 161, 54 [4.15].   
355 Myles McGregor-Lowndes, ‘Does Charity Begin and End at Home for Tax Exemptions?’ 
(1998) 5 Canberra Law Review 221, 223. 
356 See Follow the Yellow Brick Road Report, above n 161, 51 [4.1].  
357 Ibid 53–4 [4.9]–[4.15]. 
358 Ibid 56 [4.23]. 
359 Ibid 54 [5.16]. 
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This inquiry culminated in a Bill introducing amendments to the ‘in Australia’ 
provisions in the ITAA 1936 for tax exempt organisations, removing the exemption 
for certain organisations located offshore and for those organisations not incurring 
their expenditure and pursuing their objectives principally in Australia.361 Until this 
time, there had been no geographic restrictions on the activities of tax exempt 
entities. 
Australia now has a formidable armoury of measures to generally address such 
tax abusive behaviour. Changes to the tax laws that resulted from the avoidance 
issues of the 1970s were accompanied by legislation directed towards the issue of 
money laundering,362 including the Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 (Cth).363 The 
legislative framework in Australia for combating the financing of terrorism builds on 
the existing anti-money laundering measures on the basis that organised crime and 
terrorist organisations typically use similar methods to launder funds and warrant 
similar policy responses.364 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) (‘Proceeds of 
Crime Act’) and the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act 2002 (Cth) were 
enacted in response to the events of September 11 and subsequent terrorist attacks.365 
Australia has introduced further legislation to strengthen its terrorist financing 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
360 Ibid 54 [5.16], Recommendation 15, 55 [4.17]. 
361 See Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 4) 1997 (Cth) amending s 23(e) of the ITAA 1936. 
362 Ivan Potas, ‘Thinking About Tax Avoidance’ (1993), 43 Trends and Issues in Crime and 
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363 Freiberg, above n 347, 175–6. 
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measures,366 as well as a list of all persons and entities subject to targeted financial 
sanctions or travel bans under Australian sanctions laws.367  
The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) was 
created as the regulatory body for monitoring and disseminating information on 
illegal behaviour involving financial transactions, ahead of other OECD countries 
who followed suit immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11.368 
Monitoring is also undertaken by the Attorney-General’s Department. AUSTRAC 
recently issued a report examining the extent to which Australian nonprofit 
organisations (NPOs) have been involved in terrorist financing activities, finding that  
While charities and NPOs are one of the more significant Australian 
terrorism financing channels, they have not featured in a large number of 
Australian terrorism financing cases. Rather than representing a sector-wide 
risk, terrorism financing in Australia has been limited to a handful of 
charities and NPOs.369  
This finding is supported by an Australian Institute of Criminology study, which 
found little evidence of Australian NPO involvement in money laundering and 
terrorist financing, suggesting that ‘there is not an elevated risk of [money laundering 
and terrorism financing] exploitation of Australian-based NPOs’. 370 
Australia’s regulatory framework for money laundering and terrorist financing 
was recently examined by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an independent 
intergovernmental body that sets standards and promotes implementation of 
measures for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.371 Australia is a 
                                                             
 
366  This includes the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) and the Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), as well as amendments to existing Commonwealth 
legislation. For a discussion of the evolution of Australia’s anti-money laundering and counter 
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367 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Cth), The Consolidated List (11 December 2015) 
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370 Samantha Bricknell, ‘Misuse of the Non-Profit Sector for Money Laundering and Terrorism 
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member of FATF and as a condition of membership, agrees to comply with the 
FATF Recommendations. Recommendation 8 focuses on nonprofit organisations 
because FATF has determined that these organisations are particularly vulnerable to 
abuse in relation to the financing of terrorism.372 Recommendation 8 and the 
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8 (‘INR8’) requires countries to identify, 
prevent and combat terrorist misuse of nonprofits through a four-pronged approach 
involving outreach to the nonprofit sector concerning terrorist financing issues;373 
supervision and monitoring of the sector;374 information gathering and 
investigation;375 and capacity to respond to international requests.376 
In 2014, FATF conducted an examination of Australia’s anti-money laundering 
and counter-terrorist financing measures, analysing the level of compliance with The 
FATF Recommendations. This culminated in a 2015 report that rated Australia non-
compliant with Recommendation 8.377 FATF found that ‘Australia has not 
implemented a targeted approach nor has it exercised oversight in dealing with 
nonprofit organisations (NPOs) that are at risk from the threat of terrorist abuse’.378 
FATF also faulted Australia for not undertaking a comprehensive risk review of the 
nonprofit sector to identify the features and types of nonprofits that are at risk of 
being misused for terrorist financing, and was particularly critical of the ACNC for 
not collecting information from, conducting outreach to, or adequately monitoring 
the charitable sector in relation to terrorist financing.379 Overall, FATF found the 
                                                             
 
372 See FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism and Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (2012), 13 (‘The FATF 
Recommendations’). 
373 Ibid INR8 55 [5(a)]. 
374 Ibid INR8 55 [5(b)]. 
375 Ibid INR8 55 [5(c)]. 
376 Ibid INR8 55 [5(d)]. 
377 FATF, Fourth Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
Financing Measures – Australia (2015) 146. 
378 Ibid 6. 
379 Ibid 145–6. It is interesting to note that the focus on criticism was the ACNC, rather than the 
ATO. This is particularly surprising given that the current Australian Government has expressed 
its desire to disband the ACNC and make the ATO responsible for the regulation of all 
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supervisory framework including the registration and reporting requirements for 
nonprofits and the domestic coordination and information sharing to be wanting, 
leaving ‘Australian NPOs vulnerable to misuse by terrorist organisations’.380  
The regulatory strategy being suggested by FATF is not a prohibition of all 
cross-border charitable activity, but rather active prevention, detection and 
remediation strategies. Following FATF’s report, the ACNC has issued guidance and 
a checklist to assist charities in minimising the risk of being used for raising and 
distributing funds for terrorist financing,381 as well as a fact sheet specifically for 
overseas aid and development charities.382 In July 2015, the ACNC held sector 
briefings for charities discussing the obligations associated with sending funds 
overseas.383 These obligations include meeting the ACNC’s governance standards, 
which apply to all charities (other than basic religious charities), whether or not they 
operate overseas.  
While FATF focused its criticisms on the ACNC, the ATO is also responsible 
(and before the ACNC was established was solely responsible) for nonprofit’s tax 
compliance. Even with the regulatory strategy of a flat prohibition on tax concessions 
for cross-border giving with limited exceptions to minimise ongoing supervisory 
expenses, the ATO was found wanting in its oversight and monitoring of DGRs 
generally. The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) conducted an independent 
performance audit of the ATO’s administration of DGRs immediately prior to the 
establishment of the ACNC, which found that the ATO faced a number of challenges 
in assessing the extent to which organisations complied with the requirements of 
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<www.acnc.gov.au/ACNC/Manage/Protect/ProtectingTF/ACNC/Edu/ProtectTF.aspx>. 
382 Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, Factsheet: Overseas Aid and 
Development Charities (2015) <https://www.acnc.gov.au/ACNC/FTS/Overseas_charities.aspx>. 
383 Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, Sector Briefing: Charities Involved 
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their DGR status. The main challenges were associated with the limited resources 
available to properly assess the compliance risks associated with the sector and to 
undertake an appropriate level of post‐endorsement compliance reviews and 
audits.384 Because there was no requirement for most DGRs to report regularly to the 
ATO, the ATO had very limited internal information on which to assess the 
compliance risk.385 The report concluded that ‘[t]he management of this risk is not 
commensurate with its assessed level of potential non‐compliance’.386 The signs are 
not encouraging for any increased oversight by the ATO of cross-border activities of 
Australian nonprofit organisations in the future. The Government’s 2014 Budget 
announced staff reductions of 4700 from the ATO’s workforce of 25 000 by 2017–
18.387 With proposed reductions in ATO budget and staff, it is not known what 
resources the ATO will have to monitor cross-border charity. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
Understanding the wider cultural context in which Australia’s charitable tax 
regime operates is foundational for determining the most appropriate policy 
framework for the tax treatment of cross-border donations and provides a basis for 
comparing Australia’s legal regime affecting cross-border giving with those in other 
jurisdictions. The available data points to a growing culture of charitable giving in 
Australia, particularly among wealthy Australians who have established PAFs as 
charitable giving vehicles. There is also evidence of Australian nonprofit 
organisations being involved in cross-border charitable activities and indications that 
Australian cross-border giving has been steadily increasing. However, the lack of 
reliable data on charitable giving and the charitable tax concessions, particularly for 
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cross-border philanthropy, means that the amount of charitable giving flowing out of 
Australia remains a mystery, as well as how much of this outflow is classified as tax 
deductible donations.  
At the same time, with bipartisan political support for a significant reduction in 
the amount and scope of Australia’s foreign aid, the argument for using tax policy to 
facilitate private international giving is particularly compelling. The Government’s 
strategic priorities for aid allocation means that there are deserving communities 
throughout the world that are not being prioritised as aid recipients and are not being 
reached through official aid channels. With private philanthropy serving as a 
complement to official government aid, there is scope for Australian philanthropists 
to assist in closing the funding gap in the delivery of foreign aid through appropriate 
tax incentives for cross-border giving.  
 An examination of the historical development of the laws and policies 
affecting Australian cross-border philanthropy shed light on Australia’s English 
legacy with respect to both the English common law model and style of charity. The 
common law origins of charity law have proven to be surprisingly relevant in 
contemporary society that is far removed from 17th century England. The concept of 
public benefit that developed from Lord Macnaghten’s classification of the four 
heads of charity remains the centrepiece of the legal definition of charity, providing a 
strong justification for the preferential taxation treatment afforded to charities. Over 
the years, the common law conception of the ‘public’ who should benefit from 
charity has not been confined to national borders, pointing to a universal concept of 
public benefit that supports charitable purposes being carried out overseas. This 
universal concept of public benefit further supports the idea that charitable objects 
performed overseas provide ‘benefits’ to the home jurisdiction in the form of either a 
direct benefit, or an indirect (moral) benefit. These colonial origins resulted in 
Australia adopting the English tradition of providing favourable tax treatment for 
nonprofit organisations, including a tax deduction for charitable gifts. Australia’s 
unique legislative history of the gift deductibility provisions and their geographic 
limitations revealed the gift deduction’s haphazard development. The result of this 
chequered history is a web of legal inconsistencies that have rendered the ‘in 
Australia’ provisions in div 30 of the ITAA 1997 essentially incoherent.  
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While the meaning of ‘in Australia’ was never clearly stated in the tax 
legislation, its origins and early development suggests that the requirement to be ‘in 
Australia’ referred to an organisation’s physical location only. However, the ATO 
ultimately adopted an alternative, stricter interpretation of ‘in Australia’, requiring 
that an organisation have its benevolent purposes in Australia and provide relief to 
people located in Australia. This interpretation was revealed to be fundamentally 
flawed based on the operation of the law. Remarkably, this flawed interpretation has 
remained for almost 50 years without being challenged, indicating either that the 
incredible complexity of div 30 made it impossible to decipher, or that there has been 
resistance to mounting a legal challenge. Either way, the implications of this 
longstanding interpretation for many Australian organisations with purposes and 
beneficiaries overseas and their donors have been considerable.    
The formal policy reasons proffered for the ‘in Australia’ requirement are to 
prevent leakage from the fisc and to counter tax abuse and terrorist financing. Yet 
from the scant evidence on the amount of cross-border philanthropy and the research 
undertaken on the risk of Australian nonprofit organisations engaging in terrorist 
financing and money laundering, there appears to be only minor leakage from the 
fisc and a relatively low tax abuse risk profile. These two policy justifications also 
come up against the underlying rationale for the gift deduction generally — to serve 
as a tax incentive to facilitate philanthropic giving — suggesting that gift deduction 
may not be fully achieving its policy objectives.  
Informed by the unique historical and cultural context in which Australia’s 
charitable tax regime operates, the next chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of 
Australia's current laws governing the tax treatment of cross-border donations and 
the Government’s proposed reforms. 
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Chapter 3: The Current Australian Legal 
Framework for Cross-Border 
Philanthropy 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 2011 GiveWell, a United States (US) organisation that identifies nonprofit 
organisations for donors around the world, recommended the Against Malaria 
Foundation (AMF) as its top-rated charity. In doing so, GiveWell mistakenly listed 
Australia as a country in which donors to AMF could receive a tax deduction. Upon 
realising its error, GiveWell stated on its website:  
We were recently alerted that even though AMF is registered as a charity in 
Australia, it is not tax deductible for donors in Australia. We’ve never 
considered the possibility that a country might have separate processes for 
these two things (the US doesn’t); this took us by surprise and resulted in our 
having to email all those who had donated to AMF from Australia in the past 
to let them know about the error. There have been some refunds as a 
result.388 
Unlike many other jurisdictions where charities are generally eligible to access tax 
deductible donations,389 in Australia a tax deduction is only available for gifts to 
organisations that qualify as Deductible Gift Recipients (DGRs).390 As evidenced by 
GiveWell’s experience, in a changed global philanthropic landscape where 
                                                             
 
388 GiveWell, How Tax Deductions and Processing Fees Make it Harder to Give Well (The GiveWell 
Blog, 13 January 2012) <http://blog.givewell.org/2012/01/13/how-tax-deductions-and-
processing-fees-make-it-harder-to-give-well/>. While GiveWell is not technically correct to say 
that there are not separate processes for determining eligibility for gift deductibility (Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) s 170(c)(2)) and eligibility for charitable status (IRC s 501(c)(3)) in the 
United States, donations to s 501(c)(3) charities ‘generally are deductible by individuals and 
corporations for income tax purposes’ pursuant to s 170. See Simon, Dale and Chisolm, above n 
9, 269. 
389 For example, in the US, domestic charities are generally eligible to receive tax deductible 
gifts. See Simon, Dale and Chisolm, above n 9, 269, 272. 
390 See ITAA 1997 div 30. 
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philanthropy increasingly crosses borders, this legal anomaly has created uncertainty. 
It also serves as just one example of the complex legal architecture surrounding gift 
deductibility in Australia.  
This chapter seeks to unpack the complex web of laws and regulations 
impacting the Australian tax treatment of cross-border donations, in an effort to 
understand the range of options available to Australian donors who wish to engage in 
tax-effective cross-border philanthropy. In doing so, it addresses RQ1. Considered in 
its wider historical and cultural context, what is the Australian legal and policy 
framework for cross-border philanthropy? The chapter begins with a description of 
the benefits of DGR status for Australian nonprofit organisations, particularly those 
involved in international charitable activities. This is followed by an examination of 
the regulatory environment for DGRs and the eligibility requirements for obtaining 
DGR status. A comprehensive analysis of the legal architecture for Australian cross-
border giving is then undertaken, including the ‘in Australia’ requirement and its 
exceptions, as well as the Government’s proposed reform agenda that seeks to further 
tighten the existing geographic restrictions around gift deductibility. 
3.2 DEDUCTIBLE GIFT RECIPIENT STATUS 
3.2.1 Benefits of Deductible Gift Recipient Status 
In Australia, individuals can only receive a tax deduction for donations to 
DGRs and Private Ancillary Funds (PAFs) can only distribute to DGRs. As a result, 
DGR status is highly prized for organisations that depend on private philanthropy as 
a funding source.391 Indeed, along with the income tax exemption, gift deductibility 
is critical to ‘[t]he continued viability of many, perhaps most, charitable institutions 
in Australia’.392 The Productivity Commission estimates that income from 
philanthropic sources amounts to just over nine per cent of total revenues for the 
                                                             
 
391 See Not-for-profit Sector Tax Concession Working Group, Fairer Simpler and More Effective 
Tax Concessions for the Not-for-Profit Sector, above n 326, 23. See also Ann O’Connell, Fiona 
Martin and Joyce Chia, ‘Law, Policy and Politics in Australia’s Recent Not-For-Profit Sector 
Reforms’ (2013) 28 Australian Tax Forum 289, 308. 
392 Richard Krever, ‘Tax Deductions for Charitable Donations: A Tax Expenditure Analysis’ in 
Richard Krever and Gretchen Kewley (eds), Charities and Philanthropic Organisations: Reforming 
the Tax Subsidy and Regulatory Regimes (Comparative Public Policy Research Unit, Monash 
University, 1991) 1. See also Dal Pont, above n 199, 9 [1.11].  
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nonprofit sector as a whole.393 Far more significant is self-generated income 
(primarily income from services) and direct government grants, with these two 
sources representing 50 per cent and 33 per cent, respectively.394 At the same time, 
the Productivity Commission found that some subsectors are far more reliant on 
private philanthropy as a source of funding.395  
The international affairs sub-sector is particularly dependent on philanthropic 
donations and much less reliant on fees and other self-generated income.396 The 
Productivity Commission found that after religious organisations, international aid 
and development organisations are the second largest recipients of donations by sub-
sector in Australia.397 A recent report based on data from the 2014 Annual 
Information Statements submitted to the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission (ACNC) found that donations contributed on average 69 per cent of 
total income for charities whose main activity was ‘international’ — higher than any 
other category of activity.398 This finding is supported by data from the Australian 
Council for International Development (ACFID) showing that charitable giving from 
the Australian community represents 63 per cent of the total revenue raised by 
Australian aid organisations, with government grants amounting to just 20 per 
cent.399 Similarly in the US, 62 per cent of revenue for the international affairs sub-
sector comes from private contributions.400 As a result, the tax treatment of cross-
border donations is central to the sustainability of organisations engaging in 
international charitable activities. It is therefore critical for Australian nonprofit 
organisations operating overseas to be able to navigate the complex regulatory and 
legal environment for obtaining DGR status. 
                                                             
 
393 Productivity Commission, above n 7, 72–3. Data is from 2006–7.  
394 Ibid 72–3, table 4.9. 
395 Ibid 74, which cites nonprofits involved in religion, international affairs, the environment, 
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396 Ibid 74. 
397 See ibid 77, table 4.10. 
398 Cortis et al, above n 166, 104 [Figure A.43].  
399 ACFID, 2013 ACFID Annual Report, above n 173, 20. 
400 See Pozen, ‘Remapping the Charitable Deduction’, above n 211, 570. 
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3.2.2 Regulatory Environment for DGRs 
The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) is responsible for administering and 
enforcing tax law for nonprofit organisations (NFPs)401 and has categorised 
nonprofits based on the tax concessions available to each. Both charitable and non-
charitable nonprofit organisations are eligible to become DGRs. Non-charitable 
nonprofits are government institutions,402 income tax exempt funds (ITEFs)403 and 
‘other NFPs’. Many community organisations fall under this last category, including 
organisations with purposes that are primarily sporting,404 recreational,405 or social406 
in nature, as well as professional or occupational associations.407 Charities are 
defined as nonprofit organisations with charitable purposes that are for the public 
benefit,408 and are classified for the purposes of assigning tax concessions as 
                                                             
 
401 There is no definition or reference to nonprofit organisation in the ITAA 1997. The ATO has 
adopted a definition of ‘non‐ profit organisation’ as one that is not operating for the direct or 
indirect profit or gain of its individual members. Any profit made must go back into the 
operation of the organisation to carry out its purposes and not be distributed to any of its 
members. The organisation’s constituent or governing documents must reflect its non-profit 
characteristics. See ANAO Audit Report No 52, above n 384, 35 [1.5]. These last two requirements 
were codified under the Tax Laws Amendment (2013 Measures No 2) Act 2013 (Cth) by amending 
s 50-50 of the ITAA 1997, which sets out the conditions for entities to become income tax 
exempt. Section 50-50(2) states that an entity must: (a) comply with all the substantive 
requirements in its governing rules; and (b) apply its income and assets solely for the purpose 
for which the entity is established.  
402 The distinction between charitable institutions and governmental institutions is based on the 
premise that to be a charitable institution an entity must have a dominant purpose that is 
altruistic, an obligation that is voluntarily assumed; whereas government institutions are 
carrying out the responsibilities of government, which are not altruistic. See Central Bayside of 
General Practice Limited v Commissioner of State Revenue (2006) 228 CLR 168; Sheppard, 
Fitzgerald and Gonski, above n 207, 238–9. 
403 ITEFs are non-charitable funds endorsed by the ATO to be exempt from income tax. They are 
established under a will or instrument of trust solely for the purpose of providing money, 
property or benefits to income tax exempt DGRs. See ITAA 1997 s 50-20.  
404 See ibid s 995-1. 
405 See ibid s 26-45(2). 
406 See ibid s 50-10 item 2.1. 
407 See Australian Taxation Office, Income Tax and Fringe Benefits Tax: Charities, TR 2005/D6, 11 
May 2005, [92]–[98], [79]. See also Sheppard, Fitzgerald and Gonski, above n 207, 196. 
408 See Charities Act 2013 (Cth) s 5. This Act, which was passed on 27 June 2013 and commenced 
on 1 January 2014, was the culmination of a number of recommendations that there be a 
statutory definition of charity, beginning with Sheppard, Fitzgerald and Gonski, above n 207. See 
Explanatory Memorandum, Charities Bill 2013 (Cth) 6–7 [1.12]–[1.14]. 
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registered charities,409 public benevolent institutions (PBIs)410 and health promotion 
charities (HPCs).411 The ACNC, Australia’s national charity regulator, is responsible 
for registering charities and enforcing governance standards.412 Registration of 
charities with the ACNC is voluntary but is required for charities to access any of the 
tax concessions available to charities from the ATO.413 Figure 2 below illustrates the 
entities comprising the Australian NFP tax landscape, highlighting those nonprofit 
organisations that are eligible to become DGRs.414  
 
Figure 2. Australian NFP tax landscape  
                                                             
 
409 A ‘registered charity’ is defined in s 995.1 of the ITAA 1997 as ‘an entity that is registered 
under the ACNCA 2012 as the type of entity mentioned in column 1 of item 1 of the table in 
subsection 25-5(5) of that Act’. With registration comes reporting and governance 
requirements, including supplying an Annual Information Statement to the ACNC. See ACNC, 
Not-for-Profit Reform and the Australian Government, above n 163, 15. 
410 PBIs provide direct services to those in need of benevolent relief or raise funds for the 
purpose of providing benevolent relief See Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission 
Act 2012 (Cth) (‘ACNCA 2012’) s 25-5(5) column 2, item 6; TR 2003/5, above n 303, [17], [61]. 
See also Hunger Project (2014) 221 FCR 302. 
411 HPCs promote the prevention or control of diseases in humans. See ACNCA 2012 s 25-5(5) 
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Promotion Charities, TR 2004/8, 30 June 2004, [28]. 
412 ACNC, Not-for-Profit Reform and the Australian Government, above n 163, 15. 
413 See ACNCA 2012, para 10-5. Charities that have been endorsed by the ATO to access tax 
concessions are known as Tax Concession Charities (TCCs).  
414 This is based on the figure provided in ANAO Audit Report No 52, above n 384 16, 40. 
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While the main recipients of tax deductible donations are charities,415 due to 
the separate eligibility requirements for endorsement as a DGR data from 2012 
showed that just over 50 per cent of all charities that had been endorsed by the ATO 
to access tax concessions were DGRs.416 Data from the annual information 
statements submitted by charities to the ACNC showed that approximately 40 per 
cent of registered charities had been endorsed as DGRs.417 For those charities 
‘involved overseas’, just 16 per cent had DGR status,418 while for those charities 
whose ‘main activity’ was in the ‘international’ sector, this rose to 43 per cent.419 
A number of commentators have noted ‘the absence of any real policy 
justification for this lack of symmetry’.420 Similarly, a recent report by the Not-for-
profit Sector Tax Concession Working Group found: 
There is no clear policy rationale for why some entities have been provided 
DGR status and others have not. The arbitrary nature of the categories leads 
to inequities and anomalies, with some entities being granted DGR status 
while similar entities or entities which provide significant public benefits 
have not.421 
The Productivity Commission found that the current DGR regime distorts 
philanthropic giving towards organisations with DGR status and recommended 
widening the scope of gift deductibility to include all endorsed charitable institutions 
                                                             
 
415 See Productivity Commission, above n 7, 2, Appendix G. 
416 As at 31 October 2012, there were 56 279 TCCs, but only 29 046 qualified as DGRs. See Myles 
McGregor-Lowndes and Emma Pelling, ‘An Examination of Tax Deductible Donations Made by 
Individual Australian Taxpayers in 2010–11’ (Working Paper No ACPNS 60, Australian Centre 
for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, Queensland University of Technology, 2013) 11.   
417 Cortis et al, above n 166, 49; Knight and Gilchrist, Australian Charities Involved Overseas, 
above n 165, 28. 
418 See Knight and Gilchrist, Australian Charities Involved Overseas, above n 165, 28. The data for 
all charities is current to July 2015.  
419 Cortis et al, above n 166, Figure 9.4, 51. 
420 Dal Pont, above n 199, 584; Bernard Colditz, Income Tax Aspects of the Income of Charities and 
of Gifts to Charities (Taxation Institute of Australia Research and Education Trust, 1977) 29–30. 
421 See Not-for-profit Sector Tax Concession Working Group, Fairer Simpler and More Effective 
Tax Concessions for the Not-for-Profit Sector, above n 326, 23. 
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and funds.422 Three years later, the Not-for-profit Sector Tax Concession Working 
Group also recommended extending DGR status to all charities registered with the 
ACNC.423 These recommendations would obviate the need for separate endorsement 
as a DGR for entities that have already been endorsed by the ATO to access tax 
concessions. To date, these recommendations have not been implemented. As a 
result, the processes and requirements for obtaining DGR status remain completely 
separate, as described in the next section. 
3.2.3 Eligibility Requirements for DGR Status 
Pursuant to Div 30 of the ITAA 1997, there are two ways for an organisation to 
obtain DGR endorsed status and receive tax deductible gifts: being endorsed by the 
ATO; or being listed by name in the income tax law.424 The vast majority of DGRs 
are endorsed by the ATO. Nonprofit organisations and governmental institutions 
have been required to apply for DGR endorsement in order to receive tax deductible 
donations since 1 July 2000. Prior to that time, organisations undertook self-
assessment or could apply to the ATO for a letter that demonstrated their compliance 
with legislative requirements.425 To be eligible for DGR endorsement by the ATO, 
                                                             
 
422 For example, the cost to a donor on a marginal tax rate of 35 per cent of donating AUD100 to 
a DGR charity will be $75 net of the tax deduction, whereas for a non-DGR charity the donation 
will cost the donor $100 as there is no deduction to be had. The Commission recommended 
extending DGR status to all charities in the interests of equity and simplicity. See Productivity 
Commission, above n 7, Recommendation 7.3, 177–79, 184. See also Industry Commission, 
above n 271, 283–6.  
423 Subject to endorsement restrictions that limit the eligible activities for use of DGR funds. See 
Not-for-profit Sector Tax Concession Working Group, Fairer Simpler and More Effective Tax 
Concessions for the Not-for-Profit Sector, above n 326, 24–26.  
424 See ITAA 1997 s 30-227 which defines ‘deductible gift recipient’ as ‘an entity or government 
entity that (a) is a fund, authority or institution described in item 1, 2, 4, 5 or 6 of the table in 
section 30-15 and is (i) endorsed under Subdivision 30-BA as a deductible gift recipient; or 
(ii) mentioned by name in that table or in Subdivision 30-B; or (b) is endorsed as a deductible 
gift recipient for the operation of a fund, authority or institution described in item 1, 2 or 4 of 
the table in section 30-15’. 
425 See ANAO Audit Report No 52, above n 384, 17, 122. Over 60 per cent of entities and funds 
were endorsed in the period immediately following the introduction of DGR endorsements – 1 
July 2000 to 30 June 2002. The ANAO recommended that the ATO ‘identifies DGRs whose 
applications for endorsement may not meet current endorsement requirements because of 
changes over time to the DGR endorsement processes and interpretation of legislation’: at 
Recommendation 2(b), 28–9, 125. 
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the organisation must satisfy the requirements set out in sub-div 30-BA of the ITAA 
1997. These requirements include:  
 having an Australian business number (ABN);426  
  falling within a general DGR category as set out in sub-div 30-B of the 
ITAA 1997;427  
 having acceptable rules for transferring surplus gifts and deductible 
contributions on winding up or revocation of endorsement;428  
 maintaining a gift fund (if seeking endorsement for the operation of a 
fund, authority or institution);429 and 
 being ‘in Australia’.430  
At the time of writing, there are 49 different categories of DGRs set out in div 
30 of the ITAA 1997 under which organisations and funds can seek endorsement by 
the ATO.431 Charities operating in the areas of welfare and rights, education, and 
culture represent more than half of the organisations that have been granted DGR 
status.432 The main types of entities that have been granted DGR status include PBIs 
(40 per cent), school or college building funds (16 per cent), ancillary funds (6 per 
cent), public libraries (6 per cent), funds on the register of cultural organisations (5 
                                                             
 
426 ITAA 1997 s 30-125(1)(a). 
427 Ibid (1)(b)(ii). 
428 Ibid (1)(c). 
429 ITAA 1997 s 30-130. 
430 ITAA 1997 s 30-125(1)(b)(iii). 
431 These categories relate to activity in the areas of health, education, research, welfare and 
rights, defence, environment, the family, international affairs, cultural organisations, and fire 
and emergency services. See ITAA 1997, sub-div 30-B – Table of Recipients for Deductible Gifts. 
432 These organisations amount to 15 515 out of the total 26 103. See Productivity Commission, 
above n 7, Appendix G. 
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per cent), and HPCs (4 per cent).433 These six categories represented 77 per cent of 
organisations with active DGR status as of 31 October 2012.434 
For most DGR categories, organisations apply solely to the ATO for 
endorsement. There are five categories where organisations need to initially apply to 
other Commonwealth agencies,435 requiring approval from the responsible Minister 
and the Assistant Treasurer.436 In its independent performance audit of the ATO’s 
administration of DGRs, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) found that 
the assessment and approval processes for applications submitted through these 
agencies are lengthy, typically taking up to two years, which may serve to discourage 
applications for these categories.437 This finding is supported by the available data. In 
2009–10, there were 249 applications for these five categories, representing just 14 
per cent of all DGR applications.438 
There are two eligibility requirements for becoming a DGR that present the 
most difficulties. The first is the ability to fit within a general DGR category. Even 
with 49 categories, the scope of eligible activities has been found to be relatively 
narrow in Australia, particularly when compared to some other jurisdictions.439 
Notably, charities established to pursue religious activities, which comprise 25 per 
                                                             
 
433 Data as of 31 October 2012. See Australian Taxation Office, Taxation Statistics 2010–11: A 
Summary of Tax Returns for the 2010–11 Income Year and Other Reported Tax Information for the 
2011–12 Financial Year (NAT 1001-04.2013, 2013) 100. 
434 See Productivity Commission, above n 7, Appendix G. 
435 These are the registers for environmental, cultural and harm prevention organisations, 
overseas aid funds and approved research institutes. 
436 See ITAA 1997, sub-div 30-B. 
437 ANAO Audit Report No 52, above n 384, 106–109 [4.33]–[4.41].  
438 See ibid 106 [4.33]. 
439 See Productivity Commission, above n 7, 177, noting that ‘donations to all charities and 
Community Amateur Sports Clubs are eligible for Gift Aid in the UK’. See also McGregor-
Lowndes and Newton, above n 327, 61, noting that in the US, a deduction is available ‘for gifts to 
religious institutions, national and international amateur sports competitions and the advocacy 
of social change, which are almost entirely excluded in Australia’. 
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cent of all reporting charities,440 generally do not qualify for DGR status.441 As a 
result, only five per cent of faith-based charities have been endorsed as DGRs.442  
The second condition that presents difficulties for organisations seeking DGR 
status is meeting the strict ‘in Australia’ requirement. If an organisation is not 
eligible for endorsement as a DGR under one of the pre-existing categories, 
Parliament may amend the ITAA 1997 to list the individual organisation by name as a 
DGR.443 Stated government policy is against adding to the list of named 
organisations, except in exceptional circumstances.444 This is reflected in the 
relatively low numbers of DGRs listed by name in the ITAA 1997. As of 31 October 
2014, there were 190 DGRs specifically listed in the legislation, representing just 
0.68 per cent of all active DGRs.445  
Scant information exists regarding the process of becoming listed by name in 
the tax law. Treasury brings the legislative amendments to government, in 
consultation with the ATO.446 The ATO does not process an inquiry for listing by 
name. Instead, requests are directed to the Treasurer in writing.447 This is a political 
process, with a successful application requiring ‘the support of the Commonwealth 
Government minister responsible for the type of activities and purposes of the 
organisation seeking listing’.448 Politicians from across the political spectrum have 
also acknowledged the problems associated with the process of listing organisations 
by name. In a fascinating parliamentary debate on this issue in 1989, the Minister for 
                                                             
 
440 Knight and Gilchrist, Australian Charities 2013, above n 164, 28, 30. Religious activities are 
the largest area of charity work, more than four times higher than any other single charitable 
activity. 
441 See ITAA 1997 s 30-45 item 4.1.1. Some religious institutions are able to obtain DGR status as 
a PBI in the welfare and rights category. 
442 Knight and Gilchrist, Australian Charities Involved Overseas, above n 165, 28. 
443 See ITAA 1997 s 30-17(1)(a); ANAO Audit Report No 52, above n 384, 38 [1.7]. 
444 See Industry Commission, above n 7, 284, referencing the standard refusal letter from the 
Assistant Treasurer sent to organisations seeking to be listed. 
445 See Australian Taxation Office, Taxation Statistics 2012–13, above n 147. 
446 ANAO Audit Report No 52, above n 384, 38 [1.7]. 
447 See Thomson Reuters, Not-For-Profit Best Practice Manual, vol 1 (at Service 2) [5.1.607]. 
448 Ibid. 
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Finance declared: ‘there is an element of semi- or quasi-arbitrariness in the selection 
of charity lists, which qualify for tax deductions. It is very difficult for anybody 
unequivocally to support or condemn any particular organisation's inclusion on the 
list’.449 One Senator suggested in response ‘that the Government look at those 
voluntary organisations that have a valid claim for tax deductibility and are like other 
organisations that do get it … to ensure that organisations are not left out just 
because they do not have a voice in this chamber or someone advocating for 
them’.450 More recently, the Not-for-profit Sector Tax Concession Working Group 
found that the process of being listed in the tax laws ‘suggest[s] that some entities are 
more deserving of assistance than others’.451 
These criticisms point to significant transparency and equity issues in the 
process of becoming listed by name in the tax law as way for an organisation to 
obtain DGR-endorsed status, suggesting that this process is in need of substantial 
reform. At the same time, because of the difficulties in meeting the eligibility 
requirements for endorsement as a DGR by the ATO, particularly for organisations 
involved in overseas charitable activities, there appears to be limited possibilities for 
these organisations to become DGRs. To understand the options available for 
nonprofits engaged overseas to obtain DGR status, the next section undertakes a 
detailed examination of the ‘in Australia’ requirement for DGRs and its exceptions.  
3.3  THE ‘IN AUSTRALIA’ REQUIREMENT FOR DGRS 
The ‘in Australia’ general condition for endorsement as a DGR is set out in the 
table in s 30-15 under ‘Special Conditions’, which states that ‘the fund, authority or 
institution must be in Australia’.452 As discussed in chapter 2, the phrase ‘in 
                                                             
 
449 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 9 June 1989, 3766 (Peter Walsh, Minister for 
Finance). This debate was around adding named organisations to the ITAA 1936 through the 
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 3) 1989 (Cth).  
450 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 9 June 1989, 3766 (Kay Patterson). In 
response, Senator Macklin concurred that there ought to be a general review of this legislation 
and that previously there had been a debate on this topic during which that suggestion was 
made, but that nothing eventuated: at 3767. 
451 Not-for-profit Sector Tax Concession Working Group, Fairer Simpler and More Effective Tax 
Concessions for the Not-for-profit Sector, above n 326, 23. 
452 Emphasis added. 
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Australia’ as it appears in the gift deductibility provisions in successive income tax 
assessment acts has not altered over the years, and no definition has been provided in 
the legislation.453 Instead, it is ATO rulings and guidance that have shaped the 
interpretation of ‘in Australia’ and the associated ‘in Australia’ requirement. 
The current ‘in Australia’ test for DGRs is set out in administrative guidance 
issued by the ATO in a 2003 public ruling on PBIs (TR 2003/5): 
25. For endorsement as a deductible gift recipient so that it can receive tax 
deductible gifts, the public benevolent institution must be ‘in Australia’. This 
involves a range of factors including establishment, control, maintenance 
and operation in Australia and the providing of public benevolence in 
Australia.454 
The ruling further explains these requirements: 
129. To be in Australia a public benevolent institution must be established, 
controlled, maintained and operated in Australia and its benevolent 
purposes must be in Australia. Because the purpose of public benevolent 
institutions is to provide direct relief to persons in need, this will mean that 
relief will be provided to people located in Australia. 
130. However, we accept that where a public benevolent institution conducts 
an activity outside Australia that is merely incidental to providing relief in 
Australia, or is insignificant, it will not disqualify the institution from 
endorsement. For example, if a public benevolent institution provides 
medical assistance to children in Australia with a particular disability but, to 
a minor extent, it also brings children from other countries to receive 
treatment in Australia, it still meets this condition for endorsement.455 
This strict interpretation was reflected in the ATO’s GiftPack, a taxation guide for 
DGRs and donors, which stated that the ‘in Australia’ condition required that funds, 
institutions and authorities ‘be established and operated in Australia (including 
                                                             
 
453 See above section 2.3.2. 
454 TR 2003/5, above n 303, [25]. Emphasis added. 
455 Ibid [129]–[131]. Emphasis added. Note that the recent case Hunger Project (2014) 221 FCR 
302, determined that the ATO view regarding ‘direct relief’ was incorrect and that fundraising 
proceeds to be given to others to relieve the poor did satisfy the directness test. 
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control, activities and assets)’ and ‘have their purposes and beneficiaries in 
Australia’.456 As discussed in chapter 2, this has been the prevailing view of the ATO 
since 1967.457 
More recently, however, the ATO’s position appears to be shifting. Since 2012, 
the GiftPack’s wording has altered, stating that ‘for funds, institutions and authorities 
to be in Australia, they must be established and operated in Australia’.458 The 
GiftPack then lists those ‘funds’ for which the ‘purposes or beneficiaries’ must also 
be in Australia and those for which the purposes and beneficiaries do not have to be 
in Australia.459 The ATO’s website reflects the changes made to the GiftPack.460 
Further evidence of the shifting ATO position was provided in August 2015 when 
the ATO issued an ‘in Australia’ discussion paper to the Not-for-Profit Advisory 
Group (the ‘Advisory Group’),461 the purpose of which was ‘[t]o provide greater 
clarity of the ATO view of the meaning of “in Australia” in Divisions 30 and 50 of 
the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 and provide input to a public ruling or other 
guidance products covering the meaning of “in Australia”’.462 The Advisory Group 
met in December 2015 to consider the extensive feedback received on the discussion 
paper. Based on the Advisory Group’s recommendations, the ATO is currently 
                                                             
 
456 See Australian Taxation Office, GiftPack: For Deductible Gift Recipients and Donors (NAT 3132-
07.2006, 2006). This also reflects the ATO’s position in prior years. See GiftPack for Deductible 
Gift Recipients and Donors (NAT 3132-5.2003, 2003) and GiftPack: A Taxation Guide for 
Deductible Gift Recipients and Donors (NAT 3132-5.2000, 2000). 
457 See above section 2.3.2. 
458 See Australian Taxation Office, GiftPack: Guide for Deductible Gift Recipients and Donors (NAT 
3132, 2012) (‘GiftPack Guide 2012’) and Australian Taxation Office, GiftPack: Guide for 
Deductible Gift Recipients and Donors (NAT 3132, 2015) (‘GiftPack Guide 2015’).  
459 Emphasis added. GiftPack remains silent on this point for institutions and authorities. See 
Australian Taxation Office, GiftPack Guide 2012, above n 458; Australian Taxation Office, 
GiftPack Guide 2015, above n 458. 
460 Australian Taxation Office, Can You be Endorsed as a DGR? In Australia Condition (20 July 
2015) <https://www.ato.gov.au/Non-profit/Getting-started/Endorsement/Deductible-gift-
recipient-(DGR)-endorsement/Can-you-be-endorsed-as-a-DGR-/#In_Australia>. 
461 Formed by the ATO in November 2013, the Not-for-Profit Advisory Group was established as 
a stewardship committee to consider matters of strategic importance to the nonprofit sector.  
462 Australian Taxation Office, Administration: Guidance Update – Interpretation of ‘in Australia’ 
(27 November 2015) <https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Consultation/What-we-are-consulting-
about/Matters-under-consultation/Administration/#G201534>. 
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drafting a new ‘in Australia’ ruling. As a result, it seems likely that the ATO will 
withdraw TR 2003/5 in the near future. 
For now, the current ‘in Australia’ test for DGRs remains that enunciated by 
the Commissioner in TR 2003/5. This test is stricter than the ‘in Australia’ test for 
income tax exemption set out in div 50 of the ITAA 1997, which provides that an 
income tax exempt entity (‘ITEE’) must have ‘a physical presence in Australia and, 
to that extent, incurs its expenditure and pursues its objectives principally in 
Australia’.463 In adopting this language, the Explanatory Memorandum stated that 
because the term ‘physical presence’ was not defined in the legislation, its ordinary 
or everyday meaning should be used.464 It also provided a detailed description of this 
term: 
In the case of 'physical presence' a broad interpretation is to be adopted — 
all that is required is for an organisation to operate through a division, sub-
division or the like in Australia. The structure of the organisation is 
immaterial as is whether it has its central management and control or 
principal place of residence in Australia. On the other hand, the term would 
not apply where an organisation merely operates through an agent based in 
Australia.465 
This broad interpretation of ‘physical presence’ does not require that the organisation 
be established, controlled, maintained and operated in Australia. In addition, the use 
of the term ‘principally’ provides further scope for ITEEs to pursue their objectives 
outside Australia compared to the provisions for DGRs, which contain no such 
modifying language.466 
It is not clear why the ATO adopted different ‘in Australia’ tests for ITEEs and 
DGRs. It has been suggested that the ATO may have determined that there are extra 
revenue costs involved in this type of tax concession, or that DGR status is 
                                                             
 
463 ITAA 1997 s 50-50(a). Emphasis added. 
464 Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 4) 1997 (Cth) [5.28]. 
465 Ibid [5.29]–[5.30]. 
466 ‘Principally’ means mainly or chiefly. Less than 50 per cent would not be considered to meet 
the ‘principally’ requirement. See Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 
(No 7) 1997 (Cth) [3.14].  
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associated with a higher risk of tax avoidance because it may be used by donors to 
access tax deductions.467 Having two tests with different thresholds for DGRs and 
ITEEs creates unnecessary complexity for nonprofits, particularly given that many 
ITEEs operate DGR funds and are therefore subject to both thresholds.468  
The practical consequences of the strict ‘in Australia’ requirement for DGRs 
are that donations by Australian taxpayers made directly to an organisation outside 
Australia are never tax deductible. Donations made to an Australian DGR that uses 
the gift for its own programs outside Australia are also not tax deductible unless its 
activities outside Australia are ‘merely incidental’,469 or the organisation obtained its 
DGR status pursuant to one of the exceptions to the ‘in Australia’ requirement 
discussed below.  
The law is not clear as to whether donations directed overseas that are 
channelled through an Australian organisation that has obtained its DGR status 
pursuant to an exception to the ‘in Australia’ requirement are tax deductible.470 The 
use of these qualified DGRs as domestic giving intermediaries is a mechanism 
widely employed by Australian charities and their donors to circumvent the strict ‘in 
Australia’ requirements. These channelling or conduit arrangements, known as 
auspicing, typically involve contractual (and less formal) agreements, where a 
servicing fee is paid to the intermediary DGR ‘in the range of 7–10% of the amount 
distributed’.471 This workaround appears to be less than beneficial for the paying 
organisations and their donors, the beneficiaries who receive their funds net of 
administrative fees, and the Australian regulators whose oversight is compromised. It 
is also unclear to what extent serving as a giving intermediary for a fee is permissible 
under current Australian law, particularly if this servicing fee is accounted for as part 
                                                             
 
467 See Not-for-Profit Project, University of Melbourne Law School, Submission to the Treasury, 
Restating and Standardising the Special Conditions for Tax Concession Entities (including the 'In 
Australia' Conditions), 15 May 2012, 19–20. 
468 See ibid 20. 
469 TR 2003/5, above n 303, [130]. 
470 See below Section 3.4. 
471 Letter from Philanthropy Australia to Prime Minister Tony Abbott, 21 April 2015, 1 (on file 
with author). 
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of a tax deductible donation. It is also questionable whether a donation to an 
intermediary DGR with conditions attached specifying where those funds are to be 
directed constitutes a tax deductible gift or a bargain.472  
While the ‘in Australia’ requirement for DGRs is strict, there are exceptions 
which provide scope for DGRs that are established and operated in Australia to 
pursue their purposes and have their beneficiaries overseas, and for donors to receive 
tax deductions for gifts to these organisations.473 Because these exceptions are so 
critical for organisations and their donors who wish to engage in tax-effective cross-
border charitable activities, they are examined in detail in the next section. 
3.3.1 Exceptions to the ‘in Australia’ Requirement  
There are four exceptions to the ‘in Australia’ requirement dispersed 
throughout div 30 of the ITAA 1997. These are:  
 overseas aid funds;  
 developed country disaster relief funds;  
 public funds on the Register of Environmental Organisations; and  
 DGRs specifically listed by name in the ITAA 1997 under ‘international 
affairs’.474  
It is important for any policy analysis to examine the effectiveness of these 
exceptions in facilitating and regulating Australian organisations (and their donors) 
engaged in tax-effective charitable activities overseas. This involves determining the 
legal and administrative requirements for each exception, as well as the extent to 
which Australian organisations engaged in cross-border charitable activities have 
qualified as a DGR and maintained their DGR status under each exception.  
                                                             
 
472  Australian Taxation Office, Income Tax: Tax Deductible Gifts – What is a Gift, TR 2005/13, 4 
September 2013, [37]–[44]; Australian Taxation Office, Goods and Services Tax: Financial 
Assistance Payments, GSTR 2012/2, 11 February 2015, [69]–[83]. 
473 Australian Taxation Office, Income Tax: Overseas Aid Gift Deduction Scheme, TR 95/2, 1 June 
1995, [1]. 
474  Overseas aid funds s 30-85; developed country disaster relief funds s 30-86; environmental 
organisations s 30-55; and DGRs listed in the tax law under International Affairs s 30-80.  
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Overseas Aid Funds 
Australian organisations undertaking relief and/or development work outside 
Australia can apply to establish an overseas aid fund under the Overseas Aid Gift 
Deduction Scheme (OAGDS) administered by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT).475 If the application is successful, the organisation can then apply 
to the ATO to be endorsed as a DGR under the general DGR category of developing 
country relief fund.476 Overseas aid funds and developing country relief funds are 
provided for in sub-div 30-B of the ITAA 1997 under the category of international 
affairs.477 They were first introduced in the ITAA 1936 through the Income Tax Law 
Amendment Bill 1981 (Cth).478 The Government has stated that this exception to the 
‘in Australia’ requirement is ‘in recognition that although some organisations are not 
operating in Australia, it is considered that they nonetheless further Australia’s 
overseas aid objectives and therefore contribute to Australia’s broad public 
benefit’.479   
Overseas aid funds are provided for in sub-div 30-B of the ITAA 1997 under 
the category of international affairs.480 There are four requirements under the ITAA 
1997 that must be met in order to qualify as an overseas aid fund. The fund must be:  
(1) a public fund;   
(2) a charity registered with the ACNC or operated by one;     
(3) established by an organisation declared by the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to be an ‘approved organisation’; and 
                                                             
 
475 The OAGDS was administered by the Australian Agency for International Development 
(‘AusAID’) prior to the integration of AusAID into DFAT.   
476 See Australian Taxation Office, Income Tax: Overseas Aid Gift Deduction Scheme, above n 473, 
[2]–[3], [4]–[6].  
477 See ITAA 1997 s 30-80(1) item 9.1.1 and s 30-85.  
478 See discussion in section 2.3.2. 
479 Explanatory Memorandum, In Australia Bill, 30 [1.133]. See also Commonwealth of Australia, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 23 August 2012, 9728 (David Bradbury, 
Assistant Treasurer).   
480 ITAA 1997 s 30-80(1) item 9.1.1, s 30-85.  
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(4) established and maintained solely for the relief of people in a 
country declared by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to be a 
developing country.481 
The second requirement that the fund is a charity registered by the ACNC or is 
operated by a registered charity ensures that the fund will be subject to ACNC 
regulation and monitoring, including reporting through the ACNC’s Annual 
Information Statements (AIS). At present however, the AIS contains minimal 
information on cross-border activities and donations. In addition, while the 
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (‘ACNCA 2012’) 
makes provision for a set of minimum standards to regulate registered charities 
sending funds or engaging in activities outside of Australia, to date these ‘external 
conduct standards’ have not been developed.482 
The third requirement that the applicant seeking to establish the overseas aid 
fund be an ‘approved organisation’ is difficult to meet, in terms of substance and 
process. Under the OAGDS Guidelines, the applicant must complete a submission to 
DFAT containing evidence that it is:  
 a legal entity;   
 voluntary, not-for-profit and non-government;     
 a community-based organisation accountable to its membership;     
 demonstrably Australian;483 
                                                             
 
481 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, List of Developing Countries as Declared by the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs (February 2015) <http://dfat.gov.au/about-
us/publications/Documents/list-developing-countries.pdf>. This list is based on the OECD 
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482  Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, External Conduct Standards (2015) 
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Affairs and Trade, Overseas Aid Gift Deduction Scheme: Guidelines for Obtaining Tax Deductibility 
(2014) 7. 
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 focused on development and/or relief484 activities covering at least one 
year;   
 conducting overseas activities on a partnership basis with indigenous in-
country partners; 485 and   
 together with its in-country partners, effective in conducting their 
activities.486  
The fourth ITAA 1997 requirement that the fund be established and maintained 
solely for the relief of people in a developing country requires that the fund ‘be 
governed by a constitution or set of rules from which it is clear that its exclusive 
purpose is to provide relief to persons in certified developing countries’.487 This 
differs from DFAT’s OAGDS Guidelines’ ‘approved organisation’ condition that 
‘the organisation’s mission statement or purpose and its project objectives should 
reflect a focus on development and/or relief’.488 The OAGDS Guidelines define 
relief as the short-term provision of basic support in emergency situations, while 
development is a long-term process focused on breaking the cycle of poverty.489 The 
inconsistency between the OAGDS Guidelines and the ITAA 1997 has created 
uncertainty for organisations seeking DGR status through the overseas aid exception. 
In addition to the four substantive requirements in the ITAA 1997, there are 
also significant administrative hurdles to overcome. The process of becoming an 
overseas aid fund is lengthy. The first step is applying for ‘approved organisation’ 
                                                             
 
484 DFAT has made it clear in their guidelines that relief and development does not include 
welfare, evangelism, missionary or political activities for the purposes of tax deductibility. If the 
organisation engages in these activities, they must be distinguished from relief and development 
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485 Ibid 12. This requires that the organisation be more than just a fundraising arm of its 
overseas partners. However, the opposite conclusion was reached in the Federal Court case of 
Hunger Project (2014) 221 FCR 302. 
486 What constitutes ‘effective’ by DFAT is primarily the applicant organisation’s monitoring and 
evaluation of overseas activities and partners. See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
above n 483, 12–13. 
487 Australian Taxation Office, Income Tax: Overseas Aid Gift Deduction Scheme, above n 473, 
[6(a)] (emphasis in original). 
488 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Overseas Aid Gift Deduction Scheme, above n 483, 9. 
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status through DFAT, which then recommends to the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
that that the applicant be an ‘approved organisation’. Once this is established, the 
ATO assesses the application for DGR endorsement to ensure that the four 
requirements in the ITAA 1997 have been met.  The ATO then seeks approval from 
the Treasurer that the fund be declared a developing country relief fund.490 Once 
approved, the Treasurer declares by notice in the Commonwealth Government 
Gazette that the fund is a developing country relief fund.491 While DFAT estimates 
that the entire process takes nine to 12 months,492 an efficiency audit determined that 
it can take up to two years to complete,493 and that as a result some lawyers are 
advising their clients not to pursue endorsement under this category.494 This appears 
to be reflected in the numbers: at 31 October 2014, there were 235 overseas aid 
funds, representing just 0.84 per cent of all active DGRs.495 
In May 2015, DFAT announced a review of the OAGDS Guidelines and 
processes in an attempt to ‘reduce red tape, streamline the process for applicants, and 
provide greater clarity in the OAGDS Guidelines’.496 As part of this review DFAT 
invited written submissions and held roundtable discussions in mid-2015.497 Key 
findings of the review included that the Guidelines should be less prescriptive and 
more flexible, and that a number of outdated and inconsistent requirements should be 
revised, particularly those related to the definitions of development and relief.498 The 
                                                             
 
490 Ibid 1–2. 
491 Ibid. 
492 Ibid 16–17. DFAT also notes that ‘there may be an interval of several months between [the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Treasurer’s] decisions’. This may explain the difference 
between the Auditor-General’s estimate and DFAT’s estimate. 
493 See ANAO Audit Report No 52, above n 384, 109 [4.41]. 
494 Ibid 108 [4.38]. 
495 Australian Taxation Office, Taxation Statistics 2012–13, above n 147, table 3. 
496 DFAT, Review of the Overseas Aid Gift Deduction Scheme: Summary of Findings (August 2015) 
6 < http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/oagds-review-summary-of-
findings.pdf>. 
497 Submissions were received from 22 organisations and individuals and more than 100 
participants attended three roundtables in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. 
498 DFAT, Review of the Overseas Aid Gift Deduction Scheme, above n 496, 11–17. 
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findings were also critical of the OAGDS process, notably the time it took to apply 
for and assess the application, the complexity of the application process and the 
resourcing toll it took on organisations, particularly when compared to the process of 
obtaining tax deductible status in other OECD countries.499 The onerous process was 
also found to be disproportionate to the risks associated with working overseas.500 
Following this public consultation, DFAT is expected to issue revised guidelines in 
2016. 
Organisations seeking to qualify as overseas aid funds are required to 
overcome significant legal and administrative hurdles, serving as a deterrent for 
organisations that would otherwise pursue endorsement under this exception. 
However, once an organisation has achieved DGR status (while subject to ACNC 
monitoring) there appears to be minimal ongoing regulation of cross-border activities 
and donations. Indeed, evidence suggests that overseas aid funds are engaged in 
auspicing, entering into third party arrangements to assist other nonprofit 
organisations channel tax deductible donations overseas often for a servicing fee. 
Developed Country Relief Funds 
Developed country relief funds are also provided for in sub-div 30-B of the 
ITAA 1997 under the category of international affairs501 and enable Australian donors 
to make tax deductible donations to developed countries that have experienced 
natural disasters. In order to qualify as a developed country disaster relief fund, the 
fund must satisfy three requirements under the ITAA 1997. It must be:  
(1) a public fund;   
(2) set up and controlled by a registered PBI; and 
(3) established and maintained solely for providing money for relief for people 
who are in distress as a result of a disaster in a country outside Australia that 
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501 See ITAA 1997 s 30-80 (1) item 9.1.2 and s 30-86. 
 102 Chapter 3: The Current Australian Legal Framework for Cross-Border Philanthropy 
has not been declared by the Minister of Foreign Affairs as a Developing 
Country.502  
The disaster must be recognised by a Treasury Minister as a disaster. The 
Minister may declare the disaster if satisfied that the disaster developed rapidly and it 
resulted in the death, serious injury or other physical suffering of a large number of 
people, or in widespread damage to property or the natural environment.503 The DGR 
entitlement is limited to two years from the date specified in a Treasury Minister's 
declaration.504 The ATO maintains a list of disasters that have been recognised by the 
Treasury since this provision was enacted in 2006.505 At the time of writing, there 
were 10 disasters on this list. 
Developed country relief funds represent a particularly limited exception to the 
‘in Australia’ requirement, applying for a limited time period to a very small number 
of natural disasters overseas. It also creates policy inequity by focusing on disasters 
in developed countries, with organisations providing support to victims of natural 
disasters in developing countries having to meet the more onerous requirements of 
the OAGDS, even where a particular disaster affects both developed and developing 
countries.506 
                                                             
 
502 See ibid (1) item 9.1.2. See also ATO Factsheet: Developed Country Disaster Relief Funds (4 
December 2012) <https://www.ato.gov.au/Non-profit/Getting-started/In-detail/Types-of-
DGRs/Developed-country-disaster-relief-funds/>.  
503 See Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (2006 Measures No 3) Bill 
2006 (Cth) 90 [11.20]. 
504 ITAA 1997 s 30-86(4). 
505 See Australian Taxation Office, List of Disasters (27 February 2015) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Non-profit/Gifts-and-fundraising/In-detail/Disasters/List-of-
disasters/#Developedcountrydisasterrelieffund>.  
506 See eg, David Bradbury, ‘Declaration of a Disaster for the Purposes of Tax Deductibility – 
Hurricane Sandy’ (Press Release, No 136, 5 November 2012) 
<http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2012/136.htm&pageI
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Public Funds on the Register of Environmental Organisations 
Administered by the Department of the Environment in consultation with the 
ATO,507 the Register of Environmental Organisations (REO) was established in 1992 
to enable deductions for gifts made directly to an environmental organisation.508 
While the ITAA 1997 does not specify that environmental organisations on the REO 
are able to operate outside Australia,509 the Commissioner of Taxation has taken the 
position that these environmental organisations do not need to have their purposes or 
beneficiaries in Australia.510 The only requirement is that ‘the actual public fund 
must be in Australia’.511  
For an organisation to be entered on the REO, it must be a public fund and 
satisfy six requirements in sub-div 30-E of the ITAA 1997. The fund must: 
(1) be a body corporate, a cooperative society, a trust, or an unincorporated 
body established for a public purpose by the Commonwealth, a state or a 
territory;512 
(2) have a principal purpose must be protecting and enhancing the natural 
environment or a significant aspect of it, providing information or education, 
or carrying out research about the natural environment or a significant aspect 
of it;513 
(3) maintain a public fund to receive gifts for its principal purpose and 
complies with any Ministerial rules to ensure that gifts made to the fund are 
used only for its principal purpose;514  
                                                             
 
507 Australian Government, Register of Environmental Organisations: A Commonwealth Tax 
Deductibility Scheme for Environmental Organisations – Guidelines (2008) 3 (‘REO Guidelines’). 
508 Explanatory Memorandum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 5) 1992, 43–44. See ITAA 
1997 s 30-55(1) item 6.1.1. 
509 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill introducing the provisions for the REO in the ITAA 
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510 See Australian Taxation Office, Income Tax: Public Funds,TR 95/27, 2 August 1995, [14(c)]. 
This position is reflected in the REO Guidelines, above n 507, 7. 
511 See Australian Taxation Office, Income Tax: Public Funds, above n 510 [14]. 
512 See ITAA 1997 s 30-260. 
513 Ibid s 30-265(1). 
514 Ibid s 30-265(2), (4). 
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(4) not give any of its property, profits or financial surplus to its members, 
beneficiaries, controllers or owners;515  
(5) have a policy of not acting as a mere conduit for the donation of money 
or property;516  and 
 (6) provide statistical information about donations and gifts to the 
Environment Secretary each financial year. 517 
In addition to these legislative requirements for inclusion on the REO, there is 
a lengthy admission process. The first step is applying to the Department of the 
Environment, which carries out an initial assessment of all applications to ensure that 
the organisations meet the legal requirements in the ITAA 1997 and the 
administrative requirements in the REO Guidelines. Once the Department has 
determined that the applicant has met these requirements, it is passed to the Treasurer 
for ATO approval.518 The Auditor General has determined that this process can take 
more than 18 months, which may serve to discourage applications.519 As of 31 
October 2014, there were 590 funds on the REO,520 representing just over two per 
cent of all active DGRs.521  
Like overseas aid funds, organisations seeking to be on the REO are required to 
overcome significant entry barriers. These impediments have served to discourage 
qualifying organisations. Once listed, these environmental organisations are required 
                                                             
 
515 Ibid s 30-270(1). 
516 Ibid s 30-270(2). 
517 Ibid s 30-270(4).  
518 See REO Guidelines, above n 507, 4. 
519 See ANAO Audit Report No 52, above n 384, 108–9 [4.38]–[4.41]. 
520 Department of the Environment, Australian Government, Register of Environmental 
Organisations (17 August 2015) 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/pages/1fbfb20f-5749-4468-b008-
feaf1804e969/files/register-environmental-organisations-2015.pdf>. 
521 Australian Taxation Office, Taxation Statistics 2012–13, above n 147, table 3. 
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to submit annual information statements,522 including audited financial statements,523 
providing some ongoing regulation. In addition, pursuant to the requirement in the 
ITAA 1997, they are prohibited from serving as a conduit to channel funds for 
another entity operating overseas, limiting the use of this workaround. 
In March 2015, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on the 
Environment began an inquiry into the REO examining the definition of 
environmental organisation and the activities undertaken.524 International activities 
have not been an area of focus for this inquiry, indicating that this ‘in Australia’ 
exception is not under scrutiny. 
Deductible Gift Recipients Listed by Name under the 'International Affairs' 
Category 
Parliament may amend the ITAA 1997 specifically to list individual 
organisations by name as a DGR.525 As a general rule, DGRs listed by name in the 
ITAA 1997 remain subject to the strict ‘in Australia’ requirement. However, those 
that are listed as DGRs under the category of ‘international affairs’ in s 30-80(2) are 
exempt from the conditions requiring that their purposes and beneficiaries be in 
Australia.526 There is currently an eclectic collection of 22 DGRs listed by name, 
representing a diverse range of activities and countries.527 Some of these 
                                                             
 
522 See eg, Department of the Environment, Register of Environmental Organisations: 2013 
Statistical Return (2013) <http://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/pages/53ca6702-
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523 REO Guidelines, above n 507, 10–11. 
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527 See ITAA 1997 s 30-80(2). 
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organisations have time limits on their gift deductibility and at the time of writing, 
the time limits for seven of these organisations had expired.528 
While these DGRs represent less than one per cent of all active DGRs (at 31 
October 2014),529 the privileges of being in this select group are noteworthy. These 
DGRs are not only exempt from the strict ‘in Australia’ requirement, but also within 
the four exceptions they have the lowest level of restrictions. Their overseas 
activities are not limited to development or relief work and their beneficiaries are not 
confined to particular countries, so long as they ‘continue to operate for their 
principal purpose and comply with any rules or conditions made by the government 
on listing as a DGR’.530 Once approved by the government of the day, these 
organisations are able to attract tax deductible donations for their overseas activities 
with relatively little oversight.531 Like overseas aid funds, there is evidence that 
DGRs specifically listed under international affairs engage in auspicing to assist 
other Australian nonprofit organisations channel tax deductible donations overseas. 
The very small number of organisations that have obtained DGR status under 
this ‘in Australia’ exception face barriers to entry that are extremely high. Entry into 
this exclusive group appears to be largely political. Organisations that succeed are 
able to offer their donors the ability to make tax deductible donations overseas, as 
well as serving as giving intermediaries for other organisations for a fee, without 
being subject to ongoing supervision by the authorities. The end result is an 
exception to the ‘in Australia’ requirement that offers little transparency, 
accountability or equity.  
Recent judicial decisions addressing the use of these channelling workarounds 
have challenged the geographic restrictions on tax laws affecting cross-border 
                                                             
 
528 See ibid ‘Special Conditions’ in table. 
529 See Australian Taxation Office, Taxation Statistics 2012–13, above n 147, table 3. 
530 See Australian Taxation Office, GiftPack Guide 2012, above n 458. 
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philanthropy. The Australian Government’s response to these decisions has been to 
propose a reform agenda that seeks to further limit the ability of Australian 
organisations and their donors to engage in tax deductible cross-border charitable 
activities. 
3.4 JUDICIAL DECISIONS PRECIPITATING REFORM 
The ‘in Australia’ requirement came under judicial scrutiny by the High Court 
of Australia in the landmark case, Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Word 
Investments Ltd.532 The applicant (‘Word’) operated as a fundraising arm of Wycliffe 
Bible Translators Australia (‘Wycliffe’), a tax exempt charity that conducted 
missionary work overseas. Word applied for income tax exemption under sub-div 
50-B of the ITAA 1997, which was refused. The Commissioner argued that there 
were four issues precluding Word from receiving tax exempt status, one of which 
was that it did not meet the s 50-50(a) ITAA 1997 ‘in Australia’ requirement that an 
entity have a physical presence in Australia and, to that extent, incur its expenditure 
and pursue its objectives principally in Australia.533  
A majority of the High Court534 determined that Word met the ‘in Australia’ 
requirement, as it had a physical presence in Australia and incurred its expenditure 
and pursued its objectives principally in Australia; the decisions to pay were made in 
Australia; the payments were made in Australia to Australian organisations; and 
Word’s objectives included providing financial assistance to those organisations.535 
In reaching its conclusion the majority examined the ‘in Australia’ test in s 50-50(a) 
as it applied to Word’s role as a charitable intermediary. The majority found that 
[s]ection 50-50(a) does not impose a prohibition on distributing to other 
charitable institutions. Nor does it require the money, when ultimately 
                                                             
 
532 (2008) 236 CLR 204 (‘Word Investments’).  
533 The other three issues were: (1) Word’s objects were not confined to charitable purposes; (2) 
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expended by Wycliffe and the other institutions, to be expended in Australia. 
Section 50-50(a) could have imposed a requirement of that latter kind, but it 
did not. It only imposed a requirement that Word incur its expenditure and 
pursue its objectives principally in Australia — not that Wycliffe and the 
other institutions do so. No doubt the ultimate benefit to charity which Word 
causes is effected by Wycliffe indirectly and to some extent outside 
Australia, not directly and in Australia: but s 50-50(a) draws no distinction 
between direct and indirect effects.536 
As a result, the ‘in Australia’ test in s 50-50(a) is confined to ‘the place where the 
relevant conduct occurs, not to that where the ultimate purpose of that conduct is 
given effect, or its objective realised, by a donee’s actual use of the money it 
receives’.537 That is, a channel was available to send funds abroad through a suitably 
qualified organisation. 
In his dissenting opinion, Kirby J found this to be an ‘erroneous reading’ of the 
‘in Australia’ requirement in s 50-50(a).538 While his Honour agreed with the 
majority that Word had a physical presence in Australia, he believed that the 
majority took ‘a narrow view of what is involved in Word’s incurring its expenditure 
and pursuing its objectives within Australia’, noting that the majority’s approach 
‘sees no difficulty in the fact that the destination of the income that is subject to the 
tax exemption is (and always was intended to be) principally outside Australia’.539 
Kirby J’s conclusion, that he deemed ‘fatal to Word’s case’, was that in so far as 
Word pursued any charitable objectives, the fact that it did so principally outside 
Australia meant that it was not entitled to exemption.540 His Honour determined that 
without compliance with the ‘in Australia’ requirement, Word could not be endorsed 
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as an entity exempt from income tax because this was a ‘threshold statutory 
requirement’ that ‘would make redundant all other issues in this [case]’.541  
By making the ‘in Australia’ requirement the threshold issue, Kirby J 
highlighted its importance for entities seeking tax exemption. It is notable that while 
his Honour considered this to be one of two ‘essential issues’ in the case,542 apart 
from a few commentators543 the academic discourse that ensued has largely ignored 
it. Commentators have instead focused on the issue of whether tax exempt entities 
can and should engage in commercial activities for profit.544 
The decision of the majority in Word Investments that the channelling of funds 
overseas through a suitably qualified intermediary organisation meets the ‘in 
Australia’ test under s 50-50(a) of the ITAA 1997 was affirmed in the recent Full 
Federal Court of Australia decision, Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Hunger 
Project Australia545 (‘Hunger Project’). In that case, the question was whether 
Hunger Project Australia (‘HPA’) qualified as a PBI in Australia. HPA was part of a 
global network of entities, centrally administered in the US, whose purpose was to 
relieve hunger in a number of developing countries. While HPA was primarily a 
                                                             
 
541 Ibid [95], [157]–[158]. 
542 Word Investments (2008) 236 CLR 204 [127]. 
543 See Stewart, ‘The Boundaries of Charities and Tax’, above n 79, 246; Stewart, ‘Tax 
Deductibility of Cross-Border Giving, above n 72, 13–14. See also Ian Murray, ‘Not-for-Profit 
Reform: Back to the Future?’ (2014) 20(1) Third Sector Review 109, 131–34; Myles McGregor-
Lowndes, ‘Policy: Protecting the Fisc and Fiscal Oversight Authority’ (Paper presented at the 
2014 Annual Conference — Regulation or Repression: Government Policing of Cross-Border 
Charity, New York University School of Law, National Center on Philanthropy and the Law, 23–
24 October, 2014). 
544 See Joyce Chia and Miranda Stewart, ‘Doing Business to Do Good: Should We Tax the 
Business Profits of Not-for-Profits? (2012) 33(2) Adelaide Law Review 335; Michael Gousmett, 
‘Charities and Business Activities’ (2009) New Zealand Law Journal 57; Myles McGregor-
Lowndes, Matthew Turnour and Elizabeth Turnour, ‘Not-for-Profit Income Tax Exemption: Is 
There a Hole in the Bucket, Dear Henry?’ (2011) 26 Australian Tax Forum 601; Ian Murray, 
‘Charitable Fundraising Through Commercial Activities: The Final Word on a Pyrrhic Victory?’ 
(2008) 11(2) Journal of Australian Taxation 138; Derek Mortimer, ‘A Word About Charity’ 
(2010) 84(4) Law Institute Journal 50; Michael Norbury and Vanessa Ritzinger, ‘All Things 
Charitable: High Court Examines the Way For-Word’ (2009) 43(8) Taxation in Australia 502; 
Robert Richards, ‘A Green Light for Charities’ (2009) 79(1) Intheblack 66; Claire Russell, ‘A 
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fundraising arm for the Hunger Project entities engaged in the direct provision of 
hunger relief, it had some involvement in global and program decision-making, as 
well as in determining where to direct the funds it raised.546 The Court did not 
specifically address the ‘in Australia’ requirement, most likely because HPA was an 
overseas aid fund and therefore came under an ‘in Australia’ exception.547 However, 
in finding HPA to be a PBI, the Court determined that 
[t]he ordinary contemporary meaning or understanding of a public 
benevolent institution is broad enough to encompass an institution, like 
HPA, which raises funds for provision to associated entities for use in 
programs for the relief of hunger in the developing world. The fact that such 
an institution does not itself directly give or provide that relief, but does so 
via related or associated entities, is no bar to it being a public benevolent 
institution.548 
The ‘in Australia’ test for ITEEs enunciated in Word Investments and affirmed 
in Hunger Project had immediate and significant implications for the ATO’s strict 
interpretation of the ‘in Australia’ requirement for DGRs. By interpreting the ‘in 
Australia’ requirement for ITEEs such that the ultimate purposes or beneficiaries 
may similarly no longer be required to be ‘in Australia’ and that it could raise funds 
in Australia and send those tax deductible funds overseas through a qualified 
Australian giving intermediary (such as an overseas aid organisation or an 
organisation specifically listed in the ITAA 1997 under international affairs). Indeed, 
the recent ATO ‘in Australia’ discussion paper evidences a shift in the ATO’s 
position towards DGRs in accordance with the Word Investments test. However, it 
remains unclear to what extent this test permits the practice of auspicing, whereby 
qualified organisations enter into third party arrangements to assist others channel tax 
deductible donations overseas for a servicing fee.549 
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As a result of the decision in Word Investments, the Government determined 
that reforming the ‘in Australia’ requirements was necessary to reduce uncertainty 
around charitable intermediary arrangements and to ensure that the ATO’s original 
strict ‘in Australia’ position prevailed. The next section examines the Government’s 
reform proposals in detail. 
3.5 THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSED ‘IN AUSTRALIA’ REFORM AGENDA 
In its 2009–10 Budget, the Australian Government announced that it would 
amend the ‘in Australia’ special conditions in div 50 of the ITAA 1997 in response to 
‘[a] recent High Court of Australia decision [which] held that charities may be 
pursuing their objectives principally “in Australia” even where they merely pass 
funds within Australia to another charitable institution that conducts its activities 
overseas’.550 In 2011, as part of a series of measures to reform the tax law and 
regulation of charities,551 the Government introduced an exposure draft of a Bill 
seeking to clarify the law by codifying the Commissioner of Taxation’s strict 
definition of the ‘in Australia’ requirements for both ITEEs and DGRs.552 Regarding 
income tax exemption of charities, the Explanatory Material noted that 
[i]gnoring minor overseas activities, the intent of the original law was only 
to allow a charity to be able to pass funds to an overseas charity that was 
endorsed as a deductible gift recipient (operating a developing or developed 
country relief fund), or an entity specifically prescribed in the regulations. 
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The High Court’s decision on Word Investment highlighted that the law is 
not achieving those objectives.553 
The exposure draft received 109 submissions, drawing attention to a number of 
drafting defects. The Australian Council for International Development’s (ACFID) 
submission summed up the general objections to the draft: 
The problems have arisen through the complexity of the various legal 
structures to which the legislation relates and as a result of the multiple 
avenues that the Government provides for tax free and tax deductible status. 
The proposed legislation attempts to apply simple tests, the result of which 
would be to create intractable clashes amongst the various legal statuses of 
the aid funds and their parent entities. In addition, the problem with the 
proposed legislation is that it seems to have been drafted without an 
understanding of the most practical considerations as to how charitable 
agencies go about doing their work.554 
There were also submissions focusing on specific sub-sectors with significant 
international activities that had been omitted from the exceptions to the proposed, 
stricter ‘in Australia’ requirements, such as health and medical research. In their 
submission, the Association of Australian Medical Research Institutes and Research 
Australia noted:  
Health and medical research is an international activity. Australia cannot 
conduct health and medical research in isolation from the rest of the world. 
Health and medical research is necessarily collaborative in nature, and in 
many cases the best partners for collaboration are overseas … Rather than 
ensuring that tax deductible donations are used for the broad (Australian) 
public interest, the proposed [‘in Australia’ requirements] will, in fact, 
severely hamper Australian health and medical research. It will also deter 
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charitable donations to the health and medical research sector, increasing the 
funding burden on the Commonwealth Government. Both outcomes are 
detrimental to the Australian public interest.555  
Further examples were cited in the arts, particularly performing arts tours and art 
exhibitions, which promote Australia’s cultural engagement overseas.556  
A revised exposure draft was introduced and opened for further consultation in 
2012, receiving 47 submissions.557 The new exposure draft addressed some of the 
concerns raised, including allowing some medical research institutions and 
international performing arts organisations to operate outside Australia.  
In 2012, the Tax Laws Amendment (Special Conditions for Not-for-profit 
Concessions) Bill 2012 (‘In Australia Bill’) was introduced into Parliament,558 with 
the stated purpose of introducing a ‘new law [that] reverses the effect of the decision 
[in Word Investments] that charities and other ITEEs can direct funds to overseas 
projects outside the current policy intent’.559 The Bill proposed a new strict ‘in 
Australia’ test for DGRs as a new s 30-18 in the ITAA 1997, pursuant to which a 
fund, authority or institution must generally:  
                                                             
 
555 Association of Australian Medical Research Institutes and Research Australia, Submission to 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Inquiry into the Tax 
Laws Amendment (Special Conditions for Not-for-profit Concessions) Bill 2012, 30 August 2012, 8. 
Similar comments were made in George Institute for Global Health, Submission to 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Inquiry into the Tax 
Laws Amendment (Special Conditions for Not-for-profit Concessions) Bill 2012, 29 August 2012. 
556 See Australia Major Performing Arts Group, Submission to Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services, Inquiry into the Tax Laws Amendment (Special Conditions 
for Not-for-profit Concessions) Bill 2012, 30 August 2012, 2, 4; Live Performance Australia, 
Submission to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Inquiry 
into the Tax Laws Amendment (Special Conditions for Not-for-profit Concessions) Bill 2012, 30 
August 2012, 2. 
557 Treasury, Restating and Standardising the Special Conditions for Tax Concession Entities 
(Including the ‘in Australia’ Conditions) (17 April 2012) 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2012/In-Australia-
Special-Conditions-for-Tax-Concession-Entities-Revised>; Exposure Draft, Tax Laws 
Amendment (2012 Measures No 4) Bill 2012 (Cth): Tax Exempt Body ‘In Australia’ 
Requirements. 
558 On 23 August 2012 the Bill was referred to the Senate Community Affairs Legislation 
Committee and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services. In 
September 2012, both committees tabled their reports recommending that the Bill be passed. 
559 Explanatory Memorandum, In Australia Bill, [1.37]. 
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 be established in Australia; 
 operate solely in Australia; and  
 pursue its purposes solely in Australia.560  
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, ‘solely in Australia’ is to be interpreted 
as requiring DGRs ‘to be established and operated only in Australia (including 
control, activities and assets) and must have their purpose and beneficiaries only in 
Australia’.561 However, overseas activities that are merely incidental to a DGR’s 
operations and purposes in Australia and overseas activities that are minor in extent 
and importance when considered with reference to the operations and pursuit of the 
organisation’s Australian activities, will not be caught.562 At the same time, just as 
for tax exemption, functioning as a mere conduit DGR for another organisation that 
operates overseas will not be permitted, and if funds are passed to another 
organisation that is not a DGR, then tracing must occur.563  
While the In Australia Bill ultimately lapsed when Parliament was dissolved in 
August 2013 for the federal election,564 in December 2013 the incoming Government 
announced that it would proceed with the ‘in Australia’ tax measure.565 In March 
2014, a new exposure draft was introduced and the consultation process opened.566 
The draft retained almost word-for-word the strict ‘in Australia’ test for DGRs 
                                                             
 
560 Emphasis added. In Australia Bill s 30-18(1).  
561 Explanatory Memorandum, In Australia Bill, [1.128].  
562 In Australia Bill s 30-18(2).  
563 Ibid 4. 
564 In August 2013, the Bill lapsed at dissolution 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Resul
t?bId=r4872>. 
565 Arthur Sinodinos, Assistant Treasurer, ‘Integrity Restored to Australia's Taxation System 
(Media Release, 14 December 2013) item 37 
<http://axs.ministers.treasury.gov.au/files/2013/12/MR008-2013.pdf>; Treasury, Restating 
and Centralising the Special Conditions for Tax Concession Entities (12 March 2014) 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2014/Conditions-for-
tax-concession-entities>.  
566 Exposure Draft, Tax and Superannuation Laws Amendment (2014 Measures No 3) Bill 2014: 
In Australia Special Conditions, 11 March 2014.  
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proposed in the Bill567 and the same interpretation of the phrase ‘solely in 
Australia’.568  
With the new exposure draft essentially mirroring the wording of the In 
Australia Bill, both political parties have proposed virtually the same strict ‘in 
Australia’ policy for DGRs. This policy has prevailed despite a number of 
submissions on the exposure drafts that such tight controls on cross-border charity 
are not in Australia’s best interests. Several submissions questioned the wisdom of 
such restrictive measures that ‘would impose some of the highest barriers to 
international participation and engagement by not-for-profits in the world’.569 In 
response to these submissions, each successive exposure draft has merely added 
exceptions to various organisational categories and for some specific organisations. 
The most recent draft Bill includes the existing DGR exceptions in addition to the 
existing DGR exceptions, and provides for two new categories: certain performing 
arts organisations570 that are approved by the Minister for the Arts as having a 
genuine need to engage in cross-border activities and that enhance Australia’s 
international reputation;571 and a new category of medical research institutions that 
                                                             
 
567 Ibid 2–3. 
568 Explanatory Materials, Exposure Draft: Tax Laws Amendment (2014 Measures No #) Bill 
2014 (Cth) 26 [1.107]. 
569 See PilchConnect, Submission to Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee Inquiry 
into the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Bill 2012, Australian Charities and 
Not-for-profits Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Bill 2012 and Tax Laws Amendment 
(Special Conditions for Not-for-profit Concessions) Bill 2012, 30 August 2012. See also Neumann 
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above n 467. 
570 Exposure Draft, Tax and Superannuation Laws Amendment (2014 Measures No 3) Bill 2014: 
In Australia Special Conditions, 11 March 2014, 3, cl 2 ss 30-18(9), 30-19(2), cl 10 s 30-305(1). 
571 Explanatory Materials, Exposure Draft: Tax Laws Amendment (2014 Measures No #) Bill 
2014 (Cth) 34 [1.137]. 
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operate outside Australia,572 in recognition that ‘medical research is an international 
collaboration activity’.573 
Submissions on the new exposure draft closed in April 2014 and in November 
2014 ‘Treasury advised that there is no government decision as yet on whether the 
“in Australia” measure will go ahead but that there is a desire to resolve this matter 
by the end of the calendar year’.574  By April 2015, the Assistant Treasurer stated that 
the Government was continuing to keep a ‘watching brief’ on the ‘in Australia’ 
provisions.575 At the time of writing, the Bill has yet to be formally introduced into 
Parliament. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
It is possible to piece together the options available for Australian donors who 
wish to make tax deductible cross-border gifts from the complex legislative 
requirements and administrative processes applying to DGRs. The current legislative 
architecture starts from the position of a flat prohibition and then allows for a few 
specific exceptions. An examination of these exceptions reveals the limited extent to 
which Australian organisations and their donors can engage in tax effective giving 
overseas. From this examination, it appears that due to the significant legal and 
administrative barriers to entry, relatively few organisations have obtained DGR 
status through one of these exceptions. For those organisations that succeed in 
overcoming the high entry barriers, there is generally little ongoing oversight and 
monitoring by the authorities. This problematic combination of high entry barriers 
and a lack of ongoing regulation has resulted in organisations and their donors using 
                                                             
 
572 Exposure Draft, Tax and Superannuation Laws Amendment (2014 Measures No 3) Bill 2014 
(Cth): In Australia Special Conditions, 11 March 2014, 3, cl 7 s 30-80(1). 
573 Explanatory Materials, Exposure Draft: Tax Laws Amendment (2014 Measures No #) Bill 
2014 (Cth) 33 [1.134]. 
574 Not-for-Profit Advisory Group, Australian Taxation Office, Record of Meeting Held on 12 
November 2014: Treasury Update (8 May 2015) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/general/consultation/in-detail/stewardship-committees---
minutes/not-for-profit-advisory-group/12-november-2014-not-for-profit-advisory-group-
meeting/>. 
575 See Xavier Smerdon, ‘Govt Targets PAFs & Fringe Benefits Tax’, ProBono Australia News 
(online), 9 April 2015 <http://www.probonoaustralia.com.au/news/2015/04/govt-targets-
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workarounds to circumvent the tax laws in order to engage in tax-effective cross-
border charitable activities, presenting further challenges for regulators in monitoring 
the flow of charitable funds overseas. 
Recent judicial decisions addressing the use of such workarounds have 
challenged the geographic restrictions surrounding the tax laws affecting cross-
border philanthropy. At the same time, the ATO appears to have recognised that its 
strict interpretation of the ‘in Australia’ requirement for DGRs is no longer feasible, 
creating possibilities for Australian organisations engaged in international charitable 
activities to bypass the ‘in Australia’ exceptions for obtaining DGR status. Despite 
this development, the Australian Government’s response has been to propose a 
detailed legislative reform agenda that seeks to further limit the ability of Australian 
organisations and their donors to engage in tax deductible cross-border charitable 
activities. The stalling of these ‘in Australia’ reform measures simply adds to the 
uncertain legal environment in which organisations providing charitable relief 
overseas and their donors are now operating.  
Given that Australia’s tax laws affecting cross-border philanthropy have 
reached this critical juncture, it is timely to question the continued legitimacy of a 
domestic tax policy that restricts the ability of organisations and their donors to 
engage in tax-effective cross-border charity. This scrutiny begins in the following 
chapter with an analysis of the deduction as it applies to domestic and cross-border 
donations against the relevant considerations that ordinarily inform Australian tax 
policymaking. 
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Chapter 4: Tax Policy Analysis 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Across jurisdictions ‘at least since Adam Smith, there has been virtually 
universal agreement that the nation’s tax law should be fair, economically efficient, 
and simple to comply with and to administer’.576 Debate over how to reform national 
tax laws is shaped primarily by these traditional tax policy concerns.577 The most 
recent review of the Australian tax system found it to be generally ‘accepted that a 
well-designed tax system will meet its revenue raising objective, while balancing the 
core principles of equity, efficiency and simplicity’.578 The review also determined 
that principles reflecting the additional concerns of sustainability and policy 
consistency are useful for informing Australian tax policy considerations.579 Using 
these five criteria — efficiency, equity, simplicity, sustainability and policy 
consistency — this chapter will undertake a tax policy analysis to evaluate gift 
deductibility in Australia as it applies to domestic and cross-border donations. 
The gift deduction is widely viewed as a government subsidy580 or tax 
expenditure,581 the fiscal equivalent of a direct government spending program, 
because it ‘triggers a reduction of taxable income and, as a result, a tax saving, that 
would not be available in a benchmark income tax system which treated charitable 
                                                             
 
576 Michael Graetz, ‘Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking’ (1995) 95(3) Columbia Law Review 609, 
609. See also Infanti, ‘Spontaneous Tax Coordination’, above n 100, 1113. 
577 See Burgess et al, above n 258, 4 [1.30]; Treasury, ‘Reform of the Australian Tax System’, 
(Draft White Paper,1985) para 1.14; Ann O’Connell, ‘The Tax Position of Charities in Australia – 
Why Does it Have to Be So Complicated?’ (2008) 37(1) Australian Tax Review 17, 19.  
578 See Treasury, 'Better Tax System, Better Australia' (Tax Discussion Paper, March 2015) 14 
<http://bettertax.gov.au/publications/discussion-paper/>.  
579 See ibid citing the principles adopted in The Henry Tax Review, above n 327, 88, 725. 
580 For a detailed discussion of subsidy theories and their origins, see above section 5.2.1. 
581 The theory of tax expenditures was pioneered by Stanley Surrey. See Stanley Surrey, 
Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures (Harvard University Press, 1973). For 
further discussion, see above section 5.2.1.  
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gifts similarly to all other gifts or uses of income’.582 Because of the tax savings 
arising from gift deductibility, the donor does not bear the entire cost of the gift and 
the government forgoes tax revenue.583 This raises the tax policy question of whether 
the public benefits derived from the tax deduction for charitable gifts exceed the 
costs of the subsidy.584 
This chapter begins by examining the threshold issue of how to effectively 
measure nonprofit (NFP) tax expenditures. It then undertakes a tax policy analysis of 
the gift deduction in Australia, evaluating the benefits of the deduction against the 
potential inefficiencies, inequities, complexities and inconsistencies it might produce. 
Consideration is also given to the impact of a deduction for cross-border donations 
on these domestic tax policy criteria. In doing so, this chapter addresses RQ2: What 
are the relevant considerations that normally inform Australian tax policy making 
and what does their application reveal about the deduction for cross-border 
donations?  
4.2 MEASURING NOT-FOR-PROFIT TAX EXPENDITURES 
Prior to undertaking a tax policy analysis of the gift deduction, there is a 
threshold issue of how to effectively measure this tax expenditure. There are three 
different ways of measuring tax expenditures, which can result in very different 
estimates of its value. The revenue forgone approach measures the difference in tax 
paid by taxpayers who receive a particular concession relative to similar taxpayers 
who do not receive that concession. It does not take into account changes in taxpayer 
behaviour and so the amount calculated as revenue forgone would not necessarily be 
the amount of revenue collected if the tax expenditure were abolished.585 The 
                                                             
 
582 Krever, ‘Tax Deductions for Charitable Donations’, above n 392, 5. See also Simon, Dale & 
Chisolm, above n 9, 274; Colinvaux, Galle and Steuerle, above n 9, 5. 
583 See ibid. For example, in Australia, if a taxpayer on the highest marginal tax rate in 2015 of 49 
per cent (including the 2 per cent medicare levy) makes an AUD100 gift to a DGR, the taxpayer 
effectively contributes AUD51, while the Government contributes AUD49. 
584 See Pozen, ‘Remapping the Charitable Deduction’, above n 211, 553. 
585 See The Henry Tax Review, above n 327, 732; Australian National Audit Office, ‘Preparation of 
the Tax Expenditures Statement: Department of the Treasury, Performance Audit’ (Audit Report 
No 32, Australian Government, 2008) (‘ANAO Audit Report No 32’); Australian National Audit 
Office, ‘Preparation of the Tax Expenditures Statement: Department of the Treasury, 
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revenue gain approach measures how much revenue could increase if a particular tax 
concession was removed by ‘making assumptions about the way taxpayers would 
respond to policy changes’.586 The outlay equivalence approach estimates how much 
direct expenditure would be required to provide a benefit equivalent to that provided 
by the tax expenditure587 and is generally most useful when policymakers are 
considering whether to deliver a program as a tax expenditure or a direct spending 
program.588  
Consistent with most tax expenditures statements in OECD countries, the 
Australian Treasury prepares its annual Tax Expenditures Statement using the 
revenue forgone approach.589 Because it is based on the assumption that taxpayers 
will not change their behaviour, this method of measuring tax expenditures has been 
criticised for being ‘similar to assuming taxpayer behaviour does not respond to 
changes in price, notwithstanding the fact that many concessions are specifically 
intended as incentives’.590 Indeed, the OECD has cautioned that ‘revenue forgone 
estimates tend to overestimate the direct revenue gain from eliminating an incentive 
by not taking into consideration behavioural effects’.591  
For the nonprofit tax expenditures in particular, legal scholars have described 
the revenue forgone method as ‘flawed’ for assuming that ‘NFP taxpayers will 
behave in a similar fashion to for-profit taxpayers’.592 This is largely because for 
nonprofit tax expenditures ‘there is a broader, unmeasurable but significant, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
Performance Audit’ (Audit Report No 34, Australian Government, 2013) 67 (‘ANAO Audit Report 
No 34’). 
586 The Henry Tax Review, above n 327, 732. 
587 Ibid; ANAO Audit Report No 32, above n 585, 67. 
588 The Henry Tax Review, above n 327, 732. 
589 See Treasury, Tax Expenditures Statement 2014, above n 160, 4.  
590 ANAO Audit Report No 32, above n 585, 63. 
591 OECD, ‘Choosing a Broad Base — Low Rate Approach to Taxation’, above n 338, 116. 
592 McGregor-Lowndes, Matthew Turnour and Elizabeth Turnour, above n 544, 610. The authors 
discuss the merits and pitfalls of the various approaches as they apply to the income tax 
exemption. 
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contribution to the public good that is involved’.593 Because Australian nonprofit 
organisations do not generally file tax returns, there are also problems with the lack 
of data available for most nonprofit tax expenditures.594 For the gift deduction, the 
reliability of the cost estimates provided in the Australian Treasury’s Tax 
Expenditures Statement is considered ‘medium-low’ because much of the data 
needed to construct an estimate is not required to be submitted to the Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO).595  
Calculating the cost to the fisc of the deduction for cross-border donations is 
challenging because Australian data does not exist to make a reliable estimate of the 
revenue forgone from deductions to Deductible Gift Recipients (DGRs) engaged 
overseas.596 This was demonstrated by Treasury’s inability to make such a 
calculation for the In Australia Bill, where neither the Explanatory Memorandum nor 
the Bills Digest provided an estimate of the revenue costs associated with cross-
border giving. The Bills Digest referred back to the Tax Expenditures Statement, 
which showed an estimate of the revenue forgone resulting from deductions to all 
DGRs, without specifying the portion of the tax expenditure allocated to charitable 
activities overseas.597 
Beyond data collection, there is also a measurement issue given that the 
amount calculated as revenue forgone from a deduction for cross-border donations 
would not necessarily be the amount collected from taxpayers if this tax expenditure 
were removed. This discrepancy is ‘largely because of the changes in taxpayer 
behaviour that removing the tax expenditure would cause’.598 For example, removing 
a deduction for cross-border gifts may result in taxpayers finding other means (or 
                                                             
 
593 Ibid 611. 
594 Ibid 610 noting that ‘current measurement is largely non-existent because data are not 
collected’. 
595 Treasury, Tax Expenditures Statement 2014, above n 160, item A54, 28.  
596 See below section 2.2.2, which nevertheless attempts to make a ‘crude’ estimate. According 
to tax expenditure data on 20 OECD countries, while a number of countries measured charitable 
tax concessions, none of the countries presented data for cross-border charitable tax 
concessions. See OECD, ‘Choosing a Broad Base — Low Rate Approach to Taxation’, above n 338. 
597 See Department of Parliamentary Services (Cth), above n 337, 24. 
598 The Henry Tax Review, above n 327, 732. 
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workarounds) to make tax-effective cross-border donations or taxpayers may choose 
to give to domestic DGRs instead. As a result, the assumption that removing a 
deduction for cross-border gifts would result in more tax revenue without taking into 
consideration taxpayer behaviour is not persuasive.  
This finding suggests that another method of measuring tax expenditures would 
better capture cross-border donations. For example, the revenue gain approach, 
which takes into account changes in taxpayer behaviour, may be more suitable. 
While there are ‘considerable difficulties in preparing such estimates for all tax 
expenditures in the Tax Expenditures Statement’,599 this method may prove more 
accurate for the nonprofit tax expenditures. Indeed, the Australian National Audit 
Office (ANAO) has recommended that ‘Treasury should include, in future TES 
publications, revenue gain estimates for the 20 largest items or reasons why this is 
not possible’.600 In the Tax Expenditures Statement 2014 the ‘deduction for gifts to 
deductible gift recipients’ ranks as the 20th largest measured tax expenditure.601 
With this threshold issue of how to effectively measure nonprofit tax 
expenditures addressed, the next section turns to an evaluation of the relevant 
considerations that ordinarily inform Australian tax policymaking to determine what 
they reveal about the deduction for domestic and cross-border donations. 
4.3 UNDERTAKING A TAX POLICY ANALYSIS 
This section undertakes a tax policy analysis of the deduction for gifts to DGRs 
employing the five criteria of equity, efficiency, simplicity, sustainability and policy 
consistency.602 While conflict among these criteria is unavoidable, ‘[t]radeoffs 
                                                             
 
599 Ibid; ANAO Audit Report No 32, above n 585, 68. These include the information or 
assumptions needed for the behavioural responses of taxpayers to policy changes and the 
assumptions that must be made regarding the policy specifications for removing each tax 
expenditure. 
600 ANAO Audit Report No 32, above n 585, 72. See also The Henry Tax Review, above n 327, 732 
(‘revenue gain estimates for significant tax expenditures should continue to be published in the 
Tax Expenditures Statement’.) 
601 Treasury, Tax Expenditures Statement 2014, above n 160, 7, table 1. 
602 See The Henry Tax Review, above n 327, 88, 725.  
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among these goals are the stuff from which tax legislation is made’.603 As a result, 
balancing each of these considerations becomes important in any assessment of the 
gift deduction as a policy tool to promote domestic giving and for understanding the 
impact of extending the deduction to cross-border donations. Central to this analysis 
is an examination of the effect of the ‘in Australia’ requirement for DGRs on each of 
these normative tax policymaking concerns, which informs the debate over how to 
reform Australia’s tax laws governing cross-border philanthropy.604 
4.3.1 Efficiency 
Treasury, or economic, efficiency is concerned with whether the tax deduction 
is a cost effective way to subsidise charitable organisations by measuring the extent 
to which the deduction delivers social benefits (in the form of donations) that exceed 
the costs of the lost tax revenue.605 As a result, the larger social aims of the deduction 
and the reach of the social benefits it delivers become important. A narrower view of 
treasury efficiency in which the social benefits of the deduction are largely confined 
to national boundaries implies a potentially greater role for direct government 
spending. 
On a granular level, treasury efficiency is concerned with whether a dollar of 
forgone taxes induces at least an extra dollar of donations. If each dollar of forgone 
revenue purchases less than one dollar of giving, arguably the subsidy should be 
removed and replaced with direct spending.606 The extent to which the tax deduction 
succeeds in encouraging giving depends on how responsive donors are to price 
                                                             
 
603 Graetz, above n 576, 610. See also McGregor-Lowndes, Matthew Turnour and Elizabeth 
Turnour, above n 544, 606. See also Burton and Sadiq, above n 343, 7; O’Connell, ‘The Tax 
Position of Charities in Australia’, above n 577, 19; Roger Colinvaux, ‘Rationale and Changing the 
Charitable Deduction’ (2013) 138 Tax Notes 1453, 1453; Infanti, ‘Spontaneous Tax 
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incentives, measured by economists as the price elasticity of giving.607 For taxpayers 
for whom giving is price elastic, lowering the price of giving through tax incentives 
can potentially increase the amount donated and the number of individuals 
donating.608 Conversely, low price elasticities suggest that tax incentives are an 
inefficient means of funding nonprofit organisations.609 The findings from the 
majority of these studies indicate that the price elasticity of giving has an absolute 
value greater than one,610 suggesting that the gift deduction is a cost-effective way to 
subsidise charitable organisations.611 A number of studies have also shown that 
higher income donors tend to be more price elastic than lower income donors,612 
making the deduction more likely to be treasury efficient than a tax credit costing the 
same amount in terms of forgone revenue.613  
While there have not been similar Australian studies to determine the price 
elasticity of giving, the Productivity Commission has suggested that a higher top 
marginal tax rate in Australia compared to the United States (US) implies that tax 
deductibility has an even larger impact on giving in Australia, indicating a higher 
                                                             
 
607 See below section 1.1. 
608 See Industry Commission, above n 271, 272; Simon, Dale and Chisolm, above n 9, 272. 
609 Duff, ‘Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions in a Personal Income Tax’, above n 11, 211. 
610 See Gergen, above n 7, 1404; Clotfelter, above n 7, 49–63; Bakija and Heim, above n 7, 617 
estimate ‘a large persistent price elasticity of charitable giving’ in range of -1.1 to -1.5. But see: 
Duff, ‘Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions in Canada’, above n 7, 60 citing a number of 
studies using different methodologies that have reported much lower estimates of price 
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611 Gergen, above n 7, 1404; Pozen, ‘Remapping the Charitable Deduction’, above n 211, 590. 
612 Bakija, above n 8, 558; Brody, ‘Charities in Tax Reform’, above n 8, 716; Duff, ‘Tax Treatment 
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613 See Duff, ‘Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions in Canada’, above n 7, 86. This is 
supported by findings from the Productivity Commission which, using a range of price elasticity 
assumptions, estimated that the tax expenditure neutral rebate rate (where the overall cost to 
the government does not change) in Australia would have been around 38 per cent in 2006–07. 
Assuming tax incentives have an inducement effect on giving, the Productivity Commission 
estimated that introducing a neutral rebate would have resulted in a decline in donations to 
DGRs in that financial year. See Productivity Commission, above n 7, 175. 
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price elasticity, particularly for wealthy taxpayers.614 This corresponds with findings 
by the Australian Center for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies showing that ‘the 
greater the taxable income, the greater the amount of tax deductible donations made 
to DGRs’.615 According to this data, wealthy taxpayers donated approximately 1.14 
per cent of their taxable income to DGRs in 2012–13, almost four times the national 
average of 0.32 per cent.616 These findings are further supported by private ancillary 
fund (PAF) data, showing that PAFs triggered a substantial increase in philanthropy 
by the high-net-worth individuals who were the intended beneficiaries of the 
incentives.617 
There have been no studies estimating price elasticities of cross-border giving; 
however, a comparative study of private charitable giving to developing countries 
conducted by the Center for Global Development concluded that ‘[c]itizens in 
countries with stronger targeted income tax incentives appear to give more private 
charity to poor countries’.618 This finding indicates a high price elasticity for 
taxpayers who give overseas, suggesting that the gift deduction may also be a cost-
effective way to subsidise international charitable organisations. Whether or not this 
increases treasury efficiency, however, depends on the larger social aims of the 
deduction and specifically the reach of the social benefits it delivers. For example, in 
the Netherlands, the tax policy providing for equal tax treatment of domestic and 
cross-border donations means that the social benefits the deduction delivers extends 
globally. As a result, the deduction for cross-border donations could be considered 
treasury efficient in its cost-effective delivery of support overseas. In contrast, in 
                                                             
 
614 Productivity Commission, above n 7, 174 (‘With no evidence of a crowding out effect in 
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Australia, where ‘the fiscal state generally does not recognise or facilitate [the] 
growth in global charity’,619 the social benefits of the deduction are largely restricted 
to those delivered within Australia’s national boundaries, with the exception of 
international aid and relief organisations and some environmental organisations. As a 
result, expanding the tax deduction to include cross-border donations would decrease 
treasury efficiency within Australia because of the consequences for national revenue 
regardless of how cost-effective it may be for international giving.  
Australia’s narrower view of treasury efficiency implies a potentially greater 
role for direct government spending in the form of foreign aid, which raises an 
additional efficiency issue concerning whether the recipients of private donations 
operating overseas are more efficient providers of charitable goods and services than 
government spending programs.620 This notion of ‘investment efficiency’, defined as 
the ratio of nonprofit output to total spending, is particularly concerned with which 
recipient organisations generate greater output per dollar received.621 Eric Zolt cites 
an example of the US Government deciding to give USD10 billion in humanitarian 
aid to Africa, which could be provided through direct foreign assistance funded out 
of general tax revenue, or through charitable deductions at a revenue cost of USD10 
billion.622 
For certain types of activities and projects, private providers may have clear 
advantages over direct government foreign assistance. Providing additional 
funds to the Gates Foundation’s efforts to combat malaria in Africa may be 
more productive than providing financial assistance to African governments 
to fund government-operated health facilities or to projects selected and 
monitored by the US Government.623  
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The use of locally based charities in the recipient country may also create 
‘advantages based on access to information, lower operating expenses due to 
proximity, and greater knowledge of local challenges’.624 As a result, while there is 
sometimes overlap between the recipients of government aid and private aid, to the 
extent that private donations are typically made to local and international NGOs 
rather than to recipient governments or multilateral agencies, a deduction for cross-
border donations is likely to have certain investment efficiency advantages over 
direct government assistance.625  
The next step in the tax policy analysis is to examine the second domestic tax 
policy consideration: equity. 
4.3.2 Equity 
Equity is concerned with the concepts of ‘similar treatment of people similarly 
situated’ (horizontal equity) and ‘fairness of the distribution of taxes at different 
levels of income, consumption, or wealth’ (vertical equity).626 The former ensures 
‘those with a similar capacity to pay bear the same burden’, while the latter ensures 
‘that those people with more capacity to pay contribute more’.627 The gift deduction 
is particularly problematic with respect to vertical equity and is subject to ‘powerful 
criticisms’ that relates to the fair treatment of donors.628 This is due to the ‘upside 
down effect’ of the tax expenditure in a tax system of progressive taxation, whereby 
the government’s contribution is tied to a donor’s marginal tax rate.629 The result of 
this system is that the wealthier the donor, the less a charitable gift costs.630 For 
example, a person in Australia’s highest tax bracket of 49 per cent pays 51 cents after 
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tax for each dollar donated, while a person in the lowest 19 per cent bracket pays 81 
cents. Given that wealthy taxpayers have the resources to make larger donations than 
lower income taxpayers, they are already able to allocate more of the tax subsidy. 
The upside down effect of the deduction compounds this inequity.631 
The Australian tax scholar Rick Krever has called vertical inequity a ‘critical 
flaw’ that renders the deduction ‘at best, “undemocratic” and at worst unacceptably 
elitist’.632 This is heightened when the favoured charitable recipients of wealthy 
donors are largely arts and cultural organisations and universities, which have some 
redistributive benefits, but unlike charities engaged in social welfare, do not 
primarily serve the poor.633 Krever provides a particularly striking example in the 
Australian education system: 
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 [A]bout one-third of deductible gifts are made to private school building 
funds, where the nexus between eventual return to the donor (albeit indirect) 
and the contribution is sufficient to call into question whether the donations 
are in fact ‘gifts’ in the normal sense of that word.634  
A tax credit or rebate does not suffer from the same inequities as a tax deduction 
because it ‘increase[s] the government’s subsidy of charitable gifts made by 
taxpayers in lower tax brackets’.635 The tax credit also succeeds in being more 
redistributive than the deduction not only among taxpayers, but also among 
charitable organisations because ‘of the different types of charities favored by high-
income and low-income taxpayers’.636 Similarly, because matching grants are 
applied at the same level for all donors, they eliminate the equity concerns of the 
upside down effect and its bias towards wealthier taxpayers.637 
When cross-border donations are introduced into the analysis, there are both 
domestic and international implications for equity. Domestically the upside down 
effect of the deduction increases if wealthier individuals in the highest tax brackets 
are more likely to engage in international giving. Given that there is evidence of a 
high price elasticity for wealthy taxpayers and potentially a high price elasticity for 
taxpayers who give overseas, the question is whether income has a significant effect 
on the likelihood of giving overseas. Empirical studies from around the world 
profiling donors who engage in cross-border philanthropy suggest that this is not the 
case.638 Instead the characteristics most strongly related to private international 
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giving are higher education, being religious and being foreign-born.639 This is 
consistent with an Australian study, which found that tertiary education is the 
strongest positive socio-economic determinant of both support for foreign aid and 
private donations to aid organisations, while income has a negative correlation with 
support for foreign aid and is not statistically significant for private donations to aid 
organisations.640 As a result of these findings, extending the deduction to cross-
border giving appears to have a neutral effect on vertical inequity.  
The gift deduction has not been subject to criticism on horizontal equity 
grounds because taxpayers in the same tax bracket are treated similarly. Taxpayers in 
Australia’s highest tax bracket of 49 per cent each pay 51 cents after tax for each 
dollar donated, while taxpayers in the lowest 19 per cent bracket each pay 81 cents. 
When international giving is introduced into the analysis, at first glance it appears 
that horizontal equity is maintained because taxpayers in a particular tax bracket are 
subject to the same tax treatment whether they give domestically or internationally. 
However, the unequal tax treatment of domestic and cross-border donations does 
have an impact on taxpayers in the same tax brackets because the gift deduction is 
generally only available for donors in that bracket who choose to give domestically, 
but not for those who choose to give overseas. As a result, the ‘in Australia’ 
requirement for DGRs decreases horizontal equity domestically with respect to 
cross-border donations because taxpayers at the highest tax rate of 49 per cent who 
give to organisations engaged in domestic charitable activities each pay 51 cents 
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after tax for each dollar donated, while those who donate to organisations operating 
overseas that do not fall under an ‘in Australia’ exception each pay a dollar.  
Globally, the impact of extending the deduction to cross-border giving may 
actually serve to reduce inequities associated with the deduction. Because the vast 
majority of private international giving is channelled to developing countries through 
relief and development NGOs,641 as charitable funds are redistributed from 
developed to developing countries they have the potential to influence the inequitable 
global allocation of resources. This redistributive effect ‘might have especially 
powerful welfare effects for the world’s most disadvantaged’.642 While the 
Australian Government has acknowledged the redistributive effect of private giving 
to international relief and development organisations through the international aid 
exception to the ‘in Australia’ requirement, as a result of the legal and administrative 
difficulties, the number of organisations qualifying for DGR status under this 
exception remains limited.643 
The next step in the tax policy analysis is to examine the third domestic tax 
policy consideration: simplicity. 
4.3.3 Simplicity 
A tax system should be ‘simple to comply with and administer’,644 resulting in 
‘rules [that] are easily understood by taxpayers and capable of efficient 
implementation by tax administrators’.645 Tax expenditures can increase the 
complexity of the tax system overall in that they ‘complicate the law and create 
additional choices for people’.646 Indeed, a recurring theme in the Australian 
nonprofit tax literature is criticism of the nonprofit tax concessions for their 
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complexity.647 For the gift deduction in particular, the separate eligibility 
requirements and application process for obtaining DGR status in Australia are far 
less straightforward compared to other jurisdictions, where charities are generally 
eligible to receive tax deductible gifts.648 These separate processes have created 
uncertainty both in Australia and overseas.649 To add to this complexity, while not all 
charities in Australia are DGRs, both charitable and non-charitable nonprofits are 
eligible to become DGRs.650 
When applied to cross-border donations, the complexity surrounding the gift 
deductibility provisions generally increases, particularly in jurisdictions where the 
tax rules governing international giving are ambiguous.651 In Australia, organisations 
engaging in international charitable activities and donors seeking a tax deduction for 
their cross-border gifts are required to navigate the complex laws and cumbersome 
processes surrounding the ‘in Australia’ requirement and its exceptions to determine 
whether they are eligible for DGR status. They are also faced with legal ambiguities 
around whether donations to an Australian DGR that re-donates the funds to a 
charitable organisation operating outside Australia are tax deductible.652 The result is 
a complicated and costly system for organisations engaging in international activities 
and their donors, who are faced with legal and regulatory requirements that on the 
one hand are quite restrictive, while on the other are able to be bypassed, with 
significant cost and effort. 
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In an attempt to reduce this complexity and ‘minimise compliance costs’, the 
Australian Government’s reform agenda seeks to ‘standardise’ the ‘in Australia’ 
requirements and to ‘simplify the tax framework applying to NFP entities’ operating 
overseas.653 While these reforms may produce greater clarity in the tax laws with 
respect to DGRs engaging internationally, the practical result is likely to be increased 
transaction costs and more complex arrangements as nonprofits and their donors 
increase the use of workarounds in order to make tax-effective donations overseas.654 
The next step in the tax policy analysis is to examine the fourth domestic tax 
policy consideration: sustainability.  
4.3.4 Sustainability 
The Henry Tax Review found that ‘[t]ax expenditures should be considered in 
light of revenue sustainability. Policies need to be affordable over the longer 
term’.655 Krever notes that while there is a lack of budgetary control over tax 
expenditures compared to direct spending programs, ‘the cost of the tax expenditure 
for the charitable deduction climbs at a fairly steady, and for the most part, not 
unpredictable rate’.656 This is supported by the Australian Treasury’s Tax 
Expenditures Statement 2014, showing that in 2012–13, the deduction for gifts to 
DGRs cost Treasury AUD1.01 billion, which is projected to rise at a consistent rate 
to AUD1.19 billion by 2017–18.657  
While the gift deduction with the ‘in Australia’ requirement in place does not 
appear to compromise revenue sustainability in Australia, it is less clear whether 
extending the deduction to include cross-border giving would threaten revenue 
sustainability in the long term. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the In Australia 
Bill, Treasury takes the position that the ‘in Australia’ requirement should be 
maintained to protect the ‘large amounts of revenue that would otherwise be 
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forgone’.658 However, neither the Explanatory Memorandum nor the Bills Digest 
provide an estimate of what that amount is likely to be. The Bills Digest refers back 
to the Tax Expenditures Statement 2011, which shows an estimate of the revenue 
forgone resulting from deductions to all DGRs, without specifying the portion of the 
tax expenditure allocated to charitable activities overseas.659 
While Australian data on tax deductions for cross-border donations does not 
exist to make a reliable estimate of the revenue forgone from deductions to DGRs 
engaged overseas, as established in chapter 2, it is possible to make a crude estimate 
of the cost to the fisc of the tax deduction for cross-border donations based on data 
collected by ACFID.660 Because ACFID’s data is derived from donations to 
international relief and development organisations, the majority of which are likely 
to be overseas aid funds, these donations would be tax deductible and would be 
included in Treasury’s annual tax expenditures statement in the line item ‘deduction 
for gifts to DGRs’. In addition, because most private international giving is 
channelled to developing countries through relief and development NGOs,661 
ACFID’s data represents a significant component of Australian cross-border giving. 
Treasury’s Tax Expenditures Statement 2014 shows that in 2012–13, the deduction 
for gifts to DGRs cost AUD1.01 billion.662 Based on the ACFID data, approximately 
10 per cent of these gifts are directed to DGRs operating overseas.663  The resulting 
cost to the fisc for the deduction for cross-border gifts amounts to approximately 
AUD101 million, a relatively minor cost to Treasury. This finding is supported by 
tax expenditure data from the Netherlands, which shows that providing equal tax 
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treatment for domestic and cross-border donations appears to have a minimal 
revenue impact.664  
The crude estimates above are based on the ‘in Australia’ requirement being in 
place. If the ‘in Australia’ requirement was removed, the question is whether there 
would be a ‘substitution effect’ resulting in domestic charity being replaced with 
foreign charity. This could potentially lead to a ‘weakened nonprofit marketplace if a 
sizeable contingent of would-be donor-overseers … starts paying less attention to 
domestic charities’.665 However, because domestic and international giving ‘reflect 
sufficiently distinct donative calculi, substitution between them may be substantially 
incomplete’.666 As a result, extending the deduction to cross-border donations is 
unlikely to result in a proportionate decline in domestic giving.  
Any calculation of the cost to the fisc of the deduction for cross-border gifts 
also needs to consider the return in the form of benefits that the Government receives 
for the public funds expended. If a global view of the impact of the deduction is 
taken ‘there is a plausible case to be made that net social welfare will be greater in a 
tax system with more generous international deductions’.667 All Australians stand to 
benefit from cross-border gifts that fund organisations involved in the production of 
global public goods such as medical and scientific breakthroughs, conflict resolution, 
human rights initiatives and artistic collaborations; and in the development of 
solutions for global challenges such as climate change, environmental pollution, and 
infectious diseases. Studies have shown that investing in corrective actions to solve 
provision problems of certain global public goods achieves greater cost-effectiveness 
than inaction, making it ‘far more appealing to invest in corrective actions than to 
continue absorbing the costs of inaction’.668 At the same time, because global public 
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goods suffer from free riding, Australia’s inaction disregards the benefits that its 
participation would confer on other countries and may result in Australia being 
worse off in the long term.669 Extending the tax deduction to cross-border donations 
that further support the provision of global public goods is likely to result in 
government savings that may not be immediately apparent, but that will have a 
significant impact on revenue sustainability in the long term.  
The final step in the tax policy analysis is to examine the fifth domestic tax 
policy consideration: policy consistency. 
4.3.5 Policy Consistency 
The tax system should be consistent with broader government policy 
objectives. The Henry Tax Review found that this is ‘particularly relevant when 
assessing the role of tax expenditures, since the justification for many of them lies in 
other economic and social policy objectives’.670 Determining whether the deduction 
is consistent with broader government policy objectives involves considering the 
policy reasons for the existing state of affairs.671 For the gift deduction, the 
underlying policy is to encourage philanthropic giving to provide support for the 
production and delivery of public goods. In Australia, this policy has resulted in 
generous deductibility provisions for donations so long as they are targeting 
charitable activities in Australia.  
The ‘in Australia’ requirement for DGRs has set strict geographic limits on the 
deductibility provisions based on two policy imperatives: to protect the national tax 
base by ensuring that publicly-funded tax concessions are used for the broad benefit 
of the Australian community; and to prevent nonprofit organisations being used for 
tax abuse purposes and terrorist financing.672 The former is consistent with the 
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Government’s tight fiscal policy in relation to international giving generally, 
although the available data indicates that there currently appears to be minor leakage 
from the fisc with limited evidence of the floodgates opening if the geographic 
restrictions around the gift deduction were removed. The latter is consistent with the 
broader government policy of safeguarding state security interests from money 
laundering and terrorist financing. However, the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF)’s 2015 report on Australia found that Australia had not undertaken a 
comprehensive risk review of the nonprofit sector to identify nonprofits at risk of 
being misused for terrorist financing and had not exercised appropriate oversight of 
nonprofits at risk of terrorist abuse.673 This finding signifies that the Australian 
Government may not be achieving its policy goal in this area.674 
While a tax policy of extending the deduction to cross-border giving 
potentially increases the risk that funds provided by Australian donors for charitable 
purposes overseas will be diverted for terrorist financing,675 paradoxically such a 
policy could also advance Australia’s security interests.676 This is because 
international philanthropy assists in ‘[a]ddressing the socioeconomic roots of the 
discontent and inequity that lead to extremism [which] is an important part of the 
strategy to enhance national security’.677 Australian cross-border donations provide 
resources to local nonprofits overseas to assist developing countries build stable 
societies by alleviating poverty and suffering, advancing health and education, 
encouraging economic development and promoting democratic governance.678 As a 
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result, extending the deduction to cross-border donations may arguably be consistent 
with promoting the Government’s national security agenda.679 
Extending deductibility to cross-border donations also implicates foreign aid 
and broader foreign policy objectives. Because governments can influence the level 
of private philanthropy through domestic tax policy, a policy promoting private 
cross-border giving can be considered ‘de facto aid policy’.680 Studies have shown 
that private international giving and official government aid are complements rather 
than substitutes.681 Indeed, one legal scholar has described the charitable deduction in 
the US as ‘the most significant foreign aid tax expenditure’.682 Unlike direct 
government spending on foreign aid, however, tax expenditures for foreign aid may 
serve objectives that are different from the government’s foreign policy and foreign 
aid priorities,683 particularly where donors hold a philosophical position that differs 
from the government.684 In the US, for example, ‘contributions to foreign NGOs that 
perform, provide counseling on, or lobby for abortion’ at the time contravened the 
Bush Administration’s ‘global gag rule’ pursuant to which official US policy was ‘to 
deny government aid to any such organization’.685 While similar situations may arise 
where the Australian Government’s foreign policy objectives are challenged by 
Australian donors’ international funding decisions, given that these inconsistencies 
are largely the result of the decisions of individual donors, they are unlikely to be 
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scalable to the extent that they significantly undermine Australia’s foreign policy 
interests.686 
Australia’s stated foreign aid policy objectives are to reduce poverty and 
promote sustainable economic growth with a focus on the Indian Ocean Asia-Pacific 
(‘Indo-Pacific’) region, which receives the vast majority of Australia’s foreign aid 
consistent with Australia’s broader foreign policy priorities and national interests.687 
In contrast to the Government’s focus on the Indo-Pacific region, ACFID has found 
that almost half of all private donations to overseas aid and development 
organisations are directed to Africa.688 While this data highlights the different 
geographic aid priorities of the Australian Government and the Australian public, it 
also shows their ability to complement one another. In this sense, the deduction 
represents ‘a form of a public-private partnership’ between the Australian 
Government and its citizens through which the Australian public and nonprofit sector 
can serve as allies in the Government’s foreign aid efforts.689  
Indeed, rather than undermining official foreign policy, the gift deduction is far 
more likely to contribute to Australia’s broader foreign policy objectives. To the 
extent that cross-border philanthropy helps to generate ‘soft power’ for the 
Australian Government that can be used to improve its global standing and influence, 
it can serve as a ‘powerful tool of public diplomacy’.690 ‘Soft power’ as distinguished 
from ‘hard power’ (eg military might) is defined ‘as the ability to coopt others to 
want the same outcomes as you through intangible attraction to shared values, 
thereby shaping the preferences of others’.691 The Dutch internationalist approach 
with its ‘focus on multilateral cooperation and its history of commitment to 
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international development agreements, has enhanced Dutch “soft power”’.692 Recent 
legislation in the United Kingdom (UK) which commits future governments to 
annual foreign aid spending of 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI) was 
enacted to provide the UK with ‘world-leading soft power capacity’.693 Generating 
soft power therefore enables countries to achieve greater effectiveness and influence 
on the world stage. International philanthropy can uniquely contribute to government 
soft power because its independence from the state allows it to ‘leverage altruistic 
values without being beholden to the government, its policies, or its geopolitical 
interests’.694  
4.4 CONCLUSION 
A tax policy analysis employing the normative tax policymaking concerns of 
efficiency, equity, simplicity, sustainability and policy consistency to evaluate the 
gift deduction revealed both the benefits and the costs inherent in this tax incentive. 
The gift deduction was shown to be a cost-effective and sustainable way of funding 
public goods, consistent with government policy of assisting charitable organisations 
in attracting public support and promoting philanthropic giving. On the other hand, 
complex deductibility provisions and procedures, and vertical inequities resulting 
from the deduction’s upside down effect are troubling. While alternative policies 
such as tax credits or matching government grants may alleviate some of these 
concerns and better serve certain tax policy criteria, the gift deduction’s endurance in 
Australia’s lax laws suggests that despite its shortcomings, it is likely to prevail as 
‘the last significant non-business deduction-based tax expenditure remaining in the 
Australian tax system’.695 
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The tax policy analysis also shed light on the implications of expanding the 
deduction to cross-border giving. The gift deduction was revealed to be a cost-
effective way to subsidise charitable organisations overseas, as well as providing 
certain investment efficiency advantages over direct government assistance. At the 
same time, because the social benefits of the deduction in Australia are largely 
restricted to those delivered within its national borders, expanding the tax deduction 
to cross-border donations was likely to decrease treasury efficiency within Australia. 
The analysis also revealed that vertical inequities from the deduction’s upside down 
effect and the complexities surrounding the gift deductibility provisions would 
persist, although they were not likely to be exacerbated. Extending the deduction to 
cross-border donations could also ultimately contribute to a reduction in global 
inequities due to the redistributive effect on the global allocation of resources. The 
impact on Australia’s revenue sustainability in the long term was likely to be 
minimal, particularly when the benefits to both the Australian and the wider global 
community of investing in the production of global public goods and in corrective 
actions for global challenges are taken into consideration. A liberal deduction policy 
was also unlikely to result in major inconsistencies with other government policies, 
particularly in the area of foreign policy and foreign aid, as they are more likely to 
complement one another, enhancing Australia’s delivery of aid, as well as its 
international standing through the generation of soft power. 
 The tax policy analysis also revealed the endurance of the ‘in Australia’ 
requirement for DGRs in the tax law, justified by its consistency with broader fiscal 
and oversight priorities. Indeed, it would appear that the Australian Government’s 
approach has been to prioritise revenue consequences over the need to balance the 
other tax policy considerations, resulting in the ‘diminished capacity of the 
traditional normative concerns of taxation — fairness, economic efficiency, and 
simplicity’696 — to influence their policy making with respect to the tax treatment of 
cross-border donations. The unfortunate result of this almost singular focus on the 
consequences for the fisc by policymakers ‘eschew[s] the difficulties of exercising 
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judgment to strike an appropriate balance among ambiguous and often conflicting 
normative goals [resulting in] laws that conform to misleading or wrongheaded 
mathematical straightjackets’.697  
With its focus on the potential fiscal consequences of extending the deduction 
to cross-border giving, the Australian Government has found a persuasive argument 
that has bipartisan political support, reinforced by Australian tax scholars.698 This 
chapter revealed that the Government’s position is subject to challenge. First, there 
are issues with current data collection and flaws in the measurement of this tax 
expenditure, which are exacerbated when attempting to collect and disaggregate data 
on international giving. The result is that the Government has not been able to 
accurately measure the revenue impact of the deduction for cross-border donations, 
which challenges its assumption that removing a deduction for cross-border gifts 
would result in significantly more tax revenue. Second, tax expenditure data from the 
Netherlands provides credible evidence that permitting equal tax treatment for 
domestic and cross-border donations can produce minimal consequences for the fisc, 
which suggests that the Australian Government’s fears of a fiscal blowout may be 
imaginary.  
The tax policy analysis offers a compelling case for extending tax relief to 
cross-border donations. To gain further insights into whether these domestic tax 
policy findings are supported by theory, the next chapter establishes a theoretical 
framework for determining whether donations targeting international charitable 
activities should enjoy similar tax treatment to domestically targeted donations. 
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Chapter 5: Theoretical Framework 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
While Australia has a tax deduction for donations targeting domestic charitable 
activities and organisations, the ‘in Australia’ requirement for Deductible Gift 
Recipient (DGR) status means there is limited tax deductibility for donations 
supporting charitable activities and organisations overseas. A review of the literature 
reveals that there is a gap in applying a theoretical framework to explain Australia’s 
different tax treatment for domestic and international charitable activities. This 
scholarly silence is surprising given the contentious history of the ‘in Australia’ 
requirements and their continuous review by the Australian Government since the 
2008 High Court decision of Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments 
Ltd (‘Word Investments’).699 Establishing a theoretical framework serves as a guide 
for better understanding the policies underlying the Australian Government’s 
approach to the tax treatment of cross-border donations and provides a principled 
basis for formulating any reforms. 
The theoretical framework employed in this chapter is based on the concept of 
public benefit that lies at the heart of the legal definition of charity in jurisdictions 
based on the English common law system, as discussed in chapter 2. This concept 
has become central to understanding the charitable tax concessions because it is 
public benefit that typically justifies the preferential taxation treatment bestowed on 
charities and their donors.700 The tax scholars John Simon, Harvey Dale and Laura 
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Chisolm have described public benefit as a ‘threshold issue cutting across virtually 
every aspect of charitable tax exemption and tax deductibility’.701 
The test for charitable status across common law jurisdictions starts from the 
basis that an organisation must have exclusively charitable purposes that are for the 
benefit of the public or some section thereof.702 The concept of public benefit 
provides a means by which the law can exclude benefits that do not warrant public 
recognition.703 The boundary of public benefit has largely drawn the line between 
that which is private or benefits the individual, and that which is public or benefits 
the community.704 The tax treatment of cross-border philanthropy raises two other 
important questions concerning the boundaries of public benefit:  
 Who is the ‘public’ that the test for charitable status refers to: is it confined 
to those in the home jurisdiction, or does it extend beyond national 
borders?705 
 Can charitable objects performed overseas or charitable gifts directed 
overseas provide a direct or indirect ‘benefit’ to the public in the home 
jurisdiction?  
This chapter seeks to answer these questions by recourse to three principal 
theories spanning the disciplines of economics, tax law and moral philosophy that all 
provide rich insights into the boundaries of public benefit for the purposes of cross-
border giving. These are: 
 Early tax and economic subsidy theory; 
 Recent nonprofit tax theory; and 
 Cosmopolitan philosophy. 
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In doing so, this chapter seeks to answer RQ3: What are the principal theories 
providing insights into the boundaries of public benefit for the purposes of 
international philanthropy, and how do these insights inform the tax treatment of 
cross-border donations? These normative frameworks are examined in detail in 
order to understand what explanatory power each theory has in delineating the 
geographic parameters of the gift deduction in a world where philanthropy 
increasingly crosses borders. 
5.2 PRINCIPAL THEORIES 
5.2.1 Early Tax and Economic Subsidy Theory: A Fiscal Perspective 
In the late 20th century, a group of largely American tax and economic 
theorists,706 ‘sought to understand charity primarily by attempting to understand why 
the state chooses to subsidise charities through tax concessions’.707 The emergence of 
subsidy theories articulated by these scholars followed a period of enormous growth 
in the United States (US) charitable sector after World War II, supported by the 
addition of s 501(c)(3) to the Internal Revenue Code in 1954 enabling qualifying 
organisations to obtain charitable tax status.708 The subsidy approach also found 
support in the history of US federal income tax legislation providing for income tax 
concessions in the early 1900s,709 in which the US charitable deduction was 
explained by Congress in subsidy terms as an incentive to ensure that the increased 
income taxes would not adversely affect charitable giving ‘by tempting “wealthy 
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men … to economize … They will say, Charity begins at home”’.710 The deduction 
was therefore defended on account of the support it provided to charities ‘because of 
what they offer to the larger community: public benefit’.711 
Many of these legal and economic theorists drew from the theory of tax 
expenditures pioneered by Stanley Surrey when he was Assistant Secretary for Tax 
Policy in the US Treasury in the 1960s.712 Surrey described the system of tax 
expenditures as providing ‘a vast subsidy apparatus that uses the mechanics of the 
income tax as the method of paying the subsidy’.713 He viewed tax concessions as 
departures from the ‘normal’ tax structure714 and proposed that these tax subsidies 
were functionally equivalent to direct expenditures and therefore should be evaluated 
in the same way as government spending programs.715 Surrey’s concern was with 
‘the “hidden” aspect of tax expenditures and the use of the tax system for purposes 
other than raising revenue’.716 His position was that ‘most of the tax expenditure 
programs should either be “scrapped because the federal financial assistance they 
provide is not warranted” or that they should be “replaced by direct assistance 
measures that can readily be devised”’.717  
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There is some irony that Surrey, who advocated repealing the charitable 
deduction, had such a powerful influence on nonprofit tax scholars who applied his 
tax expenditure theory to justify the very existence of the deduction by characterising 
it as a government subsidy or tax expenditure to promote charitable activities having 
a public benefit. These theorists considered the deduction to be a subsidy because it 
‘trigger[ed] a reduction of taxable income and, as a result, a tax saving, that would 
not be available in a benchmark income tax system which treated charitable gifts 
similarly to all other gifts or uses of income’.718 Because of the tax savings arising 
from gift deductibility, the donor does not bear the entire cost of the gift.719 The 
result is that when the government allows taxpayers to deduct their charitable gifts 
from their taxable income, the state forgoes tax revenue, which affects all 
taxpayers.720  
Not all of the early nonprofit tax theorists classified the gift deduction in 
subsidy terms. William Andrews and Boris Bittker argued instead that the gift 
deduction was necessary to account for the proper base of income for tax purposes, 
based on the Haig Simons definition of income as the sum of amounts spent by the 
taxpayer on personal consumption plus wealth accumulation.721 Under this approach, 
amounts expended for the benefit of those other than the taxpayer do not constitute 
private consumption.722 Charitable giving does not represent private consumption by 
the taxpayer because they are no longer available for the taxpayer’s use and are 
therefore outside the tax base so a deduction is an appropriate adjustment.723 This 
approach did not gain widespread acceptance by tax scholars primarily because ‘[t]he 
act of making a donation means the taxpayer controls the disposition of assets, which 
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seems inconsistent with the notion that the same gift reduces the taxpayer’s 
income’.724 As a result, most nonprofit tax theorists continue to characterise the gift 
deduction as a government subsidy or tax expenditure to promote charitable activities 
having a public benefit. 
By characterising the gift deduction as a government subsidy, the early tax and 
economic scholars also drew from the public goods theory proposed by the 
economist Burton Weisbrod in 1975 to explain the existence of nonprofit 
organisations in market economies.725 According to this theory, which was based on 
a traditional three-sector model, markets fail to supply adequate quantities of public 
goods. Governments then provide these goods in accordance with the demands of the 
electorate by way of the median voter; however, there will be some individuals 
whose level of demand is greater than the median voter’s. Nonprofits arise to satisfy 
this residual demand for public goods that is not fulfilled by government.726 Public 
subsidy is therefore justified ‘when normal market operations result in a less than 
socially optimal supply of a good or service that yields external benefits to the larger 
society’.727  
Weisbrod’s theory ‘laid the groundwork for what became known as the “public 
goods theory of nonprofit organizations” — a theory that has been expanded and 
revised and perhaps, most importantly, influenced the development of other theories 
in the field’.728 The economist Henry Hansmann was particularly influential in his 
refinement of Weisbrod’s theory, determining that it worked best when applied to 
goods and services that are close to ‘pure’ public goods, such as medical research, 
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the essential characteristics of which are that one person’s enjoyment of the good 
does not preclude its enjoyment by others (‘non-rivalry’), and that once the good has 
been provided to one person, there is no easy way to exclude anyone else from 
enjoying its benefit (‘non-excludability’).729 Hansmann noted that many goods 
provided by the nonprofit sector are generally regarded by economists as ‘quasi-
public’ (such as health, education and the arts), which allow for some exclusion 
and/or rivalry.730 He proposed a contract failure theory pursuant to which nonprofits 
arise as trustworthy alternatives to meet the demand for these goods due to ‘contract 
failure’ between consumers (who cannot accurately assess the public goods 
provided) and for-profit firms (that have ‘both the incentive and the opportunity to 
take advantage of customers by providing less service than was promised and paid 
for’)731 that gained traction with other economic theorists.732 
For the legal scholars that applied Weisbrod’s public goods theory to nonprofit 
tax law, the gift deduction was ‘needed to promote the provision of certain kinds of 
benefits to the public…when normal market operations result in a less than socially 
optimal supply of a good or service that yields external benefits to the larger 
society’.733 Mark Gergen reasoned that public goods were undersupplied because 
some individuals choose to free-ride on the charitable activities of others rather than 
pay to support the goods themselves, so the deduction is needed as a correction for 
this free-rider problem.734 Rob Atkinson viewed the deduction as a reward to 
individuals who choose to support socially valued undertakings, which contributes to 
a more altruistic society.735 Saul Levmore explained the deduction as a mechanism 
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by which citizens ‘vote’ for government subsidy to be directed towards particular 
public goods, providing them with a greater commitment to these projects.736  
A number of nonprofit tax scholars viewed the subsidy as warranted because of 
the benefits of pluralism737 it provided in ‘stimulating or enhancing the voice of 
citizens in the production of a diverse, decentralized, and pluralistic associational 
sector’.738 As explained by John Simon, Harvey Dale and Laura Chisolm: 
A system that provides for diverse, decentralized decision making about 
which visions of public benefit merit support is well suited to a 
heterogeneous society, where many citizens prefer a supply of public 
goods—like culture, health, welfare, and protection of civil rights and the 
environment—that exceeds what majoritarian political processes will 
provide.739  
The result is greater quality, diversity and innovation in the funding of public 
goods.740 The US, a particularly heterogeneous society with a vast array of 
nonprofits, most closely exemplifies this pluralistic ideal.741 
Who is the ‘Public’ that should Benefit from Charity?  
Given that these subsidy theorists defended the gift deduction on the basis that 
it promoted the provision of public benefits, how did they characterise the ‘public’ 
who should benefit from the goods and services provided by charities? Weisbrod’s 
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public goods theory was based on a traditional three-sector model with government, 
a private sector, and a nonprofit sector ‘that are part of a single society in which 
voting, contributions, and subsidies takes place’.742 The society he contemplated was 
the fiscal state. Most economic theories that developed from Weisbrod were 
similarly national in their focus, although Hansmann appeared to deviate from this 
approach in an example used to illustrate contract failure theory. He cited the case of 
an individual who, rather than making a donation to an international aid organisation 
to alleviate hunger overseas, instead tried to purchase the same service from a for-
profit firm. In this situation Hansmann noted ‘the difficulty is that the purchaser 
(donor), who has no contact with the intended beneficiaries, has little or no ability to 
determine whether the firm performs the service at all, much less whether the firm 
performs it well’.743 In discussing Hansmann’s contract failure theory, the economist 
Richard Steinberg employed a similar overseas aid example.744 These examples 
suggest that both Hansmann and Steinberg envisioned charitable purposes being 
carried out overseas, with the implication that for contract failure theory, the ‘public’ 
to benefit from charity is broader than those residing within the fiscal state. 
Most subsidy theorists that applied Weisbrod’s public goods theory to the 
charitable tax concessions also employed the traditional three-sector model, viewing 
the role of the charitable tax concessions as primarily to support the charitable sector 
within the fiscal state. As a result, charitable tax concessions were ‘sensibly limited 
to organisations which [were] locally established (and within the jurisdiction of local 
courts and regulators) … and to organisations operating locally’.745 However, there 
were indications that some subsidy theorists had a broader vision. The early legal 
theorists who justified the subsidy for the charitable deduction because of the 
benefits of pluralism it provided, considered the ‘public benefit’ of charity not simply 
as supplying underfunded public goods, but the decentralised process of producing 
                                                             
 
742 Zolt, above n 620, 367. 
743 Hansmann, ‘Economic Theories of Non-Profit Organisations’, above n 729, 30. 
744 Steinberg, above n 726, 121. 
745 Groves and Lowe-Petraske, above n 38, 10. 
 154 Chapter 5: Theoretical Framework 
public goods and the creation of civil society itself.746 As a result, rather than being 
primarily concerned with its budgetary impact on the fiscal state, these theorists were 
more concerned with promoting a ‘pluralistic associational sector’747 wherever that 
may be. This suggests that the ‘public’ to benefit from charity should be 
geographically expansive enough to enable private citizens to support a broad cross-
section of organisations throughout global civil society.  
Can Charitable Objects Performed Overseas ‘Benefit’ the Public in the 
Home Jurisdiction? 
Because the early economic and tax theorists employed a three-sector model, 
where the role of the charitable tax concessions was primarily to support the fiscal 
state, they generally did not consider charity outside the state’s geographic 
boundaries. As a result of their national focus, these scholars were similarly silent as 
to whether a charitable object performed overseas could benefit the public in the 
taxing jurisdiction. 
With charity and philanthropy increasingly crossing borders towards the end of 
the 20th century, nonprofit tax scholars started to explicitly question the relevance of 
the traditional three-sector model with its national frame of analysis. The next section 
examines how these legal theorists characterised the gift deduction and the public 
benefits it promoted in an era of philanthropic globalisation. 
5.2.2 Recent Nonprofit Tax Theory: A Global Perspective 
In his seminal article, Foreign Charities, Harvey Dale was the first tax scholar 
to point out that despite the rapid growth in international charity in an increasingly 
interconnected global economy, the tax literature had failed to address issues of how 
to treat international charitable activities.748 While Dale did not specifically address 
the theories underlying the deduction, he critically examined the US tax rules 
applying to cross-border donations and foreign charitable organisations, arguing that 
‘the enormous scope of this international activity has given rise to an urgent need for 
support from US individuals and organizations’ which was being constrained by 
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these ‘ancient and bizarre’ rules.749 He concluded that ‘[i]n a world in which charity 
increasingly crosses — and ought to cross — national borders, US donors should not 
be forced to resort to formalisms … in order to provide needed support abroad’.750 
Dale’s recommendations for changing the US rules applying to cross-border giving 
were not implemented. 
More than a decade later, in 2006, following further changes to the global 
philanthropic landscape, David Pozen undertook the first examination of how the 
different theories explaining the charitable deduction applied to cross-border 
donations, expressing surprise that ‘[i]n a globalized world of charity, deduction 
theory has remained oddly, even irresponsibly, parochial’.751 He sought to ‘situate 
the charitable deduction in a broader critical and spatial context, and to show how it 
has provided a vital, underexplored link between US tax policy and the “global 
associational revolution”’.752 In his extensive analysis of the deduction theories, 
Pozen found that applying these theories to cross-border giving presented a number 
of challenges, not least of which was that they were ‘silent on the appropriate status 
of internationally targeted donations’.753 His solution was to propose ‘an integrated 
theory of the deduction that would accommodate the strengths and weaknesses of 
each of its major justifications’,754 including ‘generating collective benefits — for 
enhancing social welfare, distributive justice, and communitarian values’.755 In 
applying his integrated theory to the tax treatment of cross-border donations, Pozen 
concluded: 
As a matter of tax theory, broadly construed, it is hard to identify a 
principled basis on which to restrict deductions geographically. The 
integrated theory points instead to an equivalency ideal, whereby 
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internationally-targeted contributions are granted the same tax treatment as 
domestically-targeted contributions, except to the extent justified by 
reasonable extrinsic considerations.756 
A year later in the Netherlands, Ineke Koele published her doctoral thesis 
entitled The International Taxation of Philanthropy, in which she examined the 
geographic restrictions or ‘landlock’ imposed by the tax regimes of the US, Germany 
and the Netherlands on the tax relief for philanthropic activities and organisations, in 
order to determine whether there was 
any sensible, discerning rational for the landlock in the tax systems of [these] 
countries ... under what conditions or circumstances is [would be] justified 
and sensible to resolve the landlock, and [whether] international 
philanthropy can be freed from international tax barriers.757  
Following her extensive analysis of the three tax regimes, Koele determined that ‘the 
arguments found for the existence of the landlock resort to the category of anti-abuse 
rationales’,758 and this ‘concern regarding control and enforcement of domestic laws 
is not sufficient to justify landlocked tax provisions’.759 In finding ‘no conceptual 
arguments’ to support the existence of these provisions, Koele concluded that: 
The philosophy of pluralism is the main justification for the special tax 
position of philanthropy. As government is not able to control the activities 
of a pluriform modern society, it is obliged to maintain a neutral position 
towards all plural powers in today’s … international society. Consequently, 
the special tax treatment of philanthropy and philanthropic organizations is 
regarded as a principled treatment. The principled nature of the tax position 
implies that governments should refrain from inhibiting, by means of 
taxation, either domestic or international activities of qualified organizations 
which are beneficial to (international) society. 760  
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As Koele was completing her thesis in 2007, the Dutch Government announced that 
it would be amending its tax laws to provide for the equal tax treatment of cross-
border donations made to the European Union (EU), the Netherlands Antilles and 
Aruba,761 which it later extended to all cross-border donations.762 Koele declared this 
to be ‘the beginning of a new paradigm for cross-border giving’,763 although as 
evidenced by the nonprofit tax scholarship that followed, this paradigm remained 
limited to Europe.    
In 2012, Eric Zolt, another American tax scholar, built on David Pozen’s 
examination of the charitable deduction theories and their application to cross-border 
donations, providing insights as to why the new paradigm for cross-border giving in 
Europe had not extended to the US. He found that the US charitable tax concessions 
were adopted ‘when most US taxpayers were focusing little attention on foreign 
charitable activities’,764 and that as a result 
US scholars have generally adopted a US-centric view of government, the 
private sector, and the nonprofit sector. In this relatively simple world, 
existing subsidy theories reflect that the goods and services could be 
provided by any of these three actors.765  
Zolt argued that introducing cross-border giving into the simple three-sector model 
complicates matters as it necessarily involves ‘more actors (multilateral institutions, 
bilateral donors, foreign governments, and foreign charities) and more preferences 
(recipient countries and their citizens) than domestic charitable activity’.766 He 
agreed with Pozen that there was no ‘comprehensive theory that supports the 
automatic extension of the existing charitable deduction regime for contributions to 
fund the domestic activities of domestic charities to cover contributions to fund 
foreign charitable activities’, but argued that ‘[m]erely showing that several of the 
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existing theories provide no clear basis for distinguishing between domestic and 
foreign charitable activities is not sufficient to justify adopting a geographically 
neutral policy’.767 Zolt concluded by offering a ‘“bang for the buck approach”, 
designing government assistance for charitable activities in a way that maximizes the 
return for amount of government funds expended’,768 arguing that if foreign 
charitable activity is to be encouraged, under the bang for the buck approach ‘the 
objective should be to provide tax subsidies to those charities that could provide the 
highest quality goods and services at the lowest costs’.769 
Two years later, an Australian tax scholar, Miranda Stewart, explored the 
challenges faced by the fiscal state as a result of both the commercialisation and 
globalisation of charity. With respect to the globalisation of charity, she focused on 
‘how Australian income tax law … should establish the eligibility for tax 
concessions for charities operating abroad and for donations abroad’,770 with the 
answer depending ‘in part on the rationale for the charitable tax concessions within 
the boundary of the fiscal state’,771 specifically: 
If the justification is that charities provide public goods that would otherwise 
have to be provided by the state, so that the tax concessions essentially 
reflect government subsidies, then the question becomes how the cost of the 
extended subsidy should be balanced with the national budgetary impact. 
Alternatively, if the rationale for tax concessions is one of liberal pluralism, 
so that the charitable sphere has its own value in our liberal democracy, this 
implies that we should accord more weight to those private decisions to 
determine where and how to fund the public good.772 
While Stewart did not directly advocate either rationale, after citing recent case law 
in the EU liberalising the tax treatment for cross-border donations, she cautioned that 
                                                             
 
767 Ibid 389. 
768 Ibid 366. 
769 Ibid 402. 
770 Stewart, ‘The Boundaries of Charities and Tax’ above n 79, 234. 
771 Ibid 251. 
772 Ibid 251–2. 
 Chapter 5: Theoretical Framework 159 
for Australia ‘the fiscal consequences of extending tax concessions to transnational 
charitable activities or deductions are unknown’ and as a result ‘limits can be 
justified at the present time’.773 This conclusion suggests that for now at least, 
Stewart favours a more traditional subsidy rationale.  
Who is the ‘Public’ that should Benefit from Charity?  
 By incorporating cross-border giving into their analysis of the gift deduction, 
these nonprofit tax scholars identified a gap in the deduction literature; namely that 
none of the early subsidy theorists had addressed the question: ‘who is the “public” 
who should benefit from the good of charity [and] does it align with the public who 
are represented in the fiscal state?’774 Pozen was the first scholar to identify this 
omission, observing that: 
No [deduction theory] has specified the relevant community to which it is 
meant to apply, which is especially ironic given that the ‘community benefit’ 
defense of the charitable deduction has come to predominate in the 
literature.775 
For these nonprofit tax scholars, answering the question of the appropriate 
community that should benefit from the good of charity raises ‘difficult value 
judgments that are hard to evaluate without some normative framework’.776 
The normative framework provided by these recent tax theorists was based 
largely on the subsidy theories formulated by earlier economic and tax scholars, with 
different conclusions being reached as to which theory best justifies extending the 
tax deduction to cross-border giving and the implications for the concept of public 
benefit in the tax law. Koele advocated the pluralism rationale, implying a broad 
conception of public benefit in tax law without consideration of its impact on the 
fisc. In contrast, Stewart adopted a more traditional subsidy rationale, with its narrow 
conception of public benefit restricted to the fiscal state, with any consideration of 
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extending the deduction to cross-border donations being measured against its fiscal 
impact. Pozen’s integrated theory, taking from each of the deduction’s principal 
justifications, supported equal tax treatment for domestic and cross-border donations, 
and like the pluralism rationale implied a broad concept of public benefit in the tax 
law. Even Zolt, who did not advocate a particular deduction theory or combination of 
theories, appeared to support a broader conception of public benefit with his ‘bang 
for the buck’ approach.777  
Can Charitable Gifts Directed Overseas ‘Benefit’ the Public in the Home 
Jurisdiction? 
While these nonprofit tax theorists identified a gap in the deduction literature 
concerning the boundary question of the ‘public’ who should benefit from the good 
of charity, cross-border philanthropy invokes a second boundary question, namely: 
can charitable gifts directed overseas provide a direct or indirect ‘benefit’ to those 
who reside in the home jurisdiction? This question was not directly raised by any of 
these scholars. However some referenced the issue by identifying international or 
global public goods for which benefits can also accrue to the taxing jurisdiction.778 
International or global public goods are typically (but not always) provided by 
international charitable organisations. Many of these goods produce externalities, 
both positive and negative, that extend beyond national borders. Consequently, they 
‘cannot be delivered by the fiscal state alone, or at all’.779 Global public goods 
producing positive externalities include medical and scientific breakthroughs, peace 
and environmental movements, and artistic performances and exhibitions. Stewart 
cites in particular ‘charities that carry out international aid, relief and development 
work’ as qualifying for tax deductible status because of government recognition that 
they ‘assist in achieving “Australia’s international aid objectives and therefore 
contribute to Australia’s broad public benefit”’.780  
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There are also global public goods that produce negative externalities, such as 
environmental pollution, climate change, infectious diseases and terrorism. Pozen 
describes these as ‘paradigmatic social harms that the free market cannot be expected 
to rectify on its own, and that governments may be handicapped from addressing in 
full because of political and institutional constraints’.781 Pozen argues that 
‘contributions to [these] international causes … have the potential to yield objective 
benefits for [the home jurisdiction] by generating goodwill … and helping to create 
more prosperous and stable trading partners’.782 In this sense, supporting global 
public goods benefits the home jurisdiction by serving as ‘a powerful tool of public 
diplomacy’, generating ‘soft power’ that can be used to enhance a country’s image 
and secure cooperation in global affairs.783  
Consequently, the ‘benefit’ derived from gifts made overseas that support the 
production of global public goods can accrue to the taxing jurisdiction, as both a 
benefit to the individuals residing in the jurisdiction (such as medical or scientific 
advances) or a benefit to the country as a whole (such as political goodwill and 
economic ties). By focusing on the benefit that could accrue to the home jurisdiction 
through the production of global public goods, these scholars did not make a 
distinction between direct and indirect benefit. The value judgments inherent in their 
broader conception of public benefit invoke a different normative framework 
involving global ethics, which is examined in the following section.  
5.2.3 Cosmopolitan Philosophy: A Moral Perspective 
For more than 40 years, the philosopher Peter Singer has been a strong 
proponent of cosmopolitan ethics, arguing that regardless of proximity or distance, 
‘if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby 
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it’.784 
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Born out of the global associational revolution, cosmopolitan philosophy has 
emerged as ‘the leading secular paradigm, explaining to affluent individuals why 
they must act and what they must do’ to alleviate poverty and suffering around the 
world.785 Bill Gates has adopted this paradigm (and quotes Peter Singer) to explain 
the moral imperative behind his vast international philanthropy, which is based on 
‘careful ethical calculations’.786 With the advent of philanthropic globalisation, this 
normative framework provides important insights into the boundaries of public 
benefit in contemporary global society and in doing so, is able to serve as a moral 
compass for the tax treatment of cross-border philanthropy.787  
Exploring the different boundaries of public benefit raises fundamental moral 
questions concerning what is owed to others throughout the world. In a discussion of 
such matters, moral philosophers invariably turn to an examination of cosmopolitan 
duties and responsibilities.788 Thomas Pogge summarises the three elements shared 
by all cosmopolitan positions:  
 Individualism — the ultimate units of concern are human beings rather 
than family lines, ethnic or religious communities, or nation-states;  
 Universality — the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every 
living human being equally; and  
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 Generality — this special status has global force in that human beings are 
ultimate units of concern for everyone.789  
Cosmopolitan ethics is therefore centered around ‘the fundamental needs and 
interests of individual human beings, and of all human beings’.790 The result, 
according to Pogge, is that people should be global citizens and their ‘political 
allegiance and loyalties should be widely dispersed over … neighborhood, town, 
country, province, state, region, and world at large’.791 In this sense, ‘global civil 
society can be seen as an aspiration to reach and include citizens everywhere and to 
enable them to think and act as global citizens’.792 
Being a global citizen entails both the benefits of participating in global civil 
society, as well as global duties and responsibilities: 
[A]ny person who enjoys the benefits of a global society (and generates 
personal wealth via global markets) also has responsibilities as a global 
citizen: globalization has the potential to cause serious damage to the 
world’s poorest nations, and members of the rich world who benefit from it 
should take action to rectify some of that damage.793 
This extends the obligation of the affluent to the poor beyond just providing 
assistance to strangers, to providing compensation for harms caused as a result of the 
negative externalities produced by globalisation.794 In these circumstances, Singer 
argues that ‘the need for a global ethic is inescapable’.795 Because one of the tenets 
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of cosmopolitan philosophy is universality whereby ‘the status of ultimate unit of 
concern attaches to every living human being equally’,796 Singer maintains that there 
is no moral justification for discriminating against those in need on geographic 
grounds.797  
In a world in which charity and philanthropy increasingly crosses borders, 
Singer advocates alleviating world poverty by having affluent individuals send a 
significant amount of their income overseas through international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) who provide public goods and services across borders.798 
[W]e can all save lives of people, both children and adults, who would 
otherwise die, and we can do so at a very small cost to us: the cost of a new 
CD, a shirt or a night out at a restaurant or concert, can mean the difference 
between life and death to more than one person somewhere in the world — 
and overseas aid agencies like Oxfam overcome the problem of acting at a 
distance.799 
Individuals who follow the ‘Singer Solution’ and engage in cross-border 
philanthropy and particularly those who provide support to developing countries 
through international organisations demonstrate an ‘interconnected global outlook 
which drives [them] to view faraway crises as their own and therefore to cast their 
benevolence widely’.800 However, even for these cosmopolitan-minded citizens, 
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there are challenges associated with fulfilling duties to people who are far, ‘from 
informational deficits, to travel expenses, to intuition and habit, to cultural 
disjunctures, to collective action problems [that] makes it more costly and more 
difficult to do good by someone in a faraway country than to do good by one’s 
neighbour’.801 These challenges reinforce the vital role played by international 
charitable organisations in enabling citizens in donor countries to fulfill their moral 
responsibilities to those in the wider global community.802  As a result, cosmopolitan 
philosophy illuminates the significance of domestic tax policy and its impact on the 
tax treatment of donations to these organisations.  
Patricia Illingworth employs cosmopolitan philosophy as a normative theory in 
examining the US tax treatment of cross-border donations, specifically the tax laws 
restricting charitable donations being made directly to foreign charities. Observing 
that this water’s edge policy is morally anachronistic in contemporary global society, 
she argues: 
[B]ecause law not only reflects norms and values, but shapes them, such 
policies can undermine efforts to expand the scope of our moral world view 
from a narrow, local, and domestic one to a global and cosmopolitan one.803 
Illingworth explicitly connects cosmopolitan philosophy with the concept of public 
benefit in order to clarify the position cosmopolitan philosophy takes on the two 
boundary questions: who is the ‘public’ that should benefit from charity; and can 
charitable gifts directed overseas ‘benefit’ the public in the taxing jurisdiction? 
[T]he water's edge policy … implies that our obligations to the distant are 
not the same as our obligations to our compatriots, because with respect to 
the latter we stand to benefit whereas with respect to the former we do not 
benefit … If the charitable status of an organization were informed by 
cosmopolitan ethics, the relevant conception of community would be 
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comprehensive enough to see how helping the distant benefits us all as part 
of one global community.804 
This expansive view of public benefit in cosmopolitan philosophy is consistent with 
the concept of universal public benefit in charity law. However, it differs in its 
implications for cross-border philanthropy. While the judicial conception of charity 
law supports the idea that cross-border philanthropy provides benefits to the taxing 
jurisdiction in the form of either a direct benefit or an indirect (moral) benefit, 
cosmopolitan philosophy suggests that cross-border philanthropy provides benefits to 
the taxing jurisdiction in the form of a direct moral benefit. Consequently, extending 
tax deductibility to cross-border giving becomes a moral imperative.805 
5.3 CONCLUSION  
The territorial issues in the common law of charity conceptualises ‘public 
benefit’ as the framework to decide questions around geographic boundaries. The tax 
treatment of cross-border philanthropy raises important questions concerning the 
geographic boundaries of public benefit. This chapter has examined three principal 
theories spanning the disciplines of economics, tax law and moral philosophy that all 
provide rich insights into the boundaries of public benefit for the purposes of cross-
border giving.  
The early American economic and legal theorists who approached legal charity 
as a fiscal concept viewed the charitable deduction as a government subsidy or tax 
expenditure to promote charitable activities having a public benefit. This subsidy was 
needed because of market and government failures resulting in the undersupply of 
public goods that yield external benefits to society. An extension of this theory 
viewed the subsidy as warranted because of the benefits of pluralism it provides in 
decentralising the process of producing public goods and in promoting a diverse civil 
society. These scholars did not consider international charitable activities when 
formulating their theories, which were based on a simple national three-sector model, 
where the role of the charitable tax concessions was primarily to support the fiscal 
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state. As a result, the ‘public’ whose members were to benefit from charity aligned 
with the taxpayers that resided within the state’s geographic boundaries and there 
was no consideration of whether a cross-border gift could ‘benefit’ the taxing 
jurisdiction. This approach is consistent with the view taken by the Australian 
Government, which has made it clear that publicly funded taxpayer concessions 
should be used for ‘the broad benefit of the Australian community’.806 By focusing 
on the overall welfare of the Australian public, the charitable tax concessions 
properly fulfil their role of supporting the charitable sector within the fiscal state.  
For those subsidy theorists who justified the gift deduction on the basis of its 
pluralistic benefits, the result is arguably different. While these theorists did not 
explicitly consider cross-border issues, their understanding of the role of the 
charitable tax concessions was to support a broad cross-section of projects and 
organisations regardless of where they were located, reflecting greater heterogeneity 
of preferences for public goods. It follows that the ‘public’ to benefit from charity 
should be geographically expansive enough to encompass the increased demand 
from donors regarding where to fund the public good and the increased diversity of 
recipients in fulfilling that demand. With this broader conception of public benefit, 
the pluralism rationale provides a basis in tax theory for extending donations 
subsidised by the state to those targeting international charitable activities.  
Later nonprofit tax theorists that emerged in the early 21st century determined 
that the national frame of analysis employed by the earlier deduction theorists did not 
adequately take into account the global reality where the boundaries of the fiscal 
state, the market and civil society had become increasingly porous. By incorporating 
cross-border giving into their analysis of the gift deduction, these nonprofit tax 
scholars revealed a gap in the earlier deduction theories in addressing the question of 
which ‘community’ was to benefit from charity. With a normative framework 
grounded in the earlier subsidy theories, combined with a global perspective 
considering the tax treatment of cross-border donations, the general consensus 
among these tax theorists was that the ‘public’ to benefit from charity should extend 
beyond the borders of the fiscal state. These theorists also indicated that charitable 
                                                             
 
806 See Explanatory Memorandum, In Australia Bill [1.2], [1.43]. 
 168 Chapter 5: Theoretical Framework 
gifts directed overseas could ‘benefit’ the public in the taxing jurisdiction to the 
extent that these donations supported global public goods. 
Cosmopolitan philosophy provides a set of values that accords with a world 
where philanthropic donations increasingly cross borders. With universality as one of 
their principal values, cosmopolitan philosophers find no moral justification for 
discriminating against those in need on geographical grounds, consistent with a 
universal conception of public benefit. Tax policies that facilitate cross-border giving 
further the values of this cosmopolitan ethos. In the same way that some donor 
countries have made it clear that the moral obligation to help the poor is a primary 
motivation in their provision of foreign aid,807 this theory suggests that providing a 
tax deduction for cross-border donations sends a signal to the public that there is a 
moral duty to helping those in need who are geographically distant. 
On balance, the theories examined in this chapter explaining the charitable tax 
concessions suggest that a more expansive view of public benefit is needed in the tax 
law in contemporary global society. Recent nonprofit tax scholarship has evidenced a 
shift in thinking towards a broader conception of public benefit in the tax law beyond 
the boundaries of the fiscal state through the pluralism rationale and later integrated 
theories. Cosmopolitan philosophy underscores that this broader conception of public 
benefit has a strong moral imperative. As a result, a compelling theoretical case can 
be made for recognising a broader concept of public benefit in the tax law in an era 
of philanthropic globalisation, which in turn supports extending gift deductibility to 
cross-border donations. 
While the Australian Government’s policy position is contrary to this 
theoretical finding, other donor countries are more closely aligned. The next chapter 
undertakes a comparative analysis of the tax treatment of cross-border donations in 
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selected jurisdictions, to determine how these countries have used domestic tax 
policy to respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by a changed global 
charitable and philanthropic landscape.  
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Chapter 6: Legal and Policy Frameworks 
in Other Jurisdictions for 
Cross-Border Philanthropy 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The global associational revolution provided the impetus for nonprofit scholars 
Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier to launch the Comparative Nonprofit Sector 
Project in the early 1990s, which aimed to map the nonprofit sector around the world 
in a systematically comparative way.808 Around this time, comparative studies on the 
tax treatment of cross-border giving written for legal practitioners first emerged,809 
followed by nascent tax scholarship on this subject.810 In 2002, Anthony Infanti, an 
American tax and comparative law scholar, undertook one of the early academic 
studies by using the rules governing the tax treatment of cross-border charitable 
contributions as a ‘single, concrete example’ to illustrate his comparative tax 
framework.811 Infanti’s primary reason for choosing this topic was because ‘it was 
                                                             
 
808 See Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier, Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the 
Nonprofit Sector Cross-Nationally (The Johns Hopkins University Institute for Policy Studies, 
1996); Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier  (eds), Defining the Nonprofit Sector: A Cross-
National Analysis (Manchester University Press, 1997); Lester Salamon and S Wojciech 
Sokolowski (eds), Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector (Kumarian Press, 
2004); Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (eds), Global Civil Society (Oxford 
University Press, 2001); Helmut Anheier and Lester Salamon, ‘The Nonprofit Sector in 
Comparative Perspective’ in Walter Powell and Richard Steinberg (eds), The Nonprofit Sector: A 
Research Handbook (Yale University Press, 2nd ed, 2006) 89; Lester Salamon, ‘Putting the Civil 
Society Sector on the Economic Map of the World’ (2010) 81(2) Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics 167. 
809 See Jonathan Schwarz, ‘International Tax Aspects of Charities: General Report’ (1989) 43(12) 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 539; Carole Shelbourn George (ed), International 
Charitable Giving: Laws and Taxation (Kluwer Law International, 1994); Bater, ‘The Tax 
Treatment of Cross-Border Donations’, above n 106; Weisbrod and Mauser, above n 106. 
810 In 1995 the National Center on Philanthropy and the Law at NYU held a conference focusing 
on the US tax treatment of cross-border giving. 
811 See Infanti, ‘Spontaneous Tax Coordination’, above n 100. 
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not a topic about which academics studying international tax normally write’.812 
Since then, the dramatic rise in international philanthropy in the early 21st century813 
has prompted a number of tax scholars from around the world to address the 
comparative tax treatment of cross-border donations, elevating this topic from the 
margins of tax law closer to the mainstream.814  
This chapter and the next employ comparative legal methodology with a focus 
on comparative tax law to examine the laws and policies affecting cross-border 
philanthropy in the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands and 
Canada. The countries examined are all present members of the OECD group of 
Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) donor countries along with Australia 
and as such are all considered developed nations with high income and the most 
significant providers of overseas development aid.815 They also share similarities in 
their approach to civil society regulation816 and are at a similar level of evolutionary 
                                                             
 
812 Anthony Infanti, ‘A Tax Crit Identity Crisis? Or Tax Expenditure Analysis, Deconstruction, and 
the Rethinking of a Collective Identity’ (2005) 25 Whittier Law Review 707, 796. Infanti 
acknowledges Harvey Dale remained the glaring exception. See Dale, above n 94. 
813 See section 1.2.1. 
814 See Ineke Koele, International Taxation of Philanthropy, above n 80; Sigrid Hemels, ‘Are We In 
Need of a European Charity? How to Remove Fiscal Barriers to Cross-Border Charitable Giving 
in Europe’ (2009) 8–9 Intertax 424; Theodore Georgopoulos, ‘Can Tax Authorities Scrutinise the 
Ideas of Foreign Charities? The ECJ's Persche Judgment and Lessons from US Tax Law’ (2010) 
16(4) European Law Journal 458; Charles Ostertag, ‘We're Starting to Share Well With Others: 
Cross-Border Giving Lessons from the Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2011) 20(1) 
Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 255; Heidenbauer, above n 91; Moore and 
Rutzen, above n 13; Heike Jochum, ‘Cross-Border Charitable and Other Pro Bono Contributions: 
The Situation in Europe and the US’ (2012) 40(11) Intertax 593; Cutbill, Paines and Hallam, 
above n 106; Heidenbauer et al, above n 86; von Hippel, above n 82; Lilian Faulhaber, 
‘Charitable Giving, Tax Expenditures, and Direct Spending in the United States and the European 
Union’ (2014) 39 Yale Journal of International Law 87; Stewart, ‘The Boundaries of Charities and 
Tax’, above n 79; Rutzen, above n 70; Oonagh Breen, ‘Allies or Adversaries? Foundation 
Responses to Government Policing of Cross-Border Charity’ (2015) 17(1) International Journal 
of Not-for-Profit Law 45; Barbara Ibrahim, ‘States, Public Space and Cross-Border Philanthropy: 
Observations from the Arab Transitions’ (2015) 17(1) International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 
72. 
815 See OECD, The DAC List of ODA Recipients, above n 35. The present members of DAC are 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union Institutions. 
816 Center for Global Prosperity, Philanthropic Freedom, above n 88, 8. 
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legal development, providing a functional equivalence that facilitates the 
comparative analysis. 
The tax treatment of cross-border donations is particularly suited to 
comparative legal methodology because it is a narrow topic with distinct legal rules 
that cross borders, implicating other countries and their international tax regimes.817  
As a tool for tax reform, a comparative analysis enables a country’s tax laws and 
policies affecting cross-border philanthropy to be considered beyond domestic tax 
policymaking concerns,818 to take into account the international realities of 
globalisation.819 In doing so, it takes the country comparison beyond parallel 
descriptions of the domestic legal rules in the four jurisdictions, to providing a 
critical evaluation of those rules within their local contexts in order to understand the 
solutions adopted in the different countries and the key international trends that have 
emerged.820  
The comparative method undertaken in this chapter and the next follows 
Anthony Infanti’s comparative tax framework of ‘spontaneous tax coordination’, 
which involves unilateral action on the part of a country seeking to reform its tax 
system by evaluating the tax rules adopted by other countries in order to better 
understand and accommodate legislative solutions and trends overseas.821 Infanti’s 
framework offers flexibility for policymakers in deciding what aspects of other 
countries’ solutions to adopt in order to accommodate domestic political, economic, 
and social norms.822 To test his theoretical framework, Infanti applied it to reforming 
the rules governing the US tax treatment of cross-border charitable contributions,823 
providing useful insights for a similar undertaking from an Australian perspective.   
                                                             
 
817 See Infanti, ‘Spontaneous Tax Coordination’, above n 100, 1120.  
818 See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of these concerns.  
819 See Infanti, ‘Spontaneous Tax Coordination’, above n 100, 1119–20.  
820 Garbarino, above n 99, 685. 
821 Infanti, ‘Spontaneous Tax Coordination’, above n 100, 1136. 
822 Ibid 1142. 
823 Ibid 1105. 
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For the practical application of his framework, Infanti followed Walter 
Kamba’s three phases of comparative legal analysis and tailored them to comparative 
tax law,824 as shown in Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3. Three phases of comparative analysis 
In the descriptive phase (undertaken in this chapter), each jurisdiction's laws and 
policies governing the tax treatment of cross-border donations are described taking 
into consideration their historical and cultural context. In the identification phase 
(undertaken in the first part of chapter 7), these laws and policies are compared 
thematically in an effort to identify any similarities and differences among them, as 
well as any trends that have emerged. In the explanatory phase (undertaken in the 
second part of chapter 7), the results of the comparative analysis are critically 
evaluated and the similarities and differences explained. By undertaking a 
comparative analysis, this chapter addresses the first part of RQ4: What other legal 
and policy frameworks for cross-border philanthropy exist in comparable 
jurisdictions and how have they responded to the globalisation of philanthropy? 
6.2 DESCRIPTIVE COUNTRY COMPARISON 
This section provides a description of the tax laws and policies governing the 
tax treatment of cross-border donations in the US, UK, the Netherlands and Canada. 
Each jurisdiction will be described under three main headings to facilitate the 
comparative analysis by providing a thematic basis for comparison, augmenting the 
functional equivalence of the four jurisdictions. 
 Nature and Scope of Charitable Giving.  The total amount of private and 
public giving in each country, including the proportion directed overseas. 
                                                             
 
824 Kamba, above n 123, 511–12.  
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 Historical Context. The historical development of each country’s 
charitable tax regime. 
 Legal and Policy Framework for Cross-Border Giving, including: 
o Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving — tax laws adopted to facilitate 
and regulate charitable giving within national borders; 
o Application of Tax Incentives to Cross-Border Donations — tax laws 
adopted to facilitate and regulate cross-border giving; 
o Anti-Abuse Measures — anti-abuse laws, regulations and guidelines 
applying to individuals and organisations engaged in cross-border 
charitable activities; 
o Giving Intermediaries — use of third party charitable intermediaries 
to enable tax-effective cross-border giving; and 
o Tax Treaties — use of bilateral tax treaties to provide reciprocal 
charitable tax relief for donors in each country. 
The descriptive country comparison begins with the US, generally viewed as a 
philanthropic barometer for the rest of the world. This is followed by country 
descriptions of the UK and the Netherlands, both of which are subject to European 
Union (EU) law, while representing the common law and the civil law traditions, 
respectively. With its basis in common law and a similar population size and gross 
domestic product (GDP) to Australia, Canada rounds out the country descriptions. 
6.2.1 United States 
Nature and Scope of Charitable Giving 
Charitable donations in the US are the highest in the world in absolute terms. 
In 2014, total charitable contributions from American individuals, corporations and 
foundations were USD358.38 billion.825 This represented an increase in the past 
decade of USD98.12 billion in current dollars, or USD32.20 billion in inflation-
adjusted dollars.826 Individual donors accounted for 72 per cent, with the remainder 
                                                             
 
825 Giving USA Foundation, Giving USA 2015: Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2014 
(2015) (‘Giving USA Annual Report 2014’). 
826 Ibid. 
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coming from foundations (15 per cent), bequests (8 per cent) and corporations (5 per 
cent).827  The vast majority of giving in the US is channelled toward domestic causes. 
Giving USA estimates that just USD15.10 billion in 2013 (4 per cent) went to 
‘international affairs’.828 
Although international donations comprise a small percentage of total giving, 
this share has generally grown over the past decade,829 with OECD figures showing 
that US private philanthropy to developing countries in 2013 was almost USD23 
billion, an increase from approximately USD2.5 billion in 1990.830 Due to under-
reporting, it has been estimated that US private philanthropy to developing countries 
may be as high as USD39 billion.831 A large proportion of this cross-border giving 
comes from the largest US foundations, with 60 per cent of the largest US 
foundations engaging in international grantmaking.832 Cross-border giving by the 
largest US foundations has increased significantly from USD680 million in 1994 to 
USD4.3 billion in 2010, representing 12 per cent of US private philanthropy to 
developing countries.833 The growth of cross-border giving by major US foundations 
has outpaced the growth of domestic philanthropy, representing 24 per cent of all 
foundation grants.834  
                                                             
 
827 Ibid. 
828 Ibid. 
829 Although there was a 2.0 per cent decrease in current dollars from 2013 to 2014 (3.6 per 
cent when adjusted for inflation). See Giving USA Annual Report 2014, above n 825.  
830 See OECD, OECD.stat, above n 25. 
831 The Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2013, above n 15, 5. 
832 Based on all grants of USD10 000 or more awarded by 1330 of the largest US foundations. 
See Foundation Center, International Grantmaking Update: A Snapshot of US Foundation Trends  
(December 2012) 3 (‘Snapshot of US Foundation Trends December 2012’). The Gates Foundation 
accounts for 44 per cent of all cross-border gifts from US foundations. See Spero, The Global Role 
of US Foundations, above n 26, 8–9. 
833 This represents a decline from USD6.3 billion in 2008 primarily due to a decrease in the 
number of large, multi-year grants. See Snapshot of US Foundation Trends December 2012, above 
n 832, 1. See also Spero, The Global Role of US Foundations, above n 26, 8–9 and The Index of 
Philanthropic Freedom 2015, above n 88, 8.  
834 Spero, The Global Role of US Foundations, above n 26, 9, using 2008 data. See also Snapshot of 
US Foundation Trends December 2012, above n 832, 1, noting that in 2010, international support 
represented 21 per cent of overall giving. 
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In 2013, the US Government was also the largest government donor by volume 
with net overseas development assistance (ODA) flows of USD31.5 billion, an 
increase of 1.3 per cent in real terms from 2012.  However US ODA as a share of 
gross national income (GNI) was just 0.19 per cent, ranking it 20th out of the DAC’s 
28 member countries.835  
Historical Context 
American Law of Charity 
The early American colonists brought ‘the English legal and social tradition of 
an active private philanthropy [which] created an environment favorable to the 
formation of charitable organizations’.836 With its origins in the English common law 
model of charity and in particular the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601,837 the 
American law of charity evolved to suit local conditions influenced by the 
proliferation of voluntary associations that had ‘played key roles in the American 
Revolution and in subsequent efforts to organize republican government’.838 By the 
19th century when Alexis de Tocqueville famously observed that ‘Americans of all 
ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever forming 
associations’,839 they were also ‘beginning to donate impressively large sums of 
money to private institutions’.840 Indeed, ‘America's principles of free association 
                                                             
 
835 OECD, Aid to Developing Countries Rebounds in 2013 To Reach an All-Time High, above n 47. 
836 John Persons, John Osborne and Charles Feldman, ‘Criteria for Exemption Under Section 
501(c)(3)’ (Research Papers Sponsored by the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public 
Needs, Vol IV: Taxes, US Department of the Treasury, 1977) 1920. See also Chauncey Belknap, 
The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying Policy 
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837 Persons, Osborne and Feldman, above n 836, 1912; Belknap, above n 836, 2027. See 
discussion in 4.3.2 below on the English Common Law Model of Charity. 
838 Peter Dobkin Hall, ‘A Historical Overview of Philanthropy, Voluntary Associations, and 
Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1600–2000’ in Walter Powell and Richard 
Steinberg (eds), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (Yale University Press, 2nd ed, 2006) 
32, 35. 
839 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Alfred A Knopf, 1945) 106. 
840 Dobkin Hall, above n 838, 36. 
 178 Chapter 6: Legal and Policy Frameworks in Other Jurisdictions for Cross-Border Philanthropy 
and pluralism shaped a fresh new spirit of philanthropy markedly different than that 
of other contemporary single-sector societies dominated by Crown or Church’.841  
Charitable organisations and charitable giving were strengthened in the 20th 
century by the federal tax laws, solidifying the ‘centrality of the nonprofit sector in 
American social and economic life’.842 In the War Revenue Act of 1917, a charitable 
tax deduction for individuals was introduced because of fears that the higher federal 
income tax rates introduced to fund the World War I effort would reduce individuals’ 
income surpluses from which they supported charity.843 Favourable federal income 
tax treatment for domestic charities continued during and immediately following the 
Depression as Congress focused primarily on raising tax revenue for domestic use.844 
At the same time ‘the Depression mentality of the mid–late 1930s, when America 
was still focused inward on national recovery, had a New Deal domestic agenda and 
an isolationist foreign policy’,845 resulted in new legislation introducing geographic 
limitations on charitable contributions. The Revenue Act of 1935, which extended the 
tax laws of charitable deductibility to corporations,846 provided that ‘no corporate 
deduction was allowed either for gifts to foreign-organised donees or, generally, for 
foreign use of donated property or money’.847 The Revenue Act of 1938 followed, 
imposing the first of these geographical limitations on the charitable tax deduction 
for individuals, providing that ‘no deduction was available unless the recipient was a 
“domestic” organization’.848 Both the charitable deduction and its geographic 
limitations have remained in the US tax law since their inception. 
                                                             
 
841 Lieber, above n 5, 735. 
842 Simon, Dale and Chisolm, above n 9, 267. 
843 Joint Committee on Taxation, ‘Present Law and Background Relating to the Federal Tax 
Treatment of Charitable Contributions’ (JCX-4-13, 2013) 4. 
844 For a detailed discussion of this history, see Crimm, above n 69, 39–44. 
845 Lieber, above n 5, 741. 
846 Joint Committee on Taxation, above n 843, 5. 
847 See Dale, above n 94, 660. 
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In 2011, the US State Department launched the Strategic Dialogue with Civil 
Society, a formal mechanism for involving civil society in the policymaking 
process.849 As part of this process, a Global Philanthropy Working Group was 
formed in 2012, bringing together US foundation leaders and government officials to 
discuss cooperating on issues related to international philanthropy. The group has 
since highlighted the legal barriers and administrative costs in the US associated with 
international grantmaking.850 
Legal and Policy Framework for Cross-Border Giving 
Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving 
Pursuant to s 170 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC),851 federal income tax 
relief in the form of a deduction is available to donors who make a contribution to 
the charitable organisations specified in s 170(c)(2). The language of s 170(c)(2) 
mirrors that of s 501(c)(3), which defines charitable organisations as those 
‘organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports 
competition, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals’.852 There are two 
classes of charitable organisations: public charities and private foundations,853 with 
the former classified as such on the basis of its broader base of public support.854  
Individual donors are generally entitled to tax deductions of up to 50 per cent 
of their annual adjusted gross income for charitable gifts.855 The tax deduction is 
                                                             
 
849 See US Department of State, Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society 
<http://www.state.gov/s/sacsed/c47725.htm>. 
850 US Department of State, ‘Secretary Clinton's Kicks Off Global Philanthropy Working Group; 
Announces Revisions to Tax Regulations’ (Press Release, 24 September 2012) 
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/198083.htm>. 
851 Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (US) (‘IRC’), as amended. 
852 IRC s 501(c)(3). For the purposes of this chapter, the terms ‘501(c)(3) organisation’, ‘US 
charity’ and ‘US charitable organisation’ are used interchangeably. 
853 IRC s 501(c)(3). They are further classified as corporations, trusts, funds or community 
chests. 
854 See Kimberly Blanchard, ‘US Taxation of Foreign Charities’ (1993) 8 Exempt Organization Tax 
Review 719, 729. 
855 IRC s 170(b). Certain contributions, such as those to private foundations, are deductible to a 
maximum of 30 per cent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. 
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available to donors who claim a set of itemised deductions, as opposed to those who 
claim the standard deduction.856 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determines 
whether an organisation meets 501(c)(3) status and issues a determination letter upon 
approval.857 Most 501(c)(3) organisations must file annual information returns, 
known as Form 990s.858 Failure to file for three years results in automatic revocation 
of an organisation’s 501(c)(3) status.859 The IRS maintains a registry of charitable 
organisations that are eligible to receive tax deductible donations.860  
Application of Tax Incentives to Cross-Border Donations 
Pursuant to s 170 of the IRC, for a donation by an individual to be deductible, 
the recipient must be ‘created or organized in the United States or in any possession 
thereof, or under the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or 
any possession of the United States’.861 As a result, tax-deductibility depends upon 
‘the donee’s domestic situs’.862 This is subject to two qualifications that preserve tax 
deductibility for the US donor. The first is that a US charity may use the funds it 
receives for charitable activities abroad.863 The second is that in furtherance of its 
mission, a US charity can re-donate the funds it receives to a foreign charity.864 The 
effect of this law is that while donations made directly to a charity outside the US are 
                                                             
 
856 Individual taxpayers may when appropriate itemise their allowable personal expenses, 
which are deducted from the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income to arrive at taxable income. As an 
election in lieu of personal itemised expense deductions, individual taxpayers are permitted to 
use a standard deduction. See Bruce Hopkins, The Tax Law of Charitable Giving (John Wiley & 
Sons, 3rd ed, 2005) 32–3. ‘See also Colinvaux, Galle and Steuerle, above n 9, 1, who note that 
while the majority of taxpayers take the standard deduction, those with incomes above USD75 
000 tend to itemise. 
857 IRC s 508; Treas. Reg. s 1.508-1. 
858 Only religious organisations are not required to file a Form 990. 
859 See Pension Protection Act of 2006 (US) s 1223. 
860 This is known as ‘Publication 78’. See Internal Revenue Service, Exempt Organizations Select 
Check <http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Exempt-Organizations-Select-Check>. 
861 IRC s 170(c)(2)(A). Note that this limitation does not apply to gift and estate tax charitable 
deductions. See Dale, above n 94, 668–70 for a detailed discussion of these provisions.  
862 See Pozen, ‘Remapping the Charitable Deduction’, above n 211, 540. 
863 Regulations s 1.170A-8(a)(1). 
864 Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B. 101; Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48. See discussion under 
Domestic Charitable Intermediaries below. 
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not tax deductible, donations to US charities that engage in charitable activities 
outside the US are tax deductible, as are donations to US charities that are re-gifted 
to a foreign charity.865 
The domestic situs requirement has been affirmed by the US Tax Court. In 
Bilingual Montessori School of Paris v Commissioner of Internal Revenue,866 the 
Tax Court determined that a US taxpayer who donated to the Bilingual Montessori 
School, which was located and operated solely in Paris, was nonetheless eligible for 
a deduction because the school was organised and incorporated under Delaware law 
and the donations were made directly to the US entity. In contrast, there are a number 
of cases where US taxpayers made donations to churches outside the US having US 
counterparts in which the Tax Court determined that these donations were not tax 
deductible because the direct recipients were not US entities.867   
Anti-Abuse Measures 
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 and media reports of US 
charities involved in the funding of terrorist activities and organisations,868 the 
Federal Government introduced new laws and guidelines for US individuals and 
organisations engaging in cross-border philanthropy that were intended to prevent 
American funds being sent directly or indirectly to terrorist organisations or 
purposes.869 These included an Executive Order allowing the US Government to 
freeze the of assets of organisations deemed to have connections with terrorism,870 
                                                             
 
865 Dale, above n 94, 662; Pozen, ‘Remapping the Charitable Deduction’, above n 211, 541. 
866 Bilingual Montessori School of Paris Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 57 TC 480 (1980). 
867 See Dora F Welti v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 1 TC 905 (1943); Anonymous v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue TC Memo 2010-87 (2010); Pauline T Golit v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue TC Memo 2013-191 (2013). For a discussion of these cases, see Heidenbauer et 
al, above n 86, 3. 
868 See Crimm, above n 69, 113–4 for a litany of examples. 
869 See Jenkins, ‘Soft Power, Strategic Security, and International Philanthropy’ above n 24, 807–
814; Mark Sidel, ‘Choices and Approaches: Anti-Terrorism Law and Civil Society in the United 
States and the United Kingdom After September 11’ (2011) 61(1) University of Toronto Law 
Journal 119, 122–5. 
870 See Executive Order No 13 224, 66 Federal Regulation 49 079 (23 September 2001). See 
Jenkins, ‘Soft Power, Strategic Security, and International Philanthropy’, above n 24, 814–8 for 
cases where assets of charitable organisations have been frozen. 
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the Patriot Act which contains penalties for organisations which knowingly provide 
support for foreign terrorist groups,871 and a set of Anti-Terrorist Financing 
Guidelines providing voluntary additional due diligence measures for US funders 
giving overseas.872  
As part of its wider enforcement efforts, the Department of Treasury publishes 
a list of individuals and organisations that have been linked to the funding of terrorist 
activities abroad, known as ‘Specially Designated Nationals’.873 Individual donors 
and grantmaking organisations are required to consult this list prior to committing 
funds to a domestic or foreign organisation.874 The IRS also issued guidance to US 
charities that accepted donations from, or granted funds to, foreign charities, 
delineating the steps these domestic charities must follow when working outside the 
US.875 Form 990s were also amended to include ‘detailed questions about 
organizations with fundraising, grantmaking or other exempt activities outside the 
United States’.876  
The most recent Financial Action Task Force (FATF) examination of the US in 
2006 found the US to be compliant with Recommendation 8877 as a result of the 
                                                             
 
871 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub L No. 107–56, 115 
Stat 272 18 USC § 2339A(a) (Supp IV 2004). 
872 US Department of the Treasury, Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best 
Practices for US-Based Charities (2002, as amended) <http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Documents/0929%20finalrevised.pdf>.  
873 US Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Designated Nationals 
List <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx>. This 
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efficiently used by governments worldwide. See US Department of Treasury, Office of Public 
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874 Crimm, above n 69, 116. 
875 Leslie Oakes, ‘Terrorists and Tax Cheats: Transforming Accountability in US Nonprofits’ in 
Zahirul Hoque and Lee Parker (eds), Performance Management in Nonprofit Organizations: 
Global Perspectives (Routledge, 2015) 43, 46. 
876 Ibid 53. 
877 Recommendation 8 and the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8 requires countries to 
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specific anti-terrorism measures including the Anti-terrorist Financing Guidelines, as 
well as the extensive registration and reporting requirements for 501(c)(3) 
organisations.878 Despite this finding, there has been criticism of the federal 
enforcement of these measures due to a lack of funding.879  The FATF report cited a 
comparative study, which found that the IRS has had difficulty monitoring the large 
number of charitable organisations under its supervision resulting in ‘a lightly 
regulated industry’.880 This is supported by findings that despite the enormous 
growth of the nonprofit sector over the two decades up to 2005, the number of IRS 
agents working in the tax exempt sector had not increased and the amount of tax 
exempt organisations being audited by the IRS was less than one per cent.881 
While US charities have not been found to be a significant source of terrorist 
financing resulting in few terrorism-related charges or convictions for US 
charities,882 the new laws and guidelines have nonetheless impacted US charitable 
organisations working overseas. There has been extensive litigation over the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
involving outreach to the NPO sector concerning terrorist financing issues; supervision and 
monitoring of the sector; information gathering and investigation; and capacity to respond to 
international requests. See discussion in section 2.3.3. 
878 FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: United States of America (2006) 240–250. 
879 See Crimm, above n 69, 155 who undertook an empirical study of domestic private 
foundations and their experiences maintaining international programs under the post-
September 11 tax regime, finding it notable ‘that all of the empirical study participants indicated 
that their private foundations had not been examined by the Service in many years, if at all’. See 
also Zolt, above n 620, 385, noting that the lack of monitoring by the IRS ‘undermine[s] our 
confidence that a significant amount of donors’ funds and federal matching funds are being well 
spent on charitable activities’.  
880 See FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: United States of America, above n 878, 250, citing International 
Committee on Fundraising Organizations (May 2002). 
881 See Oakes, above n 875, 54. 
882 See Jenkins, ‘Soft Power, Strategic Security, and International Philanthropy’ above n 24, 819 
(‘The government has not substantiated claims that US-based nonprofits are significant sources 
of terrorist financing’). See also Bjorkland, Reynoso and Hazlett, above n 70, 245 who conducted 
a comprehensive review of charges brought by the US Federal Government after September 11, 
against US charities and charity-associated individuals, finding that ‘there will likely be few 
convictions of US-based charities for terrorism’. This is supported by Oakes, above n 875, 46, 
who found that ‘[u]ltimately only two nonprofits were actually charged with aiding terrorism 
and in one case, those involved were acquitted’.  
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constitutionality of laws criminalising the provision of material support to US-
Government designated foreign terrorist organisations,883 culminating in the 2010 US 
Supreme Court decision in Holder v Humanitarian Law Project,884 where a majority 
of the Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of the laws while leaving ‘room 
for Congress to act to preserve an appropriate space for work by nonprofit, 
humanitarian organizations’.885 The Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines have also 
had a significant impact on US charitable organisations because while they are 
voluntary in theory, ‘in practice American non-profits faced a real risk of 
investigation or even prosecution for failing to carry out the due diligence that the 
guidelines detailed’.886 The result is that some charities have restricted their overseas 
activities and giving, particularly in conflict zones, while others shifted the risks onto 
foreign partners.887 
 Giving Intermediaries 
A donor may make a tax deductible donation to a US 501(c)(3) organisation 
which in turn donates the money to a foreign charity, provided that the gift falls 
within the charitable purposes of the US intermediary and that the US intermediary 
exercises proper ‘control or discretion’ over the funds and is not acting as a ‘mere 
conduit’.888 A deduction is also allowed where the intermediary US-based charity 
operates as a ‘friends of’ organisation. The tax deductible donations made to a 
                                                             
 
883 Sidel, above n 869, 128. 
884 Holder v Humanitarian Law Project 561 US (2010), 130 S Ct 2705. 
885 Sidel, above n 869, 133. For an extensive discussion of this case, see 128–135. 
886 Ibid 124.  
887 Ibid 125–6. 
888 Revenue Ruling 63-252, 1963-2 CB 101 (defines a ‘conduit’ as an organisation in which funds 
have come to rest momentarily before being passed along to a foreign donee designated 
by a donor); Revenue Ruling 66-79, 1966-1 CB 48 (defines ‘control and discretion’ to mean that 
a donor may not exercise so much control over the domestic public charity that the donor 
effectively determines the charity's use of the donated funds for a specific grantee). A recent IRS 
ruling (PLR 201438032, 19 September 2014) confirmed that donations to a US charity who then 
transfers the funds to its foreign subsidiary are tax deductible provided that the US charity 
exercises control and discretion over the funds, which further the charitable purposes of the US 
charity. See Crimm, above n 69, 65–7 for further discussion of public charities being used as 
international giving intermediaries. 
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‘friends of’ organisation are directed to a specific named foreign entity,889 such as 
American Friends of the National Gallery of Australia and American Friends of the 
Louvre. 
There are also 501(c)(3) organisations that have been specifically established in 
the US to serve as international giving intermediaries, charging management fees for 
their services. These include Give2Asia for donations to nonprofit organisations 
throughout Asia, Australia and New Zealand;890 the King Baudouin Foundation 
United States for donations to nonprofit organisations in Europe and Africa;891 and 
the Resource Foundation for donations to nonprofit organisations in Latin America 
and the Caribbean.892 For gifts to Israel, the enigmatic PEF Israel Endowment 
Funds893 has been described as a ‘mega-“friends of” organization’, maintaining a list 
of more than 1000 Israeli charities that it has determined are eligible to receive gifts 
from American donors.894    
If the charitable organisation engaged in international grantmaking is a private 
foundation, stricter rules apply to ensure that the funds are used for legitimate 
charitable purposes.895 These include a requirement that one of two due diligence 
methods — expenditure responsibility or equivalency determination — is used to 
make grants overseas.896 Expenditure responsibility requires that the foundation 
obtain assurance that the foreign charity can fulfil the purpose of the grant as 
specified in a written grant agreement that includes spending and reporting 
                                                             
 
889 Revenue Ruling 66-79, 1966-1 CB 48; Revenue Ruling 74-229, 1974-1 CB 142. 
890 See Give2Asia < http://www.give2asia.org/>. 
891 See King Baudouin Foundation United States < http://www.kbfus.org/>. 
892 See The Resource Foundation <http://resourcefnd.org/>. 
893 See PEF Israel Endowment Funds, Inc < http://pefisrael.org/>. 
894 Josh Nathan-Kazis, ‘How To Be a “Friend” and Get a Tax Break in Return: Millions in 
Donations Go to Helping Overseas Institutions’, The Jewish Daily Forward (online), 16 December 
2014 <http://forward.com/articles/210767/how-to-be-a-friend-and-get-a-tax-break-in-
return/?p=all>. 
895 See IRC ss 4940–4948, which were added in 1969. For a discussion of these rules, see Dale, 
above n 94, 680–684.  
896 See IRC s 4945(d); Treasury Regulations s 53.4945-5(a)(5). 
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responsibilities.897 Equivalency determination requires that the foundation make a 
good faith determination that the foreign charity is equivalent to a s 501(c)(3) 
organisation,898 by obtaining written advice from a qualifying tax practitioner or an 
affidavit from the foreign charity.899 
As a result of the difficulties involved in international grantmaking for both US 
grantmakers and their recipients, the nonprofit sector engaged in self-regulation as a 
tool to complement government regulation.900 In 2005, a charitable sector working 
group issued principles on international charity as an alternative to the US Treasury’s 
Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines901 and in 2007 the US Council on Foundations 
along with the European Foundation Centre published principles of accountability 
for international philanthropy.902 By 2012, the Department of the Treasury and the 
IRS proposed rule changes aimed at reducing the legal barriers and administrative 
costs associated with cross-border philanthropy.903 These regulations led to the 
establishment of NGOsource in 2013, an organisation that maintains a database of 
                                                             
 
897 IRC s 4945(h); Treasury Regulations s 53.4945. 
898 IRC s 4942; Treasury Regulations s 53.4942-3. 
899 IRS Revenue Procedure 92-94, 1992. 
900 Sidel, above n 869, 142. 
901 Treasury Guidelines Working Group of Charitable Sector Organizations and Advisors, 
Principles of International Charity (March 2005) 
<http://www.oneworldtrust.org/csoproject/images/documents/USAM18.pdf>. 
902  Council on Foundations and European Foundation Center, Principles of Accountability  
for International Philanthropy (April 2007) 
<http://www.cof.org/sites/default/files/documents/files/PrinciplesAccountability%20for%20
International%20Grantmaking.pdf>. 
903 See Internal Revenue Service, ‘Reliance Standards for Making Good Faith Determinations’ (77 
FR 58796 (24 September 2012) <https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/09/24/2012-
23553/reliance-standards-for-making-good-faith-determinations>. The most significant change 
was expanding the class of qualified tax practitioners who may assist private foundations to 
make equivalency determinations for grants to foreign charities. See also US Department of 
State, ‘Hillary Rodham Clinton's Remarks at the Launch of the Department of State's Global 
Philanthropy Working Group’ (24 September 2012) 
<http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/09/20120924136490.html#axzz3
RI5EJQR> 
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information about nonprofit organisations around the world, allowing multiple 
grantmakers to rely on its equivalency determinations.904  
Tax Treaties 
While Congress historically has been reluctant to extend the charitable 
deduction by treaty,905 the US has bilateral income tax treaties with Canada, Mexico 
and Israel that each permit an income tax deduction for US donors who make 
charitable gifts to organisations in these countries.906 However, in all three treaties 
the tax deduction is restricted to a percentage of the donor’s income from sources in 
the foreign country of the recipient organisation.907 As a result, if the donor has no 
income arising in these countries, no deduction is available. The only exception is the 
case of gifts to Canadian universities attended by the US donor or a family member 
where the limitation on Canadian source income does not apply.908  
The three tax treaties also address when a foreign charitable organisation meets 
the public charity standards under US law. The US–Canada Treaty recognises 
Canadian charities as a public charity in the US, provided the charity presents 
financial information to the IRS showing that it qualifies as such.909 The US–Mexico 
                                                             
 
904 See NGOsource <http://www.ngosource.org/>. The International Center for Not-for-Profit 
Law has also prepared country reports with information on local laws that should be considered 
when undertaking an equivalency determination. See Council on Foundations, Country Notes 
<http://www.cof.org/global-grantmaking/country-notes>. 
905 Dale, above n 94, 665; Crimm, above n 69, 47–8. 
906 See Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, United States–Canada, signed 
26 September 1980, 1980 UTS 93 (entered into force 16 August 1984) art XXI (US–Canada 
Treaty); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income, United States–Mexico, Treaty Doc No 103-7 (1992) (signed and 
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Taxes on Income, United States–Israel, signed 20 November 1975, Exec Doc No 94-2 (1975) 
(entered into force 1 January 1995) art 15A (US–Israel Treaty). See Crimm, above n 69, 47; 
Joannie Chang, Jennifer Goldberg and Naomi Schrag, ‘Cross-Border Charitable Giving’ (1997) 
31(3) University of San Francisco Law Review 563, 601–8; Dale, above n 94, 665–68 for a 
discussion of these treaties. 
907 Dale, above n 94, 667; Crimm, above n 69, 49. For Canada and Mexico, the tax deduction is 
capped by the section 170(b) percentage limits on the charitable deduction, while for Israel the 
limitation is 25 per cent. 
908 See US–Canada Treaty, art XXI. 
909 See Crimm, above n 69, 52. 
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Treaty provides that as long as Mexican law provides standards for organisations 
authorised to receive tax relief that are ‘essentially equivalent’ to the standards under 
US law, an organisation determined by the Mexican authorities to meet such 
standards will be treated (for purposes of grants by US private foundations and 
public charities) as a public charity under US law.910 Similarly, the US–Israel Treaty 
provides that entitlement to a charitable tax deduction depends on a determination by 
the US authorities that the Israeli organisation would qualify under US standards as 
essentially equivalent to a s 501(c)(3) organisation.911 
6.2.2 United Kingdom912 
Nature and Scope of Charitable Giving 
Charitable giving in the UK, while not at US levels, is significant for Europe. 
The total amount donated in 2012–13 was GBP17.5 billion.913 Individual donors 
accounted for 62 per cent, with the remainder coming from foundations (14 per cent), 
legacies (11 per cent) and companies (7 per cent).914 Of this amount, 12 per cent 
went to causes overseas.915 A 12-country survey of European giving in 2009 
estimated that the UK was the top country in terms of total contributions.916 This is 
                                                             
 
910 US–Mexico Treaty, art 22 [2]. See ibid 53. 
911 See Crimm, above n 69, 55. 
912 While most tax laws apply across the UK, each jurisdiction has its own charity laws and 
national charity regulators (the Charity Commission for England and Wales, the Charity 
Commission for Northern Island and the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator). This section 
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with those in Northern Ireland Scotland. See Alison Paines, ‘England and Wales’ in Clive Cutbill, 
Alison Paines and Murray Hallam (eds), International Charitable Giving (Oxford University Press, 
2012) 221, 222. 
913 NCVO, UK Civil Society Almanac 2015 (2015) <http://data.ncvo.org.uk/a/almanac15/>; Cathy 
Pharoah, Richard Jenkins and Keiran Goddard, Giving Trends: Top 300 Foundations - 2014 Report 
(ACF and Cass Business School, 2014). 
914 UK Civil Society Almanac 2015 (NCVO, 2015); Cathy Pharoah, Richard Jenkins and Keiran 
Goddard, Giving Trends: Top 300 Foundations – 2014 Report (ACF and Cass Business School, 
2014). 
915 Charities Aid Foundation, UK Giving 2014 (2015) 14. 
916 See Pamala Wiepking (ed), The State of Giving Research in Europe: Household Donations to 
Charitable Organiszations in Twelve European Countries (Pallas, 2009), 73. The top five countries 
for charitable giving in terms of total contributions were: EUR10.55 billion from the UK; EUR4 
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consistent with a study of private philanthropy to developing countries showing that 
out of 18 European countries, the UK was the most generous, contributing USD4.2 
billion.917 From 1978 to 2004, total private giving from the UK to overseas 
development charities increased more than sixfold in real terms from GBP116 
million to GBP683 million.918 This significant increase compares with the far smaller 
growth in ODA across the same period, which grew in real terms by a factor of just 
one and a half.919  
In the early 2000s, Tony Blair’s New Labour Government introduced 
significant reforms to the charitable sector, including reforming the legal regime 
providing charitable tax concessions, extending the tax relief available to donors and 
encouraging giving through other means.920 Upon taking office in 2010, the Coalition 
Government introduced the ‘Big Society’ policy initiative to empower communities, 
open up public services and promote social action.921 For charitable giving, the Big 
Society initiative ‘envisages the promotion of a culture of philanthropy leading to 
increased charitable giving, particularly from high-net-worth individuals’.922 In 2013, 
the Coalition Government also increased its overseas aid by almost 30 per cent to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
billion from Italy; EUR2.8 billion from Germany; EUR2.2 billion from France; and EUR1.9 billion 
the Netherlands. 
917 The next largest were USD1.46 billion from Germany, USD1 billion from France, USD823 
million from the Netherlands and USD583.1 million from Italy. See Center for Global Prosperity, 
The Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2012 (Hudson Institute, 2012) 13–4.  
918 Anthony Atkinson et al, ‘Charitable Giving for Overseas Development: UK Trends Over a 
Quarter Century’ (2012) 175(1) Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in 
Society) 167, 175. 
919 Ibid 174. 
920 Cathy Pharoah, ‘Challenges for Tax Policy Towards Individual Charitable Giving: The 
Experience of Recent Attempts to 'Reform' the UK Gift Aid Scheme’ (2010) 1(2) Voluntary Sector 
Review 259, 261. See also Morris, ‘Public Benefit: The Long and Winding Road to Reforming the 
Public Benefit Test for Charity’, above n 201, 104. 
921 Debra Morris, ‘Recent Developments in Charity Taxation in the United Kingdom: The Law 
Gives and Law Takes Away’ in Matthew Harding, Ann O’Connell and Miranda Stewart (eds), Not-
for-Profit Law: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
254, 254, citing Cabinet Office (UK), Building the Big Society (2010). 
922 Morris, ‘Recent Developments in Charity Taxation in the United Kingdom’, above n 921, 254. 
See also HM Government (UK), Giving White Paper (2011) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78915/givi
ng-white-paper2.pdf>. 
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USD17.9 billion, which enabled it to reach — for the first time — the UN target of 
0.7 per cent of GNI.923 In March 2015, the UK Parliament passed legislation 
committing to this UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNI in annual foreign aid spending, 
legally binding future UK governments.924 
Historical Context 
English Common Law Model of Charity 
The starting point for the English common law model of charity has its roots in 
the Elizabethan era in 16th century England, during which there was a movement 
away from the Church as custodian of charitable funds and towards the 
encouragement of secular charitable giving.925 The Tudor state was particularly eager 
‘to encourage the relief of poverty and other welfare purposes through private 
philanthropy’.926 Private philanthropy was fostered prominently and effectively 
through the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601927 which ‘vastly stimulated constructive 
and well considered charitable giving by lending full and most formidable protection 
to the aspirations of donors’.928 In doing so, the Statute codified ‘a long development 
and a fruitful national experience in the growth of charitable trusts as instruments of 
social betterment’.929 Its preamble set forth purposes that were considered at the time 
to be charitable: 
                                                             
 
923 OECD, Aid to Developing Countries Rebounds in 2013 to Reach an All-Time High, above n 44. 
924 The International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act 2015 (UK) was 
passed on March 25, 2015 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/12/enacted>. 
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926 Michael Chesterman, Charities, Trusts and Social Welfare (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979) 24. 
927 Statute of Charitable Uses 1601, 43 Eliz 1, c 4. See discussion in ibid 24–8. 
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The relief of aged, impotent, and poor people; the maintenance of sick and 
maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools and scholars 
of universities; the repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea 
banks and highways; the education and preferment of orphans; the relief, 
stock or maintenance of houses of correction; the marriages of poor maids; 
the supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen; handicraftsmen and 
persons decayed; the relief or redemption of prisoners or captives; and the 
aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens, setting 
out of soldiers, and other taxes. 
In 1891 Lord Macnaghten in Pemsel930 used this preamble as the basis for 
articulating a legal definition of charity by classifying charitable purposes under the 
‘four heads of charity’.931 As discussed in chapter 2, the influence of this 
classification on the courts resulted in the preamble forming ‘the basis for modern 
judicial pronouncements on how to establish a charitable purpose’.932 The concept of 
‘public benefit’ articulated in this classification became central to the legal definition 
of charity.933  
With respect to charitable purposes carried out overseas, the judicial 
conception of the ‘public’ who should ‘benefit’ from charity has not been limited to 
those in the jurisdiction in which the charity is based.934 As discussed in detail in 
chapter 2,935 from as early as 1858, UK courts and the UK Charity Tribunal have 
upheld trusts covering a wide range of charitable purposes to be carried out 
overseas,936 provided that they do not contravene public policy.937  
                                                             
 
930 Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531. 
931 Ibid 583 (Lord Macnaghten).  
932 See Morris, ‘Public Benefit: The Long and Winding Road to Reforming the Public Benefit Test 
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935 See discussion in section 2.3.1. 
936 See Ironmongers’ Co v A-G (1844) 10 Cl & Fin 908 (relief of poverty); Armstrong v Reeves 
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While this broad concept of public benefit found in the judicial conception of 
charity was reflected in UK charities being able to operate overseas, historically UK 
tax law only allowed tax relief for gifts to charities established in the UK.938 As a 
result, donations by UK taxpayers directed overseas did not receive the same 
favourable tax treatment that applied to domestic donations. Donors seeking tax 
relief for gifts to a charitable organisations outside the UK had two options:  give to a 
‘friends of’ charity serving as a UK affiliate for a foreign charity, or make the 
donation through a giving intermediary. 
The English common law definition of charity was relied upon in the tax laws 
because historically there was no restricted definition of charity for fiscal 
purposes.939 The common law definition was eventually codified in the Charities Act 
2006 (UK),940 now contained in the Charities Act 2011 (UK).941 The enactment of 
the Finance Act 2010 (UK) introduced a new definition of charity for tax 
purposes,942 linked to the definition in the Charities Act 2011 (UK), which applies to 
all charity tax relief in the UK.943  
Influence of EU Law 
Since the mid-2000s, EU case law as interpreted by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) has had a significant impact on the tax treatment of cross-border 
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938 Paines, above n 912, 255.  
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941 Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25 s 1. 
942 Finance Act 2010 (UK) c 13 s 30 sch 6. 
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donations for the UK and other Member States.944 While the right to impose direct 
taxation and to grant relief from such taxation falls within the competence of the 
Member States, that right must be exercised consistently with EU law and in 
particular the fundamental freedoms as guaranteed by the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (‘TFEU’).945 A previously noted in chapter 1, in two key 
judgments dealing with the tax treatment of charities, the ECJ has developed a 
general non-discrimination principle according to which a foreign charity in the EU 
is entitled to hold the same tax privileged status as a domestic charity, provided that 
it can be shown to be comparable to a domestic charity.946  
In the 2006 case of Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v Finanzamt 
München für Körperschaften (‘Stauffer’),947 an Italian foundation supporting music 
education owned a building in Germany from which it received rental income. For a 
German charitable foundation, rental income was exempt from corporation tax, but 
the German tax authorities would not grant exemption to the Stauffer Foundation 
because it was based in Italy. The ECJ held that such rental income is protected 
under the free movement of capital. Restrictions on the fundamental freedoms are 
only permissible if they are applied in a non-discriminatory way and are justified by 
overriding reasons in the public interest. The less favourable treatment of foreign EU 
charities is not justifiable according to these criteria. Therefore, non-resident 
charities should not be treated differently for tax purposes simply because they are 
resident in another Member State. As a result, if a Member State allows a tax 
exemption for domestic charities, it should extend such tax benefits to charities in 
                                                             
 
944 Heidenbauer et al, above n 86, 7; von Hippel, above n 82, 12. 
945 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008 OJ, C 
115/47 (‘TFEU’). See Philip Moser and Raymond Hill, ‘Charities and EU Law’ in Clive Cutbill, 
Alison Paines and Murray Hallam (eds), International Charitable Giving (Oxford University Press, 
2012) 77, 100. 
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other Member States provided they meet the same conditions as domestic 
charities.948  
This was followed by the 2009 case Hein Persche v Finanzamt Lüdenscheid 
(‘Persche’),949 brought by Mr Persche, a German citizen, who made an in-kind gift to 
a retirement home with a children’s home attached in Portugal, which was a 
registered charity under Portuguese law. Mr Persche claimed a tax deduction for the 
gift in his German income tax return, which was refused by the German tax office on 
the basis that the recipient charity was not established in Germany, a requirement 
under German law. The ECJ ruled in favor of Mr Persche, determining that 
restricting tax deductibility to donations to domestic charities to the exclusion of 
charities in other Member States that satisfy the requirements for charitable status in 
the donor’s Member State is not compatible with the free movement of capital as 
guaranteed by the TFEU.950  
The non-discrimination principle established in Stauffer and Persche was 
reaffirmed in later cases. In Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach eV v Belgium 
(‘Missionswerk’),951 a Belgian citizen appointed Missionswerk, a German charity, as 
her sole heir. After her death, Missionswerk sought a reduced tax rate of succession 
duties that applied to domestic charities, which the Belgian tax authority rejected. 
The ECJ concluded that a Member State could not treat domestic charities and 
charities established elsewhere in the EU differently purely based on the difference 
in those charities’ respective centres of operation.952 Similarly, in European 
Commission v Austria,953 the ECJ rejected an argument by Austria that it was 
necessary to restrict income tax deductions for donations to research and teaching 
institutions to those institutions established in Austria on the basis that this conflicted 
with the free movement of capital within the EU. 
                                                             
 
948 See Heidenbauer et al, above n 86, 12. 
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The effect of these cases is that while there is no ‘mutual recognition’ of 
foreign charities registered in the EU, the ‘equal treatment’ of comparable foreign 
charities in the EU is required under EU law.954  
This means that it is for each Member State to determine whether it will 
provide tax incentives for charitable giving and, if so, what kind of general 
interests it wishes to promote by such tax incentives. However, once a 
Member State decides to provide for an advantageous tax treatment for its 
charities and charitable giving, it should also provide for non-discriminatory 
tax treatment in comparable intra-EU scenarios.955 
These cases, particularly the Persche judgment, had an immediate impact on 
the UK. Following that decision, in 2006 the European Commission sent the UK a 
formal request in the form of a reasoned opinion956 to end its discrimination against 
charities in other Member States.957  
The Commission identified obstacles to the free movement of capital, the 
free movement of persons, and the freedom of establishment — all brought 
about by the fact that the favourable tax treatment of donations is ‘only 
granted if the charity is established in the United Kingdom’.958 
The UK responded by enacting the Finance Act 2010 (UK), which reflected this 
principle of non-discrimination and expanded charitable tax reliefs beyond its 
geographic borders. The UK is now part of a majority of Member States who grant 
the same type of tax relief available for domestic donations to ‘European’ cross-
border donations.959  
                                                             
 
954 Heidenbauer et al, above n 86, 11. See also Moser and Hill, above n 945, 105. The burden of 
proof is on charities and their donors. 
955 Heidenbauer et al, above n 86, 8. 
956 The second step of an infringement procedure provided for by the TFEU art 258. 
957 See ‘Commission Requests the United Kingdom to End Discrimination of Foreign Charities’ 
(Press Release, IP/06/964, 10 July 2006). 
958 Heidenbauer, above n 91, 91. See also Moser and Hill, above n 94, 94. 
959 These include Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and the 
UK See von Hippel, above n 82, 28–9; Heidenbauer, above n 91, 90. 
 196 Chapter 6: Legal and Policy Frameworks in Other Jurisdictions for Cross-Border Philanthropy 
This extension of charitable tax reliefs to donors in the UK who give to foreign 
charities resulted in additional provisions in the Finance Act 2010 (UK) to guard 
against the potential for fraud and other abuses as a result of this geographic 
expansion.960 These provisions gave the UK tax authority HM Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC) a greater role in the governance of charities, previously the purview of the 
principal UK charity regulator the Charity Commission of England and Wales 
(Charity Commission).961 The provisions included a requirement that charities 
undergo a registration process with HMRC (in addition to registering with the 
Charity Commission)962 in order to qualify for charitable tax reliefs.963 They also 
included a new, stricter definition of charity for tax purposes (discussed below) 
applying to all charities, whether UK or foreign. 
Legal and Policy Framework for Cross-Border Giving 
Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving 
Tax relief is available to individual donors who make cash donations to 
charities. The main scheme used by taxpayers in the UK is Gift Aid.964 Introduced in 
1990, Gift Aid is a somewhat complicated scheme combining two types of tax relief: 
a match component whereby charities can reclaim tax relief at the basic rate of 
                                                             
 
960 See Morris, ‘Recent Developments in Charity Taxation in the United Kingdom’, above n 921, 
256. 
961 Ibid 257. 
962 All charities are required to register with the Charity Commission unless their annual income 
is less than EUR5000 or they are exempt or excepted from registration (because they fall under 
groups such as churches, scout/guide groups or armed forces organisations and have income 
less than EUR100 000). Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25 ss 30–33. See also Charity Commission of 
England and Wales, Guidance: Excepted Charities (11 June 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/excepted-charities/excepted-charities--2>. 
For a discussion of exempt and excepted charities see Paines, above n 912, 231–2. 
963 Paines, above n 912, 238–240, noting that this registration process takes approximately 10 
weeks. 
964 See Pharoah, above n 920, 261 (‘The Gift Aid scheme accounts for the vast majority of tax-
effective gifts – around 90%’). See also Charities Aid Foundation, UK Giving 2012/13 – An Update 
(March 2014) 7, in which 42 per cent of those surveyed reported using Gift Aid. The other two 
schemes for individual giving are payroll giving and gifts of shares and property. Income tax 
relief was formerly available on a deed of covenant to charity; however, this form of tax relief 
was abolished in 2000 as a consequence of the introduction of Gift Aid. See James Kessler and 
Oliver Marre, Taxation of Charities and Non-Profit Organisations (Key Haven Ltd, 9th ed, 2013) 
416 [15.2]. 
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income tax (currently 20 per cent); and a rebate component whereby higher-rate 
donors (those at tax rates above the basic rate) can reclaim additional tax relief.965 
The match part of the scheme treats the taxpayer’s donation as if income tax had 
been deducted at the basic rate.  For example, at the current basic rate of 20 per cent, 
a GBP80 donation is deemed to be a gift of GBP100, from which GBP20 had been 
previously deducted. This GBP20 can then be claimed by the charity from HMRC, 
so that the total amount received by the charity is GBP100 (comprising GBP80 from 
the donor and GBP20 from HMRC).966 The rebate part of the scheme enables higher-
rate taxpayers to get a rebate reflecting the additional tax paid. For example, if the 
donor’s tax rate is 40 per cent, they will receive an additional GBP20 in tax relief for 
the GBP100 received by the charity because the cost to the higher-rate donor of the 
charity receiving GBP100 is GBP60.967  
Application of Tax Incentives to Cross-Border Donations 
Pursuant to the Finance Act 2010 (UK), Gift Aid and other charitable tax 
reliefs have been extended to donors who make gifts to a charity in an EU Member 
State, Iceland or Norway. The Charity Commission considers that a purpose may be 
charitable even if all its potential beneficiaries are outside England and Wales, unless 
it is contrary to public policy in the UK.968 The Commission’s approach is to 
consider whether the purpose would be charitable if it were confined to England and 
Wales. For fiscal purposes, a charity is defined in the Finance Act 2010 (UK) as a 
body of persons or trust that:969 
 is established for charitable purposes970 only as defined in the Charities Act 
2011 (UK),971 and those purposes must be for the public benefit;972 
                                                             
 
965 Kimberley Scharf and Sarah Smith, Gift Aid Donor Research: Exploring Options for Reforming 
Higher-Rate Relief (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, 2009) 15. 
966 See Paines, above n 912, 248. 
967 See ibid. 
968 Charity Commission of England and Wales, ‘Analysis of the Law relating to Public Benefit’, 
above n 232, 16[74]. 
969 Finance Act 2010 (UK) c 13 s 30 sch 6. Emphasis added. 
970 See Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25 s 3(1) that provides a list of charitable purposes. 
971 See ibid s 1. 
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 meets the jurisdiction condition (ie is subject to the control of a relevant UK 
or EU court or the equivalent under the law of another territory); 
 meets the registration condition (by complying with any requirement to be 
registered as a charity in the UK or with any equivalent requirement under 
the law of another territory); and 
 meets the management condition requiring that its managers are ‘fit and 
proper persons’.973  
The result of this definition is that a charity in an EU Member State, Norway or 
Iceland may now be eligible for UK tax reliefs if it meets the definition of a charity 
in England and Wales, is registered under the law of its home jurisdiction with a 
body corresponding to the Charity Commission, and is managed by ‘fit and proper 
persons’. It is notable that the jurisdiction condition is not restricted to European 
countries. Rather, the wording of this provision leaves scope for charities beyond 
Europe to become eligible in the future if their country is included in the 
regulations.974 
In order for a charity in an EU Member State, Norway or Iceland to be able to 
claim Gift Aid and for its donors to obtain tax relief for their gifts, the charity must 
pass a ‘comparability test’ in which it must prove to the UK tax authorities that it 
meets the legal requirements for a charity set forth in the Finance Act 2010 (UK).975 
In doing so, the organisation may be required to provide documents evidencing its 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
972 See ibid s 2. 
973 See HM Revenue and Customs, Detailed Guidance on the Fit and Proper Persons 
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/charities/guidance-notes/chapter2/fp-persons-test.htm>. The ‘fit 
and proper’ test was designed to prevent abuse of an organisation’s charitable tax status by its 
trustees and senior managers and represents ‘the greatest change to the legal and fiscal 
treatment of charities in a generation, in that for the first time it links the availability of 
charitable tax reliefs to the personal characteristics of its managers’. Paines, above n 912, 240. 
See also Morris, ‘Recent Developments in Charity Taxation in the United Kingdom’, above n 921, 
257. 
974 Mark Bowler Smith, ‘UK National Report for the EATLP Rotterdam Congress on the Taxation 
of Charities’ (Report, European Association of Tax Law Professors, 2012) 5. See also Robert 
Meakin, ‘Camille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc v Inland Revenue Commissioners’ (2013) 
16 The Charity Law and Practice Review 73, 81.  
975 See European Foundation Centre and Transnational Giving Europe, ‘United Kingdom: 
Country Profile’ (2014) 2 (‘United Kingdom Country Profile 2014’). 
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charitable status.976 If the organisation succeeds, it will be included in a list of 
qualifying charities kept by HMRC.977 In practice, obtaining recognition as a charity 
with HMRC for charities from an EU Member State, Norway or Iceland has been 
‘slow and lengthy’, with 142 of these foreign charities having applied for recognition 
by early 2015, of which only 11 had been successful, and with fewer than five having 
made Gift Aid claims.978  
The additional provisions in the Finance Act 2010 (UK) have also resulted in 
UK charities operating overseas being subject to increased oversight by HMRC. 
Historically, UK charities could apply funds abroad provided they took reasonable 
steps to ensure that the funds would be applied for charitable purposes under English 
law.979 The Finance Act 2010 (UK) added the provision that charities must now take 
‘such steps as the Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs consider 
are reasonable’ when transferring funds abroad.980 Any funds found by HMRC not to 
have been applied for charitable purposes under English law may be deemed non-
charitable expenditure, resulting in loss of the charity’s tax relief and payment of tax 
on this amount.981 The ‘fit and proper’ persons test contained in the definition of 
charity in the Finance Act 2010 (UK) provides the HMRC with oversight over 
trustees and senior managers.982 The Charities Commission also monitors charities 
operating overseas. All registered charities with income greater than EUR10 000 are 
                                                             
 
976 See ibid. 
977 See ibid. 
978 Bill Lewis and Lucinda Ellen, ‘Opening the Door to Overseas Charities’ in Charity and Social 
Enterprise Update (Bates Wells Braithwaite, 2015) 21. This information was obtained following 
a Freedom of Information request made by Bates Wells Braithwaite. The European Foundation 
Centre also found that ‘of around 50 EU/EEA charities that attempted to receive UK charity 
status in 2011, none was registered in the list [of qualifying charities]’. See United Kingdom 
Country Profile 2014, above n 975.  
979 Paines, above n 912, 254. 
980 Finance Act 2010 (UK) c 13 sch 8 s 2(1). 
981 HM Revenue and Customs, Tax and Charitable or Non-Charitable Expenditure 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140505102719/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/chari
ties/tax/expenditure.htm>. 
982 See Morris, ‘Recent Developments in Charity Taxation in the United Kingdom’, above n 921, 
257 (‘[I]f a manager or trustee fails the new test, HMRC may reject the charity’s claim to tax 
relief’). 
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required to submit an annual return to the Charity Commission, which must include 
information on the amount spent in each country overseas.983  
Anti-Abuse Measures 
The Charity Commission’s supervisory role also requires it to take steps to 
identify charities that may be involved in terrorist financing pursuant to the 
Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), which prohibits the provision of direct or indirect support 
to proscribed (terrorist) organisations overseas.984 As a result of the increased 
perception of charities being involved in terrorist financing and money laundering, 
the Charity Commission has issued detailed guidance on charities and terrorism to 
address these issues.985  
In 2013, a review of the regulatory effectiveness of the Charity Commission by 
the National Audit Office found that the Charity Commission was ‘not do[ing] 
enough to identify and tackle the abuse of charitable status’,986 and recommended 
that the Cabinet Office ‘assist the Commission in securing legislative changes to 
address gaps and deficiencies in the Commission’s powers’.987 In response, the 
                                                             
 
983 Charity Commission of England and Wales, Send a Charity’s Annual Return 
<https://www.gov.uk/send-charity-annual-return>. In addition to the annual return, pursuant 
to the Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25 s 15, charities are also required to submit an annual report 
and annual accounts with the Commission.  
984 Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) c 11 s 12. See Charity Commission of England and Wales, Counter-
Terrorism Strategy (April 2012) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/313532/ct
stext.pdf>. 
985 See ibid; Charity Commission of England and Wales, OG 410 Charities and Terrorism 
<http://ogs.charitycommission.gov.uk/g410a001.aspx>; Charity Commission of England and 
Wales, Compliance Toolkit: Protecting Charities from Harm (September 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/protecting-charities-from-harm-compliance-
toolkit#chapter-1>; Charity Commission of England and Wales, Charities: How to Manage Risks 
When Working Internationally (May 2013) <https://www.gov.uk/charities-how-to-manage-
risks-when-working-internationally>. 
986 National Audit Office, ‘The Regulatory Effectiveness of the Charity Commission’ (Report, HC 
813, Session 2013-14, 4 December 2013) 9 
<http://www.nao.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2013/11/10297-001-Charity-Commission-
Book.pdf>. At the same time, the Cabinet Office published Consultation on Extending the Charity 
Commission’s Powers to Tackle Abuse in Charities (December 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263248/C
onsultation-on-Extending-the-Charity-Commissions-powers_4-December.pdf>. 
987 National Audit Office, above n 986, 11. 
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Government released a draft Protection of Charities Bill in October 2014 and 
provided the Charity Commission with an additional EUR8 million in funding, 
aiming to strengthen the Commission’s investigatory and enforcement powers to 
prevent the abuse of charities for terrorist and other criminal purposes.988 A Joint 
Committee report in February 2015 acknowledged that while evidence showed the 
abuse of charities for terrorist purposes is rare, the Charity Commission ‘should be 
more effective at tackling it than has historically been the case’.989 The Committee 
supported proposals in the Bill giving the Commission more regulatory powers, 
while at the same time urged the Government to address the difficulties posed by 
anti-terrorism legislation for charities working in conflict zones.990 
In its most recent report of the UK, FATF found it to be largely compliant with 
Recommendation 8.991 The Charity Commission’s role was central to this finding as 
FATF determined that charities represent ‘the most significant aspect of the nonprofit 
sector by value and by profile’.992 The report commended the Charity Commission’s 
registration and reporting requirements, as well as the extensive guidance the Charity 
Commission provides to charities on legal and regulatory compliance for charities 
operating internationally, particularly around issues involving charities and 
terrorism.993 The report also noted that the Charity Commission appeared ‘adequately 
resourced in order to carry out their functions in terms of their governing legislation 
                                                             
 
988 Minister for the Cabinet Office (UK), Draft Protection of Charities Bill (October 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/365710/4
3820_Cm_8954_web_accessible_Draft_protection_of_charities_bill.pdf>. See also Prime Minister 
David Cameron, ‘New Funding and Powers to Tackle Abuse in the Charity Sector’ (Press Release, 
22 October 2014) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-funding-and-powers-to-
tackle-abuse-in-the-charity-sector>. 
989 House of Lords and House of Commons, Joint Committee on the Draft Protection of Charities 
Bill (3 February 2015) 20, 16. 
990 Ibid 54. 
991 FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism – The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island (2007) 244. 
The largely compliant rating (as opposed to fully compliant) was due to issues concerning 
Northern Ireland. 
992 Ibid 240. 
993 Ibid 240–44. 
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and also to provide adequate support to the work of law enforcement authorities in 
relation to terrorism and terrorist financing investigations’. 994 
Giving Intermediaries 
A donor is able to get tax relief by giving to a UK charity who in turn donates 
the money to a foreign charity, provided that the charity takes such steps as the 
HMRC considers reasonable to ensure that that funds are applied for charitable 
purposes of the UK charity.995 In addition to UK charities serving as intermediaries, 
the UK is one of 17 European countries involved in Transnational Giving Europe 
(TGE), a European giving intermediary, which enables donors resident in one of the 
participating countries to support charities in other member countries, while 
obtaining tax relief in their country of residence.996 TGE charges an administrative 
fee for its services as a European giving intermediary.997 In 2013, TGE assisted more 
than 6800 donors channel EUR8.5 million in cross-border donations across Europe 
to more than 350 charities.998 
Tax Treaties 
Under UK tax treaty practice, there are no bilateral tax treaties with provisions 
granting charitable tax relief for donors. 
                                                             
 
994 Ibid 244. 
995 Finance Act 2010 (UK) c 13 sch 8 s 2(1); Paines, above n 912, 254–5. 
996 See <http://www.transnationalgiving.eu/tge/default.aspx?id=219948&langtype=1033>. The 
other participating countries are: Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Switzerland. 
997 Operational costs of five per cent for donations up to EUR100 000 and one per cent for 
amounts over EUR100 000. The maximum cost is EUR15 000. See 
<http://www.transnationalgiving.eu/tge/details.aspx?id=219956&LangType=1033>. 
998 See <http://www.transnationalgiving.eu/tge/default.aspx?id=219948&langtype=1033>. 
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6.2.3 The Netherlands 
Nature and Scope of Charitable Giving 
Charitable giving in the Netherlands is high, particularly for a country with a 
far smaller population than other European countries with significant giving.999 A 
biennial survey by the Center for Philanthropic Studies at VU University Amsterdam 
found that total giving in 2013 was EUR4.4 billion, including giving from 
individuals (45 per cent), corporations (31 per cent), bequests (6 per cent), 
foundations (6 per cent) and other fundraising (11 per cent).1000 Of this amount, a 
significant 13 per cent went to overseas aid.1001 A 12-country survey of European 
giving in 2009 ranked the Netherlands fifth in terms of total contributions.1002 This is 
consistent with a study of private philanthropy to developing countries showing that 
out of 18 European countries, the Netherlands ranked fourth, contributing USD823 
million.1003  
Since 2006, successive Dutch governments have introduced fundamental 
reforms representing a major shift in policy from welfare state to ‘participation 
society’.1004 The reduction in government support has resulted in policymakers 
placing greater emphasis on individual responsibility, with the expectation that 
                                                             
 
999 The population of the Netherlands is 17 million, compared with 80 million in Germany, 65 
million in France, 63 million in the United Kingdom and 59 million in Italy. See European Union, 
EU Member Countries <http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/>.  
1000 Bekkers, René, Theo Schuyt and Barbara Gouwenberg, Giving in the Netherlands (Center for 
Philanthropic Studies, VU University Amsterdam, 2015). 
1001 Ibid. 
1002 See Wiepking (ed), The State of Giving Research in Europe, above n 916, 73. The top five 
countries for charitable giving in terms of total contributions were: EUR10.55 billion from the 
UK; EUR4 billion from Italy; EUR2.8 billion from Germany; EUR2.2 billion from France; and 
EUR1.9 billion from the Netherlands. 
1003 The largest were USD4.2 billion from the UK, USD1.46 billion from Germany, USD1 billion 
from France, USD823 million from the Netherlands and USD583.1 million from Italy. See The 
Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2012, above n 917, 13–4.  
1004 Lei Delsen, From Welfare State to Participation Society: Welfare State Reform in the 
Netherlands: 2003–2010 (Working Paper No 12–103, Nijmegen Center for Economics (NiCE), 
May 2012) 26–8; Spitz, Muskens and van Ewijk, above n 692, 31. 
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private donors will play a greater role.1005 At the same time, in 2013 Dutch overseas 
aid at USD5.44 billion — while high as a percentage of GNI compared to many 
other DAC member countries — fell below 0.7 per cent (to 0.67 per cent) for the first 
time since 1974.1006 This followed an announcement from the Dutch Government 
that there would be further significant aid cuts of EUR750 million annually from 
2014 to 2017,1007 as a result of budgetary pressures caused by the Dutch financial 
crisis and a shift in Dutch aid policy from social to economic development, aligning 
development cooperation with Dutch national interests.1008  
Historical Context 
Dutch Charitable Sector 
The origins of the charitable sector in the Netherlands is found in ‘the Dutch 
tradition of subsidiarity accommodating different religious and ideological camps by 
leaving the provision of crucial services to nonprofit organizations affiliated with 
such groups’.1009 In the late 19th century, Dutch society was organised into social 
groups based on religious and political lines, known as ‘pillarization’.1010 The four 
pillars were Protestant, Catholic, Socialist/Social-Democrat and Conservative/Liberal 
and each had their own political parties, unions, newspapers, hospitals and 
schools.1011 This environment fostered the growth and development of religiously 
and ideologically affiliated charitable organisations,1012 which historically had strong 
                                                             
 
1005 Arjen de Wit, ‘A Longitudinal Analysis of Government Expenditures, Fundraising and 
Charitable Donations in the Dutch Voluntary Sector’ (Working Paper, Center for Philanthropic 
Studies, VU University Amsterdam, July 2014) 3. 
1006 OECD, Aid to Developing Countries Rebounds in 2013 to Reach an All-Time High, above n 44. 
1007 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade 
and Investment (April 2013) 59. 
1008 See Spitz, Muskens and van Ewijk, above n 692, 14 who provide an analysis of the historical, 
social and economic context of Dutch development aid and insight into the factors that have led 
to changes in the Dutch approach to development cooperation. 
1009 Ary Burger et al, ‘The Netherlands: Key Features of the Dutch Nonprofit Sector,’ in Lester 
Salamon et al (eds), Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector (Johns Hopkins 
Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999) 145. 
1010 Spitz, Muskens and van Ewijk, above n 692, 10; Burger et al, above n 1009, 152. 
1011 Spitz, Muskens and van Ewijk, above n 692, 10. 
1012 Burger et al, above n 1009, 145–6. 
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relationships with the National Government.1013 At the same time, Dutch 
missionaries (Catholic and Protestant) were sent to the colonies to spread 
Christianity, but in practice were more engaged in providing charitable services, 
particularly in health and education.1014 
Following the Second World War, the traditional pillarization broke down and 
Dutch citizens became involved with organisations that were not defined by religious 
or political affiliation, resulting in a decline in the role of religion in Dutch 
society.1015 The Government continued to play a significant role in the development 
of the Dutch charitable sector.1016 The growth of the welfare state resulted in 
increased public funding for charitable activities (both domestic and international), 
which enhanced the sector’s importance and solidified the centrality of charitable 
organisations in Dutch social and economic life.1017 
Dutch Tax Law 
Historically there has been no separate body of charity law in the Netherlands. 
Rather than using the term ‘charity’, ‘the concept of a “public interest organization” 
is used as a pars pro toto of the non-profit sector’.1018 Public interest organisations 
are typically established as either a foundation [stichting] or an association 
[vereniging].1019 Tax law is the primary source of law applying to public interest 
organisations, with the Dutch tax authorities regulating the charitable sector.1020 
Foundations and associations that qualify under the Dutch tax laws as a ‘public 
benefit institution’ [algemeen nut beogende instelling] (ANBI) are eligible for Dutch 
tax relief. 
                                                             
 
1013 Spitz, Muskens and van Ewijk, above n 692, 8. 
1014 Ibid. 
1015 Ibid 10. 
1016 Burger et al, above n 1009, 146. 
1017 Ibid 146, 152. 
1018 Ineke Koele, ‘The Netherlands’ in Clive Cutbill, Alison Paines and Murray Hallam (eds), 
International Charitable Giving (Oxford University Press, 2012) 259, 360. 
1019 Ibid 362–3. 
1020 Ibid 360. 
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The tax system in the Netherlands has adopted a liberal approach to the 
concept of public benefit. The 1983 landmark case Hoge Raad1021 held that donations 
to charitable organisations in Africa were tax deductible: 
even if those institutions did not have any public benefit within the 
Netherlands and even if the Dutch populace did not necessarily approve of 
their purpose, provided that the institutions could be said to serve the public 
benefit of a certain (foreign) population and did not support violence.1022  
This broad concept of public benefit found in Dutch tax law is reflected in Dutch 
charitable organisations being able to conduct all of their activities overseas without 
jeopardizing their charitable status, and being able to receive tax deductible gifts 
from Dutch donors to support their charitable activities overseas.1023 
Influence of EU Law 
As discussed under the UK above, EU case law as interpreted by the ECJ has 
had a significant impact on the tax treatment of cross-border donations for Member 
States, including the Netherlands.1024 Historically, tax incentives were only available 
for donations to domestic charities in the Netherlands.1025 Following Stauffer and the 
threat of an infringement procedure,1026 the Netherlands amended its legislation in 
early 2008 to provide for the equal treatment of domestic and foreign charities. 
While this initially only included charities in other Member States and countries with 
which the Netherlands has tax treaties in place, by the end of 2008 charitable entities 
in any country could seek recognition as a Dutch charity for tax purposes.1027 
Legal and Policy Framework for Cross-Border Giving 
Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving 
                                                             
 
1021 Hoge Raad, BNB 1983/176 (Stichting Bevrijdingsfonds Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika). 
1022 Koele, ‘The Netherlands’, above n 1018, 387. 
1023 Ibid. 
1024 Heidenbauer et al, above n 86, 7; von Hippel, above n 82, 12. 
1025 Heidenbauer et al, above n 86, 5. 
1026 Ibid 11. 
1027 Ineke Koele, ‘How Will International Philanthropy Be Freed from Landlocked Tax Barriers?’ 
(2010) European Taxation 409, 413. 
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Tax relief in the form of a tax deduction is available to individuals who donate 
to an ANBI.1028 The Income Tax Act 2001 [Wet Inkomstenbelasting] distinguishes 
between periodic and one-time gifts.1029 A one-time gift is tax deductible to the 
extent that the amount, combined with other donations made during the taxable year, 
exceeds a floor of one per cent of taxable gross income and is capped at 10 per cent 
of taxable gross income.1030 Periodic gifts, whereby the donor commits to pay 
annually over a period comprising at least five years of their life, are not subject to 
the floor or cap.1031 As a result, these gifts are fully deductible up to 100 per cent of 
taxable gross income.1032  
Donations to ANBIs that have applied and been designated the status of 
‘cultural charities’ by the Dutch tax authorities, whereby at least 90 per cent of their 
activities serves a cultural purpose, are deductible at a higher rate of 125 per cent for 
the years 2012–17.1033 This means that for a EUR1000 periodic gift to a cultural 
charity, EUR1250 is tax deductible. If the donor is in the highest tax bracket in the 
Netherlands of 52 per cent, the tax deduction is EUR650, making the net cost to the 
taxpayer EUR350.1034  
Application of Tax Incentives to Cross-Border Donations 
                                                             
 
1028 Income Tax Act 2001 [Wet Inkomstenbelasting] (The Netherlands), title 6.9. A deduction for 
charitable gifts was introduced in 1952 as an incentive to give and to relieve the financial needs 
of charities. See René Bekkers and Elly Mariani, ‘Is the Charitable Deduction in the Netherlands 
Treasury Efficient?’ (Working Paper, Department of Philanthropic Studies, VU University 
Amsterdam, 2009) 3.  
1029 Income Tax Act 2001 [Wet Inkomstenbelasting], arts 6.34–6.39. See Ineke Koele, 
International Taxation of Philanthropy, above n 80, 234; Sigrid Hemels, ‘Seminar H: Cross-
Border Charitable and Other Pro-Bono Contributions, Appendix 1: Answers for the Netherlands’ 
(IFA 2012 Boston Congress, 2012) 2. 
1030 See Koele, International Taxation of Philanthropy, above n 80, 234. 
1031 See ibid. 
1032 See Koele, ‘The Netherlands’, above n 1018, 382–3. 
1033 Heidenbauer et al, above n 86, 6, noting that ‘[t]he government hopes that this multiplier 
will give an incentive for private donations to cultural charities to make up for the significant 
reductions in government subsidies to cultural institutions’. 
1034 This example was cited in ibid using the highest tax bracket in 2013. 
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Donations to foreign charities are fully deductible for Dutch taxpayers.1035  
This is because foreign charities resident in an EU Member State or a state 
designated by the Dutch Ministry of Finance (ie states with which the Netherlands 
has an agreement to exchange information on income tax and gift and inheritance 
tax)1036 are able to register as a Dutch charity.1037 Foreign charities outside the EU or 
a designated state are also able to register as a Dutch charity.1038  
Any domestic or foreign legal entity with a charitable purpose can apply to the 
Tax and Customs Administration (TCA) for registration as an ANBI, which confers 
Dutch charity status.1039 Under Dutch tax law, there are a number of registration 
requirements for any entity (domestic or foreign) seeking Dutch charity status. The 
main requirement is that at least 90 per cent of its activities are dedicated to pursuing 
the public benefit, an exhaustive list of which is contained in the General Tax Act 
[Algemene Wet inzake Rijksbelastingen].1040 There is also an integrity requirement 
                                                             
 
1035 Ibid 5; Koele, ‘How Will International Philanthropy Be Freed from Landlocked Tax 
Barriers?’, above n 1027, 413. 
1036 This may be in the form of a bilateral tax treaty, an agreement on exchange of tax 
information, or the Convention between the Member States of the Council of Europe and the 
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also includes charities in the Kingdom of the Netherlands: the Caribbean Islands, Aruba, Curaçao 
and the Dutch part of Saint-Martin. 
1038 General Tax Act [Algemene Wet inzake Rijksbelastingen] (The Netherlands) art 5b; 
Heidenbauer et al, above n 86, 5. This also applies the additional gift deduction for charities 
registered as ‘cultural charities’. 
1039 FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism – The Netherlands (2011) 263. 
1040 See General Tax Act [Algemene Wet inzake Rijksbelastingen] (The Netherlands) art 5b. This 
list was included in the legislation from 1 January 2012. See Hemels, ‘Seminar H: Cross-Border 
Charitable and Other Pro-Bono Contributions’, above n 1029, 2; Koele, ‘The Netherlands’, above 
n 1018, 361. See also Tax and Customs Administration [Belastingdienst], Which Conditions Must 
Be Met by Public Benefit Organisations? 
<http://www.belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/connect/bldcontenten/belastingdienst/business/ot
her_subjects/public_benefit_organisations/conditions_pbos/>. 
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whereby an entity cannot become (or remain) a Dutch charity if a Dutch court has 
convicted the organisation, its trustees or management of incitement to violence.1041  
The procedure for obtaining Dutch charity status is that the charity submits an 
application form to the TCA along with governing documents, evidence of tax status 
in the country of residence (for foreign charities), the most recent financial 
statements and a list of its board members.1042 Since January 2014, there is an 
additional requirement for applicants to publish certain information on their website, 
including financial statements, and to report this website to the tax authorities.1043 
The TCA reviews each applicant for compliance with the registration requirements 
and, in doing so, may also require a full overview of the organisation’s finances.1044  
For registered charities, there is no requirement to submit an annual 
information statement,1045 although the TCA may revoke charitable status if it 
determines that an organisation’s activities are not being exercised in the public 
interest.1046 There is also ongoing monitoring of a number of registered charities by 
the Central Bureau for Fundraising (CBF), an independent, privately run accrediting 
and oversight agency that promotes responsible fundraising, providing its member 
organisations with greater credibility.1047 Charities apply to the CBF for a ‘seal of 
approval’, which involves the CBF conducting an assessment of the organisation’s 
                                                             
 
1041 See Sigrid Hemels, ‘Cross Border Charitable Giving and Taxation: The Netherlands’ 
(Rotterdam Congress National Reports, 2012) 3. For other registration requirements, see Tax 
and Customs Administration [Belastingdienst], Which Conditions Must Be Met by Public Benefit 
Organisations?, above n 1040. 
1042 European Foundation Centre and Transnational Giving Europe, ‘The Netherlands: Country 
Profile’ (2014) 2 (‘The Netherlands Country Profile 2014’). 
1043 See Tax  and  Customs Administration [Belastingdienst], New Conditions Apply to ANBIs as of 
January 1st 2014 
<http://www.belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/connect/bldcontenten/belastingdienst/business/ot
her_subjects/public_benefit_organisations/new_conditions_apply_to_anbis_as_of_january_1st_2
014/>. 
1044 FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism – The Netherlands, above n 1039, 263. 
1045 See Koele, International Taxation of Philanthropy, above n 80, 281. 
1046 Koele, ‘The Netherlands’, above n 1018, 388. 
1047 FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism – The Netherlands, above n 1039, 262. 
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records and information against a number of criteria, as well as conducting 
subsequent annual assessments to ensure ongoing compliance.1048 While the CBF 
only monitors approximately 350 (or 0.05 per cent) of all Dutch charities, it 
nonetheless serves as an important charitable monitoring body given that the 
charities under its supervision account for approximately 85 per cent of all funds 
raised in the Netherlands and all of the international NGOs in the Netherlands.1049 
Upon receiving its Dutch charity status, the foreign charity is included in a list 
of charities (domestic and foreign) that are eligible to receive tax deductible 
donations.1050 A Dutch donor must state in their tax declaration that the foreign 
charity is included in this list in order to receive a deduction,1051 but there are no 
special requirements or responsibilities for donations to foreign charities.1052 Once 
registered as a Dutch charity, there are also no geographic restrictions on the 
charity’s activities. Both resident and non-resident registered charities can undertake 
some or all of their activities outside the Netherlands.1053 Foreign charities that have 
registered as charities in the Netherlands include the Canadian Cancer Society, the 
English Foundation & Friends of the Royal Botanic Gardens, the Stichting 
Federation of European Neuroscience Societies Trust Foundation in Berlin, the 
Museum of Modern Art in New York, and the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra, with 
the latter two securing the additional benefit of being registered as cultural 
charities.1054  
Notwithstanding the fact that most foreign charities can obtain Dutch charity 
status without any significant difference in requirements, the European Commission 
was of the opinion that the Netherlands did not meet its obligations to guarantee the 
                                                             
 
1048 Ibid 264. 
1049 Ibid. 
1050 See <http://www.belastingdienst.nl/rekenhulpen/giften/anbi_zoeken/>. 
1051 The Netherlands Country Profile 2014, above n 1042, 2. 
1052 Koele, ‘The Netherlands’, above n 1018, 388. 
1053 See ibid 387 (‘Since 1965 Dutch law has limited the geographic scope of a qualifying public 
interest organization’). 
1054 Heidenbauer et al, above n 86, 6; Hemels, ‘Seminar H: Cross-Border Charitable and Other 
Pro-Bono Contributions’, above n 1029, 2. 
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free movement of capital under art 63 of the TFEU and in 2010 sent the Netherlands 
a formal request to change its rules requiring compulsory registration for foreign 
charities to be eligible for Dutch tax relief. This request was widely criticised as ‘a 
flawed initiative’ given that ‘[a]ll charities, whether based in the Netherlands, the EU 
or any other country, have to be recognized [in the Netherlands] before they are 
considered to be eligible for tax relief’.1055 To date, the Netherlands has not changed 
its compulsory registration requirements for both foreign and domestic charities. 
Anti-Abuse Measures 
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Dutch Government amended 
the Criminal Code to include provisions on anti-terrorist financing.1056 In 2013, the 
financing of terrorism became a specific criminal offence applying to all legal 
entities, including charities.1057 Several reviews by the Dutch authorities have 
determined that while the charity sector was vulnerable to abuse, there was ‘no 
concrete evidence’ of such abuse by criminal organisations.1058  
FATF’s most recent report on the Netherlands found it to be largely compliant 
with Recommendation 8, remarking that the information available on registered 
charities was comprehensive, particularly for charities that were monitored by the 
independent CBF as well as the TCA.1059 While observing that greater coordination 
and information sharing between the CBF and the various Dutch authorities was 
required, the report concluded that:  
                                                             
 
1055 Koele, ‘How Will International Philanthropy Be Freed from Landlocked Tax Barriers?’, above 
n 1027, 413–4. See also Hemels, ‘Seminar H: Cross-Border Charitable and Other Pro-Bono 
Contributions’, above n 1029, 1–2 who found this ‘a remarkable statement, as charities resident 
in the Netherlands have to register as well and under the same conditions’). This case was 
referred to the ECJ in 2011. See Koele, ‘The Netherlands’, above n 1018, 390. 
1056 Wouter Muller, Christian Kalin and John Goldsworth (eds), Anti-Money Laundering: 
International Law and Practice (John Wiley & Sons, 2007) 578–9. 
1057 International Monetary Fund, Netherlands: Report on Observance of Standards and Codes—
FATF Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
(Country Report No 11/91, April 2011) 4–5. 
1058 FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism – The Netherlands, above n 1039, 261. 
1059 Ibid 268. 
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The measures in place with respect to NPOs operating in or from the 
Netherlands warrant a high level of transparency. From meetings with the 
private sector it appears that the level of compliance by NPOs with these 
measures is significant.1060 
Giving Intermediaries 
A donor is able to obtain a tax deduction by giving to a Dutch charity who in 
turn donates the money to a foreign charity, provided that the funds are applied for 
charitable purposes and that the donor did not ‘in fact’ instruct the Dutch charity ‘to 
apply the funds to a specified third party’.1061 Like the UK, the Netherlands is one of 
the 17 European countries involved in TGE, which serves as a European giving 
intermediary for over 350 charities, charging an administrative fee for its services.1062  
Tax Treaties 
The Netherlands has one bilateral tax treaty that provides for recognition of tax 
incentives for cross-border giving, with Barbados.1063 Article 22, made at the request 
of Barbados as part of its tax treaty policy,1064 stipulates that donations from a 
resident of one country to an organisation recognised as a charity in the other country 
are deductible under the same terms and conditions as those applicable to domestic 
charities, provided that the donor’s country agrees that the foreign organisation 
qualifies as a charity for the purposes of deductibility under its income tax laws.1065  
                                                             
 
1060 Ibid 267. 
1061 Koele, ‘The Netherlands’, above n 1018, 389. 
1062 See discussion of TGE in section 6.2.2. 
1063 Convention between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Barbados for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed 28 
November 2006, Treaties IBFD (entered into force 12 July 2007). 
1064 See Heidenbauer et al, above n 86, 10, noting that ‘[a] similar provision on donations to 
charitable institutions is included in article 21 of the Barbados–Seychelles Income and Capital 
Tax Treaty (2007), article 22 of the Barbados–Mauritius Income Tax Treaty (2004), article 22 of 
the Barbados–Mexico Income Tax Treaty (2008) and article 23 of the Barbados–Ghana Income 
Tax Treaty (2008)’. 
1065 See ibid. 
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6.2.4 Canada 
Nature and Scope of Charitable Giving  
Charitable giving in Canada, while not at US levels, is substantial. The total 
amount donated in Canada in 2012–13 was CAD20.2 billion, comprising giving from 
individuals (63 per cent), foundations (22 per cent) and corporations including 
sponsorships (15 per cent).1066 Of this amount, approximately eight per cent was 
directed to international organisations.1067 In the past 20 years, the number of private 
foundations in Canada increased by 76 per cent to just over 5300 while the number 
of public foundations has increased by 69 per cent to just over 5100.1068 Together, 
these foundations made gifts totalling CAD4.4 billion in 2012.1069 Of the 150 largest 
grantmaking foundations by total value of gifts made, 20 per cent made grants to 
organisations located outside Canada.1070  
Since 2006, Canada’s Conservative Government’s focus on ‘Investing in 
Stronger Communities’ has resulted in measures to enhance tax incentives for 
charitable giving.1071 The most recent measures were introduced in the Government’s 
Economic Action Plans for 2013 and 20141072 following an extensive report on tax 
incentives for charitable donations issued by the House of Commons Standing 
                                                             
 
1066 Statistics Canada, General Social Survey on Giving, Volunteering and Participating, (2013); 
Imagine Canada and Philanthropic Foundations Canada, Assets and Giving Trends of Canada’s 
Grantmaking Foundations (2014). 
1067 See Martin Turcotte, ‘Charitable Giving by Canadians’ (Statistics Canada, 2012) 27, table 5. 
1068 Imagine Canada and Philanthropic Foundations Canada, above n 1066, 1. Private 
foundations differ from public foundation in that for the former, half or more of the foundation’s 
directors do not deal with each other at arms’ length and/or 50 per cent or more of the 
foundation’s funding comes from a person or group that exercise control. 
1069 Ibid 8. 
1070 Ibid 14. 
1071 See Government of Canada, Chapter 3.4: Supporting Families and Communities (Budget 2014, 
2014) <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2014/docs/plan/ch3-4-eng.html>. See also Malcolm Burrows, 
‘Charitable Tax Incentives in Canada: Overview and Opportunities for Expansion’ (2009) 22 The 
Philanthropist 3, 21 (‘The charitable sector – rooted in volunteerism and community action – fits 
squarely within the Conservative worldview. There is also a demonstrated support for 
charitable giving in the 2006 and 2007 federal budgets’). 
1072 These include investments to reduce the administrative burden on charities and measures 
to enhance tax incentives for charitable giving. See Government of Canada, above n 1071. 
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Committee on Finance.1073 At the same time, the Government announced the merger 
of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) with the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade into a new body ‘Foreign Affairs, Trade and 
Development Canada’.1074 The result has been a decline in international aid. In 2013, 
overseas aid was USD4.91 billion, or 0.27 per cent of GNI, representing a decrease 
from 2012 of more than 10 per cent.1075  
Historical Context 
English Common Law Model of Charity 
The Canadian legislature and judiciary have relied on the English common law 
judicial interpretation of charitable purposes, and in particular Lord Macnaghten’s 
classification in Pemsel and the preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601.1076 
Historically, like England, Canadian ‘citizens and religious institutions were the 
primary drivers of voluntary sector activities and organizations’, with the 
Government taking a “hands off” approach’.1077 It was only because of ‘a growing 
economic depression, accelerating unemployment, massive immigration adjustments, 
a traditional federal reluctance to provide support in areas of provincial jurisdiction, 
and a pending federal election’1078 that income tax incentives for charitable donations 
were introduced.  Originating in the 1930 Amendment to the Income War Tax Act, 
this provision was specifically conceived with reference to Pemsel as the basis for 
                                                             
 
1073 House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving in 
Canada (February 2013) 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Committee/411/FINA/Reports/RP5972482/finarp15/fin
arp15-e.pdf>. 
1074 See Sharma, above n 190. 
1075 OECD, Aid to Developing Countries Rebounds in 2013 to Reach an All-Time High, above n 44. 
1076 Duff, ‘Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions in Canada’, above n 7, 75–6, noting at 66 
that his classification of charitable purposes was approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Guaranty Trust Co of Canada v MNR [1967] SCR 133 and in Vancouver Society of Immigrant and 
Visible Minority Women v MNR [1999] 1 SCR 10 [‘Vancouver Society’]. 
1077 Peter Elson, ‘The Origin of the Species: Why Charity Regulations in Canada and England 
Continue to Reflect Their Origins’ (2010) 12(3) International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 75, 
77. 
1078 Ibid 78. 
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the definition of charitable purposes.1079 Since that time, the English common law 
definition of charity has been relied upon in the Canadian tax laws because there is 
no restricted definition of charity for fiscal purposes.1080 As a result, the Charities 
Directorate of the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), which regulates charities, 
continues to look to the common law when it makes determinations of charitable 
status under Canada’s Income Tax Act (ITA).1081 
The Supreme Court of Canada has also ‘shown considerable reluctance to 
expand the categories of charitable organizations beyond those traditionally 
recognized under the Pemsel test’.1082 As a result, charitable purposes must fall into 
one or more of the four categories in Pemsel: to relieve poverty, advance education, 
advance religion, or benefit the community as a whole. Following the common law, 
the Canadian Courts have also determined that a charity must be established for the 
public benefit.1083 In doing so, the Courts have adopted a broad concept of public 
benefit extending to charitable purposes carried out overseas.1084 This is reflected in 
Canadian charities being able to conduct activities overseas provided such activities 
are not contrary to public policy in Canada.1085 
                                                             
 
1079 Ibid, 81–2. 
1080 Duff, ‘Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions in Canada’, above n 7, 75. 
1081 Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (‘ITA’); s 149-1(1) defines charity as ‘a charitable organization 
or charitable foundation’. 
1082 David Duff, ‘Charities and Terrorist Financing’ (2011) 61(1) University of Toronto Law 
Journal 73, 85, citing Vancouver Society where the court held that providing support to 
immigrant and visible minority women was not charitable under the Pemsel test; and AYSA 
Amateur Youth Soccer Association v Canada Revenue Agency [2007] 3 SCR 217, determining that 
the promotion of sport is not a charitable purpose. 
1083 See Canada Revenue Agency, Guidelines for Registering a Charity: Meeting the Public Benefit 
Test (CPS-024, March 2006) <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/chrts/plcy/cps/cps-024-
eng.html#footnote2>. 
1084 See Re Levy Estate (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 375, where the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a 
gift to a foreign charity was a charitable purpose under the common law.  
1085 See Canadian Magen David Adom for Israel v Canada (Minister of National Revenue) [2002] 
FCA 323 [57]; Canadian Committee for the Tel Aviv Foundation v Canada [2002] 
FCA 72). 
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Legal and Policy Framework for Cross-Border Giving 
Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving 
Pursuant to the ITA, a non-refundable tax credit is available to individuals who 
make donations to qualified donees.  A tax credit differs from a tax deduction in that 
instead of refunding the tax paid on the donated income, each dollar of the donation 
triggers a credit which can then be used ‘to offset some or all of the tax liability 
imposed on the donated income’.1086 As a result, the credit reduces taxes by a set 
percentage of total donations for each donor rather than linking the value of the tax 
benefit to the donor’s income level or marginal tax rate.1087 In Canada, the credit, 
which allows taxpayers to claim the fair market value of gifts that were made during 
the year or any of the five preceding taxation years, has two tiers: charitable gifts up 
to CAD200 are creditable at the lowest marginal rate of 15 per cent; while those over 
CAD200 are creditable at the highest marginal rate of 29 per cent.1088 The aggregate 
value of gifts that may be claimed in a year is subject to a cap of 75 per cent of the 
donor's annual net income.1089  
In order for a gift to eligible for the donation tax credit, an organisation must be 
a ‘qualified donee’ as defined by the ITA.1090 A list of qualified donees is maintained 
by the CRA and is publicly available.1091 The most important type of qualifying gift 
is a gift to a ‘registered charity’.1092 An organisation whose purposes and activities 
are charitable (as defined in the common law), may apply to the CRA to become a 
registered charity. Pursuant to the ITA, registered charities are required to be resident 
in Canada and must have been established or created in Canada.1093 Reporting 
                                                             
 
1086 Krever, ‘Tax Deductions for Charitable Donations’, above n 392, 15. 
1087 See Colinvaux, Galle and Steuerle, above n 9, 11. 
1088 ITA s 118-1(3); ITA s 117(2). 
1089 ITA s 118-1(1). 
1090 See ITA s 149-1(1) for a definition of ‘qualified donee’. 
1091 See Canada Revenue Agency, Charities Listings <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-
gvng/lstngs/menu-eng.html>. 
1092 ITA s 248(1). A registered charity is a charitable organization, private foundation or public 
foundation as defined in ITA s 149-1(1). 
1093 ITA s 248(1). 
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requirements include filing an annual information return.1094 An entity is registered 
subject to revocation for failure to comply, at the discretion of the CRA.1095 The 
CRA conducts audits for compliance and has sanctions for noncompliance, which 
sharply increased following the discovery in 2007 that charities were being used as 
tax shelters.1096 The CRA spent the next five years auditing charities, resulting in the 
rejection of CAD2.5 billion in tax claims for donations and the revocation of 
charitable status for 47 charities.1097 
Application of Tax Incentives to Cross-Border Donations 
As a general rule, the tax credit is not available for donations made directly to 
foreign charities. This is because it is not possible for a foreign charity to become a 
‘registered charity’ in Canada because of the domestic situs requirement. This rule is 
subject to two important qualifications: a Canadian charity may use the funds it 
receives for charitable activities abroad1098 and can serve as a domestic giving 
intermediary provided certain conditions are met.1099 The ITA provides two further 
limited exceptions to this general rule in its definition of qualified donees. The first is 
for prescribed foreign universities that include Canadian students.1100 These 
universities are listed in Schedule VIII of the Income Tax Regulations.1101 At the 
time of writing, 533 universities appeared on this list, more than 80 per cent of which 
were located in the US.1102 
                                                             
 
1094 See ITA s 149-1(14). 
1095 ITA 168(1).  
1096 Susan Phillips, ‘Shining Light on Charities or Looking in the Wrong Place? Regulation-By-
Transparency in Canada’ (2013) 24 Voluntas 881, 897. See also Duff, ‘Charities and Terrorist 
Financing’, above n 1082, 103 noting that ‘annual audits [of registered charities] fell between 
2002 and 2003 but have risen steadily since then, from 356 in 2003 to 790 in 2007–8’. 
1097 Phillips, above n 1096, 897. 
1098 MacKenzie v MNR, 52 DTC 346 (TAB). 
1099 See discussion under Domestic Charitable Intermediaries below. 
1100 ITA s 149-1(1)(a)(iv).  
1101 See Canada Revenue Agency, List of Prescribed Universities Outside Canada 
<http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/qlfd-dns/qd-lstngs/prscrbdnvrsts-lst-eng.html>. 
1102 Of the 533 listed universities, 435 were in the US, 42 were in the UK and 56 were in other 
countries. 
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The second exception is for foreign organisations that have received a gift from 
the Canadian Government.1103 Recent changes to the ITA have made it more difficult 
for foreign organisations to qualify under this second exception.1104 A three-part test 
is applied in order to assess an applicant's eligibility for registration as a foreign 
qualified donee. The foreign organisation must demonstrate that it (1) was the 
recipient of a gift from the Canadian Government; (2) would meet the definition of a 
charitable organisation under Canadian law (with the exception of the residency 
requirement); and (3) will carry on activities in the area of disaster relief, urgent 
humanitarian aid, or activities in the national interest of Canada.1105 The legislative 
changes also include additional registration requirements.1106 Once registered, the 
foreign charitable organisation has qualified donee status for a 24-month period that 
includes the date of the gift from the Canadian Government1107 and is included on a 
                                                             
 
1103 ITA s 149-1(1), (26). 
1104 These changes were announced in the 2012 Budget and came into force on 1 January 2013. 
1105 ITA s 149-1(26)(b). Previously, the foreign qualified done test was based on a two-part test 
without the third prong. See Canada Revenue Agency, Charitable Organizations Outside Canada 
That Have Received a Gift from Her Majesty in Right of Canada (CG-015, August 2012) 
<http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/chrts/plcy/cgd/hrmjsty-eng.html>. The CRA has 
clarified that this third prong requires that one or more of the organisation’s current activities 
should be ‘related to’ disaster relief, urgent humanitarian aid, or activities in the national 
interest of Canada, but has not yet provided guidance on what would be considered ‘activities in 
the national interest of Canada’. See Canada Revenue Agency, Budget 2012 – Gifts to Foreign 
Charitable Organizations (2012) <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/bdgt/2012/qa02-eng.html>. 
1106 ITA s 149-1(26). The application must include inter alia: the organisation’s governing 
documents and recent financial statements; a description of the organisation’s activities; a list of 
all the current directors and officers; evidence of the organisation’s charitable status from the 
home country authority; and documentation related to the gift from the Canadian Government. 
See Canada Revenue Agency, Foreign Charitable Organizations That Have Received a Gift from 
Her Majesty In Right of Canada, above n 1105. 
1107 ITA s 149.1(26).  
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publicly available list of foreign qualified donees maintained by the CRA.1108 At the 
time of writing, three organisations appeared on this approved foreign charity list.1109  
Anti-Abuse Measures 
All registered charities must comply with Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation. 
In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks and their Canadian precursor, the 
Air India Bombings (which took place in 1985 on a flight from Vancouver), the 
Canadian Government introduced significant changes to the laws relating to terrorist 
financing and to the regulation of charities.1110 The Anti-Terrorism Act of 20011111 
resulted in amendments to Canada’s Criminal Code to criminalise intentional 
terrorist financing and amendments to the money laundering legislation to include 
terrorism financing. The Anti-Terrorism Act also included the Charities Registration 
(Security Information) Act (‘CRSIA’),1112 establishing a mechanism to deny or revoke 
registration of charitable status if there are reasonable grounds to conclude the 
charity has operated to make its resources available to an organisation or person that 
engages in or supports terrorist activities either directly or indirectly.1113 The CRA 
has also worked with the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of 
Canada (FINTRAC), which discloses information to the CRA on suspected cases of 
                                                             
 
1108 To maintain its status as a qualified donee, the foreign organisation must properly issue 
official donation receipts and keep books and records to support any official donation receipts it 
issues and provide these to the CRA upon request. See Canada Revenue Agency, Foreign 
Charitable Organizations That Have Received a Gift from Her Majesty In Right of Canada, above n 
1105. 
1109 These are Bill, Hillary & Chelsea Clinton Foundation, Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars, and The Rhodes Trust – Public Purposes Fund. 
1110 Kent Roach, ‘The Air India Report and the Regulation of Charities and Terrorism Financing’ 
(2011) 61 University of Toronto Law Journal 45, 45–48. 
1111 Anti-Terrorism Act, SC 2001, c 41. 
1112 Charities Registration (Security Information) Act (‘CRSIA’) SC 2001, c 41, s 4(1)(a). 
1113 See Duff, ‘Charities and Terrorist Financing’, above n 1082, 97–8; Roach, above n 1110, 48. A 
2010 report noted that the CRSIA had not been used to revoke charitable status for any 
charities, largely because providing support for terrorist activities would also be grounds for 
revocation of charitable status under the ITA. See Commission of Inquiry Into the Investigation 
of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, ‘Air India Flight 182: A Canadian Tragedy – Final Report 
(Volume 5: Terrorist Financing) (Final Report, 2010) 217–8. 
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terrorist financing involving charities,1114 to produce guidance to help Canadian 
charities identify vulnerabilities to terrorist abuse.1115  
FATF’s most recent report of Canada found it was largely compliant with 
Recommendation 8 having taken ‘considerable steps to implement 
[Recommendation 8] in relation to registered charities’, which account for the vast 
majority of all donations and foreign activities of the nonprofit sector and are 
considered by the Canadian Government to constitute that part of the sector most at 
risk for terrorist financing.1116 This finding is a result of the CRA closely monitoring 
charities through its registration and annual reporting requirements, maintaining an 
extensive information collection regime for all nonprofits for tax purposes and 
conducting comprehensive field audits of about 800 registered charities each year.1117 
FATF found that ‘on average, about 10 registered charities a year lose their 
registrations as a result of serious non-compliance issues’, including those that 
‘failed to demonstrate sufficient control over their foreign operations’.1118  
Giving Intermediaries 
Canadian registered charities are permitted to carry on their own charitable 
activities abroad. However, funds can only be directed (whether inside or outside 
Canada) to qualified donees or to activities that are directly under the charity's 
control and supervision and for which it can account for any funds expended.1119 As 
a result, a Canadian charity can serve as a giving intermediary provided that it is not 
                                                             
 
1114 See FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism – Canada (2008) 257. 
1115 Canada Revenue Agency, Checklist for Charities on Avoiding Terrorist Abuse 
<http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/chrts/chcklsts/vtb-eng.html>; Canada Revenue Agency, 
Charities in the International Context <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/chrts/ntrntnl-
eng.html>. 
1116 FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the 
Financing of Terrorism – Canada, above n 1114, 254–9. 
1117 Ibid. 
1118 Ibid 256. 
1119 Canadian Committee for the Tel Aviv Foundation v Canada [2002] FCA 72; Canadian Magen 
David Adom for Israel v Canada (Minister of National Revenue) [2002] FCA 323; Bayit Lepletot v 
Canada (Minister of National Revenue) [2006] FCA 128. See also Canada Revenue Agency, 
Canadian Registered Charities Carrying Out Activities Outside Canada (CG-002, July 2010) 
<http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/chrts/plcy/cgd/tsd-cnd-eng.html#_ftn2>. 
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used as a mere conduit.1120 This issue was considered in the recent case of Public 
Television Association of Québec v Canada (National Revenue),1121 where the Public 
Television Association of Québec (PTAQ), a registered charity, carried out some 
charitable activities through Vermont Public Television (VPT), a US 501(c)(3) 
organisation, pursuant to broadcasting and fundraising agreements. The CRA 
revoked PTAQ’s charitable registration on the basis that PTAQ was not carrying on 
its own activities with VPT as its agent, but instead was merely a conduit for VPT to 
issue receipts for donations received by VPT from Canadian donors. The Court 
upheld the revocation, finding that PTAQ was serving as a conduit for VPT because 
it failed to exercise appropriate direction and control over its resources. 1122 
Any funds sent to foreign charities overseas must be done in furtherance of the 
charity’s own activities through a formal arrangement (such as an agency or joint 
venture agreement), enabling the foreign charity to carry on activities on behalf of 
the Canadian charity.1123 The CRA requires that a charity take all necessary measures 
to direct and control the use of its resources when carrying out activities through an 
intermediary, and maintain a record of steps taken to direct and control the use of its 
resources to enable the CRA to verify that all of the charity's resources have been 
used for its own activities.1124 As part of its ongoing audit activity, the CRA is 
particularly concerned with transfers to foreign charities.1125 
Tax Treaties 
Article XXI (7) of Canada’s bilateral income tax treaty with the US provides 
income tax benefits for gifts to US charities, provided that it would qualify for 
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registration as a Canadian charity if it were resident in Canada.1126 However, tax 
relief is only available against Canadian taxes on US source income. It has been 
suggested that it may be possible to rely on article XXI (7) of the US–Canada Treaty 
to argue that a gift by a Canadian charity (as a resident of Canada) to a US charity is 
to be treated for the purposes of Canadian taxation as a gift to a ‘registered charity’ 
as defined in the ITA.1127 This argument was put forth in the recent case of Prescient 
Foundation v Minister for National Revenue,1128 involving an appeal by a Canadian 
foundation of the revocation of its charitable registration as a result inter alia of it 
making a gift to a non-qualified donee which was a US 501(c)(3) organisation whose 
principal mission is to alleviate poverty and illness in Africa.1129 However, the 
Federal Court of Appeal did not address this argument, finding for the appellant on 
other grounds.1130 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
Employing comparative tax methodology, this chapter has undertaken the first, 
descriptive phase of Infanti’s comparative tax framework to examine the 
‘comparable’ jurisdictions of the US, UK, the Netherlands and Canada. This country-
by-country description of the laws and policies governing the tax treatment of cross-
border donations shed light on the distinctive historical and cultural contexts in 
which each jurisdiction’s charitable tax regime functions. The descriptive country 
comparison also revealed that while there is policy consistency across the four 
jurisdictions in encouraging domestic giving through the tax laws, this is not the case 
with cross-border giving. The four countries evidence a wide range of tax laws and 
policies affecting the tax treatment of cross-border donations. 
                                                             
 
1126 See Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, United States–Canada, signed 
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1130 Prescient Foundation v Minister of National Revenue [2013] FCA 120, para 32 (Mainville JA). 
This argument was also raised, but not addressed by the Court, in Public Television Association of 
Québec v Canada (National Revenue) [2015] FCA 170. 
 Chapter 6: Legal and Policy Frameworks in Other Jurisdictions for Cross-Border Philanthropy 223 
A detailed analysis of the results of this descriptive phase is undertaken in the 
following chapter, which focuses on the second (identification) and third 
(explanatory) phases of Infanti’s comparative tax framework. In doing so, it takes the 
comparative analysis beyond parallel descriptions of the tax laws and policies in the 
four jurisdictions to providing a critical evaluation of the various approaches in the 
current global philanthropic landscape in which these tax regimes operate. 
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Chapter 7: Evaluation of Country 
Approaches to the Tax 
Treatment of Cross-Border 
Philanthropy 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will undertake the second (identification) and third (explanatory) 
phases of Anthony Infanti’s comparative tax framework to examine the ‘comparable’ 
jurisdictions of the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands and 
Canada. These two phases involve ‘identifying … any trends in the rules being 
adopted or abandoned’ by these countries, and then ‘compar[ing] and contrast[ing] 
these rules to determine which, if any, is superior to the others’.1131 In doing so, this 
chapter addresses RQ4: What other legal and policy frameworks for cross-border 
philanthropy exist in comparable jurisdictions and how have they responded to the 
globalisation of philanthropy? This analysis will then inform the formulation of any 
proposed reforms for Australia’s policy framework governing the tax treatment of 
cross-border donations. 
The chapter begins with the identification phase, which identifies similarities 
and differences that have emerged from the descriptive country comparison. Each 
country’s approach to the provision of tax incentives for cross-border donations is 
described to determine the extent to which these differences are a result of the 
historical and cultural contexts in which their charitable tax regimes operate. This 
enables local differences to be taken into account when ‘adapting’ from these 
jurisdictions to develop any reform proposals for Australia.1132 This is followed by 
the description of a number of similarities that manifest thematically through the 
identification of three key trends that are common to some or all four jurisdictions. 
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The explanatory phase is then undertaken, which explains the similarities and 
differences that have emerged from the descriptive country comparison. This phase 
introduces Australia into the comparative analysis in order to determine where it is 
located on the spectrum of approaches to the tax treatment of cross-border donations. 
In doing so, this analysis will contribute to the few comparative studies that have 
included Australia in a multi-country examination of approaches to the tax treatment 
of international giving.1133  
The five country approaches are then evaluated to determine whether any are, 
on balance, ‘better’ than or ‘superior’ to the others. While Infanti does not provide 
guidance on the standards to apply in order to evaluate superiority,1134 he suggests it 
is not necessary to adopt the superior solution, but rather an ‘appropriate’ solution 
may emerge ‘out of parts of the different national solutions’.1135 In his quest to find 
an ‘appropriate’ solution for the US tax laws governing cross-border charitable 
contributions, Infanti advocates ‘balancing the benefits of the superior rule against all 
of the relevant theoretical and practical considerations that normally inform US 
international tax policymaking’.1136 He suggests a number of international tax policy 
concerns, including the expected impact of tax provisions on: political relations with 
foreign countries; the need to raise revenue; the prevention of tax avoidance and 
evasion; and the mitigation of external complexity.1137 
It is possible to use these international tax policy considerations to derive 
specific criteria for evaluating superiority. For the purposes of this analysis, these 
four considerations have been adapted, based on the descriptive country comparison, 
to formulate four ‘superiority’ criteria: 
                                                             
 
1133 Those that do consider Australia include Bater, 'The Tax Treatment of Cross-Border 
Donations', above n 106, Heidenbauer et al, above n 86; Moore and Rutzen, above n 13, and 
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1135 Infanti, ‘Spontaneous Tax Coordination’, above n 100, 1139, 1142. 
1136 Ibid 1139, 1226. 
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 improving relations with foreign countries by responding to the growth in 
global charity and philanthropy;  
 reducing external complexity through clear laws and procedures 
surrounding cross-border giving;  
 mitigating tax abuse and terrorist financing while facilitating legitimate 
cross-border flows of charity; and 
 minimising costs to the fisc while achieving desired outcomes. 
Evaluating the spectrum of national approaches against these four ‘superiority’ 
criteria will shed light on both the strengths and weaknesses of Australia’s strict 
approach to the tax treatment of cross-border giving against the approaches taken in 
the other four jurisdictions. It will also reveal which, if any, of the approaches are 
‘superior’ to the others according to the above criteria, and will inform the 
development of an ‘appropriate’ solution for the Australian context. 
7.2 IDENTIFICATION PHASE: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IDENTIFIED 
7.2.1 Country Approaches to the Provision of Tax Incentives for Cross-Border 
Donations 
From the descriptive comparison, it is possible to identify the different 
approaches undertaken by the US, UK, the Netherlands and Canada with respect to 
the tax incentives provided to individuals for cross-border donations. Consistent with 
the emphasis on local context in Anthony Infanti’s comparative tax framework, the 
differences in country approaches appear to be largely a result of the particular 
historical and cultural contexts in which each country’s charitable tax regime 
functions. 
With its strong historical underpinnings reflecting the ‘Tocquevillian ideal of 
American nonprofit exceptionalism’,1138 the US has developed a unique culture of 
philanthropy that continues to generously support its robust nonprofit sector. While 
this philanthropic culture and nonprofit legacy have been enshrined in US tax laws, 
the tax treatment of cross-border giving appears to have emanated from a more 
                                                             
 
1138 Pozen, ‘Remapping the Charitable Deduction’, above n 211, 537. 
 228 Chapter 7: Evaluation of Country Approaches to the Tax Treatment of Cross-Border Philanthropy 
inward-looking, isolationist time in US history. This has resulted in a domestic situs 
requirement in the tax laws that does not allow a deduction for donations made 
directly to foreign charities, although the US has tax treaties with Canada, Mexico 
and Israel that contain ‘mutual recognition’ provisions enabling cross-border 
reciprocity for charitable donations. At the same time, the tax laws do permit a 
deduction if a donation to a US charity is used by that charity for charitable activities 
abroad or if the donation is passed through a US charitable intermediary in an 
appropriate manner.  
The UK has a deep-rooted history of charity that during Elizabethan times 
developed into secular philanthropy, culminating in a statute that formalised and 
regulated charitable giving. More recently, empowered by government policies, the 
UK has evolved philanthropically into one of the most generous countries in Europe. 
The English common law model of charity recognises a broad concept of public 
benefit extending to charitable purposes carried out overseas, reflected in UK 
charities being permitted to freely engage in charitable activities abroad. As a result 
of the ECJ cases establishing a principle of non-discrimination, the UK has witnessed 
an expansion of the concept of public benefit in its tax laws, with Gift Aid extending 
to taxpayers who donate to a charity in a European Union (EU) Member State, 
Iceland or Norway. To obtain tax relief for donations to charities outside Europe, a 
UK donor must make a gift to a domestic charity, which either uses the funds for its 
own charitable activities abroad or re-donates the funds to a charity overseas. 
Canada has followed the English common law model of charity by relying 
upon the common law definition of charity in its tax laws and recognising a broad 
concept of public benefit extending to charitable purposes carried out overseas, 
which is reflected in Canadian charities being able to engage in charitable activities 
abroad. However, Canadian tax laws affecting cross-border giving more closely 
resemble those of the US than the UK. Like the US, Canada’s domestic situs 
requirement does not permit tax relief for individual donations made directly to 
foreign charities, although it does have a tax treaty with the US enabling cross-border 
reciprocity for charitable donations. At the same time, tax relief is permitted if a 
donation to a Canadian charity is used by that charity for charitable activities abroad 
or if the donation is passed through a Canadian charitable intermediary in an 
appropriate manner. In Canada uniquely, donations to certain foreign universities and 
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to specified foreign charities that have received a gift from the Canadian Government 
are also eligible for tax relief. 
The Netherlands has a long history of supporting the growth and development 
of domestic and international charitable organisations and a strong commitment to 
private and public cross-border giving, reflecting its internationalist cosmopolitan 
approach to philanthropy. The Netherlands has incorporated this internationalist 
approach in its tax laws, recognising a broad concept of public benefit extending to 
charitable activities carried out overseas. Following the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) cases establishing a principle of non-discrimination, the Netherlands amended 
its tax laws to provide for the equal tax treatment of domestic and foreign charities 
that register with the Dutch tax authority. Indeed, rather than limiting its charitable 
tax relief to European cross-border donations as mandated by the ECJ, the 
Netherlands went one step further, extending its tax relief to donations made directly 
to foreign charities beyond Europe. As a result, foreign charities in any country can 
seek recognition as a Dutch charity for tax purposes.  
From this synopsis it is evident that each country has developed a unique 
approach to the tax treatment of cross-border giving, deriving from the historical and 
cultural contexts in which their charitable tax regimes operate. The descriptive 
country comparison also revealed similarities across the four jurisdictions that are 
described in the next section.  
7.2.2 Key Trends Across Jurisdictions 
Given that the four countries share similarities in their approach to civil society 
regulation1139 and are at similar levels of evolutionary legal development, there is a 
functional equivalence based on a ‘presumption of similarity’.1140 It is not surprising 
then that the descriptive country comparison revealed a number of similarities across 
the jurisdictions, manifesting in three key trends:  
 increased government oversight of cross-border giving through anti-abuse 
measures;  
                                                             
 
1139 Center for Global Prosperity, Philanthropic Freedom, above n 88, 8. 
1140 Marian, above n 103, 429. 
 230 Chapter 7: Evaluation of Country Approaches to the Tax Treatment of Cross-Border Philanthropy 
 the ‘proactive’ use of tax tools by government to regulate cross-border 
giving; and  
 the use of ‘workarounds’ by charitable organisations and their donors to 
facilitate tax-effective cross-border giving. 
A detailed examination of each of these trends is undertaken in the following section, 
providing important insights into the current legal and regulatory environment in 
which cross-border giving operates around the world. 
Increased Oversight of Cross-Border Giving through Anti-Abuse Measures 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, authorities in the US, 
Canada and the UK have exercised increased oversight over international giving, 
largely as a result of the Government and media focusing on the potential for cross-
border donations being diverted for terrorism and money laundering.1141 This 
heightened concern around charities being used for terrorist financing purposes led to 
the introduction of new anti-abuse laws, regulations and guidelines for individuals 
and organisations engaged in cross-border charitable activities. 
The US has been the most prolific in its adoption of anti-terrorism measures 
affecting charities in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks.1142 While 
oversight considerations have played an important role in maintaining geographic 
restrictions on the tax relief for cross-border donations contained in US tax laws, the 
Government’s anti-terrorist financing measures have resulted in additional 
administrative and due diligence requirements for US public charities and private 
foundations engaged in activities and grantmaking overseas. The additional 
administrative requirements have increased the transaction costs associated with 
international giving, making it far more burdensome.1143 The result according to one 
commentator is that ‘[s]ince September 11, US-based international funders have 
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become at best collateral damage and at worst targets in the Government's campaign 
against terrorist financing’.1144  
The Canadian Government has also introduced new anti-terrorism legislation 
and guidelines affecting charities and their donors in response to both the September 
11 terrorist attacks and the Canadian Air India Bombings. New legislative provisions 
in the ITA and the enactment of the Charities Registration (Security Information) Act 
(CRSIA) have ‘redefined the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA)’s role and the 
importance of protecting the integrity of Canada’s registration system for 
charities’.1145 The CRA has shown that it is particularly concerned with transfers to 
foreign charities and that it has both the will and the resources to undertake regular 
audits.1146 In doing so, the CRA works closely with other government agencies, such 
as the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), 
on suspected cases of terrorist financing involving charities.  
In the UK, new anti-terrorism measures were introduced following the 
September 11 terrorist attacks.1147 In addition to these measures, the extension of 
charitable tax reliefs for cross-border donations was accompanied by new legal and 
regulatory requirements driven by the potential for fraud and other tax abuse as a 
consequence of this geographic expansion, resulting in increased oversight by HM 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the Charity Commission of England and Wales 
(Charity Commission).1148 As an established independent charity regulator, the 
Charity Commission is central ‘to the counter-terrorism enforcement process [and] 
remains crucial to British efforts in this area’,1149 identifying charities that may be 
involved in terrorist financing and issuing detailed guidance on charities and 
terrorism. This is evidenced by funding being provided to the Charity Commission 
                                                             
 
1144 See Jenkins, ‘Soft Power, Strategic Security, and International Philanthropy’, above n 24, 844. 
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specifically to deal with terrorist financing, as well as recent legislative proposals to 
further increase the Charity Commission’s regulatory powers to ensure that it can 
effectively carry out its investigatory and enforcement role.  
In contrast to the other jurisdictions, in the Netherlands there is less focus on 
the prevention of terrorism financing through specific regulatory requirements and 
guidelines.1150 Because foreign charities seeking Dutch tax relief are required to 
register with the Tax and Customs Administration (TCA), the tax authorities receive 
detailed information about the charity and its sources of financing. This supervisory 
role is reinforced by additional information gathering and monitoring by the Central 
Bureau for Fundraising (CBF), particularly for international charities. The result is 
that cross-border charitable activities face little additional scrutiny from the Dutch 
authorities, with monitoring and oversight similar to that undertaken for domestic 
charitable activities. 
The second key trend to emerge from the descriptive country comparison is the 
‘proactive’ use of tax tools by government in all four jurisdictions to regulate cross-
border giving. This trend is examined in the following section. 
Proactive Use of Tax Tools to Regulate Cross-Border Giving 
Governments in the jurisdictions examined have introduced a range of tax tools 
to regulate international giving for donations made to foreign charities. These 
include: 
 domestic giving intermediaries;  
 tax treaties;  
 registration of foreign charities; and  
 approved foreign charity lists.  
In all four jurisdictions, these tools have been driven in part by the increasing need 
for government oversight of cross-border giving. In the US and Canada, they have 
also been employed as a response to the challenges that the tax laws present for 
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cross-border giving, largely as a result of the domestic situs requirements. In the UK 
and the Netherlands, these tools have also been influenced by developments in the 
case law of the ECJ. 
In all four jurisdictions, domestic giving intermediaries are the primary 
mechanism used to regulate indirect cross-border giving, while different tax tools 
have been employed for regulating direct cross-border giving. Table 7.1 below 
illustrates the proactive use of tax tools in each jurisdiction. 
Table 7.1 Tax tools used to regulate cross-border giving 
                   Tools 
 
Country 
Domestic 
giving 
intermediaries 
Tax treaties Registration 
of foreign 
charities 
Approved 
foreign charity 
lists 
US Y Y N N 
UK Y N N Y1 
Netherlands Y Y Y N 
Canada Y Y N Y 
1 Available only to charities in an EU Member State, Norway or Iceland. 
 
The following section describes each of these mechanisms, focusing on the extent to 
which they have been employed by government in each jurisdiction to regulate cross-
border philanthropy. 
Domestic Giving Intermediaries 
In all of the countries examined, the use of domestic giving intermediaries has 
become an important tool for governments to regulate cross-border charitable giving. 
In the US and Canada, the place-of-organisation rule does not generally permit tax 
relief for gifts made directly to foreign charities. However, tax relief is available for 
cross-border gifts made to a domestic charity that re-donates the funds to a foreign 
charity, provided that the domestic charity maintains discretion and control over the 
funds.1151 Similarly, in the UK and the Netherlands, donors have always been able to 
obtain tax relief by giving to a domestic charity that re-donates the funds to a foreign 
charity, provided that the domestic charity is not serving as a conduit for channelling 
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the funds overseas.1152 As a regulatory tool, using domestic charities as a means to 
send charitable funds overseas provides governments with the assurance that the tax 
subsidy is being used for gifts to legitimate charities over which they have authority, 
providing them with a greater ability to monitor these entities against the misuse of 
charitable funds.1153 
Bilateral Tax Treaties and the Concept of ‘Mutual Recognition’  
A tool employed by the US, Canada and the Netherlands to regulate tax-
effective cross-border giving is the use of bilateral tax treaties to provide cross-
border reciprocity for charitable donations. Canada and the Netherlands each have 
one treaty containing such a provision, while the US has three.1154 These provisions 
promote the concept of ‘mutual recognition’ by allowing charities meeting the 
requirements or standards of one jurisdiction to be automatically recognised as 
charities in another jurisdiction and be eligible for tax relief.1155 Because mutual 
recognition ‘implies a transfer of sovereignty to other [states] … governments 
therefore have to trust other [states] to regulate and control their charities 
sufficiently’.1156 As a result, such treaty provisions have not been widely adopted, 
indicating that governments are wary of using tax treaties as a tool for regulating 
(and facilitating) cross-border giving. Harvey Dale notes that in the case of the US:  
Future US bilateral tax treaties are unlikely to contain similar provisions. 
The Senate has expressed grave concern about using the treaty process to 
grant charitable contribution deductions which otherwise would be denied 
under section 170(c)(2)(A).1157  
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In practice, these treaty provisions also offer limited relief for donors as a result of 
the foreign source income requirements, particularly given the relatively small 
number of taxpayers in these countries with significant source income overseas.1158  
Despite the limited application of these treaty provisions the concept of 
‘mutual recognition’ embedded in the provisions gained currency in 2012, with the 
European Commission’s proposal for a Council Regulation for a European 
Foundation Statute.1159 This proposal extended the concept of mutual recognition to a 
regional level, envisioning ‘a new European legal structure for philanthropic cross-
border purposes’.1160 Under the proposal, a new legal form was to be established for 
entities with a public benefit purpose (known as FEs), effectively removing national 
legal and administrative establishment requirements and enabling mutual recognition 
of FEs in all Member States.1161 This would enable FEs and donations to FEs to 
receive the same tax treatment as domestic charities.1162 Although the proposal found 
support in the European Parliament, there was significant opposition in the European 
Council largely because of national sovereignty concerns.1163 As a result, the 
European Commission withdrew the proposal in 2014.1164  
Registration of Foreign Charities 
In the Netherlands, foreign charities are able to register with the Dutch tax 
authorities as a Dutch charity, providing an important tax tool for the government to 
regulate and monitor foreign charities and allowing these charities the same tax relief 
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as domestic charities. This approach was adopted following the ECJ decisions in 
Stauffer and Persche, directing Member States to apply tax incentives for charitable 
giving to non-resident charities that meet their charity requirements (other than 
residency).1165 Registration allows the Dutch tax authorities to have a measure of 
control over foreign charities and the funds entrusted to them, by subjecting these 
foreign charities to Dutch regulatory and reporting requirements. While this 
regulation may increase the administrative burdens and costs for charities potentially 
creating disincentives for registration,1166 it appears to provide a relatively simple 
and straightforward mechanism for both regulating and facilitating tax-effective 
cross-border giving. 
Approved Foreign Charity Lists 
 In Canada and the UK, foreign charities that satisfy certain criteria based on a 
review by the tax authorities are included on an approved foreign charity list that 
enables taxpayers to make a donation directly to those foreign charities and obtain 
charitable tax relief. In Canada, the CRA maintains a list of foreign charities that the 
Canadian Government has contributed to and approved as foreign-qualified donees, 
allowing Canadian taxpayers to receive a tax credit for gifts to these charities. In the 
UK, following the non-discrimination principle established in Stauffer and Persche, 
the HMRC maintains a list of charities from EU Member States, Norway and Iceland 
that have qualified for UK charitable tax relief. While this tool provides a mechanism 
for governments to review and pre-approve foreign charities for domestic tax relief, 
as well as facilitating tax-effective cross-border giving, in both countries the 
approved foreign charity lists appear to have limited practical application. This is due 
to the difficulties foreign charities have faced in gaining approval from the tax 
authorities to secure a place on these lists.1167 
The third key trend to emerge from the descriptive country comparison is the 
use of workarounds by charitable organisations and their donors across three of the 
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jurisdictions to facilitate tax-effective cross-border giving. This trend is examined in 
the following section. 
Use of ‘Workarounds’ to Facilitate Tax Effective Cross-Border Giving 
While governments have adopted a range of tax tools in an attempt to regulate 
cross-border giving, donors and their charities faced with restrictive tax laws in the 
US and Canada and, to a lesser extent, the UK, have employed ‘workarounds’ to 
facilitate tax-effective cross-border donations. The domestic tax authorities in these 
jurisdictions have sanctioned the use of workarounds despite the fact that they 
challenge the authorities’ ability to regulate international giving. In doing so, 
governments have been able to maintain a tough policy stance in relation to the 
provision of tax relief for cross-border donations, while providing a back door for 
donors who seek to make tax-effective cross-border gifts. 
The entrenchment of the place-of-organisation rule in the US and Canadian tax 
laws requires donors who wish to obtain tax relief for cross-border gifts to ‘do 
indirectly what they cannot do directly’.1168 In the US, Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS)-sanctioned workarounds include foreign charities and their donors establishing 
‘friends of’ organisations, and US foundations exercising expenditure responsibility 
and undertaking equivalency determinations. In Canada, CRA-sanctioned 
workarounds include domestic charities entering into formal arrangements with 
foreign charities to enable the transfer of funds overseas. In the US, Canada and the 
UK, there is also widespread use of organisations that have been specifically 
established to serve as international giving intermediaries, including Give2Asia, the 
King Baudouin Foundation, the Resource Foundation and Transnational Giving 
Europe (TGE).1169 
The use of workarounds has been criticised for producing ‘artificial constructs 
and paper agency relationships that bear no relationship to reality’1170 in order to 
facilitate tax-effective cross-border giving. Workarounds also create increased 
transaction costs for both donors and charities. In the US, there are significant costs 
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associated with establishing and maintaining a ‘friends of’ organisation and for 
foundations there are ongoing administrative costs involved in undertaking 
expenditure responsibility and equivalency determinations. In Canada, there are the 
legal costs of structuring formal arrangements such as agency and joint venture 
agreements. There are also administrative fees charged by international giving 
intermediaries for their services. 
The result is a complicated, uncertain and costly system for organisations 
engaging in international activities and their donors, who are faced with legal and 
regulatory requirements that on the one hand are quite restrictive and on the other are 
able to be circumvented albeit with significant cost and effort.1171 The ability to 
bypass restrictive tax legislation also has the undesirable effect of creating a gap in 
the rule of law, resulting in a lack of transparency and enforcement difficulties. At 
the same time, workarounds appear to offer a politically expedient solution for 
policymakers faced with legislative roadblocks on the one hand, and constituents 
agitating for changes to the tax law on the other. 
The next section explains the similarities and differences that have emerged 
from the descriptive country comparison by evaluating the approaches adopted by 
the four countries to the tax treatment of cross-border donations against a number of 
criteria and incorporating Australia into this analysis. 
7.3 EXPLANATORY PHASE: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES EXPLAINED 
7.3.1 Introducing Australia into the Comparative Analysis 
The identification phase revealed a relatively broad spectrum of approaches to 
the tax treatment of cross-border donations, ranging from the US and Canada whose 
approaches are moderately restrictive, to the UK which is moderately permissive, 
through to the Netherlands with the most permissive and the most internationalist 
approach. When Australia is introduced into the analysis, it appears at the most 
restrictive end of the spectrum, as shown in Figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4. Spectrum of approaches to tax treatment of cross-border donations 
While Australia’s tax treatment of cross-border donations most closely 
resembles the US and Canada, its tax laws are far more restrictive than either 
jurisdiction. This is in part a result of a fundamental difference in the design of the 
Australian tax system as it applies to charities compared to the other jurisdictions 
examined. In the US, UK, Canada and the Netherlands, tax relief for donations to an 
organisation is generally available once the organisation passes the threshold of 
being a ‘charity’ (or the country equivalent). In contrast, in Australia, being endorsed 
as a charity does not entitle an organisation to receive tax deductible donations. For 
this, the organisation must pass a second threshold of being endorsed a Deductible 
Gift Recipient (DGR), which is subject to its own eligibility requirements and 
application process.1172 This threshold adds a layer of difficulty to the process of 
obtaining tax deductible status. 
One of the main requirements for obtaining DGR status under this second 
threshold is the ‘in Australia’ condition, which requires that an organisation be 
established, controlled, maintained and operated in Australia; have its benevolent 
purposes in Australia; and provide relief to people located in Australia.1173  The 
domestic situs requirements in Australia, the US and Canada do not permit a 
deduction for donations made directly to foreign charities. However, the US has tax 
treaties with three countries and Canada has one, that all contain ‘mutual recognition’ 
provisions enabling cross-border reciprocity for charitable donations. Australia has 
no such tax treaty provisions, even in bilateral tax treaties with countries in which it 
has close cooperation.1174 As a result, donations by Australians made directly to a 
charitable organisation outside Australia are never tax deductible. Table 7.2 below 
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illustrates the extent to which tax relief is permitted on donations made directly to 
foreign charities for each of the five jurisdictions. 
Table 7.2 Donation destination for which tax relief is permitted  
Country Donation Destination  
US Canada, Mexico, Israel 
UK EU Member States, Iceland, Norway 
Netherlands All countries 
Canada US 
Australia No countries 
 
In contrast to the other jurisdictions examined, Australia also does not permit a 
tax deduction for cross-border donations made indirectly through domestic charities 
with DGR status, unless such activities are relatively minor or incidental to the 
charities’ Australian operations or unless the organisation obtained its DGR status 
pursuant to one of the exceptions to the ‘in Australia’ requirement. The result is a 
policy of imposing a flat prohibition on tax incentives for cross-border charitable 
activities, mitigated by special exemptions with high entry barriers. 
The law is not settled on whether donations made through an Australian DGR 
that in turn donates those funds overseas are tax deductible.1175 Indeed, the use of 
domestic giving intermediaries has been the only mechanism employed by 
Australian charities and their donors to circumvent the ‘in Australia’ requirement. As 
a result of these restrictive policies, even when compared to the moderately 
restrictive approaches of the US and Canada, Australia’s strict approach to the tax 
treatment of cross-border donations is unusual. 
Following Infanti’s comparative tax framework, the question then becomes 
whether any of the approaches adopted in the five countries to the tax treatment of 
cross-border giving is on balance ‘better’ than or ‘superior’ to the others. The next 
section undertakes this evaluation. 
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7.3.2 Evaluation of Approaches Against ‘Superiority’ Criteria 
The approaches adopted in the five jurisdictions are evaluated against four 
criteria derived from international tax policy considerations to determine whether 
any are on balance ‘better’ than or ‘superior’ to the others. Evaluating the spectrum 
of national approaches against these four ‘superiority’ criteria also illuminates the 
strengths and weaknesses of Australia’s strict approach. Based on the descriptive 
country comparison, a superior approach would aim to: 
 improve relations with foreign countries by responding to the growth in 
global charity and philanthropy;  
 reduce external complexity by providing clear laws and procedures 
surrounding cross-border giving;  
 mitigate the risks of tax abuse and terrorist financing while facilitating 
legitimate cross-border flows of charity; and  
 minimise the costs to the fisc while achieving desired outcomes. 
The following sections examine each of these ‘superiority’ criteria in detail, 
beginning with understanding the extent to which each country has improved 
relations with other countries by responding to the growth in global charity and 
philanthropy.  
Responsiveness to the Growth in Global Charity and Philanthropy 
A superior approach to the tax treatment of cross-border donations would seek 
to improve relations with foreign countries by enabling domestic organisations and 
individuals to provide much-needed support around the world. With the appropriate 
tax incentives, private philanthropy can respond to the enormous growth in cross-
border charity and philanthropy, which will assist in the provision of overseas aid 
and the generation of ‘soft power’ for government that can be used to improve a 
country’s global standing and can serve as a ‘powerful tool of public diplomacy’.1176 
Understanding how responsive each country and its citizens have been to the 
growth in global charity and philanthropy requires a comparison of each country’s 
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778–9. For a detailed discussion of the benefits of ‘soft power’, see section 4.3.5. 
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giving data. The fiscal incentives used in each country to encourage philanthropy by 
lowering the price of giving will have an influence on the level of giving.1177 
Unfortunately, data on charitable giving can be highly unreliable, which is 
exacerbated in the disaggregation of data for cross-border giving, because in most 
jurisdictions it is not measured in any systematic way. The result is that it is difficult 
to verify with any accuracy the amount of charitable giving flowing out of countries. 
Australian giving data is particularly illustrative.1178 Moreover, country estimates are 
typically based on data from different sources using different methodologies and 
definitions over different time periods, making any attempt to compare data across 
countries even more challenging. As a result, any estimates of cross-border 
philanthropy involve considerable heroic assumptions.  
With these strong caveats in place, an attempt is made to arrive at a crude 
estimate of private and public international giving across the five jurisdictions in 
Table 7.3 below. The total private giving estimates and the percentage of private 
giving directed internationally is obtained from non-governmental sources within 
each country, while the estimates of private giving to developing countries and 
overseas development assistance (ODA) is derived from OECD data, which 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor governments provide to the 
OECD annually. 
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Table 7.3 Country giving data  
       Giving 
 
 
Country 
Total private 
giving 
(billion) 
Total 
private 
giving 
(USD 
billion)6 
Total 
private 
giving 
as a % 
of GDP  
% of 
private 
giving to 
internat. 
affairs 
Private 
giving to 
developing 
countries 
(USD 
billion, 
2013)10 
Total 
ODA 
(USD 
billion, 
2014) 11 
ODA as 
a % of 
GNI 
(2014)11 
US USD 358.41 358.38 2%1 4%1 22.58 (6%) 32.73 0.19% 
UK GBP17.52 27.38 1%7 12%8 0.26 (0.9%) 19.39  0.71% 
Netherlands EUR4.43 5.85 0.7%3 13%3 1.51 (26%) 5.57  0.64% 
Canada CAD 20.24 19.62 0.5%7 8%4 1.92 (10%) 4.20 0.24% 
Australia AUD 8.65 8.63 0.6%7 10%9 1.43 (17%) 4.20 0.27% 
 
1 Source: Giving USA 2015: Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2014 (2015). Data from 
2014 includes: giving from individuals (72%), bequests (8%), corporations (5%), and 
foundations (15%). 
2 Sources: NCVO, UK Civil Society Almanac 2015 (2015); Cathy Pharoah, Richard Jenkins and 
Keiran Goddard, Giving Trends: Top 300 Foundations – 2014 Report (ACF and Cass Business 
School, 2014) 2. Data from 2012–13, includes: giving from individuals (62%), legacies (11%), 
companies (7%), foundations (14%); and gift aid paid to charities (6%). 
3 Source: Centre for Philanthropic Studies, Giving in the Netherlands 2015 (VU University 
Amsterdam, 2015). Data from 2013, includes: giving from individuals (45%), bequests (6%) 
corporations (31 per cent), foundations (6%) and other fundraising (11%). 
4 Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey on Giving, Volunteering and Participating 
(2013) and Imagine Canada and Philanthropic Foundations Canada, Assets and Giving Trends of 
Canada’s Grantmaking Foundations (2014). Data from 2012–13, includes: giving from 
individuals (63%), foundations (22%) and corporations, including sponsorships (15%).  
5 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. Australian National Accounts: Non-Profit Institutions 
Satellite Account, 2012–13 (Catalogue No 5256.0, 2014), Table 7.1. Data from 2012–13, includes: 
giving from individuals including bequests (46%), foundations (5%), businesses including 
sponsorships (26%) and other fundraising (22%). 
6 Allows a USD comparison of the amounts in the first column based on the annual average 
exchange rate for the year of the country data using <ozforex.com.au/forex-tools/historical-
rate-tools/yearly-average-rates>. 
7 Myles McGregor-Lowndes, ‘The Not-for-Profit Sector in Australia: Fact Sheet’ (ACPNS Current 
Issues Information Sheet 2014/4, Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, 
Queensland University of Technology, 2014) 4. 
8 Charities Aid Foundation, UK Giving 2014 (2015) 14. 
9 Based on Australian community donations, bequests and legacies for the international aid and 
development sector. Source: ACFID, 2013 ACFID Annual Report (2014) 19. 
10 Source: <http://stats.oecd.org/qwids>. This data is from the line item ‘net private grants’ 
defined as ‘grants by NGOs and other private bodies, net of subsidies received from the official 
sector’. See <http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm#Private_Flows>. No data is available 
for Australia in 2013, so data is taken from 2012. 
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11 Source: OECD, http://www.compareyourcountry.org/oda?page=0&cr=oecd&lg=en 
 
Table 7.3 suggests that, based on the independent estimates of the percentage 
of private giving to international affairs (column 4), the Netherlands ranks first, 
followed closely by the UK. Australia ranks third, with Canada and the US lagging. 
Given that most private international giving is channelled to developing countries,1179 
the data reported by governments to the OECD represents a significant component of 
private cross-border giving. As a result, it should be consistent with the non-
government estimates of private giving to international affairs. However the results 
are not consistent. The UK Government in particular seems to have vastly 
understated its private giving to developing countries (0.9 per cent compared to 12 
per cent), while the Dutch Government appears to have vastly overstated its figures 
(26 per cent compared to 13 per cent). Estimates of private giving to developing 
countries from the American and Canadian Governments also appear to be slightly 
overstated. Similarly, while Australia ranks highly on both measures, the estimates 
provided by the Government to the OECD appear to be significantly overstated (17 
per cent compared to 10 per cent) due to calculation errors.1180 One explanation for 
countries overstating data reported to the OECD is that the estimates derive from 
community support provided to the international aid and development sector, some 
of which may be used for domestic programs. For example, the Australian Council 
for International Development (ACFID) stated that in 2012–13, its members reported 
total expenditures of AUD1.4 billion, AUD154 million or 11 per cent of which was 
spent on domestic projects.1181 
While the private cross-border giving data is highly questionable, there is some 
indication that the more permissive approaches of the Netherlands and the UK may 
have resulted in a stronger commitment to both private and public international 
giving, although it is also possible that other factors have influenced this finding. 
This public policy commitment worked out through the tax laws was undertaken in 
                                                             
 
1179 Roodman and Standley, above n 2, 5–6. 
1180 See discussion in section 2.2.2. 
1181 See ACFID, 2014 ACFID Annual Report (2014) 26. 
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both countries in response to the case law of the ECJ. The Netherlands went one step 
further in its commitment to private giving by extending the non-discrimination 
principle espoused by the ECJ to countries outside the EU, reflected in its first place 
ranking under both measures of private cross-border giving. The UK extended its 
commitment to public giving by legislating to commit its foreign aid spending to the 
UN target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI),1182 reflected in its first 
place ranking of ODA as a percentage of GNI, based on more accurate official aid 
data. 
The next section examines the second ‘superiority’ criterion, which involves 
understanding the extent to which each country’s laws and procedures provide clarity 
for organisations and their donors engaging in international charitable activities, and 
for government in ensuring that the tax subsidy is used for its intended purposes. 
Clarity of Laws and Procedures Surrounding Cross-Border Giving 
A superior approach to the tax treatment of cross-border donations would 
reduce external complexity by ensuring that the laws and procedures applying to 
cross-border giving are clear and unambiguous. Complexity is reduced by providing 
certainty for international charities, their donors and recipients, and by providing the 
government with a cost effective means of ensuring that the tax expenditure is being 
used for its intended purposes. The descriptive country comparison revealed that 
there are significant legal and procedural ambiguities surrounding cross-border 
giving in the US and Canada, largely due to the place-of-organisation requirements. 
These ambiguities have resulted in greater complexity and uncertainty for 
organisations engaging in international charitable activities and their donors, leading 
to increased transaction costs and necessitating the use of workarounds to facilitate 
tax-effective cross-border giving.  
In contrast in the Netherlands (and to a lesser extent the UK), the tax laws 
affecting cross-border philanthropy do not suffer from the same vestiges of history or 
legislative impediments as the US and Canada, but rather have been drafted under 
the influence of more recent case law. The result is that the Dutch tax laws are less 
                                                             
 
1182 The International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act 2015 (UK) 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/12/enacted>. 
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complex and provide greater clarity in their treatment of cross-border donations, 
which is reflected in both the ease of registration for foreign charities and the ability 
of Dutch donors to make tax-effective gifts overseas. This legal and procedural 
clarity alleviates the need for workarounds, resulting in greater transparency and 
adherence to the rule of law for cross-border giving, and enabling greater ease of 
monitoring and enforcement by the Dutch tax authorities and other regulators.1183  
Like the US and Canada, in Australia there are considerable legal and 
procedural ambiguities surrounding cross-border giving. The meaning of ‘in 
Australia’, which was never clearly stated in the tax legislation and which the 
Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has interpreted more strictly than its origins 
suggest, provides a glaring example. This has resulted in inconsistencies throughout 
div 30 of the ITAA 1997, creating considerable uncertainty for both organisations and 
their donors seeking to engage in cross-border charitable activities. For organisations 
seeking DGR status under one of the exceptions to the ‘in Australia’ requirement, 
there are ambiguities concerning the legislative requirements that must be satisfied 
and the lengthy and cumbersome procedures involved.1184 In addition, as a result of 
Word Investments and the proposed reform agenda that ensued, legal ambiguities 
exist as to whether donations to an Australian DGR that re-donates the funds to a 
charitable organisation operating outside Australia are tax deductible.1185 These 
ambiguities combined with restrictive tax laws have led Australian charities and their 
donors to find other means of facilitating tax-effective cross-border giving, making 
monitoring and enforcement more difficult for Australian regulators.  
Unlike other jurisdictions faced with restrictive tax laws, however, Australian 
charities and their donors have not employed a wide range of ‘workarounds’ to 
circumvent the tax laws to facilitate tax-effective overseas gifts. There has been no 
establishment of either ‘friends of’ organisations or organisations specifically 
established to serve as international giving intermediaries, and no entering into 
                                                             
 
1183 See FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism – The Netherlands, above n 1039, 267.  
1184 See ANAO Audit Report No 52, above n 384. 
1185 See Word Investments (2008) 236 CLR 204; Hunger Project (2014) 221 FCR 302. 
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formal arrangements with foreign charities or undertaking equivalency 
determinations. Indeed, the only significant workaround used in Australia is 
auspicing, whereby Australian nonprofits enter into third party contractual (and less 
formal) arrangements with DGRs in order to direct tax deductible donations 
overseas. Like most workarounds, auspicing increases the transaction costs of giving 
overseas for organisations and their donors.1186  
While it is difficult to measure the extent of auspicing, the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics Non-Profit Institutions Satellite Account 2012–131187 found that ‘grants 
and other payments’ made by Australian nonprofit organisations (NFPs) to ‘non-
resident organisations’ (defined as any organisation domiciled overseas, including 
foreign branches and subsidiaries of Australian organisations1188) amounted to more 
than AUD1 billion,1189 highlighting the widespread use of domestic nonprofits for 
cross-border giving, a significant component of which is likely to be intermediary 
giving.  Indeed, both Treasury and the ATO are concerned that domestic giving 
intermediaries may be serving as ‘mere conduits’ by simply passing funds from an 
Australian DGR to an overseas entity, and thereby circumventing the strict ‘in 
Australia’ requirement. The proposed ‘In Australia’ reforms represent an attempt by 
Treasury to remove the legal ambiguities associated with the ‘in Australia’ 
requirements and to curtail the ability of charities and their donors to engage in the 
practice of auspicing. 
The following section examines the third ‘superiority’ criterion, which involves 
understanding the extent to which each country has succeeded in mitigating the risks 
associated with nonprofits being used for the purposes of terrorist financing and tax 
abuse, while enabling the facilitation of legitimate cross-border flows of charity. 
Mitigation of Terrorist Financing Risks 
A superior approach to the tax treatment of cross-border donations would 
ensure that the Government was addressing the risks of nonprofits being used for 
                                                             
 
1186 See discussion in section 3.3.1. 
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1188 Ibid 48. 
1189 Ibid table 10.1.  
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terrorist financing and tax abuse purposes. Evidence from the descriptive country 
comparison shows that while there is a real risk of charities being abused for terrorist 
purposes, in practice there have been few convictions of charities for aiding and 
abetting terrorism.1190 This is supported by recent Australian reports finding little 
evidence of Australian nonprofits being involved in money laundering and terrorist 
financing.1191 These findings raises the question of whether the introduction of more 
stringent laws and regulations has met with greater monitoring and enforcement, 
thereby reducing the risks that charitable funds will be used for terrorist financing 
purposes.  
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) mutual evaluation reports examining 
each country’s compliance with FATF Recommendation 8 provides some insights, 
particularly the requirement that countries ‘take steps to promote effective 
supervision or monitoring of their NPO sector’.1192 The most recent FATF 
examination of the US found it to be compliant with Recommendation 8 due to the 
adoption of specific anti-terrorism measures, as well as the extensive registration and 
reporting requirements for 501(c)(3) organisations.1193 FATF also found the UK to 
be largely compliant with Recommendation 8,1194 noting the Charity Commission’s 
registration and reporting requirements and the guidance it provides to charities 
                                                             
 
1190 In the US, see Bjorkland, Reynoso and Hazlett, above n 70, 245; Oakes, above n 875, 46; 
Jenkins, ‘Soft Power, Strategic Security, and International Philanthropy’ above n 24, 819. In the 
UK, see House of Lords and House of Commons, above n 989, 16, 20. In the Netherlands, reviews 
conducted by the Ministry of Finance, the Financial Expertise Centre, the Ministry of Justice, and 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office in cooperation with the Tax and Customs Administration found 
that while the charity sector is vulnerable, ‘there is no concrete evidence of abuse by criminal 
organizations’. See FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism – The Netherlands, above n 1039, 261. 
1191 AUSTRAC, above n 369, 15; Bricknell, above n 370, 5. 
1192 The FATF Recommendations, above n 372, INR8 55 [5(b)]. This requires inter alia that NPOs 
be licensed or registered, maintain information on their activities and directors that is public 
available and issue annual financial statements, as monitored by the appropriate authorities 
who can sanction NPOs for non-compliance. See The FATF Recommendations, above n 372, 56–7. 
1193 FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism – United States of America, above n 878, 240–250. 
1194 FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism – The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island, above n 991, 
244. The largely compliant rating (as opposed to fully compliant) was due to issues concerning 
Northern Ireland. 
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operating internationally.1195 Canada was also found to be largely compliant with 
Recommendation 8 as a result of the CRA closely monitoring charities through its 
registration and annual reporting requirements, maintaining an extensive information 
collection regime for all nonprofits for tax purposes and conducting annual field 
audits of registered charities.1196 Similarly, FATF’s report on the Netherlands found 
it to be largely compliant with Recommendation 8, citing the comprehensive 
information available on registered charities, particularly for those charities 
monitored by the independent CBF as well as the TCA.1197  
In contrast to the four jurisdictions examined, FATF’s 2015 report on Australia 
rated Australia non-compliant with Recommendation 8.1198 While this rating was 
based on new stricter criteria than the reports for the other jurisdictions,1199 the 
findings were incontrovertible. The report found that Australia had not undertaken a 
comprehensive risk review of the nonprofit sector to identify nonprofits at risk of 
being misused for terrorist financing and had not exercised appropriate oversight of 
nonprofits at risk of terrorist abuse.1200 The report was particularly critical of the 
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) for not collecting 
information from, conducting outreach to, or adequately monitoring the charitable 
sector in relation terrorist financing.1201 Overall, FATF found that the supervisory 
framework for nonprofits and the domestic coordination and information sharing 
                                                             
 
1195 Ibid 240–44. 
1196 FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism – Canada, above n 1114, 254–9. 
1197 FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism – The Netherlands, above n 1039, 268. 
1198 FATF, Fourth Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
Financing Measures – Australia, above n 377, 146. 
1199 See The FATF Recommendations, above n 372, 13. 
1200 FATF, Fourth Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist 
Financing Measures – Australia, above n 377, 6. 
1201 Ibid 145–6. It is interesting to note that the focus on criticism was the ACNC, rather than the 
ATO. 
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were wanting, leaving ‘Australian NPOs vulnerable to misuse by terrorist 
organisations’.1202 
FATF has determined that these ‘[m]easures adopted by countries to protect 
the NPO sector from terrorist abuse should not disrupt or discourage legitimate 
charitable activities’.1203 Citing a recent study on the impact of counter-terrorism 
measures on humanitarian action,1204 FATF notes there are ‘concerns that counter-
terrorism measures enacted nationally are having just such an impact on the 
operations of legitimate NPOs’.1205  
The descriptive country comparison revealed that in the US, Canada and the 
UK, the scope of counter-terrorism legislation, regulations and guidelines have had a 
significant impact on charities operating, and donors funding, internationally. This 
impact has been felt most acutely by those charities operating in conflict zones such 
as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, where it is often difficult to monitor the use 
of charitable resources by third party gatekeepers and contractors.1206 As a result, 
there are concerns that the breadth of some counter-terrorism measures may be 
creating barriers to the efficient delivery of aid and deterring legitimate charities 
from providing humanitarian support abroad, particularly in major conflict areas.1207 
To address these concerns, the US has introduced (but not yet passed) legislation to 
remove barriers to providing aid created by US counterterrorism policy. The 
proposed Humanitarian Assistance Facilitation Act of 2013 permits humanitarian 
                                                             
 
1202 Ibid 16. 
1203 The FATF Recommendations, above n 372, 54. See also FATF, Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non-
Profit Organisations, above n 675, 32; and FATF, Best Practices – Combating the Abuse of Non-
Profit Organisations (Recommendation 8): Limited Update to Reflect the Revised FATF 
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Humanitarian Affairs and the Norwegian Refugee Council, 2013). 
1205 FATF, Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non-Profit Organisations, above n 675, 32. 
1206 See Duff, ‘Charities and Terrorist Financing’, above n 1082, 115. 
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assistance of civilian populations in areas of conflict or disaster when carried out in 
good faith and with certain safeguards against aid diversion.1208 
Like the other jurisdictions examined, Australia has also introduced substantial 
new counter-terrorism legislation following the September 11 terrorist attacks.1209 
The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Criminal Code’) creates a number of offences 
that are relevant to humanitarian actors, including ‘getting funds to from or for a 
terrorist organisation’,1210 ‘providing support to a terrorist organisation’,1211 and 
‘associating with terrorist organisations’.1212 For this last offence, the Criminal Code 
has a humanitarian aid exception.1213 Similar humanitarian aid exceptions are 
contained in the provisions relating to preparations for incursions into foreign 
countries for purpose of engaging in hostile activities1214 and associating in support 
of serious organised criminal activity.1215 Individuals have access to the humanitarian 
aid defences in situations ‘where they undertake prohibited acts solely for the 
purpose of providing humanitarian assistance’.1216 This language follows a 
recommendation of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor that 
activities falling under the humanitarian exceptions should be limited to those 
involved in activities ‘conducted by or in association with the ICRC [International 
Committee of the Red Cross], the UN [United Nations] or its agencies, and agencies 
contracted or mandated to work with the UN or its agencies, (as well as entities with 
the status of deductible gift recipients in the category overseas aid funds under 
                                                             
 
1208 The Humanitarian Assistance Facilitation Act of 2013 (HR 3526). At the time of writing this 
had not been enacted. 
1209 See section 2.3.3. 
1210 Criminal Code, s 102-6. 
1211 Ibid s 102-7. 
1212 Ibid s 102-8. 
1213 Ibid s 102-8(4)(c). 
1214 Ibid ss 119-4(7), 119-5(4), as amended by the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment 
(Foreign Fighters) Act 2014 (Cth).  
1215 Criminal Code s 390-3(6)(c). 
1216 Explanatory Memorandum, Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) 
Bill 2014 (Cth) [240]. 
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applicable income tax legislation)’.1217 To date, no prosecutions of humanitarian 
actors have occurred under the Criminal Code.1218  
In the Netherlands, while there is less focus on preventing terrorist financing 
through specific legal and regulatory measures, foreign charities seeking Dutch tax 
relief are required to register with the Dutch tax authorities and provide information 
about their sources of financing. This registration requirement has the ability to 
generate information on terrorist financing, while reducing the impediments to 
legitimate cross-border flows of charity. As noted by Ineke Koele: ‘In a civil law 
tradition, measures inspired by anti-abuse motives [are] applied and interpreted as 
narrowly as possible in order not to hinder bona fide players in the sector’.1219 
The following section examines the fourth and final ‘superiority’ criterion, 
which involves determining the extent to which each country has succeeded in 
minimising the fiscal consequences of the tax deduction for cross-border giving 
while achieving the desired outcomes of this tax expenditure. 
Minimise Costs to the Fisc  
A superior approach would ensure that countries minimise the costs to the fisc 
in the preferential tax treatment of cross-border donations, while at the same time 
achieve the use of the tax expenditure for its mandated purpose. All of the countries 
examined have a charitable funding system in which individuals’ donations will 
trigger a consequent government contribution either directly to the charity or 
indirectly to the donor in the form of a deduction, tax credit or rebate, or matching 
government grant.1220 While governments provide these tax incentives to encourage 
charitable giving, they are also concerned with the fiscal consequences, which are 
                                                             
 
1217 Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Annual Report (2014) 17. AUSTRAC’s 
report on terrorist financing in Australia made a similar recommendation. See AUSTRAC, above 
n 369, 16. 
1218 See Mackintosh and Duplat, above n 1204, 23. 
1219 See Koele, ‘Tax Privileges of NGOs and Their Benefactors: A Landlocked Privilege’ in Paul 
Bater, Frits Hondius, and Penina Kessler Lieber (eds), The Tax Treatment of NGOs: Legal, Fiscal, 
and Ethical Standards for Promoting NGOs and Their Activities (Kluwer Law, 2004) 323, 326. 
1220 Krever, ‘Tax Deductions for Charitable Donations’, above n 392, 14. 
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measured in a tax expenditure statement (TES).1221 Table 7.4 below shows the 
revenue impact of the tax incentives for each jurisdiction, highlighting the line item 
in each country’s TES that takes into account the tax concessions for charitable 
donations. The table also provides a comparison of this tax expenditure data, with the 
strong caveat that international comparability of tax expenditure estimates has 
significant limitations.1222  
                                                             
 
1221 For a discussion of tax expenditure measurement, see section 4.2. 
1222 See OECD, ‘Choosing a Broad Base — Low Rate Approach to Taxation’, above n 338, 115 
(‘Tax expenditure definitions differ across countries due to differences in the definition of their 
benchmark tax systems. Factors that have an impact on the choice between a broad base and 
use of tax expenditures include own country’s preferences regarding income redistribution, the 
strength of its tax administration, and its revenue requirements. Most, if not all, of these factors 
differ across countries, making international comparison more difficult’). 
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Table 7.4 Revenue impact of tax incentives  
            Data 
 
Country 
Country 
Estimates 
(billion, 
2014) 
 
Country 
Estimates 
(USD billion, 
2014)11 
OECD 
Estimates 
(USD billion,  
2007–08)12 
% GDP 
(2007–
08)12 
 
% Total Tax 
Revenues 
(2007–08)12 
US1 USD43.806 43.80 36.8313 0.30 0.95 
UK2 GBP1.767 2.79 1.25 0.09 0.25 
Netherlands3 EUR0.438 0.54 0.25 0.04 0.12 
Canada4 CAD2.489 2.18 2.58 0.20 0.51 
Australia5 AUD1.1010 0.94 0.71 0.07 0.22 
 
1 Deductibility of charitable contributions. 
2 Income of charities, comprising the total sum paid to charities in respect of income tax 
deducted at source from eligible investment income and basic rate tax relief on donations under 
the Gift Aid scheme, and an estimate of income tax relief received by donors. 
3 Deduction for charitable donations (Giftenaftrek). 
4 Charitable donation tax credit, including donations of publicly listed securities, ecologically 
sensitive land and cultural property. 
5 Deduction for gifts to DGRs. 
6 Source: US Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of federal tax expenditures for fiscal years 
2014–2018 (August 5, 2014) table 1.  
7 Source: HMRC, Estimated costs of the principal tax expenditure and structural reliefs 
8 Source: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [House of Representatives of the Dutch 
Parliament], ‘Inkomstenbeperkende Regelingen en Belastinguitgaven’ [Tax Expenditures 
Report] in Nota over de Toestand van’s Rijks Financiën: Vergaderjaar 2013-14 [Notes on the 
Government’ Finances: Year 2013-14], 33 750, No 2 (17 September 2013) table 5.3.2. 
9 Source: Department of Finance, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations (2014), table 1. 
10 Source: Treasury, Tax Expenditures Statement 2014 (January 2015) 7, item A54. 
11 USD comparison of the first column based on 2014 exchange rates.  
12 Source: OECD, ‘Choosing a Broad Base — Low Rate Approach to Taxation’ (Tax Policy Studies 
No 19, 2010) annex A. 
13 This excludes the deductibility of charitable contributions for education and health. 
While Table 7.4 does not disaggregate tax expenditures for cross-border 
giving, it is notable that the internationalist approach of the Netherlands — providing 
equal tax treatment for domestic and cross-border donations —  appears to have a 
minimal revenue impact, which is particularly surprising given that the Netherlands 
has some of the highest marginal income tax rates in the world. This finding 
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indicates that the Dutch are getting maximum value out of this tax expenditure and 
suggests that fears of a fiscal blowout from extending the deduction to cross-border 
giving may be imaginary. In contrast, the charitable deduction in the US and Canada 
appears to have more significant revenue consequences.  
In determining the revenue impact of tax incentives for charitable giving, it is 
important to note that factors other than fiscal incentives also influence individual 
philanthropic behaviour, including the level of government support provided to 
nonprofits; the extent of regulation of the nonprofit sector; and culture, particularly 
religion and fundraising professionalism.1223 While some of these factors may 
explain the findings in Table 7.4, estimates showing that approximately 15 per cent 
of total Dutch private giving is spent overseas, while just four per cent of total US 
private giving and eight per cent of Canadian giving is allocated to ‘international 
affairs’,1224 reinforces the proposition that the floodgates are not opening when 
preferential tax treatment is extended to cross-border gifts. As a result, even taking 
into account other factors that may influence individual cross-border giving, the tax 
expenditure data for the Netherlands sheds new light on the idea that extending the 
gift deduction to cross-border donations can achieve the desired outcomes without 
creating a significant hole in the fisc. 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has undertaken the second (identification) and third (explanatory) 
phases of Anthony Infanti’s comparative tax framework to examine the ‘comparable’ 
jurisdictions of the US, UK, the Netherlands and Canada. The identification phase 
revealed similarities and differences emerging from the descriptive country 
comparison. This phase found that while each country provides tax incentives for 
individuals making domestic donations, the unique historical and cultural contexts in 
which their charitable tax regimes operate have led to different approaches to the tax 
relief for cross-border gifts. The result is a relatively broad spectrum of tax 
                                                             
 
1223 See Pamala Wiepking and Femida Handy, ‘Explanations for Cross-National Differences in 
Philanthropy’ in Pamala Wiepking and Femida Handy (eds), The Palgrave Handbook for Global 
Philanthropy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 9, 9–19. 
1224 See table 7.3 herein. 
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incentives for cross-border giving, ranging from the US and Canada whose 
approaches are moderately restrictive, to the UK which is moderately permissive, 
through to the Netherlands with the most permissive and most internationalist 
approach. 
A number of similarities, manifested thematically through the identification of 
three key trends common to some or all of the jurisdictions, were also heavily 
informed by local context, further highlighting the pervasiveness of contextual 
differences in the comparative analysis. The three key trends provided insights into 
the current legal and regulatory environment in which cross-border giving operates 
across the world. An environment that emphasises government regulation and 
oversight through the tax laws, combined with increased pressure from charities and 
their donors for tax-effective cross-border giving solutions, is driving workarounds 
of these laws. These trends revealed that all of the jurisdictions are concerned with 
ensuring appropriate regulation and oversight for cross-border philanthropy and 
charitable activities. They also uncovered how the tax laws have been used in the 
Netherlands and the UK to facilitate cross-border giving in response to the case law 
of the ECJ, while in the US and Canada, where the tax laws have proven inadequate 
for tax-effective cross-border giving, the authorities have sanctioned the use of 
workarounds. 
The third, explanatory phase introduced Australia into the comparative 
analysis, highlighting just how restrictive Australia’s approach is compared to the 
other jurisdictions examined, with its water’s edge policy of a flat prohibition on tax 
incentives for cross-border charitable activities mitigated by special exemptions with 
high entry barriers. Evaluating the spectrum of national approaches against the four 
‘superiority’ criteria derived from international tax policy considerations shed light 
on some of the weaknesses in Australia’s strict approach. These included Australia’s 
responsiveness to the growth in global charity and philanthropy, the clarity of 
Australia’s laws and procedures governing cross-border giving, and the measures 
taken to mitigate terrorist financing and other tax abuse risks. The findings from the 
evaluation are shown in Table 7.5 below. 
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Table 7.5 Findings based on superiority criteria 
          
Criteria 
 
Country 
Responsiveness to 
growth in global 
charity & 
philanthropy 
Clarity of laws 
and procedures 
Mitigation of 
terrorist financing 
risks 
Minimise costs to 
the fisc  
US S N Y N 
UK Y S Y S 
Netherlands Y Y Y Y 
Canada S N Y N 
Australia N N N S 
   Key: Y=yes; S=somewhat; N=no 
At the same time, this evaluation revealed the ‘superiority’ of the Dutch 
approach against all of the criteria. The Netherlands has responded to the 
globalisation of charity and philanthropy through its strong commitment to private 
cross-border giving, strengthening its political relations with other countries and 
enhancing Dutch ‘soft power’. Its narrow application of anti-abuse measures has also 
promoted legitimate cross-border flows of charity. The clear Dutch laws and 
procedures providing tax relief for both domestic and foreign charities has had 
minimal consequences for the fisc. In addition, the primary legal mechanism used to 
regulate and facilitate tax-effective cross-border giving in the Netherlands —  the 
registration of domestic and foreign charities with the tax authorities —  has served 
to mitigate the risks of these organisations being used for terrorist financing 
purposes. The ‘superior’ approach of the Netherlands delivers an ‘equivalency ideal’ 
whereby cross-border donations are subject to the same tax treatment as domestic 
donations.1225  
 Informed by the findings from the comparative analysis, the next step is to 
determine the most ‘appropriate’ framework for reforming the Australian tax regime 
governing cross-border giving. If the Australian Government ultimately decides to 
endorse a new policy position, the final chapter offers a framework for implementing 
such reform. 
                                                             
 
1225 Pozen, ‘Remapping the Charitable Deduction’, above n 211, 594. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Globalisation has created a world where people are financially and socially 
more interconnected than ever before. In the 21st century, this interconnectedness has 
extended to philanthropy, with charitable gifts increasingly crossing national borders. 
The remarkable rise in international philanthropy has transformed the global 
landscape in terms of both the amount of private philanthropy and the form that 
giving takes. It has been accompanied by a new breed of philanthrocapitalists, 
investing vast amounts of their wealth in global public goods that have been under-
funded by government. As globalisation proceeds at an even faster pace, the dramatic 
growth in international giving is likely to continue. 
Almost every OECD donor country offers tax incentives to encourage the 
production of public goods through philanthropy, making charitable gifts less 
expensive for donors than they would be otherwise. However, as a result of donor 
country concerns relating to the fiscal consequences of extending tax concessions to 
cross-border donations and the ability to regulate charitable funding expended 
overseas in response to money laundering and terrorist financing, many governments 
have adopted a protectionist approach, placing territorial barriers around charitable 
tax relief for donors. With globalisation challenging this traditional framework for 
the tax treatment of cross-border donations, national boundaries around philanthropy 
have started to blur.  
This thesis has shown that despite these challenges to domestic tax policies 
affecting cross-border giving, the Australian Government has remained steadfast in 
its commitment to a protectionist tax policy originating in 1967, that restricts the 
ability of donors to engage in tax-effective cross-border philanthropy. To date, there 
has been little tax scholarship on the Government’s water’s edge policy and its 
proposed reform, which has helped to shield this policy from principled scrutiny, 
leaving all stakeholders with inadequate information and insufficient data from 
which to develop future policy direction. With recent judicial consideration of this 
policy resulting in extensive government review and pending legislation, this thesis 
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has captured a critical moment in the history of Australia’s tax treatment of cross-
border donations to redress the existing research chasm. 
Concerns about the Government’s water’s edge policy were recently raised by 
Philanthropy Australia, the umbrella association for philanthropic trusts and 
foundations, in a letter to the Prime Minister. These concerns were specifically ‘with 
Australia’s regulatory and taxation framework for international philanthropy, which 
imposes some of the highest barriers to international philanthropy in the world’.1226 
Philanthropy Australia’s letter noted its members’ inability ‘in a time of budget 
constraint’ to respond to the Government ‘seeking to promote the role of private 
sector initiatives which support international development’ and specifically 
encouraged the Government to change its policy and consider more facilitative 
taxation provisions in relation to cross-border philanthropy.1227 
With Australia’s tax treatment of cross-border donations having reached this 
critical juncture, this thesis has provided the first comprehensive academic 
examination of this issue. In doing so, it has specifically addressed the research 
problem of whether the current tax incentives for Australian cross-border 
philanthropy and their oversight are appropriate to meet the challenges of the rising 
tide of international giving. Uniquely, this examination employed a number of 
different analytical approaches, undertaking an historical, theoretical, comparative 
and policy analysis. Building inductively over four distinct stages, this thesis 
addressed the first four research questions posed in the introductory chapter. 
 RQ1. Considered in its wider historical and cultural context, what is the 
Australian legal and policy framework for cross-border philanthropy? 
(Chapters 2 and 3) 
                                                             
 
1226 Letter from Philanthropy Australia to Prime Minister Tony Abbott, above n 471, 1. See also 
'Philanthropists Urge Changes to International Giving', ProBono Australia News (online), 5 May 
2015 <http://www.probonoaustralia.com.au/news/2015/05/philanthropists-urge-changes-
international-giving>; Damon Kitney, ‘Call for Cut in Red Tape on Giving,’ The Australian 
(Sydney), 5 May 2015, 19. 
1227 Letter from Philanthropy Australia to Prime Minister Tony Abbott, above n 471, 2. 
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 RQ2. What are the relevant considerations that normally inform 
Australian tax policymaking and what does their application reveal about 
the deduction for cross-border donations? (Chapter 4) 
 RQ3. What are the principal theories providing insights into the 
boundaries of public benefit for the purposes of international 
philanthropy, and how do these insights inform the tax treatment of cross-
border donations?  (Chapter 5) 
 RQ4. What other legal and policy frameworks for cross-border 
philanthropy exist in comparable jurisdictions and how have they 
responded to the globalisation of philanthropy? (Chapters 6 and 7) 
The research findings derived from each of stage of analysis inform the fifth 
and final stage of determining the most appropriate policy framework for Australian 
cross-border philanthropy in a changed global philanthropic landscape. In doing so, 
this chapter answers RQ5. If the Government ultimately decides to implement a tax 
policy facilitating the production and delivery of public goods throughout the world, 
what would be the most appropriate policy framework for Australian cross-border 
philanthropy? To this end, the latter part of the chapter proposes a policy framework 
with specific recommendations for reforming the Australian tax regime governing 
cross-border philanthropy. The chapter begins with a synopsis of the research 
findings from the first four research questions. 
8.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
8.2.1 The Australian Legal and Policy Framework for Cross-Border 
Philanthropy (RQ1) 
An examination of the historical development of the laws and policies affecting 
Australian cross-border philanthropy revealed its English legacy in relation to both 
the common law framework and structural approach to charitable giving. The 
common law origins of charity law have proven to be remarkably relevant in 
contemporary society that is far removed from 17th century England. Specifically, the 
concept of public benefit that developed from Lord Macnaghten’s classification of 
 Chapter 8: Conclusion 261 
the four heads of charity in Pemsel1228 remains at the heart of the legal definition of 
charity, providing a strong justification for the preferential tax treatment afforded to 
charities. Indeed, the tax treatment of cross-border philanthropy raises two important 
questions concerning the geographic boundaries of public benefit:  
 Who is the ‘public’ that the test for charitable status refers to: is it confined 
to those in the home jurisdiction or does it extend beyond national 
borders? 
 Can charitable objects performed overseas or charitable gifts directed 
overseas provide a direct or indirect ‘benefit’ to the public in the home 
jurisdiction? 
Over the years, the common law conception of the ‘public’ who should benefit from 
charity has not been confined to national borders, pointing to a universal concept of 
public benefit that supports charitable purposes being carried out overseas. This 
universal conception of public benefit suggests that the ‘public’ who should benefit 
from charity extends beyond national borders and supports the idea that charitable 
objects performed overseas provide ‘benefits’ to the home jurisdiction in the form of 
a direct benefit, or an indirect (moral) benefit.  
From its early colonial history, Australia followed the English tradition of 
providing favourable tax treatment for charitable organisations by establishing a tax 
deduction for charitable gifts. However, Australia’s gift deductibility provisions 
uniquely limited the deduction to gifts to organisations ‘in Australia’. Consequently, 
Australia has a tax deduction for donations targeting domestic charitable activities 
and organisations, but no specific provision for deductions to organisations located 
and operating outside Australia unless they fall within one of the limited classes of 
exceptions of overseas aid funds, developed country disaster relief funds, public 
funds on the Register of Environmental Organisations (REO), and Deductible Gift 
Recipients (DGRs) listed by name in the tax law. While it may be possible for an 
Australian donor to effect a tax deductible cross-border gift using an Australian 
                                                             
 
1228 Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531. 
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resident organisation as a channel (a common workaround in some other 
jurisdictions), this avenue in Australia is beset with difficulties.  
This legislative architecture reflects a broader water’s edge policy of imposing 
a flat prohibition on tax concessions for cross-border charitable activities, mitigated 
by special exemptions with high entry barriers. Accordingly, only certain classes of 
organisations that have been subjected to initial heavy vetting can engage in tax-
effective cross-border charity. This is reflected in the numbers, with three classes of 
exceptions each representing less than one per cent of all active DGRs and one 
representing just over two per cent.1229 Recent data from the Australian Charities and 
Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) shows that just 16 per cent of charities 
‘involved overseas’ were endorsed as DGRs compared with 40 per cent of all 
charities.1230 For the 128 charities whose ‘main activity’ was ‘international activities’ 
(typically larger international aid and development organisations), 43 per cent had 
DGR status.1231 The result is that many deserving organisations engaged in 
international charitable activities that are particularly reliant on philanthropic 
donations for their sustainability have not obtained the income-generating benefits of 
DGR status. This state of affairs also significantly restricts the options available for 
Australian donors seeking to obtain a tax deduction for donations directed overseas. 
For those organisations that succeed in overcoming the high entry barriers, there is 
generally little ongoing oversight and monitoring by the authorities. This problematic 
combination of high entry barriers and a lack of ongoing regulation has resulted in 
organisations and their donors using workarounds to circumvent the tax laws in order 
to engage in tax-effective cross-border charitable activities, presenting further 
challenges for regulators in monitoring the flow of charitable funds overseas. 
It is only with recent reform proposals that the Australian Government has 
clearly articulated the policy reasons underlying the geographic restrictions placed 
around gift deductibility: to prevent leakage from the fisc, and to counter tax abuse 
                                                             
 
1229 Australian Taxation Office, Taxation Statistics 2012–13, above n 147, table 3. This is 
supported by data from the ACNC, see Cortis et al, above n 166. 
1230 See Knight and Gilchrist, Australian Charities Involved Overseas, above n 165, 28. The data for 
all charities is current to July 2015.  
1231 See Cortis et al, above n 166, Figure 9.4, 51. 
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and terrorist financing. Yet from the scant evidence on the extent of Australian 
international giving and its associated costs, there currently appears to be only minor 
leakage from the fisc with limited evidence of the floodgates opening. Similarly, 
research undertaken on the risk of Australian nonprofit organisations engaging in 
terrorist financing and money laundering point to a relatively low tax abuse risk 
profile. These two policy justifications also appear to conflict with the underlying 
rationale for the gift deduction generally — to serve as a tax incentive to facilitate 
philanthropic giving — suggesting that gift deduction may not be achieving its 
overarching policy objectives. 
Recent judicial decisions have challenged aspects of this policy framework, 
calling into question the legislative efficacy of the geographic restrictions placed 
around the gift deductibility provisions.1232 At the same time, the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) appears to have recognised that its strict interpretation of the ‘in 
Australia’ requirement for DGRs is no longer feasible, although no formal ruling has 
been issued to date. This creates possibilities for Australian organisations engaged in 
international charitable activities to bypass the ‘in Australia’ exceptions to obtain 
DGR status. Despite this development, the Australian Government’s response has 
been to propose a reform agenda which will further tighten the law on the books for 
Australian cross-border charity and philanthropy, introducing stricter ‘in Australia’ 
requirements for both the gift deduction and the tax exemption which, if enacted, 
would ensure that the ‘in Australia’ requirements endure in the tax laws. 
With Australia’s tax laws affecting cross-border philanthropy having reached 
this critical juncture, it is timely to assess Australia’s restrictive tax policy affecting 
cross-border donations. The next stage of the analysis examined Australia’s tax 
deduction for domestic and cross-border giving against the relevant considerations 
that ordinarily inform Australian tax policymaking. 
                                                             
 
1232 Word Investments (2008) 236 CLR 204; Hunger Project (2014) 221 FCR 302. 
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8.2.2 Considerations that Ordinarily Inform Australian Tax Policymaking and 
What They Reveal About the Tax Treatment of Cross-Border Donations 
(RQ2) 
The tax policy analysis revealed both the benefits and shortcomings inherent in 
the gift deduction measured against the domestic tax policy considerations of 
efficiency, equity, simplicity, sustainability and policy consistency. On balance, the 
analysis demonstrated that while extending the deduction to cross-border donations 
is not without domestic costs, the benefits to both the Australian community and the 
wider global community are hard to ignore. The gift deduction is a cost-effective 
way to subsidise charitable organisations overseas, and provides certain investment 
efficiency advantages over direct government assistance. Extending the deduction to 
cross-border donations could also ultimately contribute to a reduction in global 
inequities due to the redistributive effect on the global allocation of resources. It also 
appears unlikely that an increase in international giving would have a substantial 
impact on Australia’s revenue sustainability in the long term, particularly when the 
benefits of investing in the production of global public goods and in corrective 
actions for global problems are taken into consideration. While policy 
inconsistencies may arise when the deduction serves objectives that contravene 
government foreign aid and broader foreign policy goals, different private and public 
aid priorities are more likely to complement than conflict with one another. Policy 
consistency may be further promoted through the generation of ‘soft power’ for 
government. 
The analysis also revealed that there are also significant issues with current 
data collection and flaws in the measurement of this tax expenditure making it 
particularly difficult to determine the cost to the fisc of the tax deduction for cross-
border donations, both with and without the ‘in Australia’ requirement for DGRs. In 
its resolute commitment to the ‘in Australia’ requirement, the Australian Government 
has adopted a particularly narrow conception of public benefit in the tax law, 
focusing on the domestic impact of extending the deduction to cross-border gifts and 
the potential fiscal consequences. By prioritising revenue and oversight concerns, the 
Government has failed to balance the normative tax policy considerations and make 
tradeoffs among them.  
The next stage involved a normative analysis of the principal theories 
providing insights into the geographic boundaries of public benefit and applied those 
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insights to the tax treatment of cross-border donations. This analysis enabled a 
determination of whether donations targeting international charitable activities 
should be treated similar to, or different from, domestically targeted donations. 
8.2.3 Principal Theories Providing Insights into the Boundaries of Public 
Benefit and How They Inform the Tax Treatment of Cross-Border 
Donations (RQ3) 
To date, no theoretical framework has been offered in the literature from which 
to determine the efficacy of the geographic restrictions the Australian Government 
has placed around the gift deductibility provisions. An examination of three principal 
theories providing insights into the boundaries of public benefit for the purposes of 
cross-border giving — beginning with early tax and economic subsidy theory 
through to recent nonprofit tax theory and cosmopolitan philosophy — established a 
theoretical framework from which to make this determination. In doing so, it 
addressed the two important geographic boundary questions surrounding public 
benefit: who is the ‘public’ to benefit from the good of charity; and can charitable 
gifts directed overseas provide a direct or indirect ‘benefit’ to the public in the home 
jurisdiction? 
The early American tax and economic theorists who approached legal charity 
as a fiscal concept viewed the charitable deduction as a government subsidy or tax 
expenditure to promote charitable activities having a public benefit. This subsidy was 
needed because of market and government failures resulting in the undersupply of 
public goods that yield external benefits to the wider society. An extension of this 
theory viewed the subsidy as warranted because of the benefits of pluralism it 
provided in encouraging citizens to have a voice in the development of a diverse and 
decentralized civil society. These theories were based on a simple national three-
sector model, where the role of the charitable tax concessions was primarily to 
support the fiscal state. As a result, the ‘public’ whose members were to benefit from 
charity aligned with the taxpayers that resided within the fiscal state and there was no 
consideration of the ‘benefits’ of cross-border giving. The pluralism theory indicated 
that the public could be geographically expansive enough to encompass the increased 
demand from donors regarding where to fund the public good and the increased 
diversity of recipients in fulfilling that demand and as such, provided a basis in tax 
theory for extending donations subsidised by the state to those targeting international 
charitable activities. 
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Recent nonprofit tax theorists determined that the national frame of analysis 
employed by the earlier deduction theorists did not adequately take into account the 
global reality where the boundaries of the fiscal state, the market and civil society 
had become increasingly porous. By incorporating cross-border giving into their 
analysis of the gift deduction, these scholars revealed a gap in the earlier deduction 
theories in addressing the question of which community was to benefit from charity. 
The general consensus among these tax theorists was that the ‘public’ to benefit from 
charity should extend beyond the borders of the fiscal state, and that charitable gifts 
directed overseas could ‘benefit’ the public in the taxing jurisdiction to the extent 
that these donations supported the production of global public goods. 
Cosmopolitan philosophy provides a set of values that accords with a world 
where philanthropic donations increasingly cross borders and has been adopted by 
the new philanthropists who are highly engaged in cross-border charitable giving. 
With universality as one of their principal values, cosmopolitan philosophers find no 
moral justification for discriminating against those in need on geographical grounds, 
consistent with a universal conception of public benefit. This theory suggests that 
providing a tax deduction for cross-border donations signals to the public that there is 
a moral duty to help those in need who are geographically distant. Tax policies that 
facilitate cross-border giving further the values of this cosmopolitan ethos. 
The result of this normative analysis is that a compelling theoretical case can 
be made for recognising a broader concept of public benefit in the tax law, to more 
closely align it with the longstanding universal concept of public benefit in charity 
law, supporting similar tax treatment for domestic and cross-border donations. This 
finding calls into question the legislative efficacy of the ‘in Australia’ provisions and 
their underlying policies, suggesting that in contemporary global society, a more 
expansive view of public benefit is needed in Australian tax law.  
While the Australian Government’s policy position is contrary to this 
theoretical finding, other donor countries are more closely aligned. The next stage in 
the analysis employed comparative tax methodology to undertake a comparative 
analysis of the tax treatment of cross-border donations in selected jurisdictions. This 
analysis provided important insights into how these countries have used domestic tax 
policy to respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by a changed global 
philanthropic landscape. 
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8.2.4 Other Legal and Policy Frameworks for Cross-Border Philanthropy and 
Their Response to the Globalisation of Philanthropy (RQ4) 
Undertaking a comparative tax analysis using Anthony Infanti’s comparative 
tax framework to examine the domestic tax treatment of cross-border donations in 
the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands and Canada provided 
a critical evaluation of these countries’ tax laws within their local contexts and 
revealed key international trends that have emerged in this area of law. These 
countries are all OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor countries, 
sharing similarities in their approach to civil society regulation and evolutionary 
legal development, providing a functional equivalence that facilitated the 
comparative analysis. This analysis contributed new substantive comparative tax 
knowledge of where each of these countries, as well as Australia, is located globally 
with respect to the tax treatment of cross-border philanthropy and how each has 
responded via tax policy to a changed global philanthropic landscape. 
The comparative analysis revealed that while there is policy consistency across 
the four jurisdictions in encouraging domestic giving through the tax laws, this is not 
the case with international giving. The four countries offered quite different 
approaches to the tax treatment of cross-border giving, largely as a result of the 
particular historical and cultural contexts in which each country’s charitable tax 
regime operates. The result is a relatively broad spectrum of tax incentives for cross-
border giving, ranging from the US and Canada whose approaches are moderately 
restrictive, to the UK which is moderately permissive, through to the Netherlands 
with the most permissive and internationalist approach. 
There were also similarities among the jurisdictions that emerged from the 
comparative analysis, manifesting in three key trends: increased oversight of cross-
border giving and charitable activities through anti-abuse measures; the proactive use 
of tax tools by government to regulate cross-border giving; and the use of 
workarounds by charities and their donors to facilitate tax-effective cross-border 
giving. These trends showed that all of the jurisdictions examined are concerned with 
ensuring appropriate regulation and oversight for cross-border philanthropy and 
charitable activities. They also revealed how the tax laws have been used in the 
Netherlands and the UK to facilitate cross-border giving in response to the case law 
of the European Court of Justice (ECJ); and how in the US and Canada, where the 
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tax laws have proven inadequate for tax-effective cross-border giving, the authorities 
have sanctioned the use of workarounds. 
At the same time, this analysis pointed to the ‘superiority’ of the Dutch 
approach in improving foreign relations by responding to the globalisation of charity 
and philanthropy through a strong commitment to private cross-border giving, 
promoting legitimate cross-border flows of charity through the narrow application of 
anti-abuse measures, and reducing external complexity through clear laws and 
procedures with minimal consequences for the fisc. In addition, the primary legal 
mechanism used to regulate and facilitate tax-effective cross-border giving in the 
Netherlands — the registration of domestic and foreign charities with the tax 
authorities — has helped mitigate the risks of these organisations being used for 
terrorist financing purposes. The superiority of the Dutch approach offers a 
compelling case for extending tax relief to cross-border donations. 
When Australia was introduced into the comparative analysis, it appeared at 
the most restrictive end of the cross-border giving spectrum. While Australia’s tax 
treatment of cross-border donations most closely resembles the US and Canada, its 
tax laws are far more restrictive than either jurisdiction. The domestic situs 
requirements in Australia, the US and Canada do not permit a deduction for 
donations made directly to foreign charities. However, the US has tax treaties with 
three countries and Canada has one, that all contain ‘mutual recognition’ provisions 
enabling cross-border reciprocity for charitable donations. Australia has no such tax 
treaty provisions.1233 As a result, donations by Australians made directly to a 
charitable organisation outside Australia are never tax deductible.  
In contrast to the other jurisdictions examined, Australia also does not permit a 
tax deduction for cross-border donations made indirectly through domestic charities 
with DGR status, unless such activities are relatively minor or incidental to the 
charities’ Australian operations or unless the organisation obtained its DGR status 
pursuant to one of the ‘in Australia’ exceptions. Because the law is not settled on 
whether donations made to a qualified Australian DGR that re-donates the funds to a 
foreign charity are tax deductible, the use of domestic giving intermediaries has been 
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the only mechanism employed by Australian charities and their donors to circumvent 
the ‘in Australia’ requirement. As a result, even when compared to the moderately 
restrictive approaches of the US and Canada, Australia’s strict approach to the tax 
treatment of cross-border donations is unusual.  
An evaluation of the spectrum of national approaches against the four 
‘superiority’ criteria derived from the descriptive country comparison illuminated 
some of the weaknesses in Australia’s strict approach. Australia was found to be 
lacking in three ‘superiority’ criteria:  
 responsiveness to the growth in global charity and philanthropy;  
 measures taken to mitigate terrorist financing and other tax abuse risks; 
and  
 clarity of the tax laws and procedures governing cross-border giving.  
The next section provides a summary of the research findings and their policy 
implications. 
8.2.5 Summary of the Research Findings 
Drawing upon a number of analytical approaches through an historical, 
theoretical, comparative and policy analysis, the research findings all point to an 
answer to the research problem of whether the current tax incentives for Australian 
cross-border philanthropy and their oversight are appropriate to both regulate and 
facilitate international giving. Namely, there is a strong case to be made for 
liberalising the tax incentives for Australian cross-border giving and adopting a free 
trade approach of allowing tax deductible donations to cross borders in an era of 
philanthropic globalisation, provided that an appropriate regulatory framework is 
established. 
Findings from the historical analysis of Australia’s tax laws and policies 
governing cross-border philanthropy (RQ1) showed that the current tax incentives 
for Australian cross-border donations and their oversight are not meeting the 
Government’s stated policy objectives. These objectives are to encourage 
philanthropy, while minimising both the fiscal consequences of the subsidy and the 
risk that these funds may be used for terrorist financing and money laundering 
purposes. The research findings demonstrated the shortcomings of Australian cross-
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border giving data collection and measurement, as well as the implications of using 
inadequate data to address the Government’s revenue concerns. They also revealed a 
regulatory framework that is lacking effective supervision and coordination, which 
ultimately fails to alleviate the Government’s regulatory concerns. In addition, these 
findings shed light on the problematic legislative architecture affecting cross-border 
philanthropy, resulting in limited options for donors seeking to engage in tax-
effective cross-border philanthropy.  
When the scope of the analysis was expanded to apply a methodology for 
examining the tax laws and policies in other DAC donor countries (RQ4), the 
problems identified in the domestic analysis were magnified. The research findings 
from the comparative tax analysis revealed that Australia’s domestic tax policy 
response to a changed philanthropic landscape is lagging behind that of other DAC 
donor countries. European countries in particular have reformed their tax laws 
affecting cross-border giving, leaving Australia exposed in its failure to adequately 
address the globalisation of charity and philanthropy. At the same time, these 
countries have adopted supervisory frameworks that more appropriately address 
government regulatory concerns around cross-border giving.  
The domestic and comparative research findings were further supported by an 
analysis of the principal theories providing insights into the geographic boundaries of 
public benefit (RQ3). This analysis suggested that there is a compelling case for 
recognising a broader concept of public benefit in the tax law in contemporary global 
society. In doing so, this theoretical framework uniquely challenges the Australian 
Government’s water’s edge policy placing geographic restrictions around tax 
incentives for charitable giving. The tax policy analysis (RQ2) provided further 
evidence that extending the tax deduction to cross-border donations, while not 
without domestic costs, is likely to provide significant benefits to both the Australian 
community and wider global society. 
The implications of these research findings are significant. To ensure that 
Australian nonprofit organisations and their donors are able to effectively contribute 
to the globalisation of charity and philanthropy, it is critical that Australia not fall 
behind other OECD nations in either the regulation or facilitation of cross-border 
philanthropy. The research undertaken in this thesis provides policymakers and other 
stakeholders with appropriate historical information and data, a solid evidence base 
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grounded in tax theory and tax policy, and an understanding of the tax laws in other 
DAC donor countries, that comprise a principled basis for reforming the Australian 
tax regime governing cross-border philanthropy. There are, however, some important 
limitations of this research, outlined in the following section. 
8.2.6 Limitations of the Research 
This research is limited by standard pedagogy around normative studies. The 
overriding limitation associated with any normative undertaking is that laws are not 
made in isolation; they are neither apolitical nor ‘free from moral content’.1234 
Policymakers in the area of tax law are subject to their own moral and political views 
as well as ‘external social, political and economic forces’.1235 Embarking on a 
normative endeavour also signifies that the writer’s own value system is never far 
from the surface. Maintaining a critical awareness of the ideological predispositions 
inherent in a normative undertaking can mitigate their impact. At the same time, it 
remains an important consideration for any practical application of the proposed 
policy framework. 
Like previous doctoral students writing in the area of charity law,1236 the 
normative framework and the theories on which it is based remain untested, with no 
quantitative or qualitative empirical research undertaken to support the principal 
arguments. Because the framework and its underlying theories are primarily 
informed by assumptions and beliefs rather than empirical data, the central thesis 
may require revision at a later date to take into account future research. 
Another limitation concerns the limits inherent in adopting a comparative 
methodology. The comparative tax methodology employed in this thesis has enabled 
Australia’s tax laws and policies to be considered beyond the domestic sphere, 
providing valuable insights into how other ‘comparable’ jurisdictions have responded 
to a changed global philanthropic environment, as well as revealing key international 
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trends. However, due to thesis wording constraints, only four jurisdictions were 
selected, three based on the common law and one civil law jurisdiction. This 
significantly limited the breadth of the comparison and weighed it heavily towards 
the English common law tradition, while omitting important jurisdictions in the civil 
law tradition, such as Germany and France, which are considered ‘“parent system[s]” 
of their respective legal families’.1237 In addition, focusing exclusively on donor 
countries in Anglo-American and European legal systems without consideration of 
donor countries in non-Western systems (albeit a smaller number), potentially limits 
the reach of the comparative findings. This provides scope for further research as 
outlined below. 
At the same time, the very nature of comparing countries that use different 
approaches to data collection and measurement, from different sources, over 
different timeframes, creates challenges for the comparative method. This makes 
‘like’ comparisons across countries difficult, with data on charitable giving providing 
a salient example of the difficulties inherent in this approach. Attempting to obtain 
reliable and accurate cross-border giving data from any country when it is not 
measured in any systematic way, let alone comparing it across countries, is 
particularly problematic and makes conclusions based on this data difficult to 
support. 
A further limitation concerns the theoretical framework and in particular the 
choice of theories and theorists. While a more traditional approach would have been 
to focus solely on tax theories, incorporating other disciplines employs different 
theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches to engage with the central 
tax issue. At the same time, expanding the universe of theories beyond tax theory 
creates issues around the selection criteria and also runs the risk that theorists’ 
viewpoints have not been adequately represented or sufficiently explained. 
Incorporating cosmopolitan philosophy, which takes a particularly ideological 
approach to philanthropy, is potentially less persuasive for the practical purposes of 
identifying principles for the appropriate tax treatment of cross-border donations than 
the tax and economic theories that are not as strongly connected to ideology. 
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8.2.7 Paths for Further Research 
This thesis has exposed the inadequate collection of data and other information 
on cross-border giving, as well as a lack of informed theory, to enable policymakers 
and other stakeholders to determine future policy direction. As a result, there are a 
number of issues around which future research can be developed. These include, but 
may not be limited to: (1) comparative analysis of tax relief for cross-border giving; 
(2) the Australian context for the tax treatment of cross-border philanthropy; (3) the 
regulatory implications of preventing nonprofit organisations being used for money 
laundering and terrorist financing; and (4) the geographic boundaries of public 
benefit in charity law and tax law. 
First, a broader comparative analysis of the tax laws and policies in a wider 
selection of donor countries could be undertaken to gain further insights into how 
different jurisdictions have adapted to the challenges and opportunities presented by 
an evolving global philanthropic landscape. Such research could expand upon the 
results of the comparative analysis undertaken here, particularly the diagrammatic 
cross-border giving spectrum. A specific area for further comparative research is 
determining whether countries with more permissive approaches to the tax treatment 
of cross-border giving demonstrate a stronger commitment to private and public 
international giving compared to those with more restrictive approaches. 
Second, for Australia, there are some areas for further research having practical 
application, although they are not without challenges. The first is undertaking 
empirical research on the amount of charitable giving flowing out of Australia, 
including how much of this outflow is classed as tax deductible gifts. A critical part 
of this research would be to determine the extent of auspicing by Australian 
nonprofit organisations and exactly what this process entails. A related area of 
research is exploring the most appropriate mechanisms for improving data collection 
around Australian cross-border charitable giving. A further area of research specific 
to Australia is investigating the process for becoming a DGR specifically listed by 
name in the tax laws, and the procedures for monitoring these DGRs. This would 
provide transparency for nonprofit organisations seeking DGR status through this 
mechanism.  
Third, the increased regulation of nonprofits to prevent terrorist financing and 
money laundering raises a number of issues for further research. One issue is 
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understanding the implications on the government and the nonprofit sector of a 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) evaluation of a country’s compliance with 
Recommendation 8 (nonprofit organisations). An important component of this 
research would be to explore how countries have responded to FATF’s 
recommendations, including changes made to the regulatory structure and 
coordination, and the costs associated with increased regulation for regulatory bodies 
and nonprofit organisations.  
Fourth, the geographic boundary of public benefit is a potentially new concept 
that requires further exploration in both charity law and tax law. In charity law, the 
boundary of public benefit has traditionally been associated with that which is 
private or benefits the individual, and that which is public or benefits the community. 
In tax law, public benefit has traditionally been tied to the geographic boundary of 
the fiscal state. Understanding how the boundaries of public benefit are changing in 
contemporary global society is one area of investigation. Another is determining 
further theories that provide insights into the geographic boundaries of public benefit 
to test the results of the theoretical framework in this thesis supporting similar tax 
treatment for domestic and cross-border giving. 
Based on the key findings from this thesis, the next section furthers the 
research in Australia by offering a policy framework for reforming the Australian tax 
regime governing cross-border philanthropy that addresses the Government’s fiscal 
and regulatory concerns, while providing Australian taxpayers with the means to 
engage in tax-effective cross-border giving enabling them to directly support the 
production and delivery of public goods throughout the world. 
8.3 POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR REFORMING THE AUSTRALIAN TAX REGIME 
GOVERNING CROSS-BORDER PHILANTHROPY: FUTURE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Should the Australian Government ultimately decide to adopt a more liberal, 
approach to the tax treatment of cross-border donations, similar to its strong 
encouragement of domestic philanthropy, the research findings from this thesis 
establish a strong foundation for reforming the Australian tax regime governing 
cross-border philanthropy. This framework can inform probable future legislation, 
tax rulings and judicial decisions on this issue, as well as generating public and 
scholarly debate on current government policy and proposed reforms. Integral to this 
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policy framework are three key recommendations that together constitute a 
pragmatic way forward. These are: 
 improving data collection and measurement of cross-border philanthropic 
flows to more accurately determine Australia’s responsiveness to the 
growth in global charity and philanthropy; 
 establishing an appropriate supervisory framework for monitoring 
Australian cross-border giving to better mitigate terrorist financing and 
money laundering risks; and 
 amending the tax legislation to provide greater clarity to Australia’s laws 
and procedures governing cross-border giving. 
These recommendations address the weaknesses in Australia’s restrictive, 
protectionist approach that were identified in the comparative analysis; specifically, 
the three superiority criteria in which Australia was found wanting.  The following 
sections examine each of these measures and their policy implications, taking into 
account the unique characteristics of the Australian tax system and the local context 
in which it operates.  
8.3.1 Improving Data Collection and Measurement of Cross-Border 
Philanthropic Flows 
Understanding the current level of cross-border philanthropy in Australia is 
foundational for informing policy development, because it would provide a data 
source for measuring the extent of Australian cross-border philanthropy and its 
associated costs, both direct and indirect. There is some evidence of Australian 
nonprofit organisations being involved in cross-border charitable activities and 
indications that Australian cross-border giving has been steadily increasing. 
However, the lack of reliable data on charitable giving, which is exacerbated when 
attempting to collect and disaggregate data on international giving, means that the 
amount of philanthropic funds flowing out of Australia and how much of this 
outflow is classified as tax deductible donations is unknown. The result is that the 
Australian Government has no way of measuring the revenue impact of the 
deduction for cross-border donations, which calls into question its assumption that 
removing a deduction for cross-border gifts would result in significantly more tax 
revenue. 
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As a first step to reform, statistics should be kept that provide an accurate and 
reliable data source for measuring the amount of the charitable tax expenditures, 
including those for cross-border philanthropy. This would inform policy 
development and provide a basis for audit activity, as recommended by a 
parliamentary committee several decades ago.1238 It would also enable the Australian 
Government to provide the OECD with more accurate annual estimates of private 
philanthropic flows to developing countries, along with its official aid data. The 
ACNC’s Annual Information Statement (AIS) provides a basis for the collection of 
such data for registered charities, although more information on cross-border 
activities and donations would need to be included. The annual published ATO 
statistics could also include cross-border data, which would require nonprofits to file 
annual audited financial statements with the ATO, similar to private and public 
ancillary funds. With this information, the Australian Tax Expenditures Statement 
could also include specific estimates of the tax expenditures for the deduction for 
cross-border under a new line item ‘deduction for cross-border gifts to DGRs’. If 
Treasury were to incorporate this tax expenditure, the revenue gain approach, which 
takes into account changes in taxpayer behaviour, is likely to be more accurate than 
the revenue forgone approach for measurement purposes. 
8.3.2 Establishing an Appropriate Supervisory Framework for Monitoring 
Cross-Border Giving 
Regulation is much more than law on the books, and what actually happens in 
practice can be very revealing. The ‘in Australia’ requirement for DGRs contained in 
the tax laws and their proposed reforms are only effective if adequate regulatory 
supervision and enforcement mechanisms are in place. Both the FATF report on 
Australia’s anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing measures and the 
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) audit of DGR regulation identified a 
failure on the part of the authorities to provide appropriate supervision and scrutiny 
of Australian nonprofit organisations operating overseas, leaving these organisations 
susceptible to non-compliance and misuse. To reduce some of these vulnerabilities, 
the tracing provisions contained in the Government’s reform proposals have targeted 
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the opportunistic channelling of donations overseas by organisations with cross-
border DGR status. These tracing provisions may persuade some of the organisations 
currently hosting such intermediary giving arrangements for a fee to reconsider their 
practices. However, without effective ongoing supervision of the hosting 
organisations, an equally plausible outcome is that the use of these channelling 
arrangements will continue to flourish as the only means available for many 
Australian nonprofit organisations and their donors to engage in tax-effective cross-
border charitable activities. 
Addressing the need for an appropriate regulatory framework for charities 
operating overseas is critical. This requires a coordinated policy response from the 
relevant bodies and government departments, with one of these bodies undertaking a 
primary supervisory role. As the independent charity regulator, the ACNC appears 
best placed to provide much of the necessary supervision. Ideally, registration with 
the ACNC would automatically entitle a charity to receive DGR status, which would 
streamline the process of becoming a DGR by obviating the need for separate DGR 
endorsement by the ATO, making this process consistent with the other jurisdictions 
examined. The ACNC could undertake responsibility for ongoing monitoring 
through its AIS, which would need to be modified to obtain more comprehensive 
information on charities involved overseas and their financing. Further oversight 
could be provided through the development and implementation of the ACNC’s 
external conduct standards for regulating charities sending funds or engaging in 
activities overseas. These regulatory mechanisms would serve to mitigate the risks of 
charities being used for tax abuse purposes and terrorist financing, and reduce the use 
of channelling workarounds, providing greater transparency and accountability. The 
ATO could provide assistance to the ACNC through its auditing capabilities, with the 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) providing 
additional oversight of cross-border transactions, similar to the Financial 
Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC).  
Like the Charity Commission for England and Wales, the ACNC could also be 
central to the counter-terrorism investigatory and enforcement process, identifying 
charities that may be at risk of involvement in terrorist financing and issuing detailed 
guidance on charities and terrorism. This would require the ACNC to be properly 
resourced to undertake these functions and may also require enacting legislation to 
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strengthen the ACNC’s regulatory powers to support the work of AUSTRAC and 
other law enforcement agencies. 
8.3.3 Amending the Tax Legislation Applicable to the Tax Deductibility of 
Cross-Border Donations 
With few options for engaging in tax-effective overseas giving, many 
Australian nonprofit organisations and their donors have resorted to using 
channelling workarounds, creating a system of cross-border philanthropy that is 
complicated, inefficient, inequitable and non-transparent. At the same time, this 
system makes monitoring cross-border fund flows far more difficult for the 
authorities, increasing the risks that these funds may be used for tax abuse and 
terrorist financing purposes, as well as making their impact on the fisc harder to 
assess.  
A better approach would be to have a general rule of allowing Australian 
charities operating overseas to obtain DGR status and removing the categories of 
exceptions, in conjunction with increased ongoing monitoring and supervision, 
making all Australian charities operating overseas subject to the same legal and 
administrative requirements. This would require the ATO to issue a new taxation 
ruling, consistent with its updated GiftPack taxation guide and the decision in Word 
Investments, clarifying the meaning of ‘in Australia’ in div 30 of the ITAA that a 
DGR be established and operate in Australia (but not that its purposes and 
beneficiaries be in Australia). At the same time, Treasury could synchronise the ‘in 
Australia’ tests for DGRs and income tax exempt organisations through legislative 
amendment, which would reduce complexity, particularly given that many tax 
exempt organisations operate DGR funds. While the extra effort by the regulatory 
authorities would not be without short-term administrative costs, in the long term this 
approach is likely to result in greater transparency of cross-border charitable 
activities and enhance Australia’s tax abuse risk profile. 
An alternative approach would be to remove the ‘in Australia’ requirement for 
DGRs altogether, enabling donations made directly to foreign charities to be fully 
deductible for Australian taxpayers, delivering an ‘equivalency ideal’ similar to the 
Netherlands. This may seem radical for Australia in that it would require significant 
legislative amendments to div 30 of the ITAA 1997 to provide for the equal tax 
treatment of domestic and cross-border donations. However, there are safeguards that 
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could be put in place to ensure that that the tenets underlying the ‘in Australia’ 
requirements are respected. These could include a requirement that foreign charities 
must register with the ACNC in order to obtain Australian charity status, similar to 
the registration requirement in the Netherlands. This would make foreign charities 
subject to the ACNC’s annual reporting requirements (modified to include more 
information on charitable activities abroad), as well as the ACNC’s external conduct 
standards (if developed and implemented). 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
Tax incentives are an important policy tool to encourage philanthropy, having 
the potential to lower the price of donations and increase the amount donated. While 
almost every donor country has tax incentives to encourage domestic philanthropy, 
until recently most had not considered tax incentives for cross-border philanthropy to 
the same extent. Philanthropic globalisation has disrupted the traditional framework 
for the provision of these tax incentives, forcing donor countries to reconsider their 
tax treatment of cross-border donations. To date, Australia has resisted the 
international trend of liberalising tax incentives for cross-border giving by 
maintaining a strict water’s edge policy that limits the ability of Australian donors to 
engage in tax-effective cross-border philanthropy. This thesis has exposed the flaws 
in this domestic tax policy and offered concrete suggestions to address them going 
forward. 
Given increased globalisation, domestic fiscal restraint significantly reducing 
government-funded overseas aid, and the desire of private philanthropy to step into 
this role, the Australian Government may decide to change policy course. If the 
Government pursues a more liberal reform agenda, this thesis has provided a number 
of sources to draw upon. These include: approaches undertaken by European 
jurisdictions who have established a path for the liberalisation of tax treatment for 
cross-border donations within appropriate regulatory supervision; a basis in tax, 
economic and philosophical theory supporting similar tax treatment for domestic and 
cross-border giving; a tax policy analysis evidencing considerable domestic and 
global benefits of a tax deduction for cross-border donations; and common law 
precedent establishing broad geographic boundaries for public benefit. Critically, 
Australia also has a legislative architecture in need of fundamental reform. At the 
same time, a change in approach would enable the Australian Government to solve 
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the quandary it currently faces of maintaining an appropriate balance between 
protecting the interest of the fiscal state, while enabling its citizens to fully and 
effectively contribute to philanthropy’s globalisation. 
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